

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

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CONTENTS.

I.

I. RITUALISM AND THE ECCLESIASTICAL LAW. By Benjamin Shaw, M.A.	1
II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED: SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON AND JOHN STUART MILL	31
III. MODERN GREECE. By E. H. Bunbury, M.A.	50
IV. ANCILLA DOMINI: THOUGHTS ON CHRISTIAN ART. By the Rev. R. St. John Tyrwhitt, M.A.	63
V. EDUCATION AND SCHOOL	80
VI. DR. PUSEY ON DANIEL THE PROPHET. By the Rev. J. J. Stewart Perowne, B.D.	96
VII. INDIAN QUESTIONS	123
VIII. SUNDAY. By the Rev. E. H. Plumptre, M.A.	142
IX. NOTICES OF BOOKS	169

II.

I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED: SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON AND JOHN STUART MILL	185
II. FREDERICK WILLIAM ROBERTSON. By the Rev. W. F. Stevenson	220
III. CONVOCATION	250
IV. BECKET LITERATURE. By the Rev. Canon Robertson	270
V. FRENCH ÆSTHETICS. By Edward Dowden	279
VI. CHURCH GOVERNMENT IN THE COLONIES. By the Rev. W. H. Fremantle, M.A.	311
VII. NOTICES OF BOOKS	343


III.

I. RATIONALISM. By the Rev. Principal Tulloch	361
II. MODERN PORTRAIT PAINTING. By Lowes Dickinson	385
III. THE EDUCATION OF WOMEN. By the Rev. Thomas Markby, M.A.	396
IV. THEODORE PARKER AND AMERICAN UNITARIANISM. By the Rev. Professor Cheetham	415
V. CHURCH HYMN-BOOKS	434
VI. THE FREEST CHURCH IN CHRISTENDOM. By a Clergyman of that Church	450
VII. MODERN THEORIES CONCERNING THE LIFE OF JESUS. By J. A. Dorner, D.D., Berlin	473
VIII. NOTES FROM IRELAND	488
IX. NOTES FROM ROME	499
X. NOTICES OF BOOKS	504

IV.

	PAGE
I. UNIVERSITY REFORM IN RELATION TO THEOLOGICAL STUDY. By C. P. Reichel, D.D.	518
II. DR. PUSEY'S EIRENICON. By the Dean of Westminster	534
III. CRETE. By E. H. Bunbury, M.A.	551
IV. PASTORAL WORK. By the Rev. W. G. Humphry, M.A.	568
V. THE CONSCIENCE CLAUSE. By the Rev. E. H. Plumptre, M.A. . . .	577
VI. ORIGINES EVANGELICÆ.	604
VII. DEAN STANLEY ON THE HEBREW KINGS AND PROPHETS. By J. S. Howson, D.D.	615
III. POLITICO-ECCLESIASTICAL QUESTIONS OF THE DAY IN ITALY. By the Rev. Lewis M. Hogg, M.A.	642

TITLE AND INDEX.



THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

RITUALISM AND THE ECCLESIASTICAL LAW.

The Directorium Anglicanum; being a Manual of Directions for the Right Celebration of the Holy Communion, for the Saying of Matins and Evensong, and for the Performance of other Rites and Ceremonies of the Church, according to the Ancient Use of the Church of England. With plan of Chancel, and illustrations of "such Ornaments of the Church, and of the Ministers thereof, at all times of their Ministration, [as] shall be retained, and be in use, as were in this Church of England, by the authority of Parliament, in the second year of the reign of King Edward VI." Second Edition, revised. Edited by the Rev. FREDERICK GEORGE LEE, D.C.L., &c. London, 1865.

Catholic Ritual in the Church of England, Scriptural, Reasonable, Lawful. By RICHARD FREDERICK LITTLEDALE, M.A., LL.D., Priest of the English Church. Second Edition. London, 1865.

The Cases of Westerton against Liddell (clerk) and Horne and others, St. Paul's, Knightsbridge; and Beal against Liddell (clerk) and Parke and Evans, St. Barnabas, Pimlico; as heard and determined by the Consistory Court of London, the Arches Court of Canterbury, and the Judicial Committee of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council. By EDMUND F. MOORE, Esq., M.A., Barrister-at-Law. London, 1867.

THANKS to popular writers on the Constitution, from De Lolme to Mr. Albany Fonblanque, most of us can give some answer to the question, "How are we governed?" But to the ordinary every-day Englishman a mist still hangs over one department. Ecclesiastical law is to him a sort of Cabala—a thing to be revered or scoffed at, according to the turn of his mind and his politics, but in any case a thing incomprehensible. This is the more to be regretted, because controversies as to Church rites and ceremonies have for some years been prevalent, and have excited much attention.

Sic.

We venture to think, therefore, that we shall do some service to many worthy persons if we seek to throw some light upon this subject, to indicate the rules and authorities by which such controversies are decided, and afterwards to apply them to a specific instance by way of illustration.

But we must premise a few words as to the way in which the disputes now so rife on such subjects have, as we conceive, arisen.

It is well known to most persons of the present generation that after the great political changes thirty years ago, when it seemed likely that the connection between Church and State would be less intimate than in former days, the minds both of clergy and laity were naturally driven back upon the Divine origin and commission of the Church. In proportion as Government patronage was lessened or withdrawn, the clergy especially sought to recall the great fact that the Church existed independently of, and anterior to, its alliance with the State. For this purpose they set themselves to trace out afresh its historical continuity, through all the changes of secular events, from patristic times down to the nineteenth century.

Now it is obvious that the continuous existence of a visible and corporate body is usually to be established by tracing those outward signs and acts which are, so to speak, the tokens of its life. Accordingly, much stress came to be laid, not only on the sacraments, and on the succession of the episcopate, but on many minute points of ritual, by means of which a legitimate ecclesiastical descent from the earlier ages was thought to be established. But in the conduct of the argument, when pressed to this extreme, a difficulty arose. The English ritual, as understood and practised thirty years ago, was by no means in complete accordance with that which careful inquiries showed to have prevailed in certain previous ages. For this difficulty, however, a solution was at once proposed. The Church of England was a branch of the Catholic Church; her reverence for antiquity, and her adherence to all that was deemed catholic, distinguished her from the Protestant bodies by whom she was surrounded. Hence, to prove that any rite was generally practised in ancient times was, *per se*, to establish its claim to be sanctioned and revived.

In many cases the rites in question witnessed to doctrines; this was, in fact, their highest meaning and value. Hence by degrees the doctrines in question came into favour likewise, and with many minds formed a powerful reason for contending more strenuously for the rites themselves.

It was early foreseen by many that questions of so much importance, and which threatened to change so materially the outward face of the Church, must soon demand an authoritative decision. And for

many of them, the only way to obtain such a decision was to submit them to the judgment of the Ecclesiastical Courts.

Of those Courts society in general, some years ago, knew and thought even less than now. The opponents of the movement of which we have been speaking had little love for them. Perhaps their notions on the subject could not be better expressed than in the language of their favourite poet, Cowper, who, after speaking of the heavy rod laid upon our forefathers by Rome, concludes with the words,—

“And to this hour, to keep it fresh in mind,
Some twigs of the old scourge are left behind;”

“which,” he adds in a quiet note, “may be found at Doctors’ Commons.”

The promoters of the movement, on their part, would probably, in the first instance, have preferred to leave the decision to the bishops personally. But some prelates hesitated to express an opinion; others, though sufficiently decided, were not unanimous. On the other hand, the most recent *cause célèbre* in the Court of Arches had taken a turn which seemed to bode well for the movement party. The decision in *Breeks v. Woolfrey* was popularly said to have legalized prayers for the dead. Much might be hoped for from such a tribunal.

Breeks v. Woolfrey was followed after a few years by *Mastin v. Escott*, and though in that case a clergyman was censured for refusing to bury a child baptized by a Wesleyan minister, still the decision mainly asserted the validity of lay baptism,—a doctrine which the Church of Rome herself did not deny; while the weight attached by the Court to ancient precedents and authorities was in unison with the feelings of the ritualist divines.

Before long the two great schools or parties in the Church came to a direct issue before the Courts of Law in the famous stone altar case (*Faulkner v. Litchfield*). In that case Mr. Faulkner, the vicar of the parish of St. Sepulchre, in Cambridge (whose church was then undergoing restoration), opposed the grant of a faculty, or licence, which was applied for by the churchwardens, to authorize a stone altar and credence table. The cause was heard, in the first instance, before the Chancellor of the Diocese of Ely, assisted by an ecclesiastical advocate as his assessor. Those who have the curiosity to refer to the report contained in the *British Magazine* for August, 1844, will be struck by the summary manner in which the question appears to have been decided. Judging from the account there given, it would seem that the argument on behalf of the vicar met with but little attention, and that his opposition was treated by the Court almost as if it were the result of ignorance or prejudice. And this was nothing more than

very commonly took place at that period. Strong in the knowledge of the Fathers, to which their opponents, generally speaking, could make little claim, the ritualists were apt to treat all gainsayers as ill-informed, narrow-minded persons. And to some extent they had induced society in general to adopt the same view. But a change was at hand. The vicar appealed to the Court of Arches, and after a very learned argument, judgment was pronounced on the 31st January, 1845. By that elaborate judgment, which occupies no less than eighty pages of Dr. Robertson's Ecclesiastical Reports, the decree of the Court below was reversed, and the ratification of the altar and credence table refused.* From this decision no appeal was made. An opinion of counsel was indeed published at the time, to the effect that, if made, it must be successful, but this opinion was not acted upon, and subsequent events have shown it to be erroneous, at least in respect to the altar, as we shall see hereafter.

The result of this great case was very marked. It showed with the utmost clearness that whatever theologians might do in the study, a judge in a Court of Law could not ignore the great fact of the Reformation.

The Dean of the Arches declared that "it would not have satisfied the purpose for which the alteration was made (*i. e.*, in the time of Edward VI.), merely to change the name of *altar* into *table*. The old superstitious notions would have adhered to the minds of the simple people, and would have continued so long as they saw the altar, on which they had been used to consider a *real* sacrifice was offered. For these reasons I consider a substantial alteration of the structure was made." (1 Robertson, p. 225.)

When a judge thus dealt not only with the fact of a change, but with the reasons of it, and gave effect to those reasons as still in force, and as proper to influence his judicial conduct, it was obvious that ecclesiastical rites were not to be justified by a simple regard to their antiquity, or without reference to their relation both to the letter and spirit of what took place at the Reformation.

Again, the following passage occurs in the judgment:—"As I understand the question, it is one simply of the construction of the rubric and Book of Common Prayer, which are incorporated into the

* The observation has sometimes been made, that though the Court refused to ratify the altar it did not direct its removal. No stress is to be laid on this point. The form of the decree was determined by the shape in which the matter was brought before the Court. This is explained by Sir John Dodson, in *Westerton v. Liddell*. He says, speaking of his predecessor, who decided *Faulkner v. Litchfield*,—"It was not competent, under the circumstances of the appeal, to go further; but there can be no doubt, if the suit before him had been for the removal of the altar, he must have decreed it. The whole tenor of his judgment puts that out of all possibility of doubt." (Moore's Report of *Westerton v. Liddell*, p. 130.)

Statute of Uniformity passed in the 13 & 14 Charles II., and of the canons which were passed in 1603, and of that number, the 82nd, which more particularly applies to the subject. In proceeding to consider this statute, the Court must proceed precisely in the same manner as it would in construing other Acts of Parliament." (1 Rob., p. 198.)

This indicates that the enactments and authorities of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries usually have a far more direct bearing on disputed questions of English ritual, than citations from ecclesiastical historians or patristic writers.

It goes further; it shows that such authorities will be construed according to the received rules of legal exposition—rules which are the product of great acuteness, and of wide experience in the business of interpretation, but with the nature and effect of which non-professional minds seldom have an exact acquaintance.

For some years no question of a similar kind came before the Courts. The case of Mr. Oakley, and the Gorham case, as pertaining to doctrine, not to ritual, do not fall within the limits of this paper.

But in 1855, disputes having for some time prevailed respecting certain articles of church furniture in the churches of St. Paul, Knightsbridge, and St. Barnabas, Pimlico, two suits were brought in the Consistory Court of the Diocese of London in relation thereto.*

The one was brought by Mr. Westerton, one of the churchwardens of St. Paul's, against Mr. Liddell the incumbent, and Mr. Horne the other churchwarden, and had for its object the removal of the altar or high altar, with the cross elevated thereon and attached thereto, as also the removal of the gilded candlesticks and the candles therein (which were alleged to be placed one on each side of the cross upon the altar), the credentia or credence table, and also of the several divers coloured altar coverings.

The other suit was brought by Mr. Beal, an inhabitant of the district chapelry of St. Barnabas, against Mr. Liddell, the incumbent and perpetual curate, and Messrs. Parke and Evans, the chapelwardens.

In this suit, the altar (which in this case was fixed, and of stone) and other articles, as at St. Paul's, were objected to; and moreover, exception was taken to a wooden screen separating the chancel from the body of the church, having a large cross fixed thereon, and brazen gates with locks; and to a linen altar cloth, ornamented with lace and embroidery. The Court was also asked to direct that the Ten Commandments should be put up at the east end of the church.

Both suits were argued together, and in December, 1855, Dr. Lushington pronounced judgment at great length. He considered

* Our authority throughout is the elaborate Report of Mr. Moore. Longmans, 1857.

that as what was styled the altar in St. Paul's Church was in fact of wood, and capable of being moved, though massive and highly carved, it was not necessary to pronounce it to be contrary to law. He also permitted the candlesticks to remain.

But he directed the cross and credence table to be removed, together with the various cloths for covering the communion table, and ordered the substitution of one only covering of silk or other decent stuff. Coming to the case of St. Barnabas, the decree ordered the removal of the structure of stone used as a communion table, which was to be replaced by a moveable table of wood. The cross upon it, as well as that upon the chancel screen, were to be taken away. As regards the cloths and coverings, and the credence table, a similar order was made to that with regard to St. Paul's; and it was further directed that the Ten Commandments were to be set up at the east end of the church. As regarded the chancel screen and gates, the learned judge stated that he was not satisfied, under all the circumstances, that they were contrary to law, at the same time declaring that in his opinion such separations between the chancel and nave were objectionable, and that he would not advise a bishop to consecrate a church fitted up according to that example. But he said it was a different thing to pull down. They were therefore allowed to stand.

Mr. Westerton did not appeal against this decree in respect of what it suffered to remain, but Mr. Liddell did so forthwith in respect of what it disallowed.

The Court of Arches sustained the judgment of the Consistory Court in all respects, though on somewhat different grounds. Thereupon a further appeal took place to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

This Court modified in some particulars the decision of the Courts below. In respect to crosses, their Lordships were of opinion that crosses, "when used as mere emblems of the Christian faith, and not as objects of superstitious reverence, might still lawfully be erected as architectural decorations of churches," and as they held the wooden cross on the chancel screen to be of this nature, they reversed the decree for its removal.* But they confirmed the order for the removal of the stone altar, and of the cross thereupon, considering that the existence of a cross attached to the table was consistent neither with the spirit nor the letter of the regulations in force as to communion tables.

Credence tables had been disallowed by the other Courts in con-

* The propriety of the screen itself was not before them. Dr. Lushington had declined to order its removal, and his judgment was not appealed against. Hence the question has not been under the consideration of any higher tribunal than the Consistory Court of London.

formity with the previous case of *Faulkner v. Litchfield*. It had been deemed that they were unauthorized, and were connected with the notion of an altar. Their Lordships thought otherwise, and explained and sanctioned their use in these words:—

“What is a credence table? It is simply a small side table, on which the bread and wine are placed before the consecration, having no connection with any superstitious usage of the Church of Rome. Their removal has been ordered, on the ground that they are adjuncts to an altar: their Lordships cannot but think that they are more properly to be regarded as adjuncts to a communion table. The rubric directs that at a certain point in the course of the Communion Service (for this is, no doubt, the true meaning of the rubric) the minister shall place the bread and wine on the communion table; but where they are to be placed previously is nowhere stated. In practice they are usually placed on the communion table before the commencement of the service, but this certainly is not according to the order prescribed. Nothing seems to be less objectionable than a small side table, from which they may be conveniently reached by the officiating minister, and at the proper time transferred to the communion table. As to the credence tables, their Lordships, therefore, must advise a reversal of the sentence complained of.” *

In respect to the embroidered cloths, the sentence was also reversed, on the ground that the covering used need not be always the same, and that whether the cloths so used were suitable or not was a matter to be left to the discretion of the ordinary. However, as regarded the embroidered linen and lace used at the time of communion at St. Barnabas, their Lordships did not dissent from the decision that they were inconsistent with the rubric. In this particular, therefore, the decree was affirmed.

Thus ended this great case. Like *Faulkner v. Litchfield*, it was not favourable to extreme ritualism, especially when such ritualism is regarded as the expression of a special system of doctrine. There is a studied tone of moderation about the judgment of the Judicial Committee. Yet the result was to condemn stone altars; to sanction the cross merely as an ornament or decoration of a church (disallowing it when fixed on the communion table); to leave the general question of cloths and coverings in the hands of the ordinary (thereby authorizing him to interfere if he saw cause); to insist that the “fair white linen cloth” used at the communion should be of a plain and simple character; and while sanctioning the credence table, to lay it down with unmistakeable explicitness, that it was only sanctioned because capable of a use and meaning having no connection with any superstitious usage of the Church of Rome, and to be deemed an adjunct, not to an altar, but to a communion table.

It ought to be mentioned, that three years later an application was made by Mr. Beal to the Judicial Committee, on the ground that

* Moore's Report of *Westerton v. Liddell*, p. 187.

The Contemporary Review.

their sentence had not been duly obeyed as regarded St. Barnabas. It was alleged that the cross which was formerly attached to the super-altar on the stone altar had indeed been removed thence, but was still retained on the sill of the great eastern window. And further, that the table which had been substituted for the stone altar was not a flat table, but had an elevation or structure placed thereon, so as to resemble what is known as a super-altar in Roman Catholic churches. There was also an objection as to the place in which the Commandments had been set up. The words of the sentence, it must be observed, were "to remove the structure of stone used as a communion table, together with the cross on or near to the same, and to provide instead thereof a flat moveable table of wood."

The Court considered that these directions had been substantially complied with; they said:—

"The stone table has been altogether removed; and with it the cross; but the cross has been placed in another part of the church or chapel, not in any sense upon the table which has been substituted for the stone table, nor in any sense in communication, or contact, or connection with it.† It remains in the church as an ornament of the church, and their Lordships think (if the word may respectfully be applied to such a subject), not an unusual or improper ornament; in no sense remaining there so as to disobey or conflict with the order contained in this monition."

Their Lordships described the other matter complained of as "a moveable ledge of wood, for the purpose of holding candlesticks and vessels;—at least that is the purpose for which it is used. It is not," the judgment continued, "fixed to the table. If remaining there when the cloth is to be placed upon the table for the purpose of the administration of the Lord's Supper, as it would interfere with that, it is accordingly removed, and the cloth is placed upon the table, and then the ledge replaced. It is not shown, and their Lordships think it ought not to be inferred, that there is anything superstitious (if the term may be used) or anything improper in the addition of that ledge. But, even if there were, their Lordships are not satisfied that it is within the terms of this monition, or that the monition in any sense or respect extends to it. But in whatever way that matter be taken, their Lordships think that neither disobedience nor offence is established with regard to that moveable ledge." It was also held that the manner in which the Commandments were set up was sufficient.

* Mr. Beal argued his own case. It is to be regretted that the Court had not the assistance of the arguments of counsel. The case is reported in 14 Moore's P. C. Reports, p. 1.

† These words, it may be noticed in passing, show how different a sense the Court puts on its former judgment from that which is assigned to it in the "*Directorium Anglicanum*." The author of that work asserts that the judgment "permitted the altar cross, so it be not *fixed*." ("*Direct.*," p. 279, 2nd Edition.)

Ritualism and the Ecclesiastical Law.

It must be borne in mind that the Judicial Committee, not having original jurisdiction, but being merely a Court of Appeal, and the appeal having been exhausted by the prior sentence, the only question legally before them on this application, was whether the sentence in question had been carried out. Hence the only points open to them were, What were the terms of the monition; and had they been obeyed? It would seem difficult for any one to contend that they had not, at least in their literal sense. Any irregularity not expressly complained of in the suit (if such there were) must have been made the subject of a new proceeding, commencing in the Court below.* Meanwhile, it is to be gathered that their Lordships upheld the distinction in principle between the cross as a mere decoration of a church, and as standing in any connection with the rites of Divine service. As regards the other matter, Mr. Liddell had expressly pleaded that "the elevation or structure alleged" was "simply a moveable ledge of wood, placed, in order that two candlesticks might stand thereon, at the back of the table."† We now proceed to say something as to that system of ecclesiastical law which guided the decisions above mentioned, and which they interpreted and enforced.

Previously to the Reformation, the Church had two principal codes. One of these was the Canon Law of Rome, at least so far as accepted and adopted in this country. For it is laid down by our great lawyers, that it never bound in this realm by its own power, but only in respect of such acceptance and adoption.‡

The other code was composed of the legatine and provincial constitutions and canons, made, from time to time, by legates or archbishops in synods over which they presided in England.§ These, together with a certain unwritten and customary jurisdiction, formed the bulk of the ecclesiastical law in respect to all questions of rites and ceremonies.

Now by the Act 25 Hen. VIII., c. 19, it was enacted that the King should have power to nominate a mixed commission of clergy and laity, to consist of thirty-two persons, to revise these provincial constitutions and canons, and to abolish such as they should not approve.

* There is some reason, therefore, for doubting whether any express and binding decision as to the "ledge" has ever been given.

† *Liddell v. Beal*: 14 Moore's P. C. Reports, p. 1.

‡ "The civil and canon laws, considered with respect to any intrinsic obligation, have no force or authority in this kingdom; they are no more binding in England than our laws are binding at Rome. But as far as these foreign laws, on account of some peculiar propriety, have, in some particular cases, and in some particular Courts, been introduced and allowed by our laws, so far they oblige, and no farther, their authority being wholly founded upon that permission and adoption."—(1 Blackst. Comm., p. 14; and see *per Tindal, C. J.*, who cites *Coke* and *Hale* to the like effect; *Reg. v. Millis*, 10 Cl. and Finn., 534.)

§ There were also certain laws of the Anglo-Saxon monarchs touching Church matters.

And by a proviso at the end of the Act it was "provided that such canons, constitutions, ordinances, and synodals provincial, being already made, which be not contrariant or repugnant to the laws, statutes, and customs of this realm, nor to the damage or hurt of the King's prerogative-royal, shall now still be used and executed as they were afore the making of this Act, till such time as they be viewed, searched, or otherwise ordered and determined by the said two-and-thirty persons, or the more part of them, according to the tenor, form, and effect of this present Act."

No commission having been issued, a later Act (27 Hen. VIII., c. 15) continues the power to the King, but limits the sittings of the commissioners to a term of three years next after the dissolution of the then Parliament. A still later Act (35 Hen. VIII., c. 16) renews the power, and confers it on the King for life. And by the second section it is enacted, "that, till such time as the King's Majesty and the said thirty-two persons have accomplished and executed the effects and contents afore rehearsed and mentioned, such canons, constitutions, ordinances synodal or provincial, or other ecclesiastical laws or jurisdiction spiritual, as be yet accustomed and used here in the Church of England, which, necessarily and conveniently, are requisite to be put in use and execution for the time, not being repugnant, contrariant, or derogatory to the laws or statutes of the realm, nor to the prerogatives of the Royal Crown of the same, or any of them, shall be occupied, exercised, and put in use for the time within this or any other the King's Majesty's dominions; and that the ministers and due executors of them shall not incur any damage or danger for the due exercising of the aforesaid laws, so that, by no colour or pretence of them, or any of them, the minister put in use anything prejudicial or in contrary of the regal power or laws of the realm, anything whatsoever to the contrary of this present Act notwithstanding."

These words are larger than those in the first Act. They perhaps extend to the unwritten usages of ecclesiastical courts, and to the Roman canon law, so far as received in England, which the 25 Hen. VIII., c. 19, did not.

Commissioners were appointed under this Act, but nothing was brought to completion before the death of the King; and the powers of the Act having expired with his life, it was found needful to pass a similar one in the reign of his successor. Under this Act (3 & 4 Edw. VI., c. 11) a commission was appointed, which prepared a revised code of ecclesiastical law, known by the name of the "*Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum*." But as this work never received a formal ratification, it is of no legal validity; and after the troubles of Mary's reign had passed away, the Legislature, instead of sanctioning this

code, simply revived the Act 25 Hen. VIII., c. 19, and enacted that it should be deemed to extend to Elizabeth, and her heirs and successors, as fully as to Henry VIII.

Upon the whole, therefore, it is to be taken that the power to direct a revision of the ancient provincial constitutions and canons exists in the sovereigns of the present day, though not exercised. And the proviso which sanctions their use until such revision be made, being also revived, they are maintained thereby, at this day, in a certain degree of force, subject to the qualifications which the Act lays down, and subject also to the effect of subsequent Acts in annulling or superseding them in any particular points.

In the reign of Elizabeth, various sets of canons were framed by Convocation. Some of these, however, never received the Royal assent so as to be binding at the present day; and those which obtained it are, generally speaking, less important and less frequently cited than those of which we are next to speak,—the canons of the reign of King James.

These were passed in the Convocation of Canterbury in 1603,* and were afterwards received by that of York. They were formally sanctioned by James I., and have therefore a legal validity. It has, indeed, been solemnly decided that they do not bind the laity, inasmuch as the laity are not represented in Convocation;† but they bind the clergy, as has been admitted frequently, even by the temporal Courts.‡

Yet their validity is only of a qualified kind; for, even in ecclesiastical matters, they are of no force as against an Act of Parliament, or if contrary to the common law of England.§

In 1606 certain other canons were drawn up, but these were never approved by the sovereign.

In 1640, during the troublous reign of Charles I., a code of canons was passed by Convocation and received the Royal assent. As to these, the case stands in a singular way. Not only was a violent opposition made to them by the Parliamentary party at the time, but

* "Sometimes called 1603, and sometimes 1604, which is owing to the style; the date, if I recollect, being January." (Lord Brougham, in the case of *Escott v. Mastin*, in the Privy Council.)

† See the great case of *Middleton v. Crofts*, *Strange's Reports*, 1056.

‡ Lord Hardwicke, in *Middleton v. Crofts*, when denying their authority over the laity, says, "It is agreed that ecclesiastical ordinances in spiritual matters, confirmed by the King, bind the clergy, being made by their representatives in Convocation."

§ Thus, in the recent case of *Pinder v. Barr* (4 Ell. and Black., 105), the Queen's Bench recognised and acted on the canon which gives the nomination of the parish clerk to the minister. There was nothing in the case to indicate any other mode of appointment in the parish in question. But almost immediately after the canons were made, it was decided, and has ever since been held, that where there is an immemorial custom for the parishioners to choose the clerk, such custom has the force of law, and must prevail against the canon. (See *Jermyn's case*, *Cro. Jac.*, 670; and 13 Rep., 70.)

even at the Restoration it was felt that they could not safely be put in force. The 13 Car. II., c. 12, which established the ecclesiastical jurisdiction "according to the King's Majesty's ecclesiastical laws used and practised in this realm," contained a proviso at the end that it should not extend "to confirm the canons made in the year 1640, nor any of them, nor any ecclesiastical laws or canons not formerly confirmed, allowed, or enacted by Parliament, or by the established laws of the land, as they stood in the year of our Lord 1639."

It has, indeed, been argued upon this clause that it does not extend to destroy the proper force of the canons in question, but only to refuse them statutory authority. But the point is hardly worth examining, because, as the learned Ayliffe states in his "*Parergon Juris Canonici Anglicani*" (Intro., p. xxxv.), "as these canons were then censured, and seem to have in them several matters contrary to the rights of the people and the laws of the realm, they have never been in use since, though they contain some wholesome doctrines and institutions in some of them." There is no instance in which any Court has proceeded upon the canons of 1640, and they are certainly regarded by lawyers as a dead letter.

These brief notices may suffice for that portion of the law of the Ecclesiastical Courts which consists of canons. There are, besides, certain injunctions and proclamations set forth by Royal authority during the times when the supremacy was exercised in a more direct form than has been the case since the Revolution. Their precise force is perhaps a matter which would admit of much argument, but it is seldom of great importance to define it with exactness. Some of them, if it could be shown that they were issued (as is sometimes supposed) under statutes enabling the sovereigns in that behalf, would stand, of course, on strong ground. But the evidence of this is rather obscure and uncertain. However, be their constitutional authority what it may, they have been frequently referred to by the Courts of Law, as showing historically what was taking place, and thus indicating the way in which the then advisers of the Crown understood the changes that had recently been made under statutory authority.

The mention of statutory authority brings us to the highest and most important form of ecclesiastical law, the Acts of Uniformity and other legislative enactments. The operative one at present is of course the last, 13 & 14 Car. II., c. 4. But this Act to a certain extent incorporates some of the provisions in previous ones. And it is to be observed, that as this Act establishes our present Prayer-book, and the Act 13 Eliz., c. 12, confirms the Articles, the result is that these have the complete force of law.*

* The Decrees of certain General Councils are recognised as a test of heresy by 1 Eliz., c. 1: but heresy is not our present subject.

We have already alluded to the usages which make up what may be called the Ecclesiastical Common Law. Like the secular common law, this is founded on immemorial custom, and prevails for the purpose of regulating the jurisdiction in matters for which no express enactment exists.

Thus far, then, we have traced the course of legal decisions on controverted points of ritual, and have endeavoured to present a sketch of the system of law on which those decisions were founded.

We shall now take a leading feature of modern ritualism, and examine it in detail. By this means we shall hope to present a connected specimen of a legal argument, and also to throw some light on questions that have not yet received a judicial solution, but which excite much attention at the present moment.

For this purpose, the point to be examined must be one to which importance is attached, and the legality of which has been strongly maintained by the ritualist school. And it must also be a representative case; or, in other words, one in the decision of which principles are necessarily discussed and established, that by implication rule many other cases of like kind.

Such an instance is that of Altar Lights.

The "*Directorium Anglicanum*,"* which is the elaborate text-book of high ritualism, speaks thus on the subject:—

"THE ALTAR LIGHTS.—These should be lighted immediately before the Communion Service by the clerk in cassock, or in cassock and surplice. He should make a reverence before ascending to light them, and commence on the Epistle side.

"It should be observed that these two eucharistic lights should never be used as mere candles for lighting the sanctuary. Other brackets for candles, or the coronæ and standard lights, are sufficient for that purpose. The two lights are symbols, and *in honorem sacramenti*, and must be *cæca lumina*, save when celebration is intended. The judgment in the Knightsbridge case decided their strict legality."—(P. 34.)

This example, then, seems to satisfy the first of our requirements; and before we have done we shall see that it also fulfils the second.

We must begin by asking, Is it true that the case of *Westerton v. Liddell* decided the legality of altar lights?

It is true that candlesticks on the communion table were objected to, and that it was decided by Dr. Lushington that they might be allowed to remain. And it is further true that this judgment was acquiesced in without appeal. But in order not to be misled, we must look at the question more closely. In that case, the proceedings were brought in the Consistory Court of London, and it was prayed that the candlesticks might be ordered to be removed. Dr. Lushington expressly said that he held "all lighted candles on the com-

munion table . . . contrary to law, except when they are lighted for the purpose of giving necessary light;" but "as to the candlesticks and candles unlighted on or near to the communion table," he says, "I acknowledge I have much more doubt. . . . If they are to be considered as ornaments merely, I should hold their use not to be reconcileable with law. But I cannot deny that it is lawful to have such articles on the communion table or near it for necessary purposes; and therefore I cannot say, though I believe that such necessity arises very seldom indeed, that it is contrary to law to have them so placed ready for use should occasion require."*

The view of the learned judge was therefore adverse to altar lights, but as the suit sought for the removal of the candlesticks themselves, he did not feel at liberty to grant what was asked. Had the question arisen in a proceeding against a clergyman under the Church Discipline Act, for using altar lights as being an unauthorized rite, it is sufficiently indicated what his judgment would have been; but such a proceeding would be wholly different from such a suit as *Westerton v. Liddell*, and must have been commenced by formalities of a distinct kind, and in another Court.

We have thus, we hope, shown that there is no ground for alleging that there has been a decision in favour of the lights, and we shall go on to examine into the general nature of the arguments brought forward in their favour.†

The great point at issue is as to the true construction of the rubric at the commencement of the Prayer-book, which says, "And here is to be noted, that such ornaments of the Church, and of the ministers thereof, at all times of their ministration, shall be retained, and be in use, as were in this Church, by the authority of Parliament, in the second year of the reign of King Edward the Sixth."

For Dr. Lushington says that candlesticks, if lighted without neces-

* It must not be forgotten that Mr. Liddell had made affidavit that the lights were used only when an artificial light was necessary. (See Moore's Report, pp. 17 and 70.)

† The statements in the "Directorium Anglicanum," as to the law of the Church of England, are often such as to make it almost impossible to treat them as matter of serious argument at all. Take the following as an instance of the style of the author's mind, though on a different subject. There is a rubric which says:—"If there be not above twenty persons in the parish of discretion to receive the communion; yet there shall be no communion, except four (or three at the least) communicate with the priest." On this the author says, "A sufficient number of the faithful ought always to be encouraged to stay at all times, whether they actually communicate or not, which will not be discovered till afterwards, so as to make a quorum in the sense of the rubric;—even if they go out after the prayer of the oblation or the exhortation, it will be too late for the priest to stop. Absent sick persons, who communicate spiritually, ought also to be counted in. Thus there can be no great difficulty in offering the Holy Sacrifice daily according to the mind of the Church," &c.—("Directorium," Pref., p. xx., note.) A work like this may be one of learned antiquarian research, but it can hardly be a trustworthy guide as to the laws of the Reformed Church of England.

sity, must "fall under the legal denomination of ornaments, and not necessities, and indeed as ornaments they have been defended at the bar. If this be so, the law in the rubric, so often quoted, must be applicable to them." And so much is understood to be generally conceded on all sides.

Now the Judicial Committee, in *Westerton v. Liddell*, had occasion to put a construction on this rubric for another purpose, and their decision is as follows:—

"Their Lordships, after much consideration, are satisfied that the construction of this rubric which they suggested at the hearing of the case is its true meaning, and that the word 'ornaments' applies, and in this rubric is confined, to those articles the use of which in the services and ministrations of the Church is prescribed by the Prayer-book of Edward VI. The term 'ornaments' in ecclesiastical law is not confined, as by modern usage, to articles of decoration or embellishment, but it is used in the larger sense of the word '*ornamentum*,' which, according to the interpretation of Forcellini's Dictionary, is used '*pro quocumque apparatu, seu instrumento*.' All the several articles used in the performance of the services and rites of the Church are 'ornaments.' Vestments, books, cloths, chalices, and patens are amongst church ornaments; a long list of them will be found extracted from Lyndwood in Dr. Phillimore's edition of Burn's '*Ecclesiastical Law*' (vol. i., pp. 375-6-7). In modern times, organs and bells are held to fall under this denomination. When reference is had to the first Prayer-book of Edward the Sixth, with this explanation of the term 'ornaments,' no difficulty will be found in discovering, amongst the articles of which the use is there enjoined, ornaments of the Church as well as ornaments of the ministers. Besides the vestments differing in the different services, the rubric provides for the use of an English Bible, the new Prayer-book, a poor man's box, a chalice, a corporas, a paten, a bell, and some other things."*

The highest Ecclesiastical Court has thus given its judgment that the words of the rubric apply, and are confined to such ornaments as are authorized in the first Prayer-book of Edward VI., which was sanctioned and enforced by the first Act of Uniformity of that monarch; and the Court, at the same time, takes occasion to obviate the difficulty sometimes raised that in fact there are no ornaments of the Church mentioned in the book in question, by citing from its pages the names of various things that come under that description.

This being so, the matter seems to resolve itself into the simple question, Does the first Prayer-book of Edward say anything about altar lights? It is not even pretended that this is the case; and hence, by a necessary inference from the judgment, they seem to be quite unauthorized.

But a writer who does not hesitate to charge the Judicial Committee with having made a complete mistake, brings a chronological argument to show that a rubric which speaks of the *second* year of Edward cannot possibly refer to the Prayer-book in question.

* Moore's Report, p. 156.

He puts it thus:—"Edward VI. began to reign on January 28th, 1547. His second year was over on January 28th, 1549. His first Prayer-book did not come into use by law until Whit-Sunday, 1549, well on in his *third* year, and till then the Latin Missal and Breviary were the only lawful service-books in England."*

The full explanation of this objection, which at first sight looks rather formidable, is as follows. The first Prayer-book of Edward VI. was put forth and sanctioned by the Act 2 & 3 Edw. VI., c. 1, and this statute enacts that all ministers, &c., "shall, *from and after the feast of Pentecost next coming*, be bounden to say and use the mattens, &c., and all their common and open prayer, in such order and form as is mentioned in the same book, and none other or otherwise." As the session of Parliament in which this statute was passed did not begin till November in the second year of the King, the feast of Pentecost next coming would be in the third year. Hence Dr. Littledale argues that the Prayer-book could not be in force till the third year, instead of the second.

But he appears to have overlooked a later clause in the same Act, which provides that the books should be got by the different parishes "before the feast of Pentecost next following, *or before*; and that all such parishes, &c., where the said books shall be attained and gotten *before* the said feast of Pentecost, shall, *within three weeks* next after the said books so attained and gotten, use the said service, and put the same in ure according to this Act."

Hence the new service, in contemplation of law, would be in use almost at once after the passing of the Act,† and the question is narrowed to the date to be assigned to the Act itself.

Dr. Littledale does not seem to have noticed that some argument took place on this very point in *Westerton v. Liddell*, and the Judicial Committee say:—

"It was urged at the bar that the present rubric, which refers to the second year of Edward VI., cannot mean ornaments mentioned in the first Prayer-book, because, as it is said, that Act was probably not passed, and the Prayer-book was certainly not in use, till after the expiration of the second year of Edward VI., and that, therefore, the words 'by authority of Parliament' must mean by virtue of canons or royal injunctions having the authority of Parliament, made at an earlier period. There seems no reason to doubt that the Act in question received the Royal assent in the second year of Edward VI. It concerned a matter of great urgency, which had been long under consideration, and was the first Act of the session; it passed through one House of Parliament on January the 15th, 1549; N.S., and the other on the 21st of the same month; and the second year of the reign of Edward VI. did not expire till January the 28th. In the Act of

* Littledale's "Catholic Ritual," p. 11.

† The meaning of the Act clearly is that it was *desirable* to use the new Liturgy as soon as possible, and it was *penal* not to use it after Pentecost at latest.

the 5th and 6th Edward VI., c. 1, § 5, it is expressly referred to as the Act 'made in the second year of the King's Majesty's reign.' Upon this point, therefore, no difficulty can arise. It is very true that the new Prayer-book could not come into use until after the expiration of that year, because time must be allowed for printing and distributing the books; but its use, and the injunctions contained in it, were established by authority of Parliament in the second year of Edward VI., and this is the plain meaning of the rubric."*

The fact here mentioned, that in 5 & 6 Edw. VI., c. 1, the Act 2 & 3 Edw. VI., c. 1, is unquestionably cited as made in the second year of his reign, ought surely to settle the question as to there being no impossibility that it should be intended by the like words in the rubric.

If any further argument be needed, it may be added that the time at which the Royal assent was given to the Act is perhaps after all not very material.

At the present day an Act takes effect only from the time at which it receives the Royal assent; but this is comparatively a recent system, having been brought about by the Act 33 Geo. III., c. 13.

Previously to the passing of that Act, the rule was, "that when the commencement of an Act was not directed to be from any particular time, it took effect from the first day of the session in which the Act was passed."†

Now seeing that the 2 & 3 Edw. VI., c. 1, in fact directed the books to be got as soon as possible (as we have shown), and seeing that the Act itself would, in contemplation of law at the time the rubric was framed, be deemed to have passed on the first day of the session, *i. e.*, on the 4th, or, at latest, on the 24th of November, 1548,‡ there seems no room left to doubt that in the legal phraseology of the day, the usages which it introduced would be spoken of as being in the Church in the second year of King Edward.

Dr. Littledale's chronological objection therefore fails, and we fall back with more confidence on the view of the Judicial Committee that the rubric really refers to Edward's first Prayer-book, which, we repeat, does not direct the use of lights on the altar.

But it may still be well to look at the alternative proposed to us by those who dissent from this view.

* Moore's Report of *Westerton v. Liddell*, p. 160. It is worth drawing attention to the fact that the rubric does not run, "such ornaments shall be retained as were in use in this Church, &c., by authority of Parliament," &c., but "such ornaments shall be retained and be in use, as were in this Church, &c., by authority of Parliament," &c.

† Dwaris on Statutes, 2nd Edition, p. 543. In the case of *Latless v. Holmes* (4 Term Report, 660), the Court refused to take notice of the date of the Royal assent to the Act on which that case depended, saying, "We can only know by a reference to the Statute-Book when the Act passed; and by that it appears to have passed on the 31st of October, the first day of the session."

‡ The Parl. Roll has the 4th; the Journals of the House say the 24th.

What other interpretation of the rubric is offered? It has been suggested that it means such ornaments "as were in use in the second year of King Edward's reign by the authority of any statute then in force, though previously enacted."* Accordingly reliance is placed on a constitution of Archbishop Reynolds, made in the year 1322, which directs the use of altar lights at the service of the Mass.† This constitution, it is contended, was in force at the passing of the Act 25 Hen. VIII., c. 19, and was, therefore, confirmed by the proviso in that Act, and by the 35 Hen. VIII., c. 16 (cited *supra*, p. 10, &c.). And hence it had the authority of Parliament in the second year of Edward VI., and comes within the terms of the rubric.

The matter turns, as will be seen at once, on the clauses given *supra*, p. 10 *et seq.*, from the Acts of Henry VIII., which purport to sanction the canons and constitutions then existing, until revised by the commissioners. It will be recollected that the authority to take steps for such revision was personal to the King, and ceased at his death, and that no such revision was in fact completed before he died.

Hence a very grave doubt has been raised, as to whether the Acts did not wholly expire with the life of the King, including the clauses which give an *interim* sanction to the canons. Mr. Stephens contended before the Judicial Committee, "that the true meaning of the statutes relating to that subject, passed in the reign of Henry VIII., is, that they provide for the review of the existing canons by commissioners appointed by the King, and give authority to these canons only in the meantime, *i.e.*, during the continuance of the commissions; that the commissioners never made any report;‡ that the commissions determined by the death of King Henry VIII.; and that the parliamentary sanction given to the canons ended at the same time."

If so, obviously they had not the authority of Parliament in the second year of Edward VI. The above summary of the argument is given by their Lordships in the judgment in *Westerton v. Liddell*, and they go on to say:—"If it were necessary to determine this point, their Lordships think this argument might deserve serious consideration, although it is contrary to the general impression which has prevailed on the subject."

* These words are taken from an opinion by Mr. Badeley on the legality of altar lights, bearing date February 12, 1851; and what follows is an attempt to state briefly the main point of his argument. It may be gathered that Dr. Littledale's view is not very dissimilar.

† "Tempore quo Missarum solemnia peraguntur, accendantur duæ candelæ vel ad minus una." (Lynd. Provinc. 236, Johnson, sub anno 1322.)

‡ Cardwell says (Docum. Annals, vol. i., p. 106), that they did draw up a report, but that it never received the King's confirmation. The difference is immaterial for the present purpose.

They did not find it necessary to decide the question, because on other grounds they were satisfied that the rubric related to the first Prayer-book of Edward VI. It may be observed that this point had already been raised some years previously in a tract* published on the subject, which puts the argument thus:—

“It is submitted that the event contemplated [the revision of the canons] having become impossible [by the death of Henry], the clauses, which were limited to operate only *until* that event, became a dead letter. It is clear in the law of real property, that ‘if an estate be limited to a man and his heirs, *until* A shall attain the age of twenty-one, the estate will determine if A should die under that age.’—(Preston on Estates, p. 55.) And the like seems to be the proper interpretation here. . . . Any other interpretation would read the words, ‘till such time as they shall be viewed,’ as if they had been, ‘in default of such review.’ The latter phrase, which has a definite legal sense, would have been quite appropriate to convey the meaning for which Mr. Badeley contends, but as the Legislature has not used it, there seems ground to think such an intention was not present to their minds. Besides, it is surely most incongruous to maintain that Parliament, while complaining that the canons were ‘overmuch onerous to His Highness and his subjects,’† should at one and the same moment make their revision dependent on the King’s life lasting until the conclusion of a long investigation, and yet bestow on them a new and authoritative sanction, which was to be perpetual in the event of any accident to the King. It should be observed that by 1 Eliz., c. 1, everything in the statute 25 Hen. VIII., c. 19 (including therefore the power to revise the canons), is extended to the Queen and her successors. And this explains how the confirmatory proviso has been treated as in force at the present day by legal writers, without impugning the above argument as to the state of things at the opening of the reign of Edward VI.”

But again, let us grant for the sake of argument that the grave doubt thus raised is unfounded.

The question, then, is as to the true intent and meaning of certain words of reference used in the rubric, and we are now considering a proposed interpretation, which makes them relate to the ancient canons and constitutions collectively. One method of testing this is by inquiring into the consequences which would ensue from adopting such a construction. If these are anomalous and inconvenient, it is a legitimate inference that the intention of the framers of the rubric cannot have been as alleged.‡

Now there are three very explicit constitutions regarding church

* “Some Examination of a recently published Opinion of E. Badeley, Esq., in favour of *Altar Lights*.” By a Layman, late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. London, 1851.

† See 25 Hen. VIII., c. 19.

‡ This method of reasoning is of frequent use in law. Mr. Broom, in his able work on *Legal Maxims*, has the following comment on the maxim, “*Argumentum ab inconvenienti plurimum valet in lege*.” He says, “Arguments of inconvenience are sometimes of great value upon the question of intention. If there be in any deed or instrument equivocal expressions, and great inconvenience must necessarily follow from one construction, it is strong to show that such construction is not according to the true intention.”

ornaments to be found in Lyndwood's and Johnson's collections of canons. One of them was made in 1250, under Archbishop Gray; another at a later period, under Archbishop Peckham; and the third in 1305, under Archbishop Winchelsey. These enjoin that there be in churches, amongst other things, a vessel for the holy water, a cross for processions, an osculatory,* a censer, a decent pyx for the body of Christ, banners for the Rogation days, the chrismatory,† a veil for Lent,‡ the images in the churches, the principal image in the chancel of that saint to which the church is dedicated, and so on.

All these matters, therefore, rest on precisely the same foundation as the constitution of Archbishop Reynolds touching altar lights. If the latter be now in force, so are these. In other words, our churchwardens are bound to furnish their churches with all the above articles. The osculatory is as much authorized to be used in the Holy Communion as the lighted candles; a veil must be hung across the church in Lent; the holy water must stand at the door; and, above all, the consecrated Host must be reserved in the pyx, or sacred box employed for that purpose, and the pyx placed in a tabernacle over the altar. "We charge," says Archbishop Peckham, in a constitution of 1279, "that for the future the most worthy sacrament of the Eucharist be so kept, that a tabernacle be made in every church, with a decent enclosure, according to the greatness of the cure and the value of the church, in which the Lord's Body may be laid, not in a purse or bag, but in a fair pyx, lined with the whitest linen, so that it may be put in and taken out without any hazard of breaking it."

It is sometimes urged that the altar itself was a recognised ornament in the second year of Edward (inasmuch as steps were not taken to abolish altars till a year or two later), and that both altar and altar lights are therefore now legal. But independently of the view taken by Sir H. J. Fust in *Faulkner v. Litchfield*, that the altar is not described with technical correctness by the term "ornament,"§

* The osculatory was a tablet or board, with the picture of Christ Jesus, the Virgin or the like, which the priest kissed himself, and gave to the people for the same purpose after the consecration was performed, instead of the ancient kiss of charity." (Johnson's note on the Canon of Winchelsey.)

† The chrismatory, the same commentator tells us, was a necessary part of the furniture of every church, and was the small vessel in which the chrism, or holy ointment for anointing persons in baptism, was contained.

‡ This was "a curtain drawn between the altar and the people during mass, whereby the people were prohibited from seeing anything that was done." (Johnson.)

§ He says, "It was contended that, as stone altars were then [viz., in the second year of Edward] in use, they, being ornaments, are now to be retained. To be sure, were this argument valid, not only is this stone altar or table proper, but no other species of table ought to be erected. Durandus was cited to show that the altar is to be considered an ornament; but it seems to me that that writer is an authority the other way. In lib. i., cap. 3, of his '*Rationale Divinorum Officiorum*,' Venice Edit., 1568, he says, '*Porro orna-*

this argument, if used at all, must be pressed to its full extent. It is not merely a structure of stone with lights upon it, such as is sometimes seen in churches where strong ritualist opinions prevail, that would have to be restored, but the altar with the pyx and the reserved Host upon or over it, and dressed in all points as in the days when (as Dr. Littledale says) "the Latin Missal and Breviary were the only lawful service-books."

But the reservation of the sacrament is directly contrary to the twenty-eighth Article; and it is a rule of law, no less than of common sense, that no construction can be valid which introduces repugnancy and contradiction.

So, again, as to the images. The old canons distinctly require them, yet they are as distinctly forbidden by the homily against "Peril of Idolatry;* and the doctrine of the homilies is confirmed by the thirty-fifth Article.

And subscription to the Articles was enjoined by the same Act of Uniformity which sanctioned the rubric, the interpretation of which is now under consideration.

We might carry our inquiries farther as to the ancient canons, with a like result; but it is presumed that enough has been said to show the strange results which would flow from holding that our present rubric legalizes, as a class, all ornaments prescribed in them.

Perhaps it may be replied that such ornaments are sanctioned, except so far as set aside by more recent laws. But this is to destroy the whole force and simplicity of the argument, which owes its virtue to a strict and literal reading of the words "such as were in this Church of England, by authority of Parliament, in the second year of the reign of King Edward the Sixth." Mr. Badeley, and those who share his view, contend that whatever falls within these terms—whatever ornaments had authority under any Act of Parliament, at a time when "the Latin Missal and Breviary were the only lawful service-books"—must be allowed to be enjoined by the rubric. To engraft on this any exception not found in it is fatal to the scheme. If one article be disallowed, why not another?

menta in tribus consistent, i. e., in ornatu ecclesiar, chori, et altaris. . . . Altaris vero ornatus consistit in capsis, in palliis, in phylacteriis, in candelabris, in crucibus, in aufrisio [aurifrigio?], in vexillis, in codicibus, in velaminibus, et in cortinis.' The altar is nowhere, that I can find, enumerated amongst the ornaments of the church or choir."—*Faulkner v. Litchfield*, 1 *Robertson*, p. 254.

* The whole spirit and tenor of the homily are against them; but one sentence may be cited merely as a sample:—"The images of God, our Saviour Christ, the blessed Virgin Mary, the apostles, martyrs, and others of notable holiness, are, of all other images, most dangerous for the peril of idolatry, and therefore greatest heed to be taken that none of them be suffered to stand publicly in churches and temples." (See third part of the homily.)

And then, what is disallowance? The whole dispute is at once let in as to whether things not mentioned are thereby forbidden, or whether there must be any, and if so, what, express words of prohibition. For instance, in reference to the matter before us, the Mass is swept away; in the year 1662, when the rubric of our present Prayer-book was finally sanctioned and set forth, and for long afterwards, it was punishable with fine and imprisonment, by 23 Eliz., cap. 1, to say Mass. And by 3 James I., cap. 5, pyxes and missals found in the possession of Popish recusants were to be destroyed.

If these statutes forbid the "*Missarum solemnia*," who is to say, with confidence, that the "*duæ candelæ*," enjoined by the canon of Reynolds as a part of that rite, are not abolished also?

Or will it be said that the "ornaments" are to be kept, but not the service? If so, are the tabernacle and the pyx to be set up, but with no Host within? the osculatory restored, but never used? If so, the analogy would appear to be that the candlesticks, though allowed to remain, should not be lighted.

There is yet one more argument in support of altar lights which we must examine, because great reliance has been placed upon it by some writers.

In the year 1547, being the first year of Edward VI., certain royal injunctions were set forth, one of which ran—"That all deans, archdeacons, parsons, vicars, and other ecclesiastical persons . . . shall suffer henceforth no torches or candles, tapers, or images of wax, to be set before any image or picture. But only two lights upon the high altar, before the sacrament, which, for the signification that Christ is the very true light of the world, they shall suffer to remain still."

Now this injunction, *per se*, is not, of course, equivalent to authority of Parliament,* but it has been alleged by many that it was in fact issued by the Crown under the powers of the Act 31 Hen. VIII., c. 8, and 34 Hen. VIII., c. 23, which gave royal proclamations put forth under their provisions the effect of Acts of Parliament. Much dispute has taken place as to whether these injunctions were or were not issued with the formalities requisite to bring them within the scope of the Acts of Henry VIII., but the point seems to be of very subordinate moment, for the following reason.

* Yet, singularly enough, it has sometimes been so treated. Thus Dean Hook, in his Church Dict., sub. "Lights on the Altar," after citing the rubric with which we are now so familiar, says, "So that, if it appear that in the second year of King Edward VI. lights were used as in this rubric is mentioned, no authority short of a Convocation for the Church, and for the State an Act of Parliament, can reverse the authority on which lights are still used upon the altar;" and then he simply produces the injunction, without any attempt to show that it had the authority of the Legislature, and appears to be under the impression that he has proved his point. *

The injunctions were put forth in the summer of 1547, and in the ensuing winter was passed the statute 1 Edw. VI., c. 12, which repealed the Acts in question, declaring that the Act "made in the Parliament holden at Westminster in the thirty-first year of the reign of the late King Henry VIII., that proclamations made by the King's Highness, by the advice of his Honourable Council, should be obeyed and kept as though they were made by authority of Parliament, and also one other Act, made in the Parliament holden in the thirty-fourth year of the reign of the said late King Henry VIII., for the due execution of the said proclamations, and also all and every branch, article, and matters in the same statutes, and in every of them, mentioned or declared, shall from henceforth be repealed, and utterly made void and of no effect." Now it is a well-settled principle of law that any obligation flowing from a statute, either *immediately* or *mediately* (*i. e.*, from some rule or order made in pursuance of powers granted by a statute), becomes null and void as soon as the statute is repealed.*

It is on this ground that when it is intended to keep alive what has been previously done under the powers of a repealed Act, a saving clause is always inserted to this effect in the Act which repeals it.

To take a recent instance, the Acts in relation to Friendly Societies gave those bodies power to make rules for their own government, and declared that when duly made and certified by a barrister appointed for that purpose, they should be binding on the members of such societies. By 13 & 14 Viet., c. 115, the law concerning Friendly Societies was modified, and the previous Acts repealed. But in order to prevent rules already made under those Acts from becoming void, which would necessarily have ensued, and would have been inconvenient, the Act contained an express clause, "that such repeal shall not invalidate or affect anything which has been done before the passing of this Act, in pursuance of any of the said Acts." The injunction, therefore, cannot be considered as having any parliamentary authority in the second year of King Edward. Consequently, it cannot be referred to under these terms in the rubric, and its

* See the cases of *Surtees v. Ellison*, 9 Barn. and Cress., 752; *Kay v. Goodwin*, 6 Bing., 576; *Reg. v. Mawgan*, 8 Ad. and Ell., 496; *Barrow v. Arnaud*, 8 Q. B., 595. Mr. Badeley expressly admits this in his opinion, to which we have before referred. He says, "I cannot regard them [the injunctions] as having the force of law in the second year of Edward VI., inasmuch as the statute 31 Hen. VIII., c. 8, which gave the effect of an Act of Parliament to the King's proclamation, was repealed by the statute 1 Edw. VI., c. 12, s. 6; and as no reservation was made in this latter statute in favour of the proclamations issued under the provisions of the former, it is plain that what those injunctions required cannot be deemed to have been in use by authority of Parliament in the second year of Edward's reign." For this reason Mr. Badeley prefers to rely on the argument from the ancient canons, with which we have endeavoured to deal already.

bearing on the matter is thus disposed of. However, it may not be amiss to mention in passing, that by another Royal Proclamation put forth only two years later—viz., in 1549—the clause in question was wholly annulled, and it was ordered—

“That all parsons, vicars, and curates omit, in the reading of the injunctions, all such as make mention of the Popish Mass, of chantries, of candles upon the altar, or any other such like thing.

“Item for a uniformity: That no minister do counterfeit the Popish Mass, so as to kiss the Lord’s table; washing his fingers at every time in the communion; blessing his eyes with the paten or sudary; or crossing his head with the paten; shifting of the book from one place to another; laying down and licking the chalice of the communion; holding up his fingers, hands, or thumbs, joined towards his temples; breathing upon the bread or chalice; showing the sacrament openly before the distribution of the communion; ringing of sacring bells; or setting any light upon the Lord’s board at any time; and finally to use no other ceremonies than are appointed in the King’s Book of Common Prayer, or kneeling otherwise than is in the said book.” *

Upon the whole, then, the conclusion to which we are led is, that there is no ground to impugn the decision of the Judicial Committee, which states the effect of the rubric to be “that the same dress and the same utensils or articles which were used under the first Prayer-book of Edward VI. may still be used.”

But there is yet a final question. Is the rubric exclusive? Does it mean that those and *none other* are to be retained?

Dr. Lushington thought that “that which the Church has prescribed is a virtual prohibition of everything else *ejusdem generis*.”† Sir John Dodson appears to have doubted.‡ The Judicial Committee held that “the word ‘ornaments’ applies, and in this rubric is confined, to those articles the use of which in the services and ministrations of the Church is prescribed by the Prayer-book of Edward VI.”§

This appears on all accounts to be the only satisfactory view; a rule which permits of indefinite additions is for practical purposes little better than no rule at all.

That the framers of the first Prayer-book of Edward VI. intended that nothing else should be used except what was therein mentioned is sufficiently evident; for in the Preface it is said, “Furthermore, by this order the curates shall need none other books for their public service but this book and the Bible.”

This is a plain proof that nothing more *need* be used. And almost the next sentence (which still stands in our present Prayer-book) shows that there was to be no such thing as a voluntary use here and

* Cardwell’s Doc. Annals, vol. i., p. 74. The Act of Uniformity, establishing the new Prayer-book, had passed in the interval between the former injunctions and these.

† Moore’s Report of *Westerton v. Liddell*, p. 50.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

there of more than was enjoined :—"Whereas heretofore there hath been great diversity in saying and singing in churches within this realm; . . . now from henceforth all the whole realm shall have but one use." And by the Act of Uniformity (2 & 3 Edw. VI., c. 1), all ministers are to say the mattins, evensong, celebration of the Lord's Supper, commonly called the Mass, and administration of each of the sacraments, and all their common and open prayer, in such order and form as is mentioned in the said book, and none other or otherwise." And "if any manner of parson, &c., . . . shall use, wilfully and obstinately standing in the same, any other rite, ceremony, order, form, or manner of Mass openly or privily, or mattins, evensong, administration of the sacraments, or other open prayer than is mentioned and set forth in the said book," he is to suffer the penalties of the Act.

And by 1 Eliz., c. 2, s. 27, it is enacted "that all laws, statutes, and ordinances wherein or whereby any other service, administration of sacraments, or common prayer, is limited, established, or set forth to be used within this realm, or any other the Queen's dominions or countries, shall from henceforth be utterly void and of none effect."

And all these clauses are brought over and made to apply to the enforcing of our present Prayer-book by 13 & 14 Car. II., c. 4; and it is thereby enacted that all ministers are to use the various services "in such order and form as is mentioned in the said book," and this "to the intent that every person within this realm may certainly know the rule to which he is to conform in public worship and administration of sacraments, and other rites and ceremonies of the Church of England." How would this intent be effected if altar lights were to be lighted at particular times, and other ceremonies performed of which there is no mention in the rubric, and for which guidance must be sought in the ancient service-books? And in speaking of these books it must not be forgotten that, at the time at which our present Prayer-book was set forth in its latest form, viz., the reign of Charles II., they were not only not books in every one's hands, but were absolutely prohibited. The 3 & 4 Edw. VI., c. 10, was then in force (being revived by 1 Jac. I., c. 25, s. 48), and speaking of the ancient service-books, this Act says, "Which for that they be not called in, but permitted to remain undefaced, do not only give occasion to such perverse persons as do impugn the order and godly meaning of the King's said Book of Common Prayer, to continue in their old accustomed superstitious service, but also minister great occasion to diversity of opinions, rites, ceremonies, and services;" and it enacts "that all books called antiphoners, missals, grails, processionals, manuals, legends, pies, portuasses, primers in Latin or English, couchers, journals, ordinals, or other books or writings whatsoever,

heretofore used for services of the Church, written or printed in the English or Latin tongue, other than such as are or shall be set forth by the King's Majesty, shall be by authority of this present Act cleanly and utterly abolished, extinguished, and forbidden for ever to be used or kept in this realm, or elsewhere within any the King's dominions."

And by 3 Jac. I, c. 5, s. 25, it is enacted that no person shall "bring from beyond the seas, nor shall print, sell, or buy any Popish primers, missals, breviaries, &c."

The case then seems to stand thus:—All directions as to certain ancient ceremonies, and as to the use of certain ancient ornaments, are "left out"* of the rubrics of our present Book, while at the same time the Acts are allowed to remain in force that render illegal the possession of the books from which the appropriate directions might be obtained. What stronger indication could be given that such ceremonies and ornaments were not to be used?

Lastly, that the public authorities, in the reign of Edward VI., considered the intention of the Legislature to be that no other ceremonies should be used than those mentioned in the Prayer-book then issued, may fairly be gathered from the Royal Proclamation or injunctions of 1549, as cited above (p. 24). These expressly enjoin upon the clergy "to use no other ceremonies than are appointed in the King's Book of Common Prayer," and there seems no reason to doubt that they were put forth with a *bond fide* purpose of carrying out the new enactment as it was then understood.†

* It is hardly possible to read the Preface to the Prayer-book without feeling that the words "left out," in the paragraphs concerning the service of the Church, are used as equivalent to "abolished" in the paragraphs "of ceremonies."

† The respect which is due to the position of the Recorder of Salisbury, Mr. John D. Chambers, induces us to give, in a note, an opinion by him on the subject of altar lights, while at the same time we shall add, as briefly as possible (to avoid repetition), such observations as appear to us to dispose of the arguments which he uses. It is extracted from a paper by him on the effect of the judgment in *Westerton v. Liddell*, which is given at length in the Appendix to the "*Directorium Anglicanum*" (2nd Edit., London, 1865). After discussing other points he says,—

"Lastly, with regard to lights. As to these, there would be no difficulty, but that the Privy Council have most culpably refused to decide the point as to the parliamentary authority of the ancient ecclesiastical constitutions, canons, and common law, which expressly required 'candles to be lighted while the solemnities of the Mass were being performed.'"

It is submitted that the point, so far as this question is concerned, was, in fact, decided. Their Lordships say, "The word 'ornaments' applies, and in this rubric is confined, to those articles the use of which, in the services and ministrations of the Church, is prescribed by the Prayer-book of Edward VI.;" and again, "Their Lordships entirely agree . . . that, in the performance of the services, rites, and ceremonies ordered by the Prayer-Book, the directions contained in it must be strictly observed; that no omission and no addition can be permitted."—*Moore's Report*, pp. 156 and 187.

Mr. Chambers proceeds,—

"Omitting, however, all reference to this question, I think it plain that lights at the celebration of Holy Communion are lawful, though not obligatory, for, amongst many others, the following reasons:—1. The Cross was retained as a decoration by the Privy

At length then we have arrived at a landing-place. We have been led to it by a long, and to many, we fear, a wearisome process, but it is well worth gaining.

Council, because 'an emblem of the Christian faith' held in great repute and used by the early Christians." [He then proceeds to allege certain ancient authorities for the use of lights, and then concludes:—] "Hence, these lights were like the Cross primitive, and had no relation to superstitions, and are used as 'emblems of the Christian faith.'"

The short answer appears to be that the Cross was sanctioned as a "decoration" only, whereas altar lights, in the sense in which we are now concerned with them, are of a ritual or ceremonial character; and that there is therefore no analogy. The passage cited at p. 13 from the "Directorium" surely establishes this point beyond dispute.

His second argument is,—

"2. Because candlesticks appear as part of the furniture of very numerous churches, in the inventories, up to the end of Edward the Sixth's reign."

So do many churches possess candlesticks now; but it does not follow that they are for this particular use. Besides, there is no reason to doubt that articles may have remained among the goods of the church long after their use was discontinued.

"3. Because the parliamentary authority of the injunctions of Edward VI., requiring their lights 'to remain still,' was recognised by both the superior Courts as in force in the second year of Edward VI., and has never been repealed."

We submit that we have already shown that, if these injunctions ever had *parliamentary* authority, they lost it by the repeal of the Act under which they were issued, and that such repeal was in the *first* year of Edward. We find nothing in the judgment of the Judicial Committee hostile to this view, or which makes them in any way a concurrent authority with the rubric as to things used in the services.

"4. The express statement of Cosin, that, *by virtue of this rubric and these injunctions*, lights were in very general use during the reigns of Elizabeth and James I. and the statement of Fuller to the same effect, is strong historical evidence."

Something more than loose statements of usage is required to overturn a distinct legal argument. Unless the evidence be perfectly distinct, and the usage be shown to have been with the approbation of the constitutional authorities, a lawyer like Mr. Chambers would, on consideration, probably feel that no great reliance can be placed upon it.

"5. Because the 'lights' are 'quite consistent with the present service,' like the credence, and with the idea of a feast and a table."

The lights are by way of "addition" in the "performance of the services ordered by the Prayer-book," and therefore cannot be permitted. A credence table was sanctioned because it was an "article" not merely "consistent with," but "subsidiary to the service," and in fact required in order to comply with the directions of the rubric. (See Moore's Report, p. 187.)

"6. Because other Protestant bodies use them, as the Lutherans do, and Luther did."

This has a doctrinal rather than a legal bearing, and does not fall within our subject.

"7. Because, even regarding the 'high altar' as abolished, the place *where* they are to be put is immaterial; they are adjuncts of 'the sacrament,' not of the altar."

This proposition seems to require more proof. At most, it only goes to one of the objections against altar lights. The others are unaffected by it. And it may be added that the Judicial Committee appears to have considered altar lights as essential adjuncts to an altar. (See Moore's Report, p. 179.)

"8. Because the declaration of the Court, that crosses are to be excluded from the service because not mentioned in Edward's first Book, cannot apply to 'lights,' which are in force by virtue of another and independent authority of Parliament, co-existing in that second year, and not repealed by that book."

We trust we have shown that such is not the case, and that the Prayer-book was sub-

We have found that the legal effect of the judgment of the Judicial Committee (which in an humble way we have endeavoured to explain and vindicate against misapprehension and objection) is to put a very definite and distinct interpretation upon the rubric at the commencement of our present Book of Common Prayer. That rubric, when it speaks of "the authority of Parliament in the second year of the reign of King Edward VI.," is to be deemed to refer to the first Prayer-book of that monarch.

The ornaments recognised by our rubric, and by it invested with a legal sanction, are "the several articles used in the performance of the services and rites of the Church" which are mentioned in that Prayer-book.

The Church does not mean to sanction whatever articles were in use in Divine service at any time during the second year of King Edward—a matter to be determined (if at all) only by a search into mediæval canons, missals, and breviaries. On the contrary, we are referred at once to the rise of the Reformation, and to the first Prayer-book in the English tongue.

It may be said, perhaps, that the application of this test gives us one or two vestments for the clergy which are not now commonly in use. If this be so, and if it be thought right to revive them, they will be revived, not because found in mediæval missals, but because thought worthy to be retained by our early reformers. On the other hand, the negative results of the rule will be found to be important and decisive. They may be briefly illustrated by one more quotation from ritualist sources.

It is well known that a claim has been put forward by the ritualist

stituted for, and did not merely co-exist with, previous laws; but for the proof of this the reader must be referred to our previous pages, which cannot now be repeated.

"9. That 'lights' are 'decorations,' not 'ornaments,' as interpreted by the Privy Council, and are not forbidden to be used at any time or any place."

The judgment says, "All the several articles used in the performance of the services and rites of the Church are ornaments" (Moore's Report, p. 156); and these are distinguished from "articles not used in the services, but set up in churches as ornaments, in the sense of decorations" (p. 159). Now the "*Directorium Anglicanum*" tells us that the altar lights "should be lighted immediately before the Communion Service by the clerk in cassock, or in cassock and surplice. He should make a reverence before ascending to light them, and commence on the Epistle side."

It may probably be safely left to the reader to say under which class these lights, so to be used and lighted, must naturally fall. And it may be added that Dr. Littledale expressly contends for them as *ornaments*.

"10. For reasons formerly given, and to avoid raising some of these questions, I should recommend these 'lights,' which may issue from candles or be of gas, should be placed on the ledge or super-altar, now to be raised behind the table, and be some distance above it, or be in the shape of standards before the table."

This certainly looks like a want of confidence in the injunctions, which speak of "two lights *upon* the high altar," and has altogether the air of a compromise. But it does not affect the main argument, and we therefore forbear to remark upon it.

school on behalf of the use of incense in the service. The "Directorium Anglicanum" has the following on the subject of incense:—

"Directions for the Use of Incense at High Celebration of the Holy Eucharist.

"A quarter of an hour before the celebration, the thurifer should present himself at the sacristy, put on the cassock and *cotta*, and, in default of the acolytes, assist the sacred ministers to vest.

"The priest, deacon, and sub-deacon being vested, the blessing of the incense to be used in the procession takes place, immediately before leaving the sacristy. The celebrant receives the spoon from the deacon, who says, 'Be pleased, reverend father, to give a blessing;' he then takes incense from the *navicula* or incense boat (held by the deacon, who receives it from the thurifer), and puts it on the charcoal in three several portions, each time sprinkling it in the form of a cross. Then, in accordance with the deacon's prayer, he blesses the incense with his right hand, saying, 'Be thou blessed by Him in whose honour thou art to be burned.' The thurible is held by the thurifer whilst the incense is put in. The procession then moves into the aisle in the following order:—

"1. Thurifer, with thurible smoking, preceded by the cross-bearer.

"2. Acolytes.*

"3. Clergy, two and two in reverse order; the post nearest the celebrant being the place of honour.

"4. Procession of celebrant:

"a. Sub-deacon and deacon.

"β. The celebrant.

"N.B.—If a bishop be present, he precedes the celebrant. This supposes him not to act *pontifically*.†

"The celebrant, standing before the midst of the altar, turns round by his right, and then, with his side to the altar, puts incense into the thurible, the deacon ministering the spoon and holding the boat as before. The priest then blesses (*secretly*) the incense with the words already mentioned. He then receives the thurible from the deacon and incenses the midst of the altar and the two corners. The celebrant himself is then incensed by the deacon. After the Introit the priest again incenses the altar. The next incensing takes place before the Gospel,—the midst of the altar is alone incensed by the deacon,—the lectern from which the Gospel is read is *never* incensed.

"When the oblations are placed upon the altar, they are incensed by the celebrant, who is afterwards incensed by the deacon. An acolyte then incenses the choir. The next and last incensing takes place (in the West) after the consecration. When the consecration and adoration of the Sacred Body are over, the deacon rises and removes the pall from the chalice; and after the consecration and adoration of the Precious Blood, he replaces it, the chief assistant having incensed the Body and Blood of our Lord."‡

Now let us compare this pompous vision with the law of the sober and reformed Church of England.

A very few words will be sufficient.

* "In the West a lighted torch is carried in the outside hand." (Note in "Directorium.")

† "When a bishop acts pontifically, he goes last in the procession, with an attendant priest on either side."—*Ibidem*.

‡ "Direct. Anglic.," p. 73.

The thurible, the incense, the cross, the torch, are ornaments not found in the first Prayer-book of Edward VI. According, therefore, to the principle to which we have endeavoured to call attention, they are unauthorized by our present rubric, the directions contained in which (we are told by authority) "must be strictly observed," and "no omission and no addition can be permitted."*

Although altars (not being ornaments) do not fall within the terms of the rubric which we have lately been more especially considering, they came very prominently before the Judicial Committee; and we cannot conclude without contrasting the language of the extract which we have just given on that subject with the following sentences from their Lordships' judgment:—

"When the same thing is signified, it may not be of much importance by what name it is called; but the distinction between an altar and a communion table is in itself essential, and deeply founded in the most important difference in matters of faith between Protestants and Romanists, namely, in the different notions of the nature of the Lord's Supper which prevailed in the Roman Catholic Church at the time of the Reformation, and those which were introduced by the Reformers. By the former it was considered as a sacrifice of the body and blood of the Saviour. The altar was the place on which the sacrifice was to be made; the elements were to be consecrated, and being so consecrated, were treated as the actual body and blood of the victim. The Reformers, on the other hand, considered the Holy Communion not as a sacrifice, but as a feast to be celebrated at the Lord's table, though, as to the consecration of the elements, and the effect of this consecration, and several other points, they differed greatly amongst themselves."†

Accordingly, a monition was directed to the churchwardens "to remove the structure of stone used as a communion table in the church or chapel of St. Barnabas, together with the cross on or near the same, and to provide instead thereof a flat moveable table of wood."

BENJAMIN SHAW.

* See judgment of Judicial Committee in *Westerton v. Liddell*.—(Moore, p. 187.) In fact, Dr. Littledale justifies the use of incense simply on the ground of its use *previous* to the first Prayer-book of Edward VI., *i. e.*, on the authority of the mediæval canons and service-books; and it is from the Roman, Sarum, and York Missals that the passage in the "Directorium" is compiled. The latter, however, also relies on some old parochial accounts showing the use of incense. There is nothing to show that this was employed in Divine service, or for any other purpose than the allowable one of purifying the air of the church. In some of these instances it seems to have been for sanitary purposes. Thus,—

"All Hallows Steyning, London,—

"1563. In the time of sickness, item, for juniper for the church, 2*d*.


"1625. The time of God's visitation, item, paid for 10 lbs. of frankincense, at 3*d*. per lb., 2*s*. 6*d*."

Again—"Jesus Chapel, Cambridge,—

"1588. Juniper to air the chapel on St. Mark's day."—"Direct.," p. 12, *note*.

To allege such instances in support of a liturgical use of incense is only another instance of the remarkable kind of reasoning with which the "Directorium" abounds, and which we have before had occasion to notice.

† Moore's Report, p. 176.



THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED :

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON AND JOHN STUART MILL.

An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and of the principal Philosophical Questions discussed in his Writings. By JOHN STUART MILL. London, 1865.

THE reader of Plato's Republic will readily recall to mind that wonderful passage at the end of the sixth book, in which the philosopher, under the image of geometrical lines, exhibits the various relations of the intelligible to the sensible world ; especially his lofty aspirations with regard to "that second segment of the intelligible world, which reason of itself grasps by the power of dialectic, employing hypotheses, not as principles, but as veritable hypotheses, that is to say, as steps and starting-points, in order that it may ascend *as far as the unconditioned* (μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου), to the first principle of the universe, and having grasped this, may then lay hold of the principles next adjacent to it, and so go down to the end, using no sensible aids whatever, but employing abstract forms throughout, and terminating in forms."

This quotation is important for our present purpose in two ways. In the first place, it may serve, at the outset of our remarks, to propitiate those plain-spoken English critics who look upon new terms in philosophy with the same suspicion with which Jack Cade regarded "a noun and a verb, and such abominable words as no Christian ear can endure to hear," by showing that the head and front of our offending, "the Unconditioned," is no modern invention of Teutonic barbarism, but sanctioned even by the Attic elegance of a Plato. And in the second place, it contains almost a history in

miniature of the highest speculations of philosophy, both in earlier and in later times, and points out, with a clearness and precision the more valuable because uninfluenced by recent controversies, the exact field on which the philosophies of the Conditioned and the Unconditioned come into collision, and the nature of the problem which they both approach from opposite sides.

What is the meaning of this problem, the solution of which Plato proposes as the highest aim of philosophy—"to ascend to the unconditioned, and thence to deduce the universe of conditioned existence"? The problem has assumed different forms at different times: at present we must content ourselves with stating it in that in which it will most naturally suggest itself to a modern thinker, and in which it has the most direct bearing on the subject of the present article.

All consciousness must in the first instance present itself as a relation between two constituent parts, the person who is conscious, and the thing, whatever it may be, of which he is conscious. This contrast has been indicated, directly or indirectly, by various names—mind and matter; person and thing; subject and object; or, lastly, in the distinction, most convenient for philosophy, however uncouth in sound, between self and not self—the *ego* and the *non-ego*. In order to be conscious at all, I must be conscious of something: consciousness thus presents itself as the product of two factors, *I* and *something*. The problem of the unconditioned is, briefly stated, to reduce these two factors to one.

For it is manifest that, so long as they remain two, we have no unconditioned, but a pair of conditioned existences. If the *something* of which I am conscious is a separate reality, having qualities and modes of action of its own, and thereby determining, or contributing to determine, the form which my consciousness of it shall take, my consciousness is thereby conditioned, or partly dependent on something beyond itself. It is no matter, in this respect, whether the influence is direct or indirect—whether, for instance, I see a material tree, or only the mental image of a tree. If the nature of the thing in any degree determines the character of the image—if the visible form of a tree is different from that of a house because the tree itself is different from the house, my consciousness is, however remotely, influenced by something different from itself, the *ego* by the *non-ego*. And on the other hand, if I, who am conscious, am a real being, distinct from the things of which I am conscious—if the conscious mind has a constitution and laws of its own by which it acts, and if the mode of its consciousness is in any degree determined by those laws, the *non-ego* is so far conditioned by the *ego*; the thing which I see is not seen absolutely and *per se*, but in a form partly dependent upon the laws of my vision.

The first step towards the reduction of these two factors to one may

obviously be made in three different ways. Either the *ego* may be represented as a mode of the *non-ego*, or the *non-ego* of the *ego*, or both of a *tertium quid*, distinct from either. In other words: it may be maintained, *first*, that matter is the only real existence; mind and all the phenomena of consciousness being really the result solely of material laws; the brain, for example, secreting thought as the liver secretes bile; and the distinct personal existence of which I am apparently conscious being only the result of some such secretion. This is *Materialism*, which has then to address itself to the further problem, to reduce the various phenomena of matter to some one absolutely first principle on which everything else depends. Or it may be maintained, *secondly*, that mind is the only real existence; the intercourse which we apparently have with a material world being really the result solely of the laws of our mental constitution. This is *Idealism*, which again has next to attempt to reduce the various phenomena to some one immaterial principle. Or it may be maintained, *thirdly*, that real existence is to be sought neither in mind as mind nor in matter as matter; that both classes of phenomena are but qualities or modes of operation of something distinct from both, and on which both alike are dependent. Hence arises a third form of philosophy, which, for want of a better name, we will call *Indifferentism*, as being a system in which the characteristic differences of mind and matter are supposed to disappear, being merged in something higher than both.

In using the two former of these terms, we are not speaking of Materialism and Idealism as they have always actually manifested themselves, but only of the distinguishing principle of these systems when pushed to its extreme result. It is quite possible to be a materialist or an idealist with respect to the immediate phenomena of consciousness, without attempting a philosophy of the Unconditioned at all. But it is also possible, and in itself natural, when such a philosophy is attempted, to attempt it by means of the same method which has approved itself in relation to subordinate inquiries; to make the relation between the human mind and its objects the type and image of that between the universe and its first principle. And such attempts have actually been made, both on the side of Materialism and on that of Idealism; and probably would be made oftener, did not counteracting influences frequently hinder the logical development of speculative principles.

In modern times, and under Christian influences, these several systems are almost necessarily identified with inquiries concerning the existence and nature of God. The influence of Christianity has been indirectly felt, even in speculations prosecuted in apparent independence of it; and the admission of an absolute first principle of all things distinct from God, or the acknowledgment of a God separate

from or derived from the first principle of all things, is an absurdity which, since the prevalence of Christianity, has become almost impossible, even to antichristian systems of thought. In earlier times, indeed, this union of philosophy with theology was by no means so imperative. A philosophy like that of Greece, which inherited its speculations from a poetical theogony, would see no difficulty in attributing to the god or gods of its religious belief a secondary and derived existence, dependent on some higher and more original principle, and in separating that principle itself from all immediate connection with religion. It was possible to assume, with the Ionian, a material substance, or, with the Eleatic, an indifferent abstraction, as the first principle of things, without holding that principle to be God, or, as the only alternative, denying the existence of a God; and thus, as Aristotle has observed, theologians endeavoured to evade the consequences of their abstract principles, by attributing to the chief good a later and derived existence, as the poets supposed the supreme God to be of younger birth than night and chaos and sea and sky.* But to a Christian philosophy, or to a philosophy in any way influenced by Christianity, this method of evasion is no longer possible. If all conditioned existence is dependent on some one first and unconditioned principle, either that principle must be identified with God, or our philosophical speculations must fall into open and avowed atheism.

But at this point the philosophical inquiry comes in contact with another line of thought, suggested by a different class of the facts of consciousness. As a religious and moral being, man is conscious of a relation of a personal character, distinct from any suggested by the phenomena of the material world,—a relation to a supreme Personal Being, the object of his religious worship, and the source and judge of his moral obligations and conduct. To adopt the name of God in an abstract speculation merely as a conventional denomination for the highest link in the chain of thought, and to believe in Him for the practical purposes of worship and obedience, are two very different things; and for the latter, though not for the former, the conception of God as a Person is indispensable. Were man a being of pure intellect, the problem of the Unconditioned would be divested of its chief difficulty; but he is also a being of religious and moral faculties, and these also have a claim to be satisfied by any valid solution of the problem. Hence the question assumes another and a more complex form. How is the one absolute existence, to which philosophy aspires, to be identified with the personal God demanded by our religious feelings?

Shall we boldly assume that the problem is already solved, and that the personal God is the very Unconditioned of which we were in

* *Metaph.*, xiv. 4.

search? This is to beg the question, not to answer it. Our conception of a personal being, derived as it is from the immediate consciousness of our own personality, seems, on examination, to involve conditions incompatible with the desired assumption. Personal agency, similar to our own, seems to point to something very different from an absolutely first link in a chain of phenomena. Our actions, if not determined, are at least influenced by motives; and the motive is a prior link in the chain, and a condition of the action. Our actions, moreover, take place in time; and time, as we conceive it, cannot be regarded as an absolute blank, but as a condition in which phenomena take place as past, present, and future. Every act taking place in time implies something antecedent to itself; and this something, be it what it may, hinders us from regarding the subsequent act as absolute and unconditioned. Nay, even time itself, apart from the phenomena which it implies, has the same character. If an act cannot take place except in time, time is the condition of its taking place. To conceive the unconditioned, as the first link in a chain of conditioned consequences, it seems necessary that we should conceive something out of time, yet followed by time; standing at the beginning of all duration and succession, having no antecedent, but followed by a series of consequents.

Philosophical theologians have been conscious of this difficulty, almost from the earliest date at which philosophy and Christian theology came in contact with each other. From a number of testimonies of similar import, we select one or two of the most striking. Of the Divine Nature, Gregory Nyssen says: "It is neither in place nor in time, but before these and above these in an unspeakable manner, contemplated itself by itself, through faith alone; neither measured by ages, nor moving along with times,"* "In the changes of things," says Augustine, "you will find a past and a future; in God you will find a present where past and future cannot be."† "Eternity," says Aquinas, "has no succession, but exists all together."‡ Among divines of the Church of England, we quote two names only, but those of the highest:—"The duration of eternity," says Bishop Pearson, "is completely indivisible and all at once; so that it is ever present, and excludes the other differences of time, past and future."§ And Barrow enumerates among natural modes of being and operation, far above our reach, "God's eternity without succession," coupling it with "His prescience without necessitation of events."|| But it is needless to multiply authorities for a doctrine so familiar to every student of theology.

* C. Eunom., i., p. 98, Ed. Grætser.

† In Joann. Evang., tract. xxxvii. 10.

‡ Summa, pars i., qu. x., art. 1.

§ Minor Theol. Works, vol. i., p. 106.

|| Sermon on the Unsearchableness of God's Judgments

Thus, then, our two lines of thought have led us to conclusions which, at first sight, appear to be contradictory of each other. To be conceived as unconditioned, God must be conceived as exempt from action in time: to be conceived as a person, if His personality resembles ours, He must be conceived as acting in time. Can these two conclusions be reconciled with each other; and if not, which of them is to be abandoned? The true answer to this question is, we believe, to be found in a distinction which some recent critics regard with very little favour,—the distinction between Reason and Faith; between the power of *conceiving* and that of *believing*. We cannot, in our present state of knowledge, reconcile these two conclusions; yet we are not required to abandon either. We cannot conceive the manner in which the unconditioned and the personal are united in the Divine Nature; yet we may believe that, in some manner unknown to us, they are so united. To conceive the union of two attributes in one object of thought, I must be able to conceive them as united in some particular manner: when this cannot be done, I may nevertheless believe *that* the union is possible, though I am unable to conceive *how* it is possible. The problem is thus represented as one of those Divine mysteries, the character of which is clearly and well described in the language of Leibnitz:—"Il en est de même des autres mystères, où les esprits modérés trouveront toujours une explication suffisante pour croire, et jamais autant qu'il en faut pour comprendre. Il nous suffit d'un certain *ce que c'est* (τί ἐστὶ) mais le *comment* (πῶς) nous passe, et ne nous est point nécessaire."*

But this distinction involves a further consequence. If the mysteries

* "Théodicée, Discours de la Conformité de la Foi avec la Raison," § 56. Leibnitz, it will be observed, uses the expression *pour comprendre*, for which, in the preceding remarks, we have substituted *to conceive*. The change has been made intentionally, on account of an ambiguity in the former word. Sometimes it is used, as Leibnitz here uses it, to denote an apprehension of the manner in which certain attributes can coexist in an object. But sometimes (to say nothing of other senses) it is used to signify a complete knowledge of an object in all its properties and their consequences, such as it may be questioned whether we have of any object whatever. This ambiguity, which has been the source of much confusion and much captious criticism, is well pointed out by Norris in his "Reason and Faith" (written in reply to Toland, p. 118, Ed. 1697: "When we say that *above reason* is when we do not comprehend or perceive the truth of a thing, this must not be meant of not comprehending the truth in its whole latitude and extent, so that as many truths should be said to be above reason as we cannot thus thoroughly comprehend and pursue throughout all their consequences and relations to other truths (for then almost everything would be above reason), but only of not comprehending the union or connection of those immediate ideas of which the proposition supposed to be above reason consists." *Comprehension*, as thus explained, answers exactly to the ordinary logical use of the term *conception*, to denote the combination of two or more attributes in an unity of representation. In the same sense, M. Peisse, in the preface to his translation of Hamilton's "Fragments," p. 98, says,—"*Comprendre, c'est voir un terme en rapport avec un autre; c'est voir comme un ce qui est donné comme multiple.*" This is exactly the sense in which Hamilton himself uses the word *conception*. (See Reid's Works, p. 377.)

of the Divine Nature are not apprehended by reason as existing in a particular manner (in which case they would be mysteries no longer), but are accepted by faith as existing in some manner unknown to us, it follows that we do not know God as He is in His absolute nature, but only as He is imperfectly represented by those qualities in His creatures which are analogous to, but not identical with, His own. If, for example, we had a knowledge of the Divine Personality as it is in itself, we should know it as existing in a certain manner compatible with unconditioned action; and this knowledge of the manner would at once transform our conviction from an act of faith to a conception of reason. If, on the other hand, the only personality of which we have a positive knowledge is our own, and if our own personality can only be conceived as conditioned in time, it follows that the Divine Personality, in so far as it is exempt from conditions, does not resemble the only personality which we directly know, and is not adequately represented by it. This necessitates a confession, which, like the distinction which gives rise to it, has been vehemently condemned by modern critics, but which has been concurred in with singular unanimity by earlier divines of various ages and countries,—the confession that the knowledge which man in this life can have of God is not a knowledge of the Divine Nature as it is in itself, but only of that nature as imperfectly represented through analogous qualities in the creature. Were it not that this doctrine has been frequently denounced of late as an heretical novelty, we should hardly have thought it necessary to cite authorities in proof of its antiquity and catholicity. As it is, we will venture to produce a few only out of many, selecting not always the most important, but those which can be best exhibited *verbatim* in a short extract.

CHRYSOSTOM.—“De Incompr. Dei Natura,” Hom. i. 3: “*That* God is everywhere, I know; and *that* He is wholly everywhere, I know; but the *how*, I know not: *that* He is without beginning, ungenerated and eternal, I know; but the *how*, I know not.”

BASIL.—Ep. cccxxiv.: “That God is, I know; but what is His essence I hold to be above reason. How then am I saved? By faith; and faith is competent to know that God is, not what He is.”

CYRIL OF JERUSALEM.—Catech. vi. 2: “We declare not what God is, but candidly confess that we know not accurately concerning Him. For in those things which concern God, it is great knowledge to confess our ignorance.”

AUGUSTINE.—Enarr. in Psalm. lxxxv. 8: “God is ineffable; we more easily say what He is not than what He is.” Serm. cccxli.: “I call God just, because in human words I find nothing better; for He is beyond justice. . . . What then is worthily said of God? Some one, perhaps, may reply and say, *that He is just*. But another, with better understanding, may say that even this word is surpassed by His excellence, and that even this is said of Him unworthily, though it be said fittingly according to human capacity.”

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA.—“In Joann. Evang.,” l. ii., c. 5 : “For those things which are spoken concerning it [the Divine Nature] are not spoken as they are in very truth, but as the tongue of man can interpret, and as man can hear ; for he who sees in an enigma also speaks in an enigma.”

DAMASCENUS.—“De Fide Orthod.,” i. 4 : “That God is, is manifest ; but what He is in His essence and nature is utterly incomprehensible and unknown.”

AQUINAS.—“Summa,” pars i., qu. xiii., art. 1 : “We cannot so name God that the name which denotes Him shall express the Divine Essence as it is, in the same way as the name *man* expresses in its signification the essence of man as it is.” *Ibid.*, art. 5 : “When the name *wise* is said of a man, it in a manner describes and comprehends the thing signified : not so, however, when it is said of God ; but it leaves the thing signified as uncomprehended and exceeding the signification of the name. Whence it is evident that this name *wise* is not said in the same manner of God and of man. The same is the case with other names ; whence no name can be predicated univocally of God and of creatures ; yet they are not predicated merely equivocally. . . . We must say, then, that such names are said of God and of creatures according to analogy, that is, proportion.”

HOOKE.—“Ecc. Pol.,” l., ii. 2.—“Dangerous it were for the feeble brain of man to wade far into the doings of the Most High ; whom although to know be life, and joy to make mention of His name, yet our soundest knowledge is to know that we know Him not as indeed He is, neither can know Him.”

USHER.—“Body of Divinity,” p. 45, Ed. 1645 : “Neither is it [the wisdom of God] communicated to any creature, neither can be ; for it is unconceivable, as the very essence of God Himself is unconceivable, and unspeakable as it is.”

LEIGHTON.—Theol. Lect. XXI., Works, vol. iv., p. 327, Ed. 1830 : “Though in the schools they distinguish the Divine attributes or excellences, and that by no means improperly, into communicable and incommunicable ; yet we ought so to guard this distinction, as always to remember that those which are called communicable, when applied to God, are not only to be understood in a manner incommunicable and quite peculiar to Himself, but also, that in Him they are in reality infinitely different [in the original, *aliud omnino, immensum aliud*] from those virtues, or rather, in a matter where the disparity of the subjects is so very great, those shadows of virtues that go under the same name, either in men or angels.”

PEARSON.—Minor Theol. Works, vol. i., p. 13 : “God in Himself is an absolute being, without any relation to creatures, for He was from eternity without any creature, and could, had He willed, be to eternity without creature. But God cannot naturally be known by us otherwise than by relation to creatures, as, for example, under the aspect of dominion, or of cause, or in some other relation.”*

BEVERIDGE.—“On the Thirty-nine Articles,” p. 16, Ed. 1846 : “But seeing the properties of God do not so much denote what God is, as what we apprehend Him to be in Himself ; when the properties of God are predicated one of another, one thing in God is not predicated of another, but our apprehensions of the same thing are predicated one of another.”

* Bishop Pearson’s language is yet more explicit in another passage of the same work, which we give in the original Latin :—“Non dantur pro hoc statu nomina quæ Deum significant quidditative. Patet ; quia nomina sunt conceptuum. Non autem dantur in hoc statu conceptus quidditativi de Deo.”—(P. 136.)

LESLIE.—“Method with the Deists,” p. 63, Ed. 1745: “What we call *faculties* in the soul, we call *Persons* in the Godhead; because there are personal actions attributed to each of them. . . . And we have no other word whereby to express it; we speak it after the manner of men; nor could we understand if we heard any of those unspeakable words which express the Divine Nature in its proper essence; therefore we must make allowances, and great ones, when we apply words of our nature to the Infinite and Eternal Being.” *Ibid.*, p. 64: “By the word *Person*, when applied to God (for want of a proper word whereby to express it), we must mean something infinitely different from personality among men.”

The system of theology represented by these extracts may, we believe, be fairly summed up as follows:—We believe that God in His own nature is absolute and unconditioned; but we can only positively conceive Him by means of relations and conditions suggested by created things. We believe that His own nature is simple and uniform, admitting of no distinction between various attributes, nor between any attribute and its subject; but we can conceive Him only by means of various attributes, distinct from the subject and from each other.* We believe that in His own nature He is exempt from all relations of time; but we can conceive Him only by means of ideas and terms which imply temporal relations, a past, a present, and a future.† Our thought, then, must not be taken as the measure and limit of our belief: we think by means of relations and conditions derived from created things; we believe in an Absolute Being, in whose nature these conditions and relations, in some manner unknown to us, disappear in a simple and indivisible unity.

The most important feature of this philosophical theology, and the one which exhibits most clearly the practical difference between reason and faith, is that, in dealing with theoretical difficulties, it does not appeal to our knowledge, but to our ignorance: it does not profess to offer a definite solution; it only tells us that we might find one if we knew all. It does not profess, for example, to solve the apparent contradiction between God’s foreknowledge and man’s free will; it does not say, “This is the way in which God foreknows, and in this

* This will be found most distinctly stated in the context of the extract from Beveridge, and in the citations from St. Augustine given in his notes; to which may be added the following from “De Trinitate,” vi. 7:—“Deus vero multipliciter quidem dicitur magnus, bonus, sapiens, beatus, verus, et quidquid aliud non indigne dici videtur; sed eadem magnitudo ejus est quæ sapientia, non enim mole magnus est, sed virtute; et eadem bonitas quæ sapientia et magnitudo, et eadem veritas quæ illa omnia: et non est ibi aliud beatum esse et aliud magnum, aut sapientem, aut verum, aut bonum esse, aut omnino ipsum esse.”

† Compare the remarkable words of Bishop Beveridge, *l. c.*, “And therefore, though I cannot apprehend His mercy to Abel in the beginning of the world, and His mercy to me now, but as two distinct expressions of His mercy, yet as they are in God, they are but one and the same act,—as they are in God, I say, who is not measured by time, as our apprehensions of Him are, but is Himself eternity; a centre without a circumference, eternity without time.”

way His foreknowledge is reconcileable with human freedom;" it only says, "The contradiction is apparent, but need not be real. Freedom is incompatible with God's foreknowledge, only on the supposition that God's foreknowledge is like man's: if we knew exactly how the one differs from the other, we might be able to see that what is incompatible with the one is not so with the other. We cannot solve the difficulty, but we can believe that there is a solution."

It is this open acknowledgment of our ignorance of the highest things which makes this system of philosophy distasteful to many minds: it is the absence of any similar acknowledgment which forms the attraction and the seductiveness of Pantheism in one way, and of Positivism in another. The pantheist is not troubled with the difficulty of reconciling the philosophy of the absolute with belief in a personal God; for belief in a personal God is no part of his creed. Like the Christian, he may profess to acknowledge a first principle, one, and simple, and indivisible, and unconditioned; but he has no need to give to this principle the name of God, or to invest it with such attributes as are necessary to satisfy man's religious wants. His God (so far as he acknowledges one at all) is not the first principle and cause of all things, but the aggregate of the whole—a universal substance underlying the world of phenomena, or a universal process, carried on in and by the changes of things. Hence, as Aristotle said of the Eleatics, that, by asserting all things to be one, they annihilated causation, which is the production of one thing from another, so it may be said of the various schools of Pantheism, that, by maintaining all things to be God, they evade rather than solve the great problem of philosophy, that of the relation between God and His creatures. The positivist, on the other hand, escapes the difficulty by an opposite course. He declines all inquiry into reality and causation, and maintains that the only office of philosophy is to observe and register the invariable relations of succession and similitude in phenomena. He does not necessarily deny the existence of God; but his personal belief, be it what it may, is a matter of utter indifference to his system. Religion and philosophy may perhaps go on side by side; but their provinces are wholly distinct, and therefore there is no need to attempt a reconciliation between them. God, as a first cause, lives like an Epicurean deity in undisturbed ease, apart from the world of phenomena, of which alone philosophy can take cognisance: philosophy, as the science of phenomena, contents itself with observing the actual state of things, without troubling itself to inquire how that state of things came into existence. Hence, neither Pantheism nor Positivism is troubled to explain the relation of the One to the Many, for the former acknowledges only the One, and the latter acknowledges only the Many.

It is between these two systems, both seductive from their apparent simplicity, and both simple only by mutilation, that the Philosophy of the Conditioned, of which Sir William Hamilton is the representative, endeavours to steer a middle course, at the risk of sharing the fate of most mediators in a quarrel,—being repudiated and denounced by both combatants, because it declares them to be both in the wrong. Against Pantheism, which is the natural development of the principle of Indifferentism, it enters a solemn protest, by asserting that the Absolute must be accepted in philosophy, not as a problem to be solved by reason, but as a reality to be believed in, though above reason; and that the pseudo-absolute, which Pantheism professes to exhibit in a positive conception, is shown, by the very fact of its being so conceived, not to be the true Absolute. Against Positivism, which is virtually Materialism, it protests no less strongly, maintaining that the philosophy which professes to explain the whole of nature by the aid of material laws alone, proceeds upon an assumption which does not merely dispense with God as a scientific hypothesis, but logically involves consequences which lead to a denial of His very existence. Between both extremes it holds an intermediate position, neither aspiring, with Pantheism, to solve the problems of the absolute, nor neglecting them, with Positivism, as altogether remote from the field of philosophical inquiry; but maintaining that such problems must necessarily arise, and must necessarily be taken into account in every adequate survey of human nature and human thought, and that philosophy, if it cannot solve them, is bound to show why they are insoluble.

Let us hear Hamilton's own words in relation to both the systems which he opposes. Against Pantheism, and the Philosophy of the Unconditioned in general, he says:—

“The Conditioned is the mean between two extremes,—two inconditionates, exclusive of each other, *neither of which can be conceived as possible,** but of which, on the principles of contradiction and excluded middle, *one must be admitted as necessary.* On this opinion, therefore, our faculties are shown to be weak, but not deceitful. The mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions, subversive of each other, as equally possible; but only as unable to understand as possible either of the two extremes; one of which, however, on the ground of their mutual repugnance, it is compelled to recognise as true. We are thus taught the salutary lesson, that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the measure of existence; and are warned from recognising the domain of our knowledge as necessarily co-extensive with the horizon of our faith. And by a won-

* It must be remembered that, to conceive a thing as possible, we must conceive the manner in which it is possible, but that we may believe in the fact without being able to conceive the manner. Had Hamilton distinctly expressed this, he might have avoided some very groundless criticisms, with which he has been assailed for maintaining a distinction between the provinces of conception and belief.

derful revelation, we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality."—*Discussions*, p. 15.

Against Materialism, and virtually against Positivism in general, he says:—

"If in man, intelligence be a free power,—in so far as its liberty extends, intelligence must be independent of necessity and matter; and a power independent of matter necessarily implies the existence of an immaterial subject—that is, a spirit. If, then, the original independence of intelligence on matter in the human constitution—in other words, if the spirituality of mind in man, be supposed a datum of observation, in this datum is also given both the condition and the proof of a God. For we have only to infer, what analogy entitles us to do, that intelligence holds the same relative supremacy in the universe which it holds in us, and the first positive condition of a Deity is established, in the establishment of the absolute priority of a free creative intelligence. On the other hand, let us suppose the result of our study of man to be, that intelligence is only a product of matter, only a reflex of organisation, such a doctrine would not only afford no basis on which to rest any argument for a God, but, on the contrary, would positively warrant the atheist in denying His existence. For if, as the materialist maintains, the only intelligence of which we have any experience be a consequent of matter,—on this hypothesis, he not only cannot assume this order to be reversed in the relations of an intelligence beyond his observation, but, if he argue logically, he must positively conclude that, as in man, so in the universe, the phenomena of intelligence or design are only in their last analysis the products of a brute necessity. Psychological Materialism, if carried out fully and fairly to its conclusions, thus inevitably results in theological Atheism; as it has been well expressed by Dr. Henry More, *Nullus in microcosmo spiritus, nullus in macrocosmo Deus*. I do not, of course, mean to assert that all materialists deny or actually disbelieve a God. For in very many cases, this would be at once an unmerited compliment to their reasoning, and an unmerited reproach to their faith."—*Lectures*, vol. i., p. 31.

* This part of Hamilton's teaching is altogether repudiated by a recent writer, who, strangely enough, professes to be his disciple, while rejecting all that is really characteristic of his philosophy. Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his work on "First Principles," endeavours to press Sir W. Hamilton into the service of Pantheism and Positivism together, by adopting the negative portion only of his philosophy—in which, in common with many other writers, he declares the absolute to be inconceivable by the mere intellect,—and rejecting the positive portions, in which he most emphatically maintains that the belief in a personal God is imperatively demanded by the facts of our moral and emotional consciousness. Mr. Spencer regards religion as nothing more than a consciousness of natural facts as being in their ultimate genesis unaccountable—a theory which is simply a combination of the positivist doctrine, that we know only the relations of phenomena, with the pantheist assumption of the name of God to denote the substance or power which lies beyond phenomena. No theory can be more opposed to the philosophy of the conditioned than this. Sir W. Hamilton's fundamental principle is, that consciousness must be accepted entire, and that the moral and religious feelings, which are the primary source of our belief in a personal God, are in no way invalidated by the merely negative inferences which have deluded men into the assumption of an impersonal absolute; the latter not being legitimate deductions from consciousness rightly interpreted. Mr. Spencer, on the

In the few places in which Hamilton speaks directly as a theologian, his language is in agreement with the general voice of Catholic theology down to the end of the seventeenth century, some specimens of which have been given on a previous page. Thus he says ("Discussions," p. 15): "True, therefore, are the declarations of a pious philosophy,—‘A God understood would be no God at all;’ ‘To think that God is, as we can think Him to be, is blasphemy.’ The Divinity, in a certain sense, is revealed; in a certain sense is concealed: He is at once known and unknown. But the last and highest consecration of all true religion must be an altar *Ἀγνώστῳ Θεῷ*—‘*To the unknown and unknowable God.*’" A little later (p. 20) he says: "We should not recoil to the opposite extreme; and though man be not identical with the Deity, still is he ‘created in the image of God.’ It is, indeed, only through an analogy of the human with the Divine nature, that we are percipient and recipient of Divinity." In the first of these passages we have an echo of the language of Basil, the two Cyrils, and John Damascene, and of our own Hooker and Usher; while in the second we find the counter truth, intimated by Augustine and other Fathers,* and clearly stated by Aquinas, and which in the last century was elaborately expounded in the "Divine Analogy" of Bishop Browne,—namely, that though we know not God in His own nature, yet are we not wholly ignorant of Him, but may attain to an imperfect knowledge of Him through the analogy between human things and Divine.

As regards theological results, therefore, there is nothing novel or peculiar in Hamilton's teaching; nor was he one who would have regarded novelty in theology as a recommendation. The peculiarity of his system, by which his reputation as a philosopher must ultimately stand or fall, is the manner in which he endeavoured to con-

other hand, takes these negative inferences as the only basis of religion, and abandons Hamilton's great principle of the distinction between knowledge and belief, by quietly dropping out of his system the facts of consciousness which make such a distinction necessary. His whole system is, in fact, a pertinent illustration of Hamilton's remark, that "the phenomena of matter" [and of mind, he might add, treated by materialistic methods] "taken by themselves (you will observe the qualification, taken by themselves), so far from warranting any inference to the existence of a God, would, on the contrary, ground even an argument to His negation." Mr. Spencer, like Mr. Mill, denies the freedom of the will; and this, according to Hamilton, leads by logical consequence to Atheism.

* As *e. g.*, by Tertullian ("Adv. Marc.," l. ii., c. 16): "Et hæc ergo imago censenda est Dei in homine, quod eisdem motus et sensus habeat humanus animus quos et Deus, licet non tales quales Deus: pro substantia enim, et status eorum et exitus distant." And by Gregory Nazianzen, Orat. xxxvii.: *Ὀνομάσαμεν γὰρ ὡς ἡμῖν ἐπετὶδὼν ἐκ τῶν ὑπερίστων τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ*. And by Hilary, "De Trin.," i. 19: "Comparatio enim terrenorum ad Deum nulla est; sed infirmitas nostræ intelligentiæ cogit species quasdam ex inferioribus, tanquam superiorum indices quærere; ut rerum familiarium consuetudine admovente, ex sensus nostri conscientia ad insoliti sensus opinionem educeremur."

nect these theological conclusions with psychological principles; and thus to vindicate on philosophical grounds the position which Catholic divines had been compelled to take in the interests of dogmatic truth. That the absolute nature of God, as a supertemporal and yet personal Being, must be believed in as a fact, though inaccessible to reason as regards the manner of its possibility, is a position admitted, almost without exception, by divines who acknowledge the mystery of a personal Absolute—still more by those who acknowledge the yet deeper mystery of a Trinity in Unity. “We believe and know,” says Bishop Sanderson of the mysteries of the Christian faith, “and that with fulness of assurance, that all these things are so as they are revealed in the Holy Scriptures, because the mouth of God, who is Truth itself, and cannot lie, hath spoken them; and our own reason upon this ground teacheth us to submit ourselves and it to the obedience of faith, for the $\tau\acute{o}\ \delta\epsilon\iota\tau\iota$, that so it is. But then, for the $\tau\acute{o}\ \pi\acute{\omega}\varsigma$, Nicodemus his question, *How can these things be?* it is no more possible for our weak understandings to comprehend that, than it is for the eyes of bats or owls to look steadfastly upon the body of the sun, when he shineth forth in his greatest strength.”* This distinction Hamilton endeavoured to extend from the domain of Christian theology to that of philosophical speculation in general; to show that the unconditioned, as it is suggested in philosophy, no less than as it connects itself with revealed religion, is an object of belief, not of positive conception; and, consequently, that men cannot escape from mystery by rejecting revelation. “Above all,” he says, “I am confirmed in my belief by the harmony between the doctrines of this philosophy, and those of revealed truth. . . . For this philosophy is professedly a scientific demonstration of the impossibility of that ‘wisdom in high matters’ which the Apostle prohibits us even to attempt; and it proposes, from the limitation of the human powers, from our impotence to comprehend what, however, we must admit, to show articulately why the ‘secret things of God’ cannot but be to man ‘past finding out.’”† Faith in the inconceivable must thus become the ultimate refuge, even of the pantheist and the atheist, no less than of the Christian; the difference being, that while the last takes his stand on a faith which is in agreement alike with the authority of Scripture and the needs of human nature, the two former are driven to one which is equally opposed to both, as well as to the pretensions of their own philosophy.

Deny the Trinity; deny the Personality of God: there yet remains that which no man can deny as the law of his own consciousness—*Time*. Conditioned existence is existence in time: to attain to a philosophy of the unconditioned, we must rise to the conception of existence out of time. The attempt may be made in two ways, and

* Works, vol. i., p. 233.

† “Discussions,” p. 625.

in two only. Either we may endeavour to conceive an absolutely first moment of time, beyond which is an existence having no duration and no succession; or we may endeavour to conceive time as an unlimited duration, containing an infinite series of successive antecedents and consequents, each conditioned in itself, but forming altogether an unconditioned whole. In other words, we may endeavour, with the Eleatics, to conceive pure existence apart and distinct from all phenomenal change; or we may endeavour, with Heraclitus, to conceive the universe as a system of incessant changes, immutable only in the law of its own mutability; for these two systems may be regarded as the type of all subsequent attempts. Both, however, alike aim, at an object which is beyond positive conception, and which can be accepted only as something to be believed in spite of its inconceivability. To conceive an existence beyond the first moment of time, and to connect that existence as cause with the subsequent temporal succession of effects, we must conceive time itself as non-existent and then commencing to exist. But when we make the effort to conceive time as non-existent, we find it impossible to do so. Time, as the universal condition of human consciousness, clings round the very conception which strives to destroy it, clings round the language in which we speak of an existence *before* time. Nor are we more successful when we attempt to conceive an infinite regress of time, and an infinite series of dependent existences in time. To say nothing of the direct contradiction involved in the notion of an unconditioned *whole*,—a something completed,—composed of infinite parts—of parts never completed,—even if we abandon the Whole, and with it the Unconditioned, and attempt merely to conceive an infinite succession of conditioned existences—conditioned, absurdly enough, by nothing beyond themselves,—we find, that in order to do so, we must add moment to moment for ever—a process which would require an eternity for its accomplishment.* Moreover, the chain of dependent existences in

* See "Discussions," p. 29. Of course by this is not meant that no duration can be conceived except in a duration equally long—that a thousand years, *e. g.*, can only be conceived in a thousand years. A thousand years may be conceived as one unit: infinity cannot; for a unit is something complete, and therefore limited. What is meant is, that any period of time, however long, is conceived as capable of further increase, and therefore as not infinite. An infinite duration can have no time before or after it; and thus cannot resemble any portion of finite time, however great. When we dream of conceiving an infinite regress of time, says Sir W. Hamilton, "we only deceive ourselves by substituting the *indefinite* for the infinite, than which no two notions can be more opposed." This caution has not been attended to by some later critics. Thus, Dr. Whewell ("Philosophy of Discovery," p. 324) says: "The definition of an infinite number is not that it contains all possible unities; but this—that the progress of numeration, being begun according to a certain law, goes on without limit." This is precisely Descartes' definition, not of the *infinite*, but of the *indefinite*. "Principia," i. 26: "Nos autem illa omnia, in quibus sub aliqua consideratione nullum finem poterimus invenire, non quidem affirma-

this infinite succession is not, like a mathematical series, composed of abstract and homogeneous units; it is made up of divers phenomena, of a regressive line of causes, each distinct from the other. Wherever, therefore, I stop in my addition, I do not positively conceive the terms which lie beyond. I apprehend them only as a series of unknown *somethings*, of which I may believe *that* they are, but am unable to say *what* they are.

The cardinal point, then, of Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy, expressly announced as such by himself, is the absolute necessity, under any system of philosophy whatever, of acknowledging the existence of a sphere of belief beyond the limits of the sphere of thought. "The main scope of my speculation," he says, "is to show articulately that we *must believe*, as actual, much that we are unable (positively) to *conceive* as even possible."* It is, of course, beyond the range of such a speculation, by itself, to enter on an examination of the positive evidences in support of one form of belief rather than another. So far as it aims only at exhibiting a universal law of the human mind, it is of course compatible with all special forms of belief which do not contradict that law; and none, whatever their pretensions, can really contradict it. Hence the service which such a philosophy can render to the Christian religion must necessarily, from the nature of the case, be of an indirect and negative character. It prepares the way for a fair examination of the proper evidences of Christianity, by showing that there is no ground for any *à priori* prejudice against revelation, as appealing, for the acceptance of its highest truths, to faith rather than to reason; for that this appeal is common to all religions and to all philosophies, and cannot therefore be urged against one more than another. So far as certain difficulties are inherent in the constitution of the human mind itself, they must necessarily occupy the same position with respect to all religions alike. To exhibit the nature of these difficulties is a service to true religion; but it is the service of the pioneer, not of the builder; it does not prove the religion to be true; it only clears the ground for the production of the special evidences.

Where those evidences are to be found, Sir W. Hamilton has not failed to tell us. If mere intellectual speculations on the nature and origin of the material universe form a common ground in which the theist, the pantheist, and even the atheist, may alike expatiate, the moral and religious feelings of man—those facts of consciousness which have their direct source in the sense of personality and free

bimus esse infinita, sed ut indefinita spectabimus." An indefinite time is that which is capable of perpetual addition: an infinite time is one so great as to admit of no addition. Surely "no two notions can be more opposed."

* Letter to Mr. Calderwood. See "Lectures," vol. ii., p. 534.

will—plead with overwhelming evidence, in behalf of a personal God, and of man's relation to Him, as a person to a person. We have seen, in a previous quotation, Hamilton's emphatic declaration that "psychological materialism, if carried out fully and fairly to its conclusions, inevitably results in theological atheism." In the same spirit he tells us that "it is only as man is a free intelligence, a moral power, that he is created after the image of God;"* that "with the proof of the moral nature of man, stands or falls the proof of the existence of a Deity;" that "the possibility of morality depends on the possibility of liberty;" that "if man be not a free agent, he is not the author of his actions, and has therefore no responsibility, no moral personality at all;"† and, finally, "that he who disbelieves the moral agency of man, must, in consistency with that opinion, disbelieve Christianity."‡ We have thus, in the positive and negative sides of this philosophy, both a reasonable ground of belief and a warning against presumption. By our immediate consciousness of a moral and personal nature, we are led to the belief in a moral and personal God: by our ignorance of the unconditioned, we are led to the further belief, that behind that moral and personal manifestation of God there lies concealed a mystery—the mystery of the Absolute and the Infinite; that our intellectual and moral qualities, though indicating the nearest approach to the Divine Perfections which we are capable of conceiving, yet indicate them as analogous, not as identical; that we may naturally expect to find points where this analogy will fail us, where the function of the Infinite Moral Governor will be distinct from that of the finite moral servant; and where, consequently, we shall be liable to error in judging by human rules of the ways of God, whether manifested in nature or in revelation. Such is the true lesson to be learnt from a philosophy which tells us of a God who is "in a certain sense revealed, in a certain sense concealed—at once known and unknown."

It is not surprising that this philosophy, when compared with that of a critic like Mr. Mill, should stand out in clear and sharp antagonism. Mr. Mill is one of the most distinguished representatives of that school of Materialism which Sir W. Hamilton denounces as virtual Atheism. We do not mean that he consciously adopts the grosser tenets of the materialists. We are not aware that he has ever positively denied the existence of a soul distinct from the body, or maintained that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. But he is the advocate of a philosophical method which makes the belief in the existence of an immaterial principle superfluous and incongruous; he acknowledges no such distinction between the phenomena of mind and those of matter as to require the hypothesis of a

* "Lectures," vol. i., p. 30.

† *Ibid.*, p. 33.‡ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

second principle to account for it; he regards the ascertained laws of antecedence and succession in material phenomena as the type and rule according to which all phenomena whatever—those of internal consciousness no less than those of external observation—are to be tested: above all, he expressly denies the existence of that free will which Sir W. Hamilton regards as the indispensable condition of all morality and all religion. Thus, instead of recognising in the facts of intelligence, “an order of existence diametrically in contrast to that displayed to us in the facts of the material universe,”* he regards both classes of facts as of the same kind, and explicable by the same laws; he abolishes the primary contrast of consciousness between the *ego* and the *non-ego*—the person and the thing; he reduces man to a thing, instead of a person,—to one among the many phenomena of the universe, determined by the same laws of invariable antecedence and consequence, included under the same formulæ of empirical generalization. He thus makes man the slave and not the master of nature; passively carried along in the current of successive phenomena; unable, by any act of free will, to arrest a single wave in its course, or to divert it from its ordained direction.

This diametrical antagonism between the two philosophers is not limited to their first principles, but extends, as might naturally be expected, to every subordinate science of which the immediate object is mental, and not material. Logic, instead of being, as Sir W. Hamilton regards it, an *à priori* science of the necessary laws of thought, is with Mr. Mill a science of observation, investigating those operations of the understanding which are subservient to the estimation of evidence† The axioms of Mathematics, which the former philosopher regards, with Kant, as necessary thoughts, based on the *à priori* intuitions of space and time, the latter declares to be “experimental truths; generalizations from observation.”‡ Psychology, which with Hamilton is especially the philosophy of man as a free and personal agent, is with Mill the science of “the uniformities of succession; the laws, whether ultimate or derivative, according to which one mental state succeeds another.”§ And finally, in the place of Ethics, as the science of the *à priori* laws of man’s moral obligations, we are presented, in Mr. Mill’s system, with Ethology, the “science which determines the kind of character produced, in conformity to the general laws of mind, by any set of circumstances, physical and moral.”||

The contrast between the two philosophers being thus thorough-going, it was natural to expect beforehand that an “Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy,” by Mr. Mill, would contain a sharp and vigorous assault on the principal doctrines of that philo-

* Hamilton, “Lectures,” vol. i., p. 29.

† Mill’s “Logic,” Introduction, § 7.


‡ *Ibid.*, book ii. 5, § 4.

§ *Ibid.*, book vi. 4, § 3.

|| *Ibid.*, book vi. 5, § 4.

sophy. And this expectation has been amply fulfilled. But there was also reason to expect, from the ability and critical power displayed in Mr. Mill's previous writings, that his assault, whether successful or not in overthrowing his enemy, would at least be guided by a clear knowledge of that enemy's position and purposes; that his dissent would be accompanied by an intelligent apprehension, and an accurate statement, of the doctrines dissented from. In this expectation, we regret to say, we have been disappointed. Not only is Mr. Mill's attack on Hamilton's philosophy, with the exception of some minor details, unsuccessful; but we are compelled to add, that with regard to the three fundamental doctrines of that philosophy—the Relativity of Knowledge, the incognisability of the Absolute and Infinite, and the distinction between Reason and Faith—Mr. Mill has, throughout his criticism, altogether missed the meaning of the theories he is attempting to assail.

This is a serious charge to bring against a writer of such eminence as Mr. Mill, and one which should not be advanced without ample proof. Want of space alone prevents us from proceeding with the proof immediately; but we promise that it shall be forthcoming in the next portion of our article.



MODERN GREECE.

An Excursion in the Peloponnesus, in the year 1858. By the late Right Hon. Sir THOMAS WYSE, K.C.B., H.M. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Athens from 1849 to 1862. Edited by his Niece, WINIFREDE M. WYSE. Two vols., 8vo. London: Day and Son, 1865.

THERE is no want of books of travels in Greece. Soon after the beginning of the present century, before the modern race of tourists had extended their rambles beyond the shores of Italy, and when a voyage to the Levant was still a tedious and uncertain affair, the classical regions of Greece were explored by Dodwell, Sir W. Gell, and, above all, by Colonel Leake, with a zeal and diligence that contrast strikingly with the indolent, *dilettante* mode of travelling so general in these days of steamboats and railroads. Since the establishment of the independent kingdom of Greece, almost every corner of the land has been ransacked with the most praiseworthy energy by numerous German scholars, some of them residents in the country, others only paying it a temporary visit, but even these generally devoting themselves to the examination of its topography and antiquities with that minute and careful diligence so characteristic of their countrymen. The labours of Ross, of Ulrichs, of Forchhammer, and of Curtius, have contributed much to our information, even after the singularly complete and elaborate investigations of Colonel Leake; and there are now but few parts of the classic soil of Hellas where the antiquarian traveller can hope to find anything that has escaped the notice of his predecessors. Much, very much, undoubtedly remains to be discovered; but the task is one beyond the means of the unassisted traveller, and we must wait for systematic excavations to bring to light the treasures of art which in all probability still lie hid

beneath the surface, as well as to determine many doubtful questions by laying bare the foundations of temples and monuments of which no trace is now visible.

But while the requirements of the classical scholar and archæologist have thus been in great measure provided for, those of the general reader have been comparatively neglected. A good book of travels in Greece is still, in one sense, a *desideratum*,—there is none to which we could refer our readers for a lively and at the same time trustworthy account of the present state of the country and the people. Most travellers in this classic land have been so absorbed in the reminiscences of the past, that they have told us but little about the present. Colonel Mure's "Tour in Greece" is, indeed, in some degree an exception, and contains much interesting information concerning the country as it then was; but more than twenty-five years have elapsed since the date of his journey, a period during which the little kingdom of Greece may be said to have been going through a term of probation; and it is surely not without interest to learn the result. Yet, singularly enough, among the almost innumerable popular books of travels that load the shelves of our publishers, hardly one is devoted to the description of continental Greece; and of the swarms of English travellers who now annually visit the Nile, the Holy Land, and Constantinople, very few bestow more time upon Greece than suffices for a hasty glance at Athens and its vicinity.

Under these circumstances nothing can be more opportune than the appearance of the present volumes; for no one certainly could be better qualified than Sir Thomas Wyse to supply the deficiency thus indicated. During the long period of his residence as British minister at the Court of Athens, while he entered with enthusiastic interest into all the classical pursuits and associations which could add to the enjoyment of such a residence, his attention was at the same time steadily turned to the political and social condition of the people among whom he was living, and no exertion was wanting on his part to promote or encourage every tendency to progress and improvement. His name will long live in the grateful memory of the Greeks, who, whatever their faults, are not unmindful of those who show disinterested zeal in their cause, and who have never forgotten the services rendered them during the War of Independence by Byron, by Hamilton, and by Hastings.

The particular tour recorded in the present pages was undertaken, as we are informed by Miss Wyse in the Preface, with the special object of collecting information for the "Financial Commission to inquire into the Resources of Greece," which was appointed immediately after the Crimean War, and of which Sir Thomas Wyse was president. The statistical and other materials collected by that Com-

mission—forming “a large mass of valuable papers, which at the time was called a mine of knowledge and instruction”—have never been published: they still slumber in the archives of the Foreign Office. But even had they been given to the world, there are probably few of our readers who would have cared to wade through the pages of a ponderous blue-book, in search of the information which is now conveyed to them in a more attractive form. The journal kept by Sir Thomas Wyse was not originally designed for publication; and though he took it up again after a considerable interval with a view to prepare it for the press, his project was cut short abruptly by the hand of death. The care of its publication consequently devolved upon his accomplished niece, who had for many years presided over his house at Athens, had accompanied him upon the tour in question, was acquainted with all his views, and fully shared in his sympathy with the aspirations and endeavours of the people among whom they had both so long resided. In giving to the world the journal thus confided to her charge, Miss Wyse has not only discharged a debt of private gratitude to her uncle’s memory, but has conferred a real obligation upon the public, both in England and Greece, by affording the people of this country the means of forming a sound and well-grounded judgment upon the condition and prospects of the rising kingdom.

It is, indeed, somewhat to be regretted that so large a portion of the work before us should be devoted to antiquarian details and archaeological discussions, which can add but little to our knowledge, while the length to which they extend may have the effect of deterring some readers, who would gladly follow Sir Thomas Wyse through his animated descriptions of Greek scenery and Greek life, as he found it in the more secluded districts of the Peloponnese. In the following pages we propose to confine ourselves almost exclusively to those portions of the book which throw light upon the circumstances and condition of modern Greece. Neither the mode in which Sir Thomas Wyse travelled, nor the time at his disposal, admitted of his carrying on any such continuous researches as can alone, at the present day, add to our knowledge of the ancient Hellenic world.

In one respect, indeed, the tour made by Sir Thomas Wyse differed from those of any of his predecessors. He was accompanied on the excursion in question by two ladies,—his niece, to whom we are indebted for the publication of the present volumes, and a friend of hers. Both of them had heard much before leaving Athens of the discomforts and difficulties to which they were about to subject themselves; but, “undismayed by these reports, they were eager to put to personal test, for their own satisfaction and the benefit of future lady travellers, the justice of these discouragements.” The result was

highly satisfactory, and may be taken as an assurance that there are no difficulties in a tour in Greece which need repel the more adventurous of the fair sex, while they may certainly look forward to a rich harvest of enjoyment. The conditions of travelling in Greece are indeed peculiar: it is in a state of transition from the Oriental system, where khans and convents supplied the only accommodation for travellers, to the European system of regular inns and hotels. But it must be admitted that it has as yet made but little progress in this direction. "Khans and convents," observes Sir Thomas Wyse, "are going out, but inns have not come in." The traveller has still to depend, in great measure, upon the casual lodging in any house in the village where he takes up his quarters, the inhabitants of which are willing to receive him "for a consideration;" and he must carry with him his own food and the means of cooking it. But the couriers, or professional travelling servants at Athens, are now so well acquainted with all the routes which are usually taken by travellers, and the places where they are likely to halt, that they almost always secure them the best accommodation that the village can afford, and the tourist may traverse most parts of Greece without having to put up with such quarters as were frequently encountered by Leake or Colonel Mure. No doubt the first aspect of some of these sleeping-places is discouraging enough. The following description by Sir Thomas Wyse may serve as an example:—

"Dimitri stopped before a wretched house, informing us that this was to be our hotel for the night. The dismay of our party was amusing; was there no other house in the village, less dilapidated, and more habitable? With many *προσκυήματα*, Agoyiates, villagers—in fine, every one—declared it was the best, only lately built, not yet finished, exempt from all the usual concomitants, and a wonder and envy to the inhabitants of Bogas, all which Dimitri confirmed. Reluctantly submitting, with many a shake of the head, as the day had waned, we clambered up a disjointed heap of stones, the substitute for steps. The house itself proved better than its exterior denoted, and later we had on several occasions to look back with respect and regret to this our first acquaintance with true Hellenic lodgings at Bogas."—(P. 313.)

This was the first night after leaving Messene, but the next at Paulitza, on the site of the ancient Phigaleia, was still more unpromising:—

"After passing through a rugged ravine, amongst rambling torrent-beds rather than footways,—streets of course there were none,—our horses' heads were turned aside into what was announced as the best habitation of the village. It stood among old olive-roots and broken walls,—where a scowling group of men and women, in spite of Leonidas, our gendarme, kept staring at us with evident suspicion as intruders. Drenched with wet, no alternative was left, but, sighing for the luxury of Bogas, to resign ourselves to the hovel before us. In the midst of our annoyance, Dimitri declared that their Majesties had more than once passed a night in the same dwell-

ing. I cannot say that we needed such inducement to accept its hospitality; but it furnished a striking proof of the unprovided state of the interior part of the country, that the sovereign could find no fitter resting-place. Had I been an ordinary traveller, I might have discredited such a statement; but I had every reason to believe in its truth. On nearer approach, the hut was even more forbidding. A door and a few loopholes gave it light, and it was hardly protected from the rain by the wretched roof, through which the smoke pierced with still less difficulty. The roof was composed of branches of trees, covered with loose flat stones in true primeval Arkadian fashion. Here, nevertheless, we passed—thanks, perhaps, to the cold—a tolerable night. Our baggage arriving early, had fortunately escaped the rain, and thus, with a blazing fire and a dinner speedily prepared and eaten, we forgot the labours of the day. The servants and Agoyiates were quartered in other huts. Leonidas had taken care to see all superfluous furniture removed from our abode, and Dimitri distinguished himself as an architect in erecting and arranging rooms for our respective quarters. Thus all were early asleep, despite cries of every sort from natives, Agoyiates, servants, dogs, sheep, and asses around us.”—(P. 18.)

But if the traveller will sometimes have to encounter the discomfort of rough quarters and a sleepless night, he will be amply compensated by the enjoyment of the morning's ride that follows in the clear bracing air, and by the mid-day halt beside some mountain streamlet, or where a fountain, gushing forth beneath a spreading plane tree, recalls to his mind the similar scene already described by Homer,—

καλῇ ὑπὸ πλατανίστῳ, ὅθεν ρέεν ἀγλαὸν ὕδωρ.

It has often been remarked, that among the most pleasing reminiscences which the traveller brings back from a tour in the Alps are the mid-day halts for refreshment at the edge of the glacier, or in some spot chosen as commanding a mountain view of surpassing magnificence; but we are confident that the tourist in Greece will look back with no less enjoyment to the noontide hours he has spent amidst scenery of a very different character, but of which the charm gradually steals over the mind, and though felt less strongly at first, ends with leaving an impression never to be effaced.

Unfortunately, in one respect, travelling in Greece has changed materially for the worse since Sir Thomas Wyse's tour was made. At that time, and for some years afterwards, there was no fear of robbers in any part of the Morea, and when the party landed at Gythium, their courier, Dimitri, assured them that the race of brigands was extinct, and might be classed with the myths of the heroic ages. But since then, the revolution of 1862, and the period of anarchy by which it was followed, have once more disorganized the country, and some years may probably elapse before the interior of Greece is restored to the same state of security which it enjoyed as lately as 1861.

The first point at which Sir Thomas Wyse touched is one rarely

visited by travellers,—indeed, we do not remember to have seen any other description of it than that of Colonel Leake,—the island fortress of Monemvasia, called by the Venetians Napoli di Malvasia, on the eastern coast of Laconia; a bold insular rock, rising almost close to the shore, with which it seems to have been joined in ancient times by a low neck of sand, though now separated by a shallow strait, which is crossed by a bridge. The fortress, which is said somewhat to resemble Gibraltar on a very small scale, was of some importance in the Venetian times, but fell into utter decay in the hands of the Turks, and is now a mere ruin. The town below it, though still nominally the seat of a bishop, and boasting of a curious old Byzantine church, is little less ruinous. Half the houses we saw (says Sir T. Wyse) were uninhabited, a large number falling rapidly “into ruin, and many windowless and roofless. There is no manufacture, trade, or industry in the place; the open roadstead to the south, as much exposed as that on the north, showed only two small fishing smacks as representatives of their commerce.” Yet the place has still a certain shadow of its former consequence; it is the seat of a tribunal, and of an Eparchy, a district of some extent, which returns two deputies to the Chambers. On Sir Thomas Wyse’s landing from an English war steamer, the first that had touched there for many years, the authorities all hastened to meet him; the Eparch, a “silent jejune man, in island trousers; the Demarch, in a creditably clean fustanella; and the doctor, in Frank dress, presenting a good epitome of the transition through which manners and costumes are hastening in Greece.” The crowd that soon gathered round them was not less varied in character, comprising “all sorts of fustanellas, island trousers, and one or two ‘young Greece’ pale and travelled faces, in Frank dress and white neckcloths (I was thankful there were no ‘gants glacés’), leading the way.” Such are the anomalies and contrasts that meet the traveller’s eye at every step in the Greece of the present day.

Yet even in such a poor and decaying place as Monemvasia, the symptoms of intellectual movement are superior to what might have been expected from the aspect of its material condition. “They have two Demotic or primary schools, and one Hellenic. The second of these primary schools, for girls, counted, they said, about thirty pupils, who were very regular in their attendance. A large proportion of the people read and write. We found many newspapers, and a good deal of inquiry on all manner of public affairs; for, like most Greek towns, Monemvasia boasts of a *café*, which is also a reading-room, and has a billiard-table for loungers. A few spoke French and Italian.”

It is strange to remember that the name of this now obscure and secluded fortress on a rock was, in the Middle Ages, celebrated throughout Europe from its having given name to the famous “Malvoisie” or

"Malmsey" wine, which then enjoyed the highest repute, and was the favourite beverage of one of our English princes. Nothing of the kind is now made in the neighbourhood, and the barren and sun-parched rocks of this part of the coasts of Laconia would seem to hold out little prospect of its ever being revived. But a large portion of the wine that passed under the name, even in the Middle Ages, appears to have come from Crete, the wines of which then bore so high a reputation, that in 1421, when Prince Henry of Portugal was about to establish a colony in Madeira, then recently discovered, he sent to Crete for vines of the choicest quality, with which to stock the island. Thus the Madeira of the present day—if, indeed, its day has not already departed—may be said to trace its lineal descent from the barren rocks of Malvasia.

From Monemvasia Sir T. Wyse proceeded by sea to Marathonisi, a small town on the coast of Laconia, which has now resumed the ancient name of Gythium, familiar to the scholar as the seaport of Sparta. Its position, indeed, marks it out as the natural place of export for the productions of the rich plains of Sparta and the "golden" vale of the Eurotas; and such it continues to be even at the present day. Yet its aspect, as seen from the sea, was only a shade less miserable than that of Monemvasia. "It looked a wretched complication of house upon house, on the sides of the naked hill, dotted here and there by a few churches, one of which, dedicated to St. Demetrius, rejoices in a belfry." Nor was the prospect on entering much better:—

"The aspect of this place is wretched. The lanes are narrow, irregular, and unwholesome; and the houses squeezed together, by the nature of the soil and insensibility to such inconveniences on the part of the inhabitants. The town is singularly deficient in fresh water and pure air; but a rushing stream, unfortunately brackish, finding its way as it can through the broken pavement to the sea, gives the means, hitherto unused, of keeping it in a passable state of cleanliness. All, however, looks disconsolate, ragged, and ruinous, as if the place had only yesterday escaped from the cannonade of the Turks, and as though, during their twenty-five years of independence, the whole population had been fast asleep. There is nothing in its external appearance which could show that it had passed under Christian rule, and were it not for the ceremonial of the authorities, and the 'emancipated' look of the younger portion of the population, who are joyous and active enough, one might suppose they yet felt the enervating influences of their late masters. In this particular, they made a much less favourable impression than Monemvasia; though, as to dwellings and streets, there is little to decide between them."—(Pp. 49, 50.)

Yet Marathonisi is not without a certain amount of trade, arising from its position as the natural outlet of the fertile plains and valleys of Laconia. But no efforts have been made to turn these opportunities to account. Nothing has been done to improve the port, which is

little more than an open roadstead, or to give increased facilities of access to the interior. A carriage road from thence to Sparta had been indeed "decreed" by the Government at Athens, but its execution had never even been commenced, though the country presents no natural difficulties.

"Despite all these drawbacks, it must not be supposed that Marathonisi, possessing so considerable a stimulus behind it as the plain of Sparta, has not improved. Even the neighbourhood of this town shows encouraging symptoms of salutary influences in the increasing culture of corn, vine, and mulberry. The hills around are rich with the most luxuriant productions. The corn crops especially are magnificent; and walking through field after field well drained and well hedged, we imagined ourselves in Belgium or England. Nor was it easy to reconcile such elements of substantial wealth, in so healthy a state of activity, with the miserable decay of the town, which ought, in some measure, to have been the reflection of so much prosperity." —(P. 52.)

Beyond Marathonisi on the west extends the rugged and mountainous district of Maina, formed by the continuation of the great chain of Taygetus, stretching down to the celebrated promontory of Cape Matapan, the ancient Tænarus. Sir T. Wyse was prevented by bad weather from landing at any of the ports along this wild and stormy coast; but the chief interest attached to a visit to this peculiar district has now passed away. The numerous towers visible from the sea scattered over every part of the district, whether isolated or attached to houses in the towns or villages, still bear witness to the recent existence of the state of things described by Colonel Leake, when every man's hand was against his neighbour; and it was not uncommon for a Maniote chief to spend years together without ever quitting the protection of his Pyrgo or tower. But, as Sir T. Wyse informs us, even this wild district has gradually subsided into the ordinary manners of the rest of Greece, and the Pyrgos of Maina will soon be as much the relics of a bygone state of society as the robber castles on the Rhine.

Striking inland from Gythium to Sparta, Sir T. Wyse bears the same emphatic testimony as all other travellers have done to the beautiful situation of that celebrated city, and the noble scenery by which it is surrounded. The actual site of Sparta is indeed much less clearly marked out by its natural features than those of most other Greek cities: it had no Acropolis in the proper sense of the term; no commanding height which was the natural defence of the city beneath: antiquarians are not even agreed as to which of several low hills was the Acropolis of Sparta, and hence the topography of the ancient city remains very obscure. Nor are there any ruins of a striking or prominent character: the theatre alone remains in tolerable preservation. But the view from that theatre is one not easily surpassed.

"It is difficult to see more abundance with less uniformity. All kinds of luxuriance in full produce,—the sharp green mulberry, the tender vine, the valonea in sturdy masses, oranges, and lemons,—embosoming bright tiled houses, corn like a very sea below us, and through the whole, clumps of cypresses, marking two realms departed for ever—old Greece and aged Turkey—and breaking up the monotony, both pictorial and historic. Sparta the new, in the midst of this, was hardly discoverable, except as a string of pleasant places, with here and there a twinkling of the Eurotas, to indicate the sources of profusion. Life and work and reward are seen now in all this; but it is a faint reflection of its ancient renown, or ancient proprietors. Here is found whatever the most industrious or the most luxurious could desire. And to complete the picture, Taygetus rises beyond, the great mountain guardian of all, its upright wall rising from the plain, its ridgy defiles, its outstanding spurs, each a base for a citadel, gloomy, grand, unchanging; all this has another influence, and, comprising the adjoining scenery of Menelaion, stretching off to Parnon, in its stern Tzakonian character, brings back the temper to a more Doric mood, and braces up to manly thought what would else dissolve under gentler influences."—(Pp. 95, 96.)

Sir Thomas had already visited the plain of Sparta, many years before, when it was far more solitary, and had in consequence a character less rich and luxuriant than it now presents. Our readers will probably recollect that the site had become completely abandoned during the Middle Ages, so that the earlier travellers in Greece were actually ignorant where this far-famed city had stood. The population had withdrawn to Mistra, a town founded on one of the lower slopes of Taygetus by Guillaume de Villehardouin in 1250, and which continued under the Turkish rule to be the capital of the surrounding district. But when the new kingdom of Greece was established, it was determined to restore the seat of local government to the ancient site, and to found a new Sparta amid the ruins of the old city. The result has certainly not been satisfactory. Mistra has been indeed abandoned, and now presents nothing more than a picturesque heap of ruins, partly mediæval, partly Turkish, clustering round the steep sides of a hill crowned by the mouldering remains of the Frank castle above. The scene was rendered all the more striking to Sir Thomas Wyse because he had himself seen it in the days of its Turkish prosperity.

"We rode up under a hot sun, through rocky narrow streets, between high enclosing court walls, over which a burst of verdure would occasionally peep. It still was a Turkish town in all its features, except the inhabitants—as if left there in its silence and desolation as a warning and a Nemesis. Not a sound was heard but that of our own cavalcade, until we reached the dark Bazaar; no stir nor sound of life, beyond a nod or a word from some unoccupied individual seated on a step or leaning on a window as we scrambled along. When last I trod these streets, though attended by a Turkish Janissary, I could hardly get through the crowd, and had more than once to hasten my steps, in order to escape from the stones of urchins and the shouts of 'Giaour Kelb' which accompanied them."—(P. 156.)

No contrast can well be more striking than that presented by the new town of Sparta with the scene thus described. It has been laid out according to the Bavarian taste (unfortunately introduced by that dynasty), with broad streets running at right angles to each other, with houses almost all traced upon a given plan, and that essentially a German model, in utter oblivion of the exigencies of the climate; with no protection against the burning sun of Greece, no provision for shade, or cooling sparkling fountains, such as would have been found in every corner of a Turkish town of similar pretensions. But fountains, observes Sir T. Wyse, "seem to have gone out everywhere, with baths and storks, as well as mosques." Meanwhile the plan of the projected city, like most projects in Greece, has been laid out on a scale "a world too wide" for its scanty population, and the streets are as yet but dusty roads "studded here and there with houses, leaving yawning distances, dead garden walls, and stray watercourses between." The place has something the air of a straggling German watering-place, without its neatness or look of prosperity. It must be admitted that these defects are in part incident to every new town, and will gradually disappear as the population increases, which it must necessarily do, as the resources of the rich valley of the Eurotas are more developed, and rendered accessible from the sea by the long-projected road to Gythium. But at present the impression produced on the mind of the traveller by the aspect of New Sparta is that of stagnation, not of progress.

From Sparta to Kalamata in Messenia, Sir Thomas Wyse crossed the rugged range of Taygetus, by a mountain pass of the wildest character, over which it is difficult to believe that there ever was a road practicable for carriages of any description, though we are told by Homer that Telemachus and his friend Pisistratus drove their chariot in a day from Pheræ, on the same site as the modern Kalamata, to the palace of Menelaus at Sparta. We doubt very much whether the same journey has ever been performed since that time. At the present day, not only is the route practicable for mules only, but it taxes the powers of even the most active and sure-footed mules to the utmost; and Sir Thomas Wyse and the ladies by whom he was accompanied were constantly compelled to dismount, and to walk over passages which they thought even mules could not surmount.

There is indeed another pass over the chain of Taygetus, lower and somewhat easier, which was that crossed by Mr. Clark and Professor Thompson, in consequence of the higher summits being still (near the end of April) too much encumbered with snow; but even this presents difficulties of no ordinary kind. There can be little doubt that the habitual intercourse between Sparta and Messenia must always have been carried on by the circuitous route ascending the valley of

the Eurotas, and turning the flank of the lofty ridges of Taygetus, by the pass of Makriplagi, near the modern town of Leondari. The mountain barrier of Taygetus, prolonged as it is to the south in one unbroken range, till it ends in Cape Matapan, must always have formed a natural boundary between Laconia and Messenia not less marked and scarcely less formidable than that of the Pyrenees between France and Spain; and the circumstance mentioned by Pausanias, that wild goats were in his day still found in numbers upon the higher summits, proves—if any proof were wanted to those who have gazed upon their jagged and precipitous peaks—that these were then as wild and inaccessible as they are now.

But we know that this barrier was passed, and that at an early period in the history of Sparta. The traveller who descends into the rich plains of Messenia will cease to wonder at this. Imperfectly cultivated as it now is, it is impossible not to be struck with the marvellous fertility of this magnificent plain; and the portion of it adjoining Kalamata, the only one where the cultivation is at present carried on with any reasonable care, gives sufficient evidence of the result. After leaving Kalamata, says Sir T. Wyse, “the first part of our way ran between those high hedges of Indian fig or cactus for which Messenia is famous; then through open or well-hedged olive and mulberry plantations, broken now and again by vines, pomegranates, and oranges, and diversified by villages. The culture all along this line—the flat land formed by the waters of the Pamisus and other streams—was in accord with the extreme richness of the soil. No one could have imagined that the hoof of the horse of Attila had been there, or that the district had so lately emerged from a war, not of devastation only, but of extermination.” This careful cultivation gradually disappeared as they advanced farther into the plain, though the country continued of much the same description: but, taken as a whole, Messenia is at the present day one of the most flourishing districts of Greece. The exports of Kalamata, which serves as the port of the whole district, and must probably continue to do so, notwithstanding many disadvantages, have been increasing for some time past, and the town itself presents signs of progress wholly unlike anything to be seen at Gythium or Monemvasia, though the old streets, clambering up the sides of a steep, rocky hill, are still “inexpressibly crooked, cramped, and filthy,” and the bazaar “exhibited the usual dislocated, ragged, unpainted, provisional look obstinately retained by all Greek as well as Turkish bazaars.” The agriculture of the plain has also visibly improved: greater care is taken, though scarcely any new processes are introduced, and though “no solicitude has been shown by any of the successive ministers to encourage progress in this direction.” The improvement that has taken place is

owing almost entirely, in Sir T. Wyse's opinion, to the spontaneous efforts of the population; and he speaks in high terms of the industry and frugality of the Messenian peasantry. Meantime, the government authorities, whether central or local, do little more than throw obstacles in the way of all attempts at progress.

The first and most glaring defect, here as everywhere else in Greece, is the want of roads to carry the agricultural produce to market, or to the neighbouring seaport. And in Messenia at least there is not the excuse that may undoubtedly be urged in many parts of the country, of the great natural difficulties that stand in the way. A road over Taygetus, as Mr. Clark observes, "would be a work that might challenge comparison with that over the Simplon;" and the mountain passes that connect Sparta with Arcadia are long, rugged, and difficult: but there would be no difficulty worth speaking of in making roads to connect every part of Messenia with the sea either at Kalamata or Navarino. Even through the plain itself there are nothing but "natural roads," which are tolerable in summer, but all but impassable in winter or bad weather. Nor is it an uncommon thing in any part of Greece, when a road has been laid out, that is to say, its course marked out through the plain, cleared of obstructions, and levelled,—"*metalling*" is a subsequent process that may be indefinitely postponed,—for the nearest proprietor to carry a drain directly across it, or divert the course of the next torrent from his own land on to the public highway. There is little harm done, he may not unreasonably argue; for the torrent would soon find its own way, if he did not conduct it there. There is no one to prevent, no one to repair the mischief; and the traveller is left to find his way out of the difficulty as best he can. In one instance, on their way to the temple at Bassæ, Sir T. Wyse found the road (a mere horse-track) which had been in existence the year before, quietly ploughed up, and fenced across by the occupiers of the neighbouring lands.

In the midst of the Messenian plain, towering over the neighbouring heights, and commanding the whole district like a national citadel, rises the mountain fortress of Ithome, which has been not unaptly compared to an inland Gibraltar. It is, indeed, as Sir T. Wyse remarks, "as prominent in the scenery as in the history of this remarkable plain." The whole history of the first Messenian war is seen at a glance when the traveller beholds this grand natural stronghold, which presents itself with an equally imposing character whether approached from Kalamata and the foot of Taygetus, or seen from the mountains on the borders of Arcadia. There is much about it that reminds one of the Acrocorinthus, but its more isolated position, as well as its greater actual elevation, give it a still grander aspect. It is needless to remark that the view from its summit com-

mands one of the noblest prospects in Greece. A little way below it, on the shoulder of the mountain, is situated the convent of Monte Vurkano, picturesquely associated with a grove of cypresses, in a manner much less common in Greece than in Italy. The convent affords, at the present day, comfortable quarters to the traveller, an advantage for which he is, in great measure, indebted to the exertions of Sir Thomas Wyse, who was so struck with the wretched accommodation for the monks and the dilapidated condition of the buildings, at the time when he visited the convent, that, on his return to Athens, he made representations on the subject to the Greek ministry, which led to the outlay of a considerable sum in additions and improvements. Nor was this all. "Sir Thomas Wyse himself frequently witnessed the good effect of the particular suggestion he had thus quietly urged, and often profited by it afterwards. Nothing official reached him; but travelling in other directions the ensuing year, he always found one or two rooms in each convent freshly painted and brushed up for travellers, 'according to a general order from Athens,' as the monks invariably stated, though apparently ignorant of its origin."

In proceeding northwards towards the celebrated temple of Phigaleia, Sir T. Wyse turned aside to visit the site of a ruined city in the midst of the wild forest-clad mountains on the south bank of the Neda, which he identifies as that of Eira, the celebrated stronghold of the Messenians, which played as important a part in the second Messenian war as Ithome did in the first. Unfortunately, in this case the locality is by no means equally well characterized, and the attribution of the site in question is far from certain. Sir Thomas Wyse argues warmly in favour of its identification with the famous city, the stronghold of Aristomenes; a conclusion for which, he admits, "the imagination pleads not less warmly." "A more fitting scene," he adds, "could not be devised for the enactment of that final drama." But we must remember that the history, as we possess it, is essentially poetical. Aristomenes, the hero of the war, may not unaptly be compared with the Cid as he appears in the traditionary history of Spain. It would be as unreasonable a stretch of scepticism to doubt the personal existence of the one as of the other, or that he actually bore a prominent and leading part in the events of the war; but we can as little accept as historical the dramatic details of the contest preserved to us by Pausanias from the poetical epic of Rhianus, as we can receive the exploits of the "Campeador de Bivar" from the anonymous author of that noblest of all ballads, the "Poema del Cid." On the other hand it appears that the site of Eira was already a subject of dispute in the time of Strabo:* no mention of it is found during

* Strabo, lib. viii., p. 360.

the historical period of Greece; and Pausanias himself, in whose pages it plays so important a part, makes no mention of the city or its ruins as existing in his time. Under these circumstances it may well be doubted whether any certainty can ever be attained upon the subject. But Sir T. Wyse has done good service by examining and describing the remains, which are little known, and have been rarely visited.

The country north of the valley of the Neda presents some of the most beautiful scenery in Greece, and it is here, at a height of 3,800 feet above the sea, surrounded by a scattered forest of oak trees, that stands the beautiful temple of Bassæ. It is a piece of singular good fortune that has preserved to us, out of the many hundred temples that adorned the ancient Peloponnese, that one, which Pausanias, who saw them all in their entirety, designates as surpassing all others, except that of Athena Alea at Tegea, in the beauty of material and the perfection of its workmanship. Its remarkable preservation is doubtless owing to its secluded and lofty situation. Sir Thomas Wyse's remarks on the sculptures that adorned the frieze of the temple—now in the British Museum—are well worthy of attention; but we cannot find place for them here, and must hasten to follow him down the valley of the Alpheus towards the site of the far-famed Olympia. The whole of this route lies through a beautiful country, in which the traveller is perpetually meeting with scenes of a truly Arcadian character. It is a very common remark with tourists who have visited only Athens, and perhaps one or two other points on the eastern coast of the Morea, that "there are no trees in Greece;" and those who have seen only Tripolitza, and the upland plains that surround it, remark, naturally enough, on the entire dissimilarity of this portion of Arcadia from all that we are accustomed to associate with the name. But the whole of Western Arcadia and the adjoining district of Triphylia abounds in woodland scenery of the most charming description. Already, in descending from the temple at Bassæ, Sir T. Wyse and his party came upon a scene that he describes as "the ideal of an Arcadian landscape:"—

"A series of gentle eminences, sweeping into soft secluded valleys, wooded in the richest manner, with every variety of southern shrub—arbutus, lentisk, agnus castus, bay, and myrtle,—timbered with luxuriant masses of oak and plane, and now and then broken by dark-green clumps of fir and pine, fine pasturage intermingling below, the grand framework of the great Peloponnesian ranges around and above: these formed the elements, of which every step presented a new variety. The red soil, recalling the fertile recesses of South Devon, and the close-foliaged pathways, revelling in all their freshness, from the rain, and exhaling their scented odours as we brushed through them, completed this inland woodland picture."—(P. 41.)

A little farther on he remarks, "All this portion of Arcadia possesses a character midway between the dell, glade, and woody

upland of early associations, and the rough, bleak Scotch mountain districts of the interior—the familiar type of Arcadia with the ancients." Equally attractive is the "park-like" character of the scenery in the neighbourhood of Olympia itself:—

"The Alpheus to our left formed the main characteristic, whilst on either side stretched an even, thickly wooded alluvial plain, shut in by a range of mountains, softening in hillocks down to the plain. The whole extent lay covered, sometimes thickly, sometimes scantily, with interchanging brush-wood, shrub, and timber. At every step the landscape becomes more mild and cheerful. The Alpheus, despite the accession of the Ladon and Erymanthus, spreads itself out, unconscious of its importance, with a lazy tranquillity, as though unwilling too soon to leave the delightful region, or desirous to preserve a dignified sobriety in the neighbourhood of Zeus μελίχιος. It is nearly 180 feet broad, but hardly ever more than five feet deep. Its many meanderings, now lowering, now raising its banks to the perpendicular, leave large patches of white sand, which gradually grow into staid islands. The small eminences over which we passed, developed by degrees into hills, covered with a vigorous growth of all kinds of trees and shrubs—plane, oak, arbutus, and rhododendron, with an occasional broad out-spreading valonea. Rushing brooks hurried across our path on their way to the Alpheus, interseamed with red fallows or quiet slopes of meadow-land. A noble park it was on the grandest scale, but without the trace of a proprietor. No village is seen, and very rarely even a single house. No boundary, nor sign of possession, is visible. The soil, of the richest quality, looks half-worked, and as if doubtful whether the cultivation will ever be completed."—(P. 82.)

Sir Thomas Wyse has enlarged at considerable, indeed at somewhat needless length upon the questions connected with the ancient topography of Olympia, as well as that of Sparta, though in both cases the scantiness of existing remains, and the imperfectly marked character of the localities, renders it impossible to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion. The only point that we can be said to know with certainty in the case of Olympia—the position of the celebrated temple of Zeus—was determined by the excavations of the French Commission, and it is to the same process alone that we can look for any further discoveries. Meanwhile it is a mere waste of time to discuss the localities as described by Pausanias, or to speculate on the site of buildings of which the very foundations are buried under the alluvial soil, or have been swept away by the floods of the Alpheus.

Between Olympia and the convent of Megaspilion, the traveller passes through one of the wildest districts of Greece; at first through the extensive forests that clothe the flanks of Mount Pholoë and Erymanthus, then over a rugged mountain tract, by a road almost as bad as that over Taygetus, descending upon the town of Kalavryta, situated in a dreary upland valley, which, notwithstanding its elevation, is marshy and unhealthy.

The ancient town of Cynætha, which occupied the same valley, was

noted, according to Polybius,* for the rudeness and barbarism of its inhabitants,—a circumstance which he attributes to the defects of their education in not learning music and geometry (!):—a modern traveller would be more apt to ascribe it to the secluded position of the valley, and the wild and rugged character of the surrounding country. Still higher up among the mountains is the celebrated waterfall of the Styx, which Sir T. Wyse unfortunately did not visit, being deterred not merely by the difficulties of the road, but by the assurance that the Styx at that season contained but little water. We have thus lost the description by his graphic pen of one of the most striking scenes in Greece. The waterfall in itself is undoubtedly very trifling—a mere thread of water; but the surrounding scenery is of the grandest and wildest description; the precipices, as remarked by Pausanias,† are the most lofty *he* ever saw,—indeed, one must go to the Alps or the Pyrenees to find anything to equal them; and there is altogether a “weird” and gloomy character about the whole scene that seems to explain why this little falling thread of black water—the Mavronero, as it is called at the present day—was identified by the Greeks of ancient times with the “down-dropping water of Styx” that was mentioned by Homer as the dread oath of the gods. It seems, observes Pausanias, as if Homer had himself seen the water of Styx dripping down from the lofty precipice.

His visit to the celebrated convent of Megaspilion left as unfavourable an impression upon Sir Thomas Wyse as it has done upon most other travellers. Indeed, the monastic institutions throughout Greece are in a state of the lowest degradation; they are wholly devoid of that love of art and love of letters which once cast a halo of light around the monasteries of Western Europe; while, so far as external appearances can be trusted, they are almost equally destitute of any deep feeling of religious devotion. The monks, as well as the secular clergy and bishops, took a prominent part in the war of independence, and have thereby earned a permanent debt of gratitude from the Greek people. But the number of monastic institutions still subsisting in the country is a grievous burden upon the resources of the infant kingdom. There are at present—or were in the year that Sir Thomas Wyse travelled—no less than a hundred and fifty-two convents in Greece, of which one hundred and forty-eight are of men, and only four of women. Even this is an immense reduction; at the close of the revolutionary war the new Government found a population of about 600,000 souls, with forty-eight bishops and five hundred and ninety-three monasteries! Fortunately, many of the latter were tenanted only by a single monk, or were in a state of ruinous decay, so that their suppression offered little difficulty. But the efforts of

* Polyb., lib. iv., c. 20.

† Pausan., lib. viii., c. 17, 66.

the State to introduce any reforms into the existing monasteries have been hitherto ineffectual; and so long as the bishops continue to be taken, as is the rule of the Greek Church, exclusively from the monastic orders, there does not appear any prospect of improvement.


The ignorance, as well as the indolence, of the Greek monastic orders prevents them from taking any active part in the education of the people. But in this respect, fortunately, their interference is not required. The educational institutions of Greece are far ahead of its progress in any other respect. An extensive system of education was organized by the Bavarian Government, under the superintendence of the State, and has been carried out with zeal and energy by the people themselves. Every village has its school, often the most conspicuous building in the place; and every place that calls itself a town has, in addition to these primary or "Demotic" schools, one of a higher class, called an "Hellenic" school, the master of which has in most instances been trained in the seminary for teachers at Athens. Wherever Sir Thomas Wyse went, he made a point of visiting the schools, and the result was generally satisfactory. The Greek children show a quickness of apprehension and facility in learning worthy of the Athenians of old, and their teachers appear to correspond to them in activity. Government inspection is wanting; but there is an inherent vitality in the whole thing, which cannot fail of attaining its main end, whatever deficiencies and shortcomings there may be for a while. The principal defect in the higher schools is found in regard to physical science, for which the modern Greeks everywhere display a want of aptitude that contrasts singularly with their quickness and cleverness in other departments of study.

It is impossible for us to follow Sir T. Wyse in detail through the remainder of his tour. At Vostitza, on the Corinthian Gulf, he found a striking instance of prosperity and activity, giving token of increasing wealth and increasing industry. This prosperity, which extends to Patras and to the intermediate country, arises from the rapid development of the culture of the currant vine, the production of which was at one time confined almost entirely to the Ionian Islands, but has of late years been largely extended on the mainland also. On the other hand, Corinth presented a painful contrast to this flourishing picture. The far-famed fortress of the Acrocorinthus, which, in Turkish and Venetian times, sheltered a considerable population within its unassailable walls, is now desolate, and contains nothing but a heap of ruins, guarded by half a dozen decrepit veterans; the so-called town of Corinth at its foot, which occupies the ancient site, is in a state of utter dilapidation and decay, having suffered so severely from an earthquake, or rather succession of earthquakes, in the spring

of 1858, that it was not deemed worth while to attempt its restoration. The inhabitants, for the most part, have removed to a spot close to the sea-shore, on the western side of the Isthmus, where a new town has grown up since the period of Sir T. Wyse's visit, which has become the recognised head of the district. New Corinth is now the residence of the Government officials, and contains, it is said, three or four hundred good houses. The constant passage of the steamers, and the transfer of their passengers by this "overland route," give it some degree of activity; and it is not impossible that it may be destined to a future career of prosperity. But its present aspect is far from encouraging.

We cannot take leave of Sir Thomas Wyse's agreeable and instructive volumes without expressing a hope that their publication may once more direct the attention of British travellers to the beautiful shores of Greece. As the facilities of travelling by steamboat and railroad increase, there is found also an increasing number of tourists who are desirous to emancipate themselves from those prosaic and unsatisfactory modes of conveyance—who long for the fresh air of the mountain, and the feeling of independence which belongs to the traveller on foot or on horseback, and who are desirous to see a people, as well as a country, more unsophisticated than those to be found on the Rhine or in the Oberland. To all such we are confident that a tour in Greece would be found productive of the highest enjoyment; and that they would return to Athens with the same satisfaction which is expressed by Sir Thomas Wyse at the close of "one of the most interesting, and, despite all its difficulties, one of the most enjoyable tours that it is possible to conceive."

E. H. BUNBURY.



ANCILLA DOMINI: THOUGHTS ON CHRISTIAN ART.

I.—EARLY REALISM.

IT is not easy to begin an essay about Art without a few tentative definitions. And it seems right enough for any author to give them^{*} at the beginning of his work, if he either argues up to them and proves them as he goes on, or fairly says that he begins by assuming their truth. Giving a formal definition at first amounts to saying that he will prove it in the end: and many men seem quite unconsciously to beg all the questions of their work in their first chapter; laying down principles to argue from which it is the purpose of their treatise to argue up to. It is sadly easy in matters of art to reason in a circle of subjective impressions—from one's own feelings to one's own feelings; and it will, perhaps, be best to say here that we are speaking as much as possible from a painter's point of view; and that our feeling about painting may, for our immediate convenience, be called that of the English Realist or Naturalist School.*

The somewhat fanciful title of this paper expresses our idea of the office of Christian Art. In using the word "school" we mean only that there are now among us many painters of greater or less power, who mutually affect each others' minds and works, and as it were exchange impressions. We ought also to say what meaning we attach to the other terms already used.

* The term "school" properly implies a number of men working together for the sake of exchanging and accumulating secrets of technical skill.

By Art we mean the production of ideas of truth (actual truth or imaginative) in a form which is both beautiful to the eye and elevating to the soul. We cannot define the term "beauty:" but we can say that any picture which suggests to a man higher, better, deeper (or clearer?) thoughts than he had before, or could have obtained without it, is a work of true Art.

The question follows, what is Christian or Religious Art? And in answering it, it will be convenient to take the old technical meaning of the word "religious," and to mention a distinction which we think will be found to hold throughout. Christian Art seems to be definable as "art produced by Christian men, who work with a purpose worthy of their faith." Religious Art, strictly speaking, will take in a narrower field of subject, and be impressed with a religious, or conventual, or ascetic character, dealing almost exclusively with "religious" subject, scriptural or traditional. The names of Holman Hunt, Madox Brown, and Millais, are those of representatives of the Christian art of our time and country. Mr. Herbert is, perhaps, our leading painter of religious subject. All that we imply, in asserting this distinction, is that Christian art is not contained within the same limits as religious art, but that great liberty in choice of subject is to be allowed to the believing painter, and that he is to be looked upon as a Christian man, using a powerful means of instruction for the benefit of his fellow-Christians, and not as a mere purveyor of amusement or sentiment. No doubt, many pictures are no better than sensation novels: but there are some which tell truths and suggest thoughts which scientific treatises may fail to convey.

We shall call attention not only to the well-known fact, that pictorial teaching was used in Christian churches from the earliest times; but that in those earliest times there was great liberty of teaching by pictures: in fact, that the Christian painter of the time, unskilful as his hand may have been, was encouraged to work in the catholic spirit of the true artist. He might paint all he could, of all he saw—with the eye of mind or body. The art of the Catacombs stands before the art of the convents, in time at least. We are fortunate in having such works as that of M. Raoul Rochette, and Monsignore Rossi, to assure us of its universality and freedom in choice of subject. It is as if the faith of workman and spectator made all subjects sacred: in those days all things might be painted in the name of Christ, and for the instruction of man. And if it can be shown that this is the principle of the earliest art, and that modern Realist Art coincides with it in frank and wide choice of subject, in play of fancy and in other vital points; then we can connect our Realists with their earliest predecessors, and show not only that there is a Sacred Art, but that all true and high art has been in a measure held sacred from the

first. This distinction between Religious or Conventual Art, with its limited range of subject, and Christian Art in general, may lead us to an explanation of what we understand by the term Realist or Naturalist. As applied to paintings or sculpture, these words mean the same thing, and are opposed to the words Purist or Idealist.*

Almost all men of high or worthy purpose in art seem to be so guided by character and circumstance, as to fall into one or the other of these classes. Of men of low or impure purpose, even of those whose nobler powers were thwarted by temptation or baser instinct, nothing need be said now. That would be a long treatise, and not a very edifying one, which should give a full idea of their glory and their shame. But setting aside all the Sensualists, higher or lower—veiling the image of Rubens, and if it must be so, those of Titian and Correggio as well, there still remain two classes of men who have painted with high and pure purpose, and have hoped and felt that they also in their work were Christian teachers of Christian men. These have either confined themselves to religious subject, rejecting secular subject for its coarseness or painfulness—in which case we call them Religious, Conventual, or Purist painters; or they have made no such rejection, and so fall under the names of Realist or Naturalist. The representative man, perhaps to all time, of the first class, is Fra Angelico of Fiesole: the second is headed by Tintoret and Michael Angelo. They, or their like, will often give their utmost strength to definitely “religious” subject. But it is in their nature, and in all men’s who are touched with the same spirit, to be essentially men of their own generation, sharing in its aspirations, and struggles, and difficulties. And so in our own time our strongest painters seem to feel that they must needs take their full part with the eager, pensive, dubious, and neuralgic life lived by thoughtful people in the nineteenth century. They cannot and do not desire to separate themselves from the strange humanity all round them; and they see its sorrowful, and evil, and unaccountable sides. They are as they are, and can be no other. Many of them will look with affection and envy at the labours of the higher Purists, but they cannot dwell apart with Angelico or Francia; they cannot ignore the evil that is in the world, nor indeed separate it from the good. Again, for good or evil, such men’s characters are deeply marked, and whether they will or no, their personality is stamped on all they produce. They see the world vividly, and can but paint what they see.

* All the terms are admirably and subtly distinguished and arranged by the author of “*Modern Painters*,” vol. iii. But his brilliant volumes have been but carelessly, if almost universally, read; and he himself justly complained, “that people dashed at his descriptions, and paid no attention to his matter;” so that a short reproduction or adaptation of his work seems not improper here.

They have their times of aspiration and adoration, but must mind earthly things; they cannot help being double-minded and unstable, sharing in the doubts and inconsistencies of their times, and feeling them more acutely than others feel them. Their art raises them above many things, but drives them through many others; and these men often echo sadly enough the words of their great leader, "*E faticoso la pittura, e sempre si fa il mare maggiore.*"*

Now the fact is, that it is on men of this character, Realists or Naturalists as we must call them, that the hopes of modern art really depend. Painters of our day, who from time to time produce the noblest works of direct illustration of Holy Scripture, are unable to confine themselves to religious subject. Their minds are full of many-coloured images of things "craving to be painted;" and their choice of subject will be determined by the vividness of those images, directly or indirectly "religious" in their character. And if Sacred Art is to be art at all, their work should be accepted, and they themselves encouraged to hold themselves as teachers responsible to God and man; not as mere craftsmen on the one hand, or as uncomprehended geniuses on the other. Being Christian men, and speaking as such, let them know that they will be attended to, and neither suspected nor scorned. It will not do to exorcise originality, or to say that thoughtful men shall find no way of making Art the handmaid of the Faith, except by painting what are called sacred pictures. Nor is it desirable that the devil, who has already possessed himself of all the good Psalm tunes, said Wesley, should have all the good paintings also. One thing, which is far more needed just now than a supply of good painters, is a large number of well-read and thoughtful spectators: just as good listeners are rarer than good talkers. And hardly enough attention is paid to the thoughts of the painter to encourage him to work them out on canvas. Deep calls to deep, and thought appeals to the thoughtful: and we should have more and better sacred pictures, if we could only see the sacredness of those we have.

We all know that from the earliest date, sculpture and painting

* Tintoret. One of the happiest creations of Mr. Browning's genius perhaps is his *Fra Lippo Lippi*: the incorrigible monk-realist; sinner in life, but not sensualist in art:—

"You've seen the world,
The beauty, and the wonder, and the power:
The shapes of things, their colours, lights and shades,
Changes, surprises—and God made it all,
For what? Do you feel thankful, ay or no,
For this fair town's face, yonder river's line?
Why not paint these
Just as they are, careless what comes of it?
God's works—paint any one, and count it crime
To let a truth slip." . . .

were used as means of instruction in the faith. Sculpture, it is evident, takes the place of painting in the first days of art, from the greater ease of its early stages. And our purpose will be well answered if we can call due attention to the frank realism and naturalism, and free use of all attainable means of Art teaching, in and from the very beginnings of Christian work. Two such beginnings there are, whose relics are partly preserved for us: one, the art of the Catacombs and early Christian sepulchres; the other, the first productions of Gothic or Northern Art in the Lombard churches. Let us take the earlier works the first. We may just notice at starting how obvious are the reasons why Christian Art should have assumed an ascetic or conventual form in the course of the third and fourth centuries, or earlier. The whole Church took an ascetic form, under stress of corruptions within and persecution from without. And with the conventual spirit rose that conventual art which is popularly supposed to include all early Christian art. On the disappearance of the arts in Italy, it was preserved in Byzantine cloisters, to be restored to her when the conquests of Belisarius partly recovered her for the Eastern Empire. It has influenced Cimabue, and Angelico, and Francia, and Perugino, and the early mind of Rafael. It is practised in its quaint purity from Athos to Sinai at this day, changing no more than the Mede or the leopard. We have seen the same features of the Madonna (described once and for ever in the "Stones of Venice," ii. 2) in the mosaics of Torcello and Murano, elsewhere in Italy, at Mount Sinai, and at Mar Saba near the Dead Sea.* Thus it was that from the ashes of the Empire sprung the first faint "Renaissance" of painting in the Western world, preceded by that architecture which, once reinforced with the Teutonic energy, sprung into its chief glory at Pisa, in the hands of Buschetto. The fragments of its fair decay in Venice have been worthily described by the author of "Modern Painters." All know and feel the chief characteristics of Byzantine art: its rigidity and delicacy; its solemnity and the severe grace of its conventionalism. It gives signs of a stricter rule than even conventual painters could endure in the West: for it is the work not

* See Curzon's "Monasteries of the Levant;" also a paper in "Vacation Tourists," by the Rev. F. Tozer, Exeter College, Oxford. The description in the "Stones of Venice" must be read at length: indeed it has been read almost universally, if it is not forgotten in these crowded times. There are not many sketches like it in the English or any other language.

† See the Marquis of Lothian's "Italian History and Art in the Middle Ages," ch. i.:—"As architecture was the art which last retained its vitality, so it was the first to rise to a new life. As early as the ninth and tenth centuries, the forms of Rome and Byzantium, fused together and touched with the spirit of the German nations, gave rise to a new style. . . . About A.D. 1050, the Pisan fleet took Palermo. . . . With their spoil they resolved to build a cathedral worthy of the State and the occasion. Buschetto was their architect, and his work stands yet unchanged," &c., &c.

only of ascetics, but of Eastern ascetics. It is in the great mosaics of Murano, and Ravenna, and Mount Sinai—most of all, perhaps, in the “Last Judgment” in the apse of Torcello, that such men’s power is seen. “Dreadful earnestness” is its chief character: there is little technical skill; the inspiration of genius, and physical beauty, are not found; there is no trace of the Gothic energy, or irony, or wild play of fancy. But there is the power of fixed faith and unchangeable conviction. And for all expression of calm abstraction and sadness in saintly or angelic features, Byzantine art remained unrivalled till Angelico and Francia arose, and is not without its lessons for us now.

We must for the time set aside the question of whether and how far the heads of the early Church may have been inclined to forbid or discourage pictorial ornament in churches, either for instruction or to stimulate religious sentiment. What we have to notice first is that such use was undoubtedly made of art in the earliest days, and that it was made with a freedom of choice in subject which reminds us of the all-representing and all-imagining sculptures of the Romanesque church-fronts of Verona. The work of the Catacombs has the realism of simplicity: its authors may not have been well able to express themselves in art, yet they had in them that which art alone could express. They seem to have painted like little children, as well as they could, rejecting nothing. Such at least is the testimony of Raoul Rochette, and of the new and most valuable publications of De Rossi. One of the chief characteristics of the earliest work, as they describe it, seems to have been its spirit of symbolism: the ready facility with which, so to speak, it saw God in all things, and discovered in earthly things analogies of things heavenly. It may be a kind of shock to some of M. Rochette’s readers to find what unceremonious and unflinching use was made even of pagan emblems in aid of Christian symbolism.* There is no cause for such alarm. Men’s minds were preoccupied by the old myths, and their new-found faith and hope could not at once sponge out the recollections of their childhood, however it might rule their wills.

* For aught we know, men like St. Paul may have seen, in a few of the heroic legends, a kind of witness to the heathen of God’s care for them. But that Christian painters copied, or used, remembrances of pagan figures for Christian purposes, there can be no doubt. M. Rochette instances a figure of the Madonna, from a very early sarcophagus, much superior as a work of art to Christian *paintings* of the same date. It is so nearly analogous to ancient figures of Penelope, as to seem almost taken from them. In fact, as we have implied, the earliest Christian art was still the art of men determined on progress,

* See note, p. 77, *infra*.

who not only dedicated their labour, but sought to make it worthier of dedication. They were not content that their pictures of the objects of their faith on which their minds dwelt, as on vivid realities, should be, as M. Rochette says, "*une suite de formules consacrées, de signes conventionnels, où l'art était plutôt une sorte d'écriture figurative qu'un véritable moyen imitatif.*" Whether Christian artists looked on the tales of Deucalion and Hercules as foreshadowings of the truth in heathen minds or not, they made use of them. The pictures of Noah in the Catacombs present an exact analogy with medals of Septimius Severus, stamped with the deluge of Deucalion. The history of Jonah is perhaps the most frequently chosen subject of all. No doubt our Lord's reference to it, as a type of His own resurrection, had much to do with this. But the history and its representations are strangely connected with those of Hercules, Jason, Hesione, and Andromeda. The last fable, in particular, had for its scene the coast or the city of Joppa, and was thus on common ground with Jonah's history. And it seems to have caused no painful feeling of irreverence in the minds of secret worshippers prepared to die the martyr's death, to recognise in the pictures of the deeds of saints and prophets, adaptations of the ideals of well-taught Paganism. They spoiled the spoiler: the tempter had no special right to beauty, or to skill in representing it.

No doubt they had their own symbolism, with all its pathetic power and beauty: but that was a beauty of thought and feeling, not dependent on Art at all—or at least very slightly. The fish, taken as a symbol of the Lord, was simply an acrostic, or peculiar monogram: no more a matter of art-representation than the labarum, or a simple figure of the cross. So with the vine—even in those days it would have seemed an irreverence to dwell over-skillfully on bursting clusters and twining tendrils, in that which was to call men's thoughts to the Vine of souls. Any rude hieroglyphic might stand for a ship, or ark, and suffice to lead the wandering soul away to the apostolic bark and its Captain. The lamb, the dove, and the phoenix never needed elaborate realization of wool or plumage. It may be said, in fact, that symbols, though productive of high and noble thoughts, and most important as means of instruction, are independent of Art: they are conventional, or restrained by conventional rules, and are simply and in fact "*plutôt une sorte d'écriture figurative qu'un véritable moyen imitatif.*" Power of symbolism is often to be preferred to artistic beauty: for a symbol may be powerful by sheer force of thought. Men may differ, and they do, in their estimates of the beauty of the *Duomo* of Torcello; but few Christians, once seeing its meaning, would endure to lose the rounded apse of that "*goodly temple-ship,*"* where the

* "*Stones of Venice,*" vol. ii. 1.

Bishop's throne is set in the steersman's place, as if he verily "oversaw" and guided the ark of the Church in storm and sunshine.

De Rossi appears to consider the good shepherd to be the earliest Christian symbol. In the crypt of Lucina (now joined to the catacomb of St. Sebastiano) it is repeated alternately with a woman's figure round the ceiling; and strongly resembles a Herculaneum picture, supposed to have been copied from the celebrated statue of Calamis. This female figure is common in the Catacombs: there are various opinions as to its exact import, which seem to centre in its being either the Blessed Virgin or an ideal of the Church. The very ancient similitude of the fish, too, is not only an anagram of the initial letters of the Lord's name and title; it represents the believer as well as the object of belief. The thought of men as fishes of the Church's net, and various ideas of passing through troubled waters in safety—of continued danger and preservation,—seem all to have been brought before men's minds by this emblem. The subject of Christian Symbolism, however, is too wide for us here, and has been ably dealt with already in the works of Mrs. Jameson and Lady Eastlake.

Before proceeding with De Rossi's book, it is time to notice the two recorded prohibitions of the use of images and pictures in Christian churches. Both seem to have been limited. All paintings of sacred figures on church walls were forbidden in the time of Diocletian. The Roman Catholic explanation of this—not an altogether satisfactory one—is that they were discontinued for fear of their desecration, or simply as a matter of prudence. It would seem that portable pictures were still allowed, or perhaps substituted for mural ones; indeed the use of the folding diptych or triptych is supposed to date from about this time. St. Clement of Alexandria's list of permitted symbols of course implies a prohibition of some kinds of images or pictures; but this is more likely to refer to Gnostic emblems than to the use of pictures for instruction, or to the effort after beauty and accurate representation in such works. Both were sought for in a rude and simple way, by the earliest artists. They symbolized the perfect holiness of their subjects by giving their features all the beauty they could depict; doubtless feeling their want of skill. "*En représentant le Christ et la Vierge,*" says Raoul Rochette, "*le seul effort d'atteindre à l'image de la Divinité accablait l'impuissance de leur talent.*" We should think it did: and others beside theirs. Entwined with idolatry as the arts were in pagan days, it is no wonder if men well skilled in them were late in casting in their lot with the disciples. The heathen painter's case was exactly that of Demetrius of Ephesus, whose tumultuous concourse no doubt contained many "artists of the period." For a time, the sensual Pagan Art refused to serve the Faith: but that does not prove that the teachers of the Faith would

not call a humbler and purer Art to their aid. It is no wonder if heathen sculptors and painters, the helots of sensual beauty, turned away from Christian churches. There is still less cause for surprise if the teachers of the new faith suspected an art which, for them, was full of associations of idolatry and persecution. Men were not likely to appreciate the sublimity of the graven image of Jupiter which had frowned in marble on their tortured brethren: and many a Christian must have seen his kindred slain, not accepting deliverance, before some Apollo whose bow-shaped lips curled for ever in immortal scorn of the mockings and the scourgings men laid on the Nazarene.

But it was not, probably, till a large part of the pagan world had been taken within the pale of the Church, and had, as a natural consequence, brought great corruption into the Church, that Christian Art took its more Conventual form, as earnest Christian life took that form also. And ever since that time, through Byzantine art, through Angelico, and Francia, and Perugino, all Purist art has borne the impress of the cloister. Yet there has been, and is, an art which is not of the cloister, but which tries to serve God in the world; and there is an analogy between that art in the earliest times and the labours of our latter days.

Times have changed. Simple and unskilful men painted of old to impress the facts of the new faith, or to set before men's eyes beloved images (actual or ideal) of its founders. They did their best, calling all means to their aid, often using pagan emblems and ideals as freely as they would use pagan paint and brushes. Now we have educated men of many thoughts, mostly feeling with a fixed pain the deficiencies of other men's faith and of their own. Their turn of mind is pensive; reserve and irony are mingled with their teaching. They cannot divest themselves of the strange English taste for melancholy humours, and looking on the seamy side of things. But they have, in common with their brethren of the Catacombs, the purpose of devoting their art to Christ's service, by making it appeal to the thought and feeling of their brethren in Him.

But there is a passage in De Rossi's invaluable volume which carries us a step farther. It supplies a missing link in Christian art, and enables us to connect the hearty naturalism of Lombard and Norman sculptors with the earliest practice of Christian workmen. All know how freely secular crafts and ordinary pursuits are represented in Gothic churches; and De Rossi connects this practice with the art of the Catacombs:—"E uno fatto che ho costantemente notato nei sotteranei cemeteri, avere i Cristiani nei primi scuoli assai adoperato sarcofagi ornati di scultori, che niun segno portano di Cristianismo, è sembrano usciti delle officine de gentili . . . imagine del

cielo cosmico, o scene di pastorizia, di agricoltura, di cacce, di giuochi. . . . Obvio e notissimo è il senso parabolico dato dei Cristiani alle scene pastorali è d'agricoltura, alle persificazione delle stagioni, ai delfini e monstri marini nuotante nelle onde.*

This at once connects the various subject of the Veronese and Lucchese church-fronts with the earliest days, and gives the art of the North, which we inherit, the sanction of the art of *martyred men. Connect the free treatment of secular subjects with Christian hope and teaching from the first, and you connect modern Realist Art with Christian teaching from the first. It is in such churches as San Zenone and San Fermo at Verona, or in S. Ambrozio at Milan, or San Michele at Lucca, that the true origin of modern art is to be seen. The first Christian art had to expire with the ancient civilization, which even the Faith could not keep alive: its faint relics remained in Byzantine temples. But as Christianity took possession of young and mighty races, they soon learned to dedicate all their early skill, and to illustrate all their lives and thoughts by the carvings of their churches. They wrote there their version of the history and the hope of all men,—yet not their spiritual thoughts only, but all their ways and crafts, and battles and huntings. And there is little doubt but that a symbolic meaning may have hovered in their minds over their representations and fancies, as in the Veronese Griffins and the Chase of Theodoric,† where the Fiend stands waiting behind the suc-

* “Egli è evidente che i fedeli quando non poterono avere arche sepolcrali con scultore di sacro argomento . . . posero molto studio in iscegliere quelle, che non offendevano direttamente la los Fede, non rappresentanza di riti idolotrici o di immagini della falsa divinità, ò di scena troppo manifestamente proprie della pagana tergonia.”

Here is a curious instance of pagan legend adopted with deep meaning,—it is a carving on a sarcophagus:—“Da un lato Ulisse legato all’ albero della nave, che ascolta il canto delle Sirene non udito dai suoi compagni, le cui orecchia egli aveva turato con cera. Dall’ altro un giovane palliato con volume in mane e sedente certamente ascolta le lezioni d’una Musa o d’uno filosofo.” He observes on it:—“Egli nella nave di Ulisse vede la chiesa, e nell’ albero la croce, dalla quali il Signore crucifisso insegna ai fedeli turare le orecchi alle seduzioni di sensi.” (From De Rossi, on the Christian adaptations of Pagan imagery.)

† “Carvings of Lombard Churches.” Appendix to vol. i. of the “Stones of Venice,” p. 361. Some remarks comparing the Lombard work of Verona with the Byzantine work of St. Mark’s come first. The Veronese work is vastly superior in energy and spirit, and also in neatness and power of architecture. The Venetian is far more beautiful in line and regular in ornamental effect, with greater sense of beauty. Some of the Veronese and other subjects follow.

“Two cocks, carrying on their shoulders a long staff, to which a fox (f) is tied by the legs: the strut of the foremost cock, lifting one leg at right angles to the other, is delicious. A stag-hunt: several others with dogs: fruit-trees between and birds in them: snails and frogs filling up the intervals, as if suspended in the air, with some saucy puppies on their hind legs: two or three nondescript beasts; and finally, on the centre of one of the arches on the south side, an elephant and castle.”

“But these sculptures are tame compared with those of St. Michele of Pavia (earlier,—of the seventh century at latest). One capital is covered with a mass of grinning heads”

cessful hunter. The personifications of months and seasons and labours of men in St. Mark's and the ducal palace at Venice are probably still better known. And the passage we have quoted from De Rossi connects them with the very first efforts of Christian art, by their principle of seeing sacred meaning in daily things.

This brings us once more to the brink of the history of Christian Symbolism, and that, in after times, cannot be separated from the subject of the Grotesque. Both, or either, would require a long treatise. Few are likely to underrate the importance of such symbolisms as Albert Durer's "Knight and Death," or "Melancholia;" and it will not do to dismiss with scanty praise or brief analysis the engravings of the great Blake, once "Pictor Ignotus." What has been said goes no further than to show that the naturalism, the irony, the various and wide-ranging subject of modern Realist painters, have precedent enough in early Christian art, and in the first Gothic-Christian art;—that then in fact all art was dedicated and held sacred. There is a distinction between Christian art and Conventual or Ecclesiastical art. The latter will always have its high value, and its calls to the better hope of man: the former will appeal to his mixed nature, to his history and sufferings, to his painful and even sinful experience. There are secular clergy as well as regulars; there are sermons on the man's life as well as on the monk's life. If we can get painters to preach us such sermons, let us take them and be thankful.

It is by looking at such pictures as Hunt's "Scapegoat" or Millais' "Evil Sower" that some idea may be formed of the difficulty of really devoting consummate art to religious teaching in modern times. Though one illustrates a parable and the other a symbolic fact, they are both of them Realist work in the fullest sense. In both there is the greatest exactness of painting from actual nature; both are of painful and distressing subject, bearing witness to evil; both are full of elaborate detail and incident. Both are as different in their inspiration from Overbeck, or Ary Scheffer, as they are from any of the Sensualists. There is strong religious feeling in all four painters; but in the Continentals it is rooted in the purity of asceticism, and formed on conventual thoughts of life and of man. In the Englishmen there is confusion of thought; doubt, sadness, inequality, suppressed violence of feeling, many evidences of the Northern mood: but withal there is a tremendous sense of the truth of Holy Scripture, and the intense reality of the thing painted. Look back from these to the days when


other heads grow out of two bodies, or out of and under feet:—all are fighting, or devouring, or struggling, . . . like a feverish dream."

Just such dreams were those of Blake in the last generation, when his mind was exhausted with definite subject, yet could not rest. (See Gilchrist's Life.)

so little skill had been attained by any man, that no man had much to learn; when all that was possible was easy, and the painter's life might pass in catacomb or convent, not without sense of progress and enjoyment of increased skill in using the simple forms and colours he knew. It is like men gliding down a small and pleasant river into the sea that wearied out the soul of Tintoret. Art now-a-days demands and stimulates all the thoughts and efforts of severely educated men.* Indeed the pictures of a true painter are often a kind of net result or index of his whole mind and character at the time. Not every day, but only as God gives him grace, can the thought of a work which shall be of worth for Christian teaching come to a man's soul. And according to other gifts, and his use of them from the first, will be the tenacity, patience, forethought, and insight into detail, with which he will get his thought worked out on canvas. The difficulty of Art is the difficulty of Life: men cannot now paint like little children as of old, because they cannot literally be as little children. Yet that man is not wise who forgets the command to remember the childlike virtues; and he will hardly paint as a Christian man whose thoughts have no reverence for the quaint hieroglyphics of the early days.

R. ST. JOHN TYRWHITT.

* The Universities seem to produce their share of painters. The names of Burne Jones, Spencer, Stanhope, and Alfred Hunt (all Oxford men), are sufficiently well known for originality and power: and there are many more.



EDUCATION AND SCHOOL.

Education and School. By the Rev. EDWARD THRING, M.A., Head Master of Uppingham School, late Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. Cambridge and London, 1864.

“THE proof of the pudding is in the eating.” So says the good old homely proverb; and it is generally equally true that the best test of a man’s theory is the plain and simple one, “Does it work?” If we apply this test to Mr. Thring’s theory, as embodied in his book which heads our article, it must undoubtedly yield an affirmative reply. Any one who knows who Mr. Thring is, and the work he has done and is doing, will at once acknowledge this. Uppingham Grammar School was until recently an ordinary school, of respectable status among provincial grammar schools, but nothing more. Its rival used to be the neighbouring school of Oakham, founded about the same period; and as a little county like Rutlandshire was over-weighted with two good grammar schools, it followed that as one flourished the other pined. Such was the condition of Uppingham on Mr. Thring’s appointment to succeed an able schoolmaster, Dr. Holden; who, however, was so little satisfied with the position and prospects of Uppingham, that from it he sought and obtained the head-mastership of the Cathedral School of Durham. In Mr. Thring’s hands, however, a notable change has come over Uppingham. Just as Harrow and Rugby rose, under wise and able management, from being mere provincial grammar schools, to the proud position they now occupy in the very forefront of the education of English lads; so Uppingham in a comparatively few years has risen from respectable grammar school

mediocrity to a position of fair rivalry with the long-established seats of public school training. This was not the work of a day, nor of mere ordinary sedulity and zeal in its government. Mr. Thring had a theory; he was a person of strong convictions; he was also a man of enterprise,—of enterprise which many persons will say was little short of rashness. He got round him a staff of masters whom he inoculated with his own convictions, and with something of his own zeal. He induced these colleagues to build houses, adapted, according to his theory, for a great and well-governed school. Each house was to be, so far as its boy-arrangements were concerned, the fac-simile of the other; their system was to be uniform, their numbers never beyond a fixed maximum: a condition which Mr. Thring imposed upon himself, magnanimously discarding the temptation to a lucrative monopoly which he might fairly have kept in his own hands. And the bold step thus taken proved a success. Had it failed, he would, perhaps justly, have been condemned as a reckless enthusiast: as he has succeeded, he has earned the thanks of all who wish well to our old grammar schools, and would gladly see them doing their full work in the education of the middle classes in this country. *Prima facie*, then, the rough test, “Does it work?” must in this case be deemed satisfactory. But though a good rough test, and perhaps in nine cases out of ten likely to be sound, it must be merely taken for what it is worth, viz., a good rough test, yielding a good *prima facie* conclusion. The test is not absolute and conclusive. In the present case, for example, success may have arisen either wholly or partially from other causes besides the soundness of the theory. It is impossible to say that novelty may not have been one element in the result. For this is eminently a novelty-loving age. We have lived in such a whirl of invention and discovery, that a new idea, a new plan, a new theory, commends itself to us on the first blush, because it is new. We have learned so much to distrust what is old and established, simply because what is old and established betrays weaknesses and flaws as time goes on and circumstances alter, that we surrender ourselves in willing bondage to what is novel, provided it also be plausible. Let any one who doubts this look around at the manifold systems of education propounded and eagerly supported through the length and breadth of the land. Not that we would insult Mr. Thring by pretending for one moment that his matured, if over-sanguine, and not wholly infallible views on school education are to be compared with the nostrums which are so greedily sought after by educational theorists or by ill-judging parents, with a zeal for their children’s welfare not according to knowledge. But it is just possible that the charm of novelty may be an ingredient in his, as in their success. But besides, it may be here, as in other cases, that the man himself is the school. It is by no means rare for

an individual to be so much the soul of a system that it collapses when he ceases to be its soul. Pythagoreanism fell with Pythagoras : Alexander's Asiatic empire not only actually broke up, but exhibited the seeds of ultimate decay in its disjointed members, as soon as Alexander's spirit ceased to animate it. To descend to the humbler sphere of schools : this is true of the greater ones to some extent. Even there a head-master who is not born to his work, and who labours *invita Minerva*, can reduce his school both in numbers and condition with frightful rapidity ; while, on the other hand, an Arnold or a Vaughan can create, or at least recreate, and infuse a life of their own into the school they are sent to rule over. This dependence on the ability and character of the head-master is of course less visible in what are commonly called the "great schools" than in the grammar schools, for the obvious reason that they can throw into the opposite scale, so as to outweigh a head-master's shortcomings, the *prestige* derived from the past, the vitality of old institutions and traditions—in a word, the system as contrasted with the man,—even the unreasoning tenacity with which people cleave to a great name after its glory has departed. The great schools, therefore, ballasted by these advantages, can tide over an interregnum of incompetency on the part of their head. Not so, however, the grammar schools. The breath of life breathed into them by an able master is in its nature too often fleeting, and the toilsomely reared edifice which the able man has constructed, yea, "and thought that his house shall endure," collapses with a run through the unskilfulness or unwisdom of his successor. And it is no disparagement to Mr. Thring to say that we believe this is, to a certain extent, the case with what he has done at Uppingham. He himself is a very appreciable element in the success he has achieved there. He has carried into effect his theory, because, right or wrong, he believes in it with all the faith of an enthusiast. He is earnest himself, and has managed to infuse somewhat both of his earnestness and faith into those about him. He not only believes in his theory, but (in the right and proper sense of the word) believes in himself as the prophet of his system ; he works it thoroughly *con amore*. To borrow our French neighbours' favourite expression, he is conscious of a mission. Nor is this all ; for even these are not all the points essential to make a great, or even a successful schoolmaster ; he must have that also which will commend him to boys. And this no one who reads Mr. Thring's book, even if he be personally a stranger to him, can doubt that he possesses, viz., vigour and vivacity, high animal spirits, an indomitable sense of fun. In fact, he has evidently carried a large slice of the boy with him into middle life.

But whatever other elements in Mr. Thring's success we may think we recognise besides the soundness of his theory, there is the success

a *fait accompli*; and the very fact of success justly claims a respectful hearing. And the more so, as Mr. Thring has shown experimentally what can be done with an old-fashioned grammar school, at a time when grammar school education is on its trial. The substance of his reply to the question, "How shall we make our grammar schools efficient?" is, "turn as many of them as will bear so transforming into public schools, avoiding the faults which are inherent in, or accidental to, the old public schools." And there is no doubt that the middle or professional class in England has either anticipated or is now endorsing his theory. To prove this we have merely to point to the unprecedented—almost mushroom growth, of the great modern public schools of Rossall, Marlborough, Wellington College, and Haileybury. These, with others, have one and all shot up into full growth almost immediately they were founded or even projected. They professed to bring the public school system within the reach of the more limited means of the professional classes; and they have been beset with such crowds of applicants, that the wonder is where so large a raw material of boy to be educated can be manufactured. The truth is, they have drained the grammar schools, and thereby have unmistakably proved the manifest preference of this class in society for the public school idea, as distinct from the mere grammar school idea. But the case is even stronger than this. St. Nicholas' College, Shoreham, with its affiliated middle and lower class schools, even in the teeth of an adverse theological prejudice, has filled to overflowing, and has thus proved that the notion of public school education and its advantages has penetrated to still lower strata in society. We are at the present time still bound to suspend our judgment, and await with deference the result of the labours of the Schools Inquiry Commission, which will doubtless make important recommendations on the subject of grammar school education. Whatever be their verdict however, we cannot doubt that the country has virtually expressed itself in favour of the public school system generally, and in particular of the old traditional channels of mental training which prevail in those institutions, modified, it may be, according to the exigencies of the present time.

And now for the book in which Mr. Thring embodies his views of what school, and school education, should be. It is, we think, to be regretted that the first chapter is, from its style and mode of treatment, somewhat calculated to repel the general reader. The book is not a *concio ad clerum*. It rather, we apprehend, addresses itself to the ordinary paterfamilias, who is glad enough to hear what the successful schoolmaster has to tell him as to the secrets of his success, and who wants practical advice about his boys' education. To such an one the *quasi*-philosophical character of the chapter in which the subject opens

is likely to have a purely mystifying effect; while the positions established in it are almost axiomatic, or are at least accepted as such by those who have reflected on the subject at all. To them, therefore, the elaborate demonstration of these is needless; to the other, tedious. His object is to show that education gives the mastery over time, and mastery over time is the secret of the superiority of class over class in the social scale. That is to say, given a class in society that can afford to spend ten years in the acquisition of skill and knowledge, and another which can only afford to spend half that time; the former will have just so much start of the other in the race of life, and, unless it re-enact the fable of the hare and tortoise, it cannot be caught up and distanced by it. But this acquisition of a stock of knowledge is not all that is required. Mere hard intellectual eminence, as the experience of the past has shown, is not able to raise or keep from falling either individual men or nations.

“Although both bodily strength and intellectual strength are needed for work, and, trained to work, are the instruments by which the class rank of individuals and nations is attained, they do not ultimately decide the fate of their possessors. They are nothing more than instruments, capable of abuse as well as of use, and the start gained by them only continues to profit so long as the true governing power, man’s true self, that power by which love and hate exist, irrespective of strength and knowledge, directs these instruments and this start to a right end.”—(P. 13.)

The mere production, therefore, of skilled labourers,—in other words, mere intellectual training,—is not all, or even half of what is wanted, if anything really great or good is to be produced. To accomplish this, the perverted life-powers require replanting. “Man’s nature wants to cast out false feeling, and to feel rightly, to love and hate truly, from its own inward essence;” and to a certain extent these, the really guiding powers of life, can be trained, as well as the instrumental ones, *i. e.*, the intellectual faculties. This training is education.

“True education is nothing less than bringing everything that men have learnt from God or from experience to bear first upon the moral and spiritual being by means of a well-governed society and healthy discipline, so that it should love and hate aright; and through this, secondly, making the body and intellect perfect, as instruments necessary for carrying on the work of healthy progress; training the character, the intellect, the body, each through the means adapted to each.”—(P. 17.)

These years of training, then, create the difference in the long run between man and man. *They do not guarantee perfection, for they may be miserably misused. And just as the excellence of the individual[character is affected for better or worse by this training or its absence, so the position of each nation in the scale of real worth turns upon the excellence or deficiency of the training it gives its youth.

For a great school is indeed a heart, propelling life-blood through the body politic. If the heart be diseased, so will be its blood. These years of training, then, are the all-important years of life, never to be repeated, never to be caught up if thrown away. "As is the boy, so is the man; and education is nothing less than the presiding power that determines the fate of both. Education is, training true life."—(P. 19.)

The training of life during the years allotted to education depends on the conditions under which life is passed. That is to say, it is not only the course of instruction, or the discipline, or the amount of masters' vigilance which makes up each boy's education; but everything with which he comes in contact, however apparently trivial and unimportant. Indeed, these apparent trivialities, and, so to speak, ancillary features in the training, are perhaps as important in their general influence as any; for the formation of character is not the result of direct teaching. Neither men nor boys can be taught virtue; they must be habituated to it, and grow up insensibly into it. If, then, we would have our boys grow up to be true men (and truth carries most of the other virtues of the personal character in its train), we must surround them with an atmosphere of truth. This axiom Mr. Thring embodies in the following canons, which almost form the key-note of the whole work:—

"No falseness in the government, no falseness in the working plan, in or out of school, can make boys true. Whatever is professed must be done.

"If a school professes to teach, then every boy must have his share of teaching; there must be no knowledge-scramble, or the untruth will make itself felt.

"If a school professes to train, then every boy must be really known, his wants supplied, his character consulted, or the untruth will make itself felt.

"If a school professes to board boys, then every boy must find proper food and proper lodging, and no meanness, or the untruth will make itself felt.

"A sufficient number of masters, variety of occupation, a feeling of being known and cared for, a spot free from intrusion, however small, are necessities in a good school; and the want of these, or of any of the other requirements for training and teaching properly, is a sort of acted falsehood, for that which is professed is not done."—(P. 22.)

This is plain speaking, and without pledging ourselves to all the details of the last paragraph as necessary symbolizations of truth, we heartily accept the principle. Nay, more; we believe that the principle really and honestly carried out in every school, as far as its light and its capacities extend, would be productive of a very much higher tone in the education of the youth of the middle class in this country. But we are not prepared to rise with Mr. Thring "upon a wind of prophecy," and to assert that where this is the case,—this adoption of truth as the leaven of the entire institution,—

"Then the boy's allegiance becomes due to the common standard, not to the traitor who betrays it; is due to the good cause, not to the mean coward who deserts it; is due to the true friends and true men who work with him, not to the tap-room heroes whose ideal is a tapster. Then the boys amongst themselves will uphold their laws, just as Englishmen will uphold theirs, and think it no shame to make thieves and traitors know their place."—(P. 28.)

Are we here to emphasize the word "*is due*"? If so, we gladly concede that, *à priori*, we should believe that truth ought to engender truth, that confidence should be reciprocated by trustworthiness, magnanimity, and unselfishness by loyalty. But how about the real? Can it be that Mr. Thring's experience bears out to the full this charming ideal? for that he has done his part in the bargain is certain. If zeal and truth and straightforwardness and disinterestedness will elicit the corresponding qualities *universally* from the boys in whose behalf these are exercised, Uppingham should be the paradise of schools. Perhaps it is. But we fear the experience of other schoolmasters, equally high-minded with Mr. Thring, will not wholly bear this out. With the better portion of the school it will; that is, with a small minority (alas! how small in proportion!)—thoroughly and fully: to some extent—for it is curious to observe how half-virtuous boys can be without apparently feeling the utter inconsistency of such a course,—to some extent, it will bear it out with the majority. But is there not a large residuum in every school who are incapable of any such reciprocity of nobleness? Is there no such thing as "the natural though corrupt love of the lie itself"? Is the innate waywardness of boyhood no disturbing cause to this Utopia of schoolboy perfection?

With this proviso, then, we accept Mr. Thring's canons of truth, and proceed with him to apply them to the practical working of the school. In training, whether it be athletes, race-horses, or boys, the trainer is, perhaps, the most important personage. To apply the test of truth, then, to this training staff, Mr. Thring lays down the doctrine that in a great school there will be a permanent staff of masters, with their incomes depending upon their work. Teaching is not a mere pouring of knowledge into receptive minds. Were this the case, it might fairly be regarded as a pleasing and useful mode of filling up the vacant time between the taking the degree and the entrance upon the life-profession, which is the light in which many young men bearing their academic honours thick upon them *do* regard it. But this is not teaching.

"Teaching is a life-long learning how to deal with human minds. As infinite as the human mind is in its variety so ought the resources of the teachers to be. The more stupid the pupils, the more skill is required to make them learn. And thus it comes to pass that, whilst the mere possession of knowledge is enough to teach advanced classes (if it is right to profane the

word by calling pouring knowledge into troughs teaching), the teaching little boys and stupid boys and low classes well, is a thing of wonderful skill."—(P. 110.)

This knowledge and skill does not, as a rule, come by intuition. There are, indeed, instances where a man seems to possess the secret instinctively; but ordinarily it is an experience purchased, like every other experience, by time and practice and failure and perseverance. A schoolmaster, then, ought not to be a bird of passage. If he is, besides the crudeness of his novice-attempts at teaching, and the harm, or at least the little good, that such efforts produce on his pupils, he cannot all at once so place himself *en rapport* with his pupils as to establish that sympathy between him and them which is essential to real teaching: for, as Mr. Thring truly observes, "the way even to the head is through the heart."

But how are we to secure this permanence? The great public schools can do it, for they can hold out adequate remuneration to all their working staff. But even the universities are unable to retain the services of competent tutors and lecturers. Oxford at this moment presents the spectacle of colleges officered from outside of their own list of Fellows, and the cry is still, "More residents!" The truth is that this is an age of restless activity. "Every man for himself" is the order of the day. Among young men especially, a mercenary spirit, or, if this be too harsh a term, a keen sense of the market value of their services, and a righteous determination to do nothing which does not pay them well, is widely spread. How are good assistant masters to be secured? Mr. Thring replies, by making their remuneration depend directly on their work—that is to say, by making them all house masters. He is against stipendiary masters; their tendency is to become mere hirelings. It may not be a high motive, but to feel that one's zeal and success directly affect one's prospects for the better, is after all an appeal to human nature as it is. "At least it gives men an interest in their work and its success, and makes toil sweeter when toil brings its visible reward."—(P. 106.)

The next point as regards masters is, that they shall not have more boys to deal with than each can attend to individually. Proof of so obvious a proposition is, one would think, needless; and yet how entirely has this clear principle been overlooked in our greatest public schools! No master, however herculean in working power, can get through more than a certain amount of work in a given time. So, on the other hand, it is of the nature of the boy to shirk that which, though legally due, will, according to the doctrine of chances, in all probability not be required of him. As to any individual knowledge of the boys of his class, or any attempt to adapt his teaching accordingly, a master with an overgrown class is simply powerless. Whether twenty-five

is the maximum number that can be taught classics by one man at a time, is a comparatively immaterial point, and may fairly be questioned. The principle, however, is irrefragable. A master who is to teach must have an individual knowledge of the mental condition of each boy in his class. He must know his capacity, and be able to determine with proximate accuracy whether his shortcomings are the result of dulness, or lethargy of mind or manner, or of idleness, or inattention. Individual knowledge of his boys is the *sine qua non* of the good class master, just as individual knowledge of the character of each boy in the school is the *sine qua non* of the good head-master. And we would venture to go a step further than Mr. Thring, and say, as a class must be limited by the capacity of its master to handle it individually, so must a school be limited to such a number of boys as its head-master can know individually; and every school which exceeds such limit has lost its element of truth, and is an imposture.

Thus much for the trainers; now for the machinery of training. On this point Mr. Thring's first dictum is perhaps the prominent feature in his theory of school, at least so far as its outward and visible form is concerned. It is this:—"The boys shall not be forced to herd together in large rooms, but each have a sanctum of his own."—(P. 109.)

To establish his position, Mr. Thring boldly discards all argument derived from facts or experience. Facts can be made to tell any story the advocate pleases. When human beings are the subjects, principles must be looked to and their natural results. Starting, then, on this purely *à priori* ground, he proceeds to argue that as boys are sent to school to be trained for the duties of after life, no boy can be expected to work or live under conditions which then would be wholly inadmissible. For example, they are to be trained how to study. This of itself is a sufficiently strange and uncongenial task for the young lad fresh from home. He is not likely to do it successfully under less favourable circumstances than trained men, with all this repugnance to study overcome, require, in order to perform intellectual work. They require quiet, a place of seclusion, and freedom from mental distraction. This, then, is a thousandfold more necessary for the poor boy who has everything to learn, and who does not yet know even how to work. This difficulty, however, may be got over by the presence of a master during hours of preparation and work, so as to enforce order and require attention. But in a free system of school administration a master cannot always be present in the boys' common room; and here the chief mischief is done to the boy's private or inner life. Here a large part of his leisure must be spent, and here he has no escape from hearing or seeing whatever the worst boy there dares say or do, or from the tyranny of the most

inveterate bully in the place. But this is no training for manhood. These are not the customs of life in manhood. No man is obliged always to herd with men whom he abhors or fears. But besides, one of the great duties of life is to—

“Ponder our ways, to withdraw from the press of busy life, and in our hearts weigh well what is true and what is not true in the hurry and glitter of the world. And school sometimes trains boys for this, by never allowing them a moment to carry out this great duty. Yet how needful it is for the little exile from home, with strange new life among strangers round about him for the first time, to have a spot, however small, which shall be his own, where he shall be safe with his books and his letters, where he can think, and weep if need be, or rejoice unmolested, and escape for a season out of the press of life about him, and the strange hardness of a new existence, into a little world of his own, a *quasi*-home, to find breathing space, and gather strength before he comes out again. Nowhere on earth is six or eight feet square more valuable than at school, the little bit which is a boy's own, the rock which the waves do not cover.”—(P. 140.)

With much of this we cordially agree. We believe that this seclusion, or partial seclusion, of each boy as regards the dormitory arrangements is, if not a necessity, as Mr. Thring would have us believe, a most desirable feature in a great school. The partitioning off of the large room into little compartments or cells of six feet square, firstly, subserves the purposes of health by providing a free current of air, which absolutely separate small bedrooms could not secure; secondly, of sufficient publicity for a reasonably healthy public opinion to repress vice, as well as for the free play of monitors' or prefects' authority and influence in its repression; and, thirdly, of sufficient privacy for the self-respect and protection of the timid and helpless. But after all, such protection and such privacy cannot be absolutely secured by this arrangement. Of this Mr. Thring must be fully aware. For no punishments, however severe or however certain as the consequence of detection, will deter boys from breaking a rule if there is a single chance of escape; and even the most Argus-eyed masters and the most conscientious monitors cannot, from the nature of the case, exercise unremitting vigilance, and preserve the sanctity of each retreat absolutely inviolate and free from intrusion.

But we entirely dissent from the separate study theory, not only because it is a needless feature in the economy of a school, but because we believe it to be theoretically unsound. We join issue with Mr. Thring on his main argument. We do not admit that because school is a training of life,—in other words, a fitting of the young boy to discharge the duties he will be called on as a man to perform,—therefore the conditions of training should be identical with, and in no respect more irksome or trying than the conditions under which the man-duties will be performed. A great deal of the disci-

pline of boy-life is different *in kind* from the habits or states of mind in the grown man, to the development of which, nevertheless, that dissimilar discipline may in a high degree conduce. We will impress Mr. Thring himself into our service to combat his own arguments. He, brave man! (we say it in all sincerity) has the courage to defy the anathemas of sentimentalists, educational theorists, and tender parents, and to avow himself a believer in the rod; and that not, as is sometimes reluctantly conceded, as the penalty for grave moral delinquencies, but as the natural and wholesome medicine for the petty, oft-repeated offences which form the bulk of school indiscipline. But how is this discipline reproduced in after-life? Simply not at all. The system of direct rewards and punishments ceases when the age of childhood closes. It is a training different in kind—fitted for the boy, impossible for the man, because the two are almost different animals, with different ideas, different sensibilities. Mr. Thring justly ridicules the notion that corporal punishment is degrading to the boy, because the man's instincts of self-respect recoil from personal outrage; but he practically falls into the same fallacy when he argues that because privacy and seclusion at will are necessities with the grown man, they are therefore indispensable conditions of the training of young boys. Hence we dissent, *in toto*, from his paradox that it is the little boys who want separate studies more than the older ones. We dissent from it, because we hold that as the ordinary discipline and coercion of little boys must cease, or become considerably relaxed, in the case of older ones, because the older ones are passing into the conditions of manhood; so the study is, if not a necessity, at least a lawful luxury for these latter, because they have, or ought to have, attained to the habit of mind which, as in the grown man, craves for occasional seclusion, and is able to profit by it. And this brings us to a second argument against the indiscriminate allotment of studies to all boys, old and young alike. Little boys are, of all others, by nature gregarious, and never so much so, or perhaps with so much advantage, as over the preparation of their lessons. Indeed, a little boy, if left to himself, and removed from the assistance of his immediate companions and classmates during the preparation of lessons, usually solves the difficulty by not preparing them at all. The truth is, he does not know how to set about it, or if he does, he is staggered and dispirited by the first difficulty that crosses his path; and more than that, he is the very worst judge himself of whether, and when, he knows a lesson. Any schoolmaster who has in his school a sufficiently large proportion of day-boys or home-boarders will at once appreciate the truth of this remark. He will acknowledge that they, as a rule, spend three times as much time over preparation and in spite of all the supposed advantages of privacy,

and such assistance as judicious parents offer to smoothen the path for them, they come considerably worse prepared than the boarders of the same age and form, simply because they, by working together, help one another, and so in no trifling degree teach one another. This advantage, then, is absolutely foregone by the separate study system; for to say that under it boys can still study together in the common room of their boarding-house is to condemn the study as a useless luxury; if a study is not made to study in, it belies its name, and is obviously a superfluity. We admit that in an ill-governed boarding-house there will—perhaps must be, considerable noise going on around them to distract attention from work; but we very much doubt whether the distraction is anything like as dangerous to progress as the opportunities for idleness and desultoriness which the very independence of a study engenders in the little boy, who is naturally overmastered by the passing temptation to be idle, and who is not old enough to realize that the claims of work are imperative and must first be satisfied.

A more plausible argument in favour of the separate study for each boy, great and small, is the harm which the little boy will receive morally from unavoidable contact with the *mauvais sujets* of the common room, and the necessity of a place of retreat from some bullying tormentor. Now this is, beyond a doubt, a most important consideration; but while we at once admit that such cases must from time to time arise in all schools, and while we deplore them as dreadful evils where they do occur, we cannot regard them as a normal or necessary state of things, or the *public school theory* has broken down. Let us fairly face this conclusion, from which there is no escape. The essence of the public school theory is government by means of a healthy public opinion. And the instrument by which this theory is worked is the monitor or prefect system. If, therefore, these are powerless,—we will not say altogether to repress and eradicate these evils, but to *minify* them and at least hold them in decent check; if public opinion is not healthy enough to frown down the overt display of the vices of the worst members of the community; if the monitors, aided by public opinion, cannot hold out reasonable protection to the young and feeble from the bully and the tyrant; above all, if the oppressed boy cannot, with fair prospect of redress, appeal to these his natural guardians in the event of insupportable ill-usage,—then, we repeat, the public school theory has broken down, and we must strike our flag, and make our submission to the amiable but weak poet of Olney on the great question of boy-education.

Indeed the “study for all” theory is, whether consciously or unconsciously, a surrender of public education. It is a transference of home to school. But *cui bono* such a transference? Public edu-

cation, if it means anything, means boys educating each other; educating each other by their virtues and their vices, by their roughnesses and their gentlenesses. If a boy is to be taken out of this as much as is possible, or as much as he likes—and what poor child would not gladly shun the ordeal, at least in his early days at school?—why send him to school at all? He can probably associate with companions when he wishes it, as well at home as at school; while, as to the intellectual training, it is not so successful, in by far the majority of boys who are subjected to it, as to make it an important element in the question.

We would rather believe that what Mr. Thring calls “the barrack” theory, with a good master, capable of impressing somewhat of his own spirit upon his boys, good monitors, and a decently sound public opinion, is after all the best. It may be a somewhat rough and Spartan training of the character; but it forces a boy to divest himself promptly of his peculiarities; it makes him rub off the angularities of his character—and what boy comes straight from home to school without more or less of these? It teaches him to adapt himself to circumstances; it knocks the conceit out of him; in a word, it engenders that *αὐρακσία*, that self-completeness and adaptability to diverse circumstances, which so completely marks off the public school man from the man who has either been brought up at home, or at the private tutor’s, however excellent, amiable, and gentlemanly he may be. It is, we repeat, a Spartan kind of training, and it has often gone to our heart to see the poor little new-boy, forlorn, frightened, miserable, amid the unsympathizing throng in the school-hall. If, however, he has any stuff in him (and if he has not, school is not the place for him as a boy, nor the wide world as a man), it is surprising how soon he rises superior to his difficulties. And after his first term, he returns with the home-delicacy of sentiment indeed rubbed off, never to revive till manhood reawakens it; but not, as we earnestly hope and believe, necessarily with a seared conscience, or a vindictive sense of cruel wrong sustained; rather with the glad consciousness of bugbears fought and vanquished, of difficulties surmounted, and moral sinew developed.

We cannot but feel that the unsound point in Mr. Thring’s school theory is an exaggerated individualism. This is not only a fault on the right side, but one into which a conscientious man is especially likely to be driven by the vicious multitudinism of the great public schools. Their numbers, combined with their frequently very inadequate officering as regards masters, have a direct tendency to deal with boys in masses, and to lose sight altogether of anything like individual character and individual training. The corrective to this defect in their case is the tutorial as contrasted with the magisterial element.

The tutor (also a master), under whom each boy is necessarily placed, supplies to some extent the personal tie which should exist between master and pupil, if the boy is to be really influenced for good by the master, as well as corrects the deficient intellectual training which overgrown classes must produce. To the non-public school mind, however, this seems but a clumsy mode of introducing the element of individual care and individual training into a school. We are not at all surprised that Mr. Thring should have at once felt this deficiency in the old public school idea, and, having felt it, that he should have resolved on providing an antidote. We think, however, that he has carried this into the opposite extreme. We go with him entirely when he speaks of the necessity of restricting the numbers in each class to the capacity of one man to teach them adequately; we recognise that in the over-grown class—

“The lecturer must insist on a certain quantum of visible work being produced by all, and take no excuse if it is not forthcoming. For he has no time to judge whether everybody can or cannot do this quantity always. Everything would go to pieces if he began making distinctions between the boys, and he would lay himself open to unlimited imposition.”

On the other hand, when the master has a form of manageable numbers,—

“He is able to make himself acquainted with the powers and attainments of every boy under him, and as far as his judgment goes, to apportion fairly their tasks to each, to help them when needful, to deal with them singly, weighing each case; and though his judgment may err in some instances, errors of judgment are very different things from arbitrary routine.”—(P. 131.)

The same principle, no doubt, is also true in its degree as applied to punishments. In the adjudication of these a wise master will exercise discrimination, forming his judgment according to his individual knowledge of the culprit's character. Though here we at once step on very delicate ground, as no animal is so keenly alive to, and at the same time tolerant of strict impartial justice, even if it amount to severity, as the schoolboy. Nevertheless, this very sense of justice in them recognises the differences in different cases, and endorses a master's distinctions in dealing with them differently, provided they are made with wisdom and sound discrimination, and, above all things, with a corresponding sense of justice on his part. Individualism too may, to a certain extent, be carried safely into the playground. Boys' tastes undoubtedly widely differ, and it is right that in the relaxation hours the boy should be permitted to indulge his taste. Hence we admit that where possible, among the more important buildings of a school,—

“Provision should be made for a school library, museum, workshop, gymnasium, swimming bath, fives courts, or any other pursuits that conduce to


a healthy life. The welfare of the majority greatly depends on something being provided to interest every kind of disposition and taste. Plenty of occupation is the one secret of a good and healthy moral life."—(P. 179.)

But along with this freedom of action to each individual to follow his own bent, we unhesitatingly hold the wisdom and justice of compulsory participation on the part of all during a fraction of the leisure time in the recognised games of the community; first, because the community has a right to the services and sympathy of its individual members. That is to say, if cricket, for example, is recognised as the one great game of the school, every boy, in right of his allegiance to the republic to which he belongs, ought, in all fairness, to support and advance this object by his own personal services. But we hold this chiefly in the interests of the individual boys themselves. Few boys like the rudiments of anything, whether it be the Greek alphabet or fielding out at cricket. It is therefore well for them that they should be required by a superior power to apply themselves to these disagreeables. Eventually they reap the fruit of their distasteful labour; in the one case in intellectual culture—in increased manliness in the other. But chiefly it is good for the individual boy, however young, to learn the duty of making his self-good bow to the good of the commonwealth to which he belongs. It is a first lesson in self-denial; and it is none the worse that this should be exercised on behalf of the community, instead of some other individual like himself: but this self-denial is the foundation of true *esprit de corps*. This tribute, however, should not encroach unduly upon each boy's fund of leisure, if other pursuits have greater charms for him. He will enter on these pursuits with all the greater zest for having thus paid his due of homage to the interests of the body; provided the homage is not over burdensome, and does not degenerate into bondage. But a schoolboy ought never to forget that he is but a unit of a great whole,—that he is a member of a body; and hence it is, that we dissent, *in toto*, from any plan which tends to detach a boy, during the hours he has to himself, from the community and its duties and interests, and to encourage him, however indirectly, to isolation from his fellows. This we believe to be exaggerated individualism, and though it may practically work well for the present, and will undoubtedly find great acceptance with the indulgent tenderness of parents, we believe that it is a cutting off of a valuable, though often unpalatable, ingredient in school education; and we venture to predict that in the long run it will not produce as sterling an article as the harder discipline of training from the earliest years to accommodate oneself to circumstances, however unpromising, and to adapt oneself to the ways of those, however uncongenial, among whom one's lot in life is cast.

But while we thus frankly differ from Mr. Thring on one important point of detail, we thank him for his book. We have forborne comment on many of its important features, because to handle the subject at all worthily exceeds the limits of a brief review. We have forborne to follow him through his masterly defence of the classical languages as the basis of school education; or through his manful and fearless grappling with the difficult question of school punishments. Suffice it to say that in most of what he says on either head we heartily concur. Nor have we attempted to criticise the hints he has thrown out elsewhere for the rehabilitation of old foundations, and for breathing into them life and activity. But Mr. Thring not only deserves our thanks for a piece of very pleasant and suggestive reading upon a subject in which all profess interest. He deserves the thanks of all who believe that there is enormous power for education scattered up and down the country, in the shape of the old endowed schools, waiting to be utilized. Mr. Thring has shown in act, as well as in word, how this may be done; if not in all, at least in many of our provincial grammar schools. In the conflicting clamour for public school education and modern education, the poor old grammar schools and their capabilities for good have been forgotten. It is refreshing to find some one who believes in them still, and who can give a reason of the faith that is in him. Mr. Thring deserves the famous resolution of thanks accorded by the Roman Senate to Terentius Varro after Cannæ, "because he had not despaired of the republic." It is pleasant to see a man derive strength and encouragement in his work from the associations of the past, for they are indeed a mighty engine for good to those who know how to use them.

"Not in the least on this account are the old foundations a saving power in the land. They are strong in the fact that their origin dates from the liberality of the dead. Their roots are in the hallowed past; and out of the grave of great and good men—great and good at all events so far as they grudged not money in a good cause—grows the shelter under which the work of education is carried on. Those who believe in education, believe also in this, and feel a deeper, truer sense of life and work from carrying on a good man's purpose; are freer from not being beholden to living task-masters; are chastened into more patient endurance by the memory of the trust they have received. It gladdens and cheers them that they are links in a chain of life and light,—*Vitai lampada tradunt*,'—and not merely sitting in the temple as money-changers."—(P. 119.)

Who knows if, after all, the old grammar schools, reformed and reinspired, are not to be the *Deus ex machina* of upper middle-class education? Reform they most, if not all, need—perhaps on a very extensive scale. But reform does not necessarily mean revolution; and there is no reason why at least a large number of them should not be worked on the principles advocated in this book, and have a grand career of usefulness opened out before them.



DR. PUSEY ON DANIEL THE PROPHET.

Daniel the Prophet: Nine Lectures delivered in the Divinity School of the University of Oxford, with Copious Notes. By the Rev. E. B. PUSEY, D.D., Regius Professor of Hebrew, and Canon of Christ Church. J. H. & J. Parker, Oxford; Rivingtons, London. 1864.

ADEQUATELY and truly to criticise a work like this within the compass usually allowed to criticism in a Review is almost out of the question. We shall not attempt to do more than notice some of its most salient arguments, and the general principles of criticism and interpretation on which it proceeds.

Dr. Pusey tells us in his Preface that these Lectures were planned as his "contribution against the tide of scepticism which the publication of the 'Essays and Reviews' let loose upon the young and instructed." But whilst "others," he says, "who wrote in defence of the faith, engaged in larger subjects, I took for my province one more confined and definite issue. I selected the Book of Daniel, because unbelieving critics considered their attacks upon it to be one of their greatest triumphs." But though he has so far apparently narrowed the range of his argument as to confine it to a single one of the points at issue in that controversy, he has brought to bear upon this point a perfect encyclopædia of learning. He has cast into his volume the labour of a lifetime. It is by far the most complete work which has yet appeared, no Continental writer having handled the subject with anything like the same fulness or breadth of treatment. In England we need scarcely say it is unrivalled. Few men amongst us could have produced such a book. It is a monument of learned industry, which reminds us rather of ancient folios than of modern octavos. But this

exhaustive method of treatment, it must be confessed, has its drawbacks. It is exhausting as well as exhaustive. The reader must labour as well as the author, and his patience is severely tried. He is not charmed to forget the ruggedness of the path either by lucidity of arrangement, or by graces of style. The argument is often embarrassed by the accumulation of matter, the style is cramped and heavy, and a large portion of the criticism is uninviting, and, to the majority of readers, even unintelligible. Still, in spite of these drawbacks, the great value of the book cannot be questioned. Whether we agree with Dr. Pusey's conclusions or not, we must be glad to find thus collected for us in one volume all that has been written, all that can by possibility be brought to bear upon the authorship and age of a book, presenting, on any hypothesis as to its origin, so many remarkable features as the Book of Daniel. Every day widens and deepens the interest felt on such subjects amongst educated men. And numbers, we cannot doubt, have already turned eagerly to this volume, attracted to it not only by the name and reputation of the author, but also by the importance of the subject, and the keen desire to ascertain what can really be said as to the date and genuineness of one of the most remarkable books of Scripture.

We wish we could speak as favourably of the general tone and temper of Dr. Pusey's volume as we can of its learning and completeness. But unhappily, its greatest defect is the bitterness of its language,—the indiscriminate censure with which all are assailed who have ventured to entertain any doubts as to the time when the Book of Daniel was written. The charge of wilful blindness, so repeatedly brought against those whose misfortune it is to be Dr. Pusey's opponents, is rather apt to enlist sympathy on their side than to convince us that their assailant is right. Instinctively we feel that such charges betray a weakness somewhere. Truth, we say to ourselves, is calm, majestic, unruffled, not impatient, because fearless of consequences. Is it wise, we ask, to be angry with the storm which shakes our dwellings? Is it not better to examine whether the foundation is secure, and the walls so built as to keep out the blast?

We lament these defects the more, because we have not forgotten that Dr. Pusey could once write in a very different strain. Thirty-seven years ago there appeared a work from his pen, entitled "*An Historical Enquiry into the probable Causes of the Rationalist Character lately predominant in the Theology of Germany.*" Let any one, after reading the "*Lectures on Daniel,*" turn to the earlier work, and he will be painfully struck by the contrast. Dr. Pusey could then speak with candour and generosity of men from whom he differed. He could do homage then to the genius and the piety of Schleiermacher. He could speak of him as "that great man who,

whatever be the errors of his system, had done more than (some very few perhaps excepted) any other for the restoration of religious belief in Germany." Would he now describe the "*Kurze Darstellung des Theologischen Studiums*" as "a work which, with a few great defects, is full of important principles and comprehensive views, and which will form a new era in theology, whenever the principles which it furnishes for the cultivation of the several theological sciences shall be acted upon?"* The whole aim of the Regius Professor's life, and the whole tendency of his writings for many years, have unquestionably been directly opposed to the principles of which, in the passage just quoted, he declares his admiration. That party of which Dr. Pusey has long been one of the acknowledged leaders,—that system, rigid in its dogmatic statements, mediæval in its ritualism, retrogressive in its principles, with which his name is identified,—have undoubtedly been the greatest obstacle to the formation of "a new era in theology." To them it is owing that the tide has been checked, and its waters hurled violently backward. We are not, however, taunting Dr. Pusey with inconsistency. We do not mean to insinuate that he ever was a disciple of Schleiermacher's, or adopted to any extent the principles of that great philosophical theologian. But we do lament that one who could once speak in terms of so much candour and moderation, not only of that distinguished man but of others, like Lessing and Herder, whose theology has appeared more than doubtful to cautious divines, should in later life have unlearned the charity which "believeth all things, hopeth all things,"—that one who once hailed the dawn of a better theology in connection with the name of Schleiermacher, should now stigmatize as "unbelievers" and "rationalists" all who venture to doubt the genuineness of Daniel. Great and good men, like Arnold of Rugby, do not deserve to have this reproach cast upon them, nor indeed can it hurt them. Every line of such a man's writings refutes the calumny. His whole life is a noble witness to the depth, the purity, the power of his faith. To call such a man an unbeliever is to travesty words—to make a mockery of language. Nor is it true of many others who have been staggered by the evidence adduced in favour of the later date, that "their real central grounds of objection" are "the fact that the Book of Daniel does contain unmistakable prophecies." Charges of this kind are unworthy of the writer. But controversy hardens. The breath of party spirit nips the bud of generosity. Charity cannot grow in that poisonous and stifling vapour.

* "*Historical Enquiry*," &c., p. 115, Note. See also the opinion expressed of Lessing and Herder and Bretschneider, p. 155. Even Lord Herbert is said, notwithstanding his errors, to be "entitled to a high degree of respect, from the earnestness of his religious as well as from his intellectual character."—(P. 126, Note 1.)

It withers, and dies, and falls away. Dr. Pusey has unhappily given but too much evidence in this volume that he has long breathed not 'the keen atmosphere of wholesome severities,' but the pestilential miasma which exhales from the field of theological strife.

The contest about the Book of Daniel, an incidental notice of which in the "Essays and Reviews" was the text of these lectures, is an old struggle revived. Porphyry, towards the close of the third century, was the first assailant of its genuineness. Of his fifteen discourses against Christians (*λόγοι κατὰ Χριστιανῶν*), the twelfth was devoted to Daniel, and we learn, from Jerome's account, the grounds on which he disputed its genuineness. The minutely historical character of the prophecies, and especially the details in chap. xi., appeared to him inexplicable except on the theory that they were predictions after the event. The prophecies, he argued, were a faithful description of Antiochus Epiphanes and his times; and their very accuracy proves that they are not true predictions, but history cast into the form of prediction. The point of his argument is thus given by Jerome in his preface to Daniel: "*Quicquid usque ad Antiochum dixerit, veram historiam continere; si quid autem ultra opinatus sit, quia futura nescierit esse mentitum.*" Porphyry was answered by Methodius, Apollinaris, Eusebius of Caesarea, and others. And from that time till the end of the last century, no further doubts were raised as to the prophetic character and genuineness of Daniel. But, the spirit of critical investigation once awakened and applied to the Scriptures, it was not possible that a book so remarkable should remain unchallenged. Porphyry's objections were revived and sharpened anew; others were suggested; till at last a complete case was made out; and during the present century, the great majority of German critics have accepted it as proved that the Book of Daniel belongs to the age of the Maccabees. Hitzig fixes the date between 170 and 164 B.C. And this has been pronounced "a certain result of historical criticism." (Lücke.)

The chief grounds on which it has been alleged that the book is not a genuine production of the time of the exile are these:—

"The character of the two languages in which the book is written; the use of Greek words; the fact that the range even of the prediction, whilst it clearly pointed to Antiochus Epiphanes and his times, does not go beyond them; the marvellous and unhistorical character of the narrative; the marked difference between the style of the book and that of the writings of the Captivity; the apocalyptic turn of the visions; the place of the book in the Hebrew Canon; the omission of Daniel from the panegyric in Ecclus. xlix."

All these objections have been combated at length—some of them, we think, successfully combated—by Dr. Pusey. We cannot attempt

to travel over the same ground. A mere outline of his arguments would occupy considerable space; and the "Lectures" themselves must be studied by those who would know what they are. We purpose only to draw attention to certain points on which we believe the main argument to turn, and which, we think, admit of a different and a fairer exposition than that given in the Regius Professor's lectures. These are—(1) The position of the book in the Hebrew Canon, and, as connected with this, the question as to the probable closing of the Canon. For if it can be shown that the Canon received its final completion under Nehemiah, the discussion as to the age of Daniel is at an end. (2) The use of Greek words, and the general character of Daniel's Chaldee. (3) The nature of the apocalyptic visions, and their relation to Antiochus Epiphanes and his times. We shall then examine briefly some of the criticisms on various points of the Hebrew Scriptures into which Dr. Pusey has diverged in the prosecution of his argument.

I. The argument drawn from the place of Daniel in the Jewish Canon, though the most has been made of it, strikes us as really of very little worth. The book stands there, not in the roll of the Prophets, but between Esther and Ezra, among the Hagiographa or Kethubhim. Its place is held to be evidence both of the "lateness of its composition, and of the secondary estimation in which it was held in the Jewish Church."* In reality it is neither. At the most it would only prove a lateness of *reception into the Canon*, not lateness of authorship. It is no proof that a book is late because it stands among the Hagiographa. Job and Ruth, whatever question there may be as to their exact date, were both of them written long before the exile. The Lamentations were written by Jeremiah, probably about the time when Jerusalem was taken by Nebuchadnezzar.† It is a sufficient reason why Daniel should not appear among the Prophets, that his work was unlike that of the other prophets, that he was not sent to Israel or Judah, but played a special and exceptional part at the court of a heathen monarch, and in a foreign land. Besides, if we are to lay stress upon the position of the book in the Jewish Canon at all, we ought in all fairness to take not a part, but the whole of the evidence thus furnished. Daniel stands there before Ezra and Nehemiah; therefore, in the judgment of the Jewish Church, was earlier than these. But again, it may be fairly asked, What is the date of the present Jewish Canon? or what value is to be attached to the judgment of those who framed it? The earliest enumeration of the books of the Canon is that given by

* Desprez, "Daniel, or the Apocalypse of the Old Testament."

† Of the Psalms we say nothing, because, although many of them are early, yet many are post-exile, and some may possibly be as late as the time of the Maccabees.

Josephus, and he evidently is not acquainted with the existing arrangement. He mentions twenty-two books, of which he says five were written by Moses, and thirteen after Moses, embracing the period from his death to the reign of Artaxerxes, the king of Persia (which are usually thus distributed:—1, Joshua; 2, Judges and Ruth; 3, Samuel; 4, Kings; 5, Chronicles; 6, Ezra and Nehemiah; 7, Esther; 8, Isaiah; 9, Jeremiah and Lamentations; 10, Ezekiel; 11, Daniel; 12, the Minor Prophets; 13, Job). The four remaining books, he says, contain hymns to God and rules of life, “by which are, beyond a doubt, meant the Psalms and the three Books of Solomon (*i. e.*, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Canticles).” * When, therefore, Mr. Desprez, in his recently published work, says, “The question to be decided by evidence is, Did the Jews withdraw the book from a place which it once occupied in the prophetic roll, or did the Christians elevate it from its original position in the Hagiographa, and install it in a place to which it had no proper title?” † we answer, the evidence is in favour of the former alternative unquestionably. In like manner, both Ruth and Lamentations seem to have been transferred from the place which they at one time occupied, the one after Judges, the other after Jeremiah, to their present position in our Hebrew Bibles. ‡ Jerome mentions that they were reckoned sometimes with the Prophets, though the Talmud places them among the Hagiographa.

But there is another question of considerable interest closely connected with the one just stated,—When was the Canon of the Old Testament closed? Dr. Pusey replies, in the time of Nehemiah, and thus rebuts the attempt to prove the lateness of Daniel from his place in the Canon. No book, no part of a book, he maintains, could have been received into the Canon so late as the time of the Maccabees. It is worth while to examine this question more dispassionately than Dr. Pusey has done. He dismisses, in the first place, briefly and contemptuously the theory of Maccabæan Psalms. “The last book, Nehemiah, was finished,” he says, “about B.C. 410. The theory of Maccabee Psalms lived too long, but is now numbered with the dead. Only one or two here and there, who believe little besides, believe in this phantom of a past century.” This is a specimen, only one we are sorry to say out of many, in which hard words are substituted for a fair investigation of what is confessedly a difficult problem. “The theory of Maccabee Psalms,” whatever else it may be, is not “a phantom of a past century.” Calvin says of the 44th Psalm, that it is clear as the day (*liquido constat*) that it was composed by any one rather than by David, and that the complaints in it fall in best with the times of

* Bleek, “*Einleitung*,” p. 680.

† “Daniel, or the Apocalypse of the Old Testament,” p. 14.

‡ Bleek, “*Einleitung*,” p. 502.

Antiochus ("proprie conveniunt in miserum illud et calamitosum tempus quo grassata est sævissima tyrannis Antiochi"), though he allows it might be referred to any date after the exile. Writing on the 74th Psalm, he leaves it an open question whether the lamentation of the poet is over the destruction of the city and temple by Nebuchadnezzar, or the profanation of the temple by Antiochus. He inclines to the latter date, suggesting that where the language seems too strong for the circumstances, it may have been coloured by the recollection of the Chaldean invasion. And he particularly notices the complaint—"There is no prophet any more, neither is there one among us who knoweth how long," as far more explicable on the Maccabæan hypothesis, than on that which would refer the Psalm to the Babylonish exile ("ita conjectura erit magis probabilis ad tempus Antiochi spectare has querimonias, quia tunc prophetis caruit Dei Ecclesia"). Similarly he thinks that the 79th Psalm may have been occasioned by either of the above-mentioned calamities ("ad utrumque tempus argumentum optime quadrat"). But we can go farther back than Calvin, and to authorities which Dr. Pusey will be more likely to treat with respect. Theophylact, though holding as a matter of course to the Davidic authorship of the 44th Psalm, still felt so strongly that the internal evidence pointed to the times of the Maccabees, that he says in his preface to the Psalm, that "David uttered it in the person of Mattathias and his sons." Similarly he holds that Psalm 79 predicts "the cruelty of Antiochus Epiphanes towards the Jews." In like manner Cassiodorus says of it: "Deplorat vero Antiochi persecutionem tempore Maccabæorum factam, tunc futuram, scilicet in spiritu prophetico quasi præteritam propter certitudinem eventus." It would be easy to multiply testimonies. Critically of course they prove nothing: but they are of importance as showing how overwhelming the evidence is in favour of the Maccabæan times, when even interpreters who suppose a Psalm to be written by David or Asaph are constrained to regard it as a prophecy of Antiochus Epiphanes. And yet Dr. Pusey writes of such Psalms as the 74th and 79th, "No one could find in these Maccabee Psalms, who did not wish to find them." We say nothing of the temper displayed in such a remark. We only observe that one of the most devout and orthodox of modern German commentators, who has investigated this question, comes to the same conclusion as Calvin, that the evidence as to date is very nearly balanced. But Delitzsch does not suffer himself to be fettered by any *à priori* theories, nor by any unproved statements as to the closing of the Canon.

If indeed it could be shown that the Septuagint Version of the Psalms was already completed about the end of the third century before Christ, as Ewald asserts, or if it were certain that the quotation

from the 79th Psalm in the First Book of Maccabees is from that Version, the argument thus urged would be very strong. But the quotation is far from being in verbal accordance with the text of the LXX.; and we really do not know with certainty when the Greek Version of the Psalms was completed, even if we concede, which is itself very doubtful, that the phrase *κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὃν ἔγραψε* introduces a quotation from Scripture. The First Book of Maccabees probably dates from about 110 B.C.; why may not the author have quoted as Scripture a Psalm written during the struggle with Antiochus Epiphanes, some sixty years before? The strongest arguments in favour of the earlier closing of the Canon are drawn from the Prologue to the Wisdom of the Son of Sirach, and from a passage in the Second Book of Maccabees. The Prologue was probably written about 130 B.C. In it the writer, who translated his grandfather's work, mentions a threefold division of the Scriptures. He says that his grandfather Jesus "had given himself to the reading of the Law and the Prophets, and the other books of our fathers" (*τῶν ἄλλων πατρίων βιβλίων*). Hence about 180 B.C., the latest probable date of the original work, a threefold division of the Canon was already recognised. But more than this: the grandson, apologizing for translating his grandfather's work from Hebrew into Greek, and pointing out that the force of the original must thus often be lost, refers to the fact that this difference is felt in the (Greek) translation of the Scriptures, where again he enumerates "the Law and the Prophets and the rest of the books." If this last expression denotes the Kethubhim, then, at this date, 180 B.C., not only was there the same threefold division of the Canon which at present exists, but all the Books had already been translated into Greek. Strange to say, it is on this passage that Ewald and others have built one of their strongest arguments against the theory of Maccabæan Psalms, whilst at the same time they hold that a number of other books were added to the Canon in the time of the Maccabees.* But if the words of this Prologue are a proof that no Maccabæan Psalms are to be found in the Canon, they are equally a proof that the Book of Daniel is not Maccabæan. Dr. Pusey is so far, at least, quite consistent. For he will have not only no Maccabæan Psalms, but no additions at all to the Canon after the death of Nehemiah. Ewald is thoroughly inconsistent when he denies Maccabæan Psalms on the ground of this Prologue, and allows other books to have been incorporated during the Maccabæan struggle.

But whatever may be the inference from this passage, there is no proof that the Canon was finally closed by Nehemiah. The account given of the formation of a library by Nehemiah, in 2 Maccabees

* Ewald specifies Proverbs, the Song of Songs, Ecclesiastes, Job, Daniel, Esther, the Chronicles.

ii. 13, of course does not prove it. We are there merely informed that Nehemiah, "founding a library, collected the (works) concerning the kings and prophets, and the (works) of David, and letters of kings concerning votive offerings." Dr. Pusey himself says: "What document the writers of the Epistle [from which this information is borrowed] had before them, we have no clue. Nor do the words contain anything as to the formation or closing of the Canon, or any act whatever in regard to it." And yet he adds: "But the passage proves thus much, that a writing was in existence a century before our Lord, under the name of Nehemiah, presupposing the existence of *the* Canon in the time of Nehemiah, in that he gathered together into a library the books of which it was composed." We are quite unable to see the proof. Even if "the letters of the kings" mean the letters in Ezra, and only canonical books are intended, still this is no evidence that *the* Canon was already in existence.

The strongest evidence in favour of Dr. Pusey's view is to be found in the language of Josephus, and in a well-known passage of the Babylonian Talmud. The historian, in his treatise against Apion, already referred to, states that no works, from the time of Artaxerxes down to his own time, had been accounted worthy of the same credit as those before them, "*because the exact succession of prophets existed no longer.*" This seems to intimate that he supposed the Canon to have been finally closed under Nehemiah; but his language is manifestly not accurate, as Dr. Pusey himself admits, inasmuch as Malachi, the last of the prophets, probably flourished under Darius Nothus, the son and successor of Artaxerxes.

There remains then only the celebrated passage in the Talmud, according to which the Canon was finally closed by the men of the Great Synagogue, under the superintendence of Ezra and Nehemiah. This looks like a formal and deliberate act. But we must not forget, in estimating the value of this tradition, that we first meet with it five hundred years after the beginning of the Christian era. Josephus does not mention it, though he acknowledges that books later than the time of Nehemiah were not regarded as canonical. The Talmudical story may be taken as a later embellishment of the earlier and simpler account, that Nehemiah collected and revised the books which up to his time had been received as authoritative. It does not prove that none were subsequently acknowledged. But the truth is, that the anxiety so often felt on this subject is altogether misplaced. Writings do not depend for their canonical authority on the fact that they have been pronounced canonical by some inspired person, but on their reception by the Church. There is no proof that the New Testament Canon was closed in the time of the last surviving apostle, St. John; much less can it be maintained that

he sanctioned our existing Canon. The Muratorian fragment, A.D. 170, omits the Epistle of James, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and 2 Peter, and notices the partial reception of the Revelation of Peter. Even in the fourth century there was no one catalogue universally recognised both in the East and West. The formation of the Canon, both Jewish and Christian, was manifestly a very gradual work. In both cases books were suspected, questioned, slowly admitted or rejected. In the second century after Christ, the Jews themselves questioned the canonicity of the Song of Solomon; and two centuries later still the Wisdom of the Son of Sirach is quoted by them as Scripture. Both the evidence therefore and the analogy of the New Testament are against the view that the Jewish Canon was finally and authoritatively closed by the hands of Nehemiah.

II. We turn next to the linguistic argument. Here there appears at first sight some prospect of a definite and tangible issue. Languages fluctuate, but they do so according to known laws. They have their youth, their growth, their maturity, their decline; and the several stages are for the most part clearly discernible. They follow, likewise, the same law which we discover in ourselves. In their childhood and youth they are simple and forcible: in their manhood ripe and ample, strong with a matured strength, and copious with gathered treasures: in their old age they begin to totter, and recur—and here the parallel is striking—to the words and expressions of infancy. The several stages are not, however, always defined with equal clearness: and this is peculiarly the case with regard to the language of the Old Testament. “The unchanging East” is almost as unchanging in its language as in its manners. Hence it is far more difficult to trace any clearly marked period of development or change in Hebrew than it is in the Western languages. And this accounts for the otherwise remarkable fact that so many eminent critics differ entirely as to the estimate which they form of the relative antiquity of certain books of the Canon. It might have been thought that books presenting so many distinctive features in their language as Job and Ecclesiastes would have contained in themselves some evidence of their age. Yet the ablest scholars are not agreed by centuries as to the time of their composition. Deuteronomy is held by some of our most learned Hebraists to be Mosaic; while others no less learned contend that it was written seven or eight centuries later. Again, it can hardly be doubted that, in the many revisions which the Sacred Books must have undergone, some archaic forms which might otherwise have served for landmarks have been obliterated. And further, the monuments of the ancient Hebrew are all comprised in the single volume of the Old Testament, so that we have far less opportunity of comparison, and therefore of induction, than in the case of most languages whose

literature has come down to us. Yet, notwithstanding all this, a careful investigation and a careful comparison may do much : and in some instances results have been obtained falling very little short of certainty. More will yet be achieved in this direction when the mists of prejudice shall be dispersed, and we shall not be afraid honestly to acknowledge facts.

In the Book of Daniel the problem presented is twofold. In the first place Greek words and Iranian words occur in it which occur nowhere else in the Old Testament ; and neither Greek nor Persian, it is said, was spoken in Babylon at the time when Daniel is commonly supposed to have written his book. And in the next place, that portion of the work which is composed in Chaldee differs, it is alleged, materially from the Chaldee of Ezra (the only other Aramaic which affords an opportunity of comparison in the Old Testament), and inclines to the later Aramaic of the Targums.

1. Dr. Pusey examines first of all the charge that Daniel Græcizes. Some two or three Greek words there are beyond a question ; but it is an important and noticeable fact that these are exclusively the names of musical instruments. *Mashrokiṭha* has been derived from *σάριγξ*, but perhaps both had better be referred to a common Sanskrit root. *Sabka* is certainly not derived from *σαμβύκη*, but on the contrary, the Greek word was itself formed from the Syriac by the insertion of the *m* ; just as the Zabians turned the Syriac *aboobo*, "reed, pipe," into *amboob*, "an insertion familiar to us in Horace's *ambubaia*, female flute-player" (p. 25). *Kithārōs* (or *Kathrōs*, Ker.) is no doubt *Kitharis*, "guitar." Why Dr. Williams should connect it with the genitive *κιθάρας* we cannot understand : for the termination *os* in Syriac is the familiar representative of the Greek termination *is*. *Psantérin* is not "a Macedonian word," a dialectic variation, *ψαντήριον* for *ψαλτήριον*. No such form as *ψαντήριον* ever occurs, and if it did, it must be Doric, not Macedonian. There is no proof that the Macedonians ever substituted the *n* for the *l*. On the other hand, the Greek word, in passing into Semitic, might very well have undergone this change, in accordance with the acknowledged principles of an interchange of these liquids in all languages. Besides these, there is only the word *sūm-pōnna*, which certainly looks very like the Greek *συμφωνία*. A formidable difficulty, however, intervenes when we try to bring the two together. The Aramaic word is used of a single instrument ; the Greek, of a concert of music. A passage has indeed been cited from Polybius, in which he mentions that Antiochus danced to the *symphony* : and by this Gesenius thought that some one instrument must have been intended. Dr. Williams takes the same view (Introduction to Desprez's "Daniel," p. xix.). Dr. Pusey, on the other hand, insists

that in that passage, as elsewhere, *sumphonia* can only mean "a concert of instruments." Hence he, with Hävernicks and Fürst, seeks for a Semitic derivation. This is barely not impossible. Words more widely apart in their signification, and distinct in their origin, may chance to appear in the same form, as witness the two meanings and derivations of the word "cope" in English. On the other hand, is it not also possible that a word signifying in Greek "a concert of many instruments," might on its way to Babylon have come to be restricted to a single instrument? Would there not be in this some analogy with the fate of the word "tobacco;" which was the name originally not of the plant, but of the vessel in which it was smoked? Be this as it may, one thing is clear, that only two or three words in Daniel, all of them denoting musical instruments, can be certainly shown to be of Greek derivation. And why should not Greek musical instruments have found their way to Babylon in the time of Nebuchadnezzar? Not only had there been before this, as Dr. Pusey shows, a long-established and extensive commerce between Greece and Assyria; not only was Babylon emphatically "a city of merchants" (Ezek. xvii. 4), but Nebuchadnezzar himself, greater even in the arts of peace than in war, had given a fresh impulse to its trade and commerce. At enormous expense, he had constructed a gigantic navigable canal connecting Babylon with the Persian Gulf. Two great lines of commerce diverging from Tyre, one by way of Egypt and the other by way of Tadmor and Thapsacus, poured their treasures into that vast emporium. It was the centre of the world's wealth and luxury, as it was the centre of the world's power. The Babylonians were a music-loving people. From their Jewish captives, we read, they would fain hear the songs of Zion. A traffic, therefore, in foreign instruments of music need not surprise us. But if the Greek instrument found its way to Babylon, why not also the Greek name? "The name travelled with the thing," says Dr. Pusey, very justly, "is an acknowledged principle of philology."

"When we speak of tea, sugar, coffee, chocolate, cocoa, cassia, cinnamon, tobacco, myrrh, citrons, rice, potatoes, cotton, clintz, shawls, we do not stop to think that we are using Chinese, Malay, Arabic, Mexican, Hebrew, Malabar, South American, Bengalee, Persian words. And we shall continue to use them, even though they were originally misapplied. And we know that the word tobacco was the name, not of the plant, but of the vessel out of which the natives smoked it. When Solomon's ship brought him the peacocks, apes, ivory, almug or alghum wood, they brought with them also the Sanskrit and Malabar names of the ape (which passed thence into Greek and our European languages) and of the alghum wood, the Tamul name of the peacock, and the Sanskrit of the elephant. There is nothing stranger in our finding Greek instruments of music in Nebuchadnezzar's time at Babylon than in the Indian names of Indian animals, and of an Indian tree having reached Jerusalem under Solomon."—(Pp. 26, 27.)

"It needed not that a single Greek should have been at Babylon. Tyrian

merchants took with them the names of the wares which they sold, just as our English merchants transmitted the names of our East Indian imports with them into Germany, or the Spaniards brought us back the American names of the products of the New World, or at this day, I am told, some of our Manchester goods are known by the name of their eminent manufacturers in Tartary, where the face of an Englishman has possibly been scarcely seen."—(P. 31.)

An attempt has recently been made by Dr. Williams to weaken the force of these considerations. He says:—

"Here the question is not whether a stray Greek term might float from Ionia to Babylon, but how came other books of the Bible, even those written at Babylon, to call a harp by its Hebrew name *kinnor*, and only the one which external evidence places after Alexander's conquest, to use the Greek word *kithara* (in what was probably [?] its genitive form, though punctuated *caythros*)? Ezekiel, captive by Chebar's stream, wrote '*kinnoraych*, thy harp;' those daughters of Zion who remembered their past tears at Babylon had hung, they said, '*kinnorotheynu*, our harps,' upon the trees that were there. In Daniel the Hebrew word has vanished; a Greek substitute appears."

But Dr. Williams has entirely overlooked the fact that Ezekiel and the Psalmist were writing Hebrew, whereas Daniel was writing Chaldee. In the language of Babylon the Greek terms had become naturalized; they were not so in the language of Judea. It is only in the *Chaldee* of Daniel that the word *Kitharos* occurs.

That Dr. Williams should contend for *Ashaphim* as a Greek word is no less surprising. He connects it with *σόφος*. "No Semitic warrant for it," he observes, "approaches within ages the time required for a precedent, unless any one chooses to make it a dialectic variation of the Hebrew *Cashaph*. A more probable clue is furnished by the frequent recurrence of *σόφος* in the LXX." But *σόφος* is nowhere the equivalent in the LXX. of *Ashaph*. Once they use *φιλόσοφος* (i. 20), twice *μάγος* (ii. 7, 10), and twice *φάρμακος* (ii. 27, v. 7). And the root is a genuine Semitic root. It is not only common in Syriac, but it is found in the purest Hebrew, if Simonis is right, as we are persuaded he is, in connecting *Ashpah*, "a quiver," with *Ashaph*. The primary signification is that of "hiding." The arrows are *hidden* in the quiver; the magicians are the men of *hidden* wisdom, or of *secret* arts. We believe it, then, to be proved that the Greek words in Daniel are not more than three or four, and are solely and exclusively the names of musical instruments. And it is evident, and indeed is not denied, that such names might have been brought by merchants to Babylon, together with the instruments which they imported.

2. Other foreign words occurring in Daniel are no less satisfactorily accounted for. Such, for instance, are certain Aryan words, technical names found in the narrative, and denoting foreign offices, dress, food, and the like. A person living in Babylon, in the habit of hearing and

using such terms every day, would naturally employ them in his writing, just as we ourselves use the words Sultan, Caliph, Vizier, &c., without attempting to find for them English equivalents. These Aryan words, it had already been noticed by Delitzsch, fall in exactly with the position of Daniel at the Court of Nebuchadnezzar. But that they should be found in an author who, according to the theory of the Maccabæan origin of the book of Daniel, lived in Palestine about 160 B.C., is totally inexplicable. How should he be acquainted "with Aryan words which related to offices which had long ceased to exist, or to dress which no one wore, words which were mostly obliterated from Aramaic, which (as far as they survived) were inherited only from Daniel's text?" This appears to us, we confess, a decisive argument. If the later composition of the book is to be maintained, then it must be shown, either that such words had become current in the language and familiar to the Jews, just as the foreign words, Pacha, Vizier, &c., have become current among ourselves; in which case we should expect to find later traces of them, whereas many of these words were unintelligible even to the Greek translators; or else that a writer in the time of the Maccabees was likely to be so accurate an archæologist as to employ with perfect correctness terms long since obsolete, in composing his historical romance.

An objection, however, has been urged on the other side of the question, which must not be left unnoticed.

"We are not dealing," it has been said, "with Ezra, who lived under Artaxerxes, but with an author supposed to represent the Syro-Chaldean age of Babylon. The Babylonians of that age were unquestionably a Semitic, not an Aryan race; and Persian would have been as strange to Nebuchadnezzar as Greek. No chronology brings Cyrus to Babylon before 540. Suppose him there in 536. Daniel would be at least eighty, approaching ninety years of age (i. 3). If he equalled the highest historical instances of longevity, it would be a strange employment for one on the brink of the grave, first to learn Persian, then to translate into it portions of his former work, and the edicts of Nebuchadnezzar. Would such a procedure be even consistent with inspiration?"

This, of course, is not a fair way of stating the question. It is needless to say that there are no portions of the Book of Daniel "translated into Persian." If here and there Iranian words occur, they are of that special technical kind which we have already described. And is it quite impossible that Iranian names should have been used in Babylon in the time of Nebuchadnezzar? What has history to tell us? When Nineveh was taken by the Median leader Cyaxares, his forces were joined by the Babylonians under Nabopolassar, the father of Nebuchadnezzar, who had revolted from Assyria.

Nabopolassar, it would seem, even consented to become the vassal of Cyaxares, in a sense like that in which the Pacha of Egypt acknowledges the sovereignty of the Sultan, and the alliance was further cemented by a marriage between Nebuchadnezzar, the son of Nabopolassar, and the daughter of Cyaxares.* And subsequently, when Cyaxares, after his conquest of Assyria, marched against Lydia, his forces were joined by those of Babylon, commanded in all probability by Nebuchadnezzar in person. If the Babylonian dynasty, therefore, was Semitic, yet the political connection between the Medes and Babylonians, and the marriage of Nebuchadnezzar with a Median princess, would be quite sufficient to account for the use of Aryan words by a writer in the position of Daniel. There was no need for him to learn Persian at the age of ninety.

3. But the evidence furnished by the general character of Daniel's Chaldee is also in favour of the earlier date. It does not differ materially from that of Ezra. It differs only so far as the style of any one man may differ from that of another writing with freedom and independence the same language at the same time, but under dissimilar circumstances. This it is which Dr. Pusey undertakes to prove; and he does so by comparing the Chaldee of Daniel and Ezra, first with one another, and then with the Targums. The discussion here is of considerable interest, partly because it traverses a field always in itself full of interest—the changes in the structure of a language, and partly for other reasons, which will appear further on. Moreover, "the Essayist" has thought it worth while to re-state his argument on this point; and it carries with it a certain air of plausibility, and demands an answer. His argument may briefly be stated thus:—Ezra has some forms common to Daniel with himself; Daniel has some forms that Ezra has not, but which are met with in the Targums of Jonathan and Onkelos. Therefore Daniel stands at a point between the two, exhibiting in his language the transition period, when old forms were already dying out, or dead, and new ones coming in—a point nearer to the new language than the old. The following instances are those alleged in proof:—

(1.) The termination of the plural pronoun of the third person, which in the earliest Chaldee verse in the Bible, Jer. x. 11, is in *M*, in Ezra is both in *M* and *N*, but in Daniel only in *N*. And this last is the form which normally, if not always, appears in the Targums. The same holds of the pronoun of the second person. Usually in Ezra—in the proportion of five times to one—it is in *M*, in Daniel and the Targums always in *N*.

(2.) The pronoun "this" in Ezra is represented by *DeCH*, *DaCH*, and *D'NaH*. In Daniel only the last of these three is found, together with a form *DA*. In the Targums the form is *DeyN*. Hence it is

* See M. v. Niebuhr, "Geschichte Assur's und Babel's," p. 97.

argued, Daniel has left Ezra far behind him, and is already more than halfway in the direction of Onkelos.

(3.) The pronoun "these" is in Jer. x. and Ezra v. 15, *ELeH*. Elsewhere Ezra uses *ILLeCH*, whereas in Daniel we find *ILLeN* (vi. 7), and its still later equivalent *ILLeYN* (ii. 44; vi. 3; vii. 17), this last being the form which occurs in the Targums. But the inference in the two latter cases is overthrown by observing (1) that Ezra and Daniel *alike* use *D'NaH*, which does *not* occur in the Targums; and (2) that if Daniel has the form *ILLeYN* in common with the Targums, he has *ILLeCH* in common with Ezra, this last being obsolete in the times of Onkelos and Jonathan. This form, moreover, which occurs four times in Ezra, is employed ten times by Daniel, whereas he uses *ILLeYN* only five times. Dr. Pusey, therefore, at least holds the balance even, when, meeting instance by instance, he casts Ezra and Daniel into one scale against Daniel and the Targums in the other. But he greatly makes the balance preponderate on his side when, availing himself of Mr. M'Gill's careful comparison between the Biblical Aramaic and that of the Targums, he shows in how many and how characteristic features the last differs from the first. This latter comparison settles the question. Daniel and Ezra, whatever their differences may be, are far nearer to each other than either of them is to the Aramaic of Onkelos.

So far we go entirely with Dr. Pusey. So far he is walking on sure ground. His next step is on a quaking morass. Granting that there is this resemblance between the Chaldee of Daniel and of Ezra, does it follow that Chaldee like that of Daniel could not have been written in the time of the Maccabees? Dr. Pusey boldly answers that it could not, and for this reason:—The Targums of Onkelos and Jonathan were written by Palestinian Jews, some twenty years before the birth of our Lord, that is, nearly a century and a half after the death of Antiochus Epiphanes. But then, as these paraphrases only embodied in writing traditional interpretations, which had long been orally repeated, "the Chaldee which they represent was anterior, probably long anterior, to themselves." It would be such Chaldee as might have been spoken in Palestine in the time of the Maccabees. If, then, an author living in Palestine wrote the Book of Daniel after the death of Antiochus, say about 160 B.C., what stage of the language should we expect to find reflected in his writings? Would his dialect be Palestinian or Babylonian? Would he approach the Targums or Ezra? There can be no doubt as to the answer. He ought to resemble the Targums; he does resemble Ezra. But unfortunately this argument *breaks down*; though, as it happens, without giving any advantage to "opponents." For, in the first place, the Targums were written not in

Palestine, but in Babylon; and in the next, that which goes, but wrongly, by the name of Onkelos, was not committed to writing, taking the very earliest possible date, till the end of the second century after Christ. Indeed, all the evidence recently accumulated on this subject by scholars the most competent to judge, leads to the conclusion that there was no authorized text of this Targum before the end of the third or the beginning of the fourth century A.D. The Targum of Jonathan was probably a little later.* What becomes, then, of an argument based on the specific character of Daniel's Chaldee? Granting the later date of the book, it would not follow that his Chaldee ought to resemble that of Onkelos or Jonathan. For on no hypothesis does Daniel approach the Targums. On the hypothesis that his book was written 160 B.C.—the hypothesis, as Dr. Pusey is pleased to call it, of "the school of Porphyry,"—Daniel, according to the corrected dates, stands midway between the two extremes. He looks back 370 years to Ezra; he looks forward 370 years to Onkelos. Or rather, to put the case more accurately, he is a hundred years farther removed from the latter than from the former. He uses the dialect of one province, the Targum that of another. For these are the facts which we are now obliged to accept. What becomes then of any resemblance, could it be established, between the structure of Daniel's Chaldee and that of the Targums? It certainly does not go one step to prove that the book was written by a Palestinian Jew in the age of the Maccabees. On the other hand, Dr. Pusey's defence receives some damage, for the differences which he notes between the two kinds of Aramaic are such as might have grown in a lapse of 470 years, which is now the period that must be allowed. But he may still claim a negative advantage. The style of Daniel's Aramaic is no proof that the book was *not* written by a contemporary of Ezra in Babylon. And this we fear is, after all, the conclusion to be drawn from a consideration of the linguistic argument as a whole. The use of the Aryan words chiefly turns the scale on the side of the earlier date.

III. To one other point we have still to address ourselves. It is that on which Porphyry's objections turned, and from which, says Dr. Pusey, all the objections of "the school of Porphyry" at the present

* In proof of these statements we refer to Mr. Deutsch's very learned and interesting article on the TARGUM, in Dr. Smith's "Dictionary of the Bible," vol. iii., p. 1644. He has there shown that the Targum was not written by Onkelos, that it was never attributed to him till the ninth century; that, not begun to be written till the end of the second century A.D., it did not even then supersede the oral Targum (on the contrary, it was "strictly forbidden to read it in public"), and that there was no uniformity in the version. In proof of its Babylonian origin, he mentions that its language has more affinity with the Babylonian than with the Palestinian Gemara; that it always renders the word *nahar*, "river," by Euphrates; that it is always quoted in the Talmud and Midrashim of Babylon as "*our* Targum," or with the formula, "*as we* translate," &c. The whole article, which is full of learning and research, is well worth reading.

time really proceed. Both as matter of evidence and as matter of interpretation, the visions of Daniel claim notice. Those visions are no doubt peculiar. The apocalypse of Daniel stands as completely alone in the Old Testament as the apocalypse of St. John does in the New. Even if Ezekiel and Zechariah, who were nearly his contemporaries, have this in common with Daniel, that to them too the word of the Lord comes in visions, yet there the resemblance ceases. Daniel is a prophet, not to Israel, but to the world. Living nearly all his life in Babylon, and holding there high offices of state, what more natural than that the revelation made to him should deal chiefly with the destinies of that mighty empire, and of those which were immediately to succeed it? Why should not he take a wider range than the sorrows of the exile or the hopes kindled by the return? Unless we are to deny all miracle and all prediction together, it is hard to say why, on the score of these visions, the book is to be rejected. Standing at the very centre of the world's power and glory as there displayed, standing there a captive and an exile, with nothing but his trust in his God to sustain him, he of all men seems most fitted to be the vehicle and organ of revelations which, tracing the course of worldly power in its various developments, portray also its final and utter overthrow, that the kingdom of God and His Christ may be set up.

Unless it can be shown that a writer, merely because he is contemporaneous with other writers, is bound to adopt their language, or to look at the world and nations from their point of view; or unless it can be shown that revelation follows only one course, or that the visions of Daniel are such as do not fall in with his position at the Court of Nebuchadnezzar first, and of Darius afterwards, there is no reason, so far as these visions are concerned, for questioning the genuineness of the book. It is to the last degree arbitrary to say that Daniel must write like Ezekiel because he happened to be contemporary with Ezekiel. One objection, and only one, is there, derived from the character of Daniel's prophecies, which possesses a real force in the controversy. It is that based on the minute and circumstantial detail with which the history of Antiochus Epiphanes is given. If this be a prophecy uttered by Daniel in exile, it differs, it is said, from all other prophecy. It is the acknowledged characteristic of the Old Testament prophets, that they describe the nearer future with precision and clearness, whilst the more distant future is lost, as it were, in the haze: whereas here the converse holds; for the earlier visions, which describe the fate of the Babylonian and Medo-Persian empires, are meagre compared with the latter, which exhibit in so much detail and with so much accuracy events and persons removed by centuries from the prophet's ken.

That there is here a departure from the general analogy of prophecy cannot be denied. The prophet does for the most part busy himself first and chiefly with the events gathering on his own horizon. Why, then, should Daniel form an exception? Why should he, living in Babylon, predict the persecution of Antiochus Epiphanes in colours so forcible as to destroy the perspective, and make it seem nigh at hand? We answer, first, that the entirely changed condition of the Jewish people may have made such predictions necessary. Restored in God's good providence, through the instrumentality of a ruler of one of the great empires of the world, to their native land, it might be needful for them to be reminded that through those very world-powers would their chastening come. A salutary purpose of discipline might be answered by thus placing the picture of the great oppressor and persecutor before their eyes. In the next place, we do not admit that true even in its details as this picture is of Antiochus Epiphanes, it is and can be true *only* of him. We believe that by "the little horn" of chaps. vii. and viii., Antiochus is primarily meant. We believe that in chap. xi. his portrait is drawn at length.* We see no reason for Dr. Pusey's distinction, according to which only in chap. viii. did Daniel pourtray Antiochus, whereas in chap. vii., and the latter part of chap. xi., is foretold an antichrist who has not yet appeared. There is no change of subject. The historical foreground is the same in all. Still Jerome long ago pointed out, in reply to Porphyry, that there are lines in the picture in chap. xi. which do not correspond with anything we know of Antiochus. And it is very probable that *all* the traits have never yet been found in any one person. This is indeed the very characteristic of all prophecy. It is typically predictive. It applies not to one only, but to many. We altogether repudiate the canon that the word of God's prophets must be limited by one single reference. Our Lord himself bade His disciples look for "the abomination of desolation spoken of by Daniel the prophet" in the capture of Jerusalem by Titus, though it was spoken, in the first instance, of the profanations of Antiochus Epiphanes. Our Lord's own predictions of the taking of Jerusalem pass off into those in which He foretells His second coming. The one event seems to be a type of the other. The same law holds here, we have been forcibly reminded,† which we see in the world around us. There "repetition of a type is the rule, and originality the exception, if indeed the exception can be found at all.

* Luther was inclined to regard the first book of Maccabees as worthy of being placed among the books of Holy Scripture, and partly on the ground that it gives us so much help in understanding this chapter of Daniel.

† Sermon of the Archbishop of York before the Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews.

Through the mineral and vegetable and animal kingdom the types of crystal and plant and animal are copied, varied, heightened, degraded; and, to use a common mode of speech, *nature* delights to repeat herself. What mean we by nature? He who made the world made the men and nations on it. . . . If the same great Artificer fashions the world, and also the actions of man, we should expect to trace the type through the one as we do through the other." Again:—"If it had been said that where words apply distinctly to one event, their second application to another must be decided on with caution and judgment, there would have been little to object to; for it would only express a limitation on our powers of criticism, and not on the Divine power. But before God all things are double one against another. To His eye the lives and errors of nations repeat themselves. Nations conform to their type as does the growing oak or the nestling bird." The same remark holds of individual men. "Human nature," in the individual as well as in the mass, "repeats itself." And hence there have been many antichrists, not one. And hence the great outlines by which we recognise one may mark another, whilst there may be lights and shadows in the picture which may make it seem at different times more applicable to one than to another. The antichrist of St. Paul and the antichrist of St. John have traits in common with the antichrist of Daniel. It is evident, therefore, that Daniel's prediction was not exhausted in Antiochus. But as he was then the foremost and the nearest type, the language employed, where it does not suit him exclusively, suits him better than any other. This uncertainty, then, mingling with the certainty, partially meets the objection based on minuteness of detail, as showing that the range of vision of the prophet is wider than the supposed case. And, lastly, this very exactness of prediction, where the object is in the far distant future, may be paralleled by the Messianic prediction in the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. Even if we admitted, with many expositors, a primary reference there to the Jewish people or the prophet, it is nevertheless a prediction of the suffering Christ, so clear, so express, that only a perverted ingenuity can deny or explain it away.

Dr. Pusey, as might be anticipated, adopts and defends with passionate earnestness the traditional interpretation of Daniel's prophecies. The four kingdoms, represented first by the gold, the silver, the brass, and the iron of the image seen by Nebuchadnezzar, and then by the four beasts of Daniel's vision, are, according to him, the Babylonian, the Medo-Persian, the Greek, the Roman. But when he attempts to carry out his interpretation consistently he is to the full as embarrassed as the interpreters whom he condemns. "Within the period of the fourth empire," he says, "there were these distinct

periods, (1) the time until it is divided into the ten portions, symbolized by the ten horns, as before it was represented as *ending* in the ten toes." It is not clear how an image representing a human form could end in anything but the toes. It seems, therefore, absurd to press this circumstance as significant. Nor is any emphasis laid, in the vision, upon the *ten* toes, as upon the ten horns in the other,—they are not said to be ten; not to mention that the mingling of the iron and clay is to our apprehension far more naturally emblematic of Alexander's successors than of the Roman Empire. Dr. Pusey's second period is, "(2) the period of those ten horns." Of this he offers no explanation. The third is "(3) that in which the eleventh, diverse from the rest, held its sway." But whereas Daniel says distinctly that "the ten horns out of this kingdom are ten kings that shall arise," Dr. Pusey says these cannot mean kings but kingdoms. If so, in all consistency the eleventh must also be a kingdom, not a king, and then how are we to explain the manifestly personal character given to it?—"And he shall speak great words against the Most High, and shall wear out the saints of the Most High, and think to change times and laws: and they shall be given into his hand until a time, and times, and the dividing of time" (vii. 25). The fourth period Dr. Pusey describes as "(4) the period after the destruction of that power [the little horn, before whom three of the first horns were plucked up], and of the whole fourth kingdom, which is to perish with him, indicated by the words, *And the rest of the beasts, the other kingdoms. Their dominion was taken away, yet their lives were prolonged on to a season and time, i. e., on to the time appointed by God.*" This sentence, he thinks, relates to something to take place after the destruction of the fourth empire, and to be yet future. But, as the fourth beast has been destroyed, we ought to be able to point out the ten horns and the little horn before whom three of the first were plucked up, and we ought to be able also to show that the other three empires are still existing, though with their dominion taken away. The truth is, as Mr. Westcott* remarks, that this view of the Roman Empire being the fourth "originated at a time when the triumphant advent of Messiah was the object of immediate expectation, and the Roman Empire appeared to be the last in the series of earthly kingdoms. The long interval of conflict which has followed the first advent found no place in the anticipations of the first Christians; and in succeeding ages the Roman period has been unnaturally prolonged to meet the requirements of a theory which took its rise in a state of thought which experience has proved false." He reminds us that it is a still more fatal objection to this view that "it

* In his article on the Book of Daniel, in Dr. Smith's "Dictionary of the Bible," vol. i., p. 394.

destroys the great idea of a cyclic development of history which lies at the basis of all prophecy;" he points out that the four empires precede the coming of Messiah, and pass away before Him, and that the Roman Empire was at its height before Christ came, and that accordingly it was not that but the Egyptian kingdom—the last relic of Alexander's empire—which must have been prefigured by the toes of the image which were smitten "by the stone cut without hands." At the same time he admits a repetition of these kingdoms in later history. Those powers, all of which placed their centre at Babylon, "appear to have exhibited on one stage the great types of national life." It is on this principle alone, according to which the nearer future is seen to reflect the more distant, according to which the earlier fulfilment expects a later, that the prophecies of the Bible can ever be fairly and adequately interpreted. Except on this principle, they are shadows without a substance. It is because he misses this principle that we think Dr. Pusey goes astray. He and Mr. Desprez, though arriving, it need scarcely be said, at most opposite conclusions, yet are both too eager to find some definite fulfilment which shall exhaust the symbol or the prediction. Partial fulfilments, for the most part, are all we can hope to trace. Even the first coming of our Lord is a type of His second: much that seems a prediction of the one is a prediction of the other. And perhaps we never shall be able to find with unhesitating certainty, in many portions even of past history, the fulfilment of prophecy, until we are able hereafter to read the whole. "Now we know in part, and prophesy (interpret) in part; but when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away."

We have left ourselves but little space to notice some of Dr. Pusey's criticisms and interpretations of the sacred text. It is generally in these that we feel constrained most entirely to differ from him. Nothing can be more forced and unnatural than many of the interpretations are; nothing more unsound than the grammatical canons by which he attempts to defend them. The Preface furnishes us with some remarkable instances in point. He there attempts to determine the interpretation of the early verses of Genesis. He asserts that Genesis and geology have no concern with each other; that they cannot clash, because all the ages which geology requires are provided for between the first and second verses of the Bible. "The claims of geology do not even touch upon theology. The belief that creation at least dated backward for countless ages was current in the Church some fourteen hundred years before geology." And then he quotes Jerome and another—to prove what? That angels and spiritual beings existed ages before this world! What has this to do with the only question which geology raises—the duration of this our globe?

Finding that Holy Scripture "speaks of the stellar system as existing before our earth," he observes that this "agrees with the remarkable parenthetical mention of the stars in Genesis." But where is the proof that it is parenthetical, or who, not embarrassed by a theory, would ever have put such a construction upon it? The really insuperable difficulties* attaching to this theory, which makes Moses only give us, in his narrative, the preparation of the earth to be the abode of man subsequently to the geological periods, Dr. Pusey passes over without remark. But he attempts to establish the theory which is that of Dr. Buckland, and which has been adopted by many who were anxious "to save the credit of the record," by a grammatical analysis of the text. He observes that, at the beginning of ver. 2, there is a peculiar collocation of words. First stands the conjunction with the subject of the sentence, then the verb substantive expressed, then the predicate: "And the earth *was* (or) *became*, emptiness and vastness," &c. Now this mode of speech implies, he argues, a vast gap—ages, it may be, of duration—between the first verse and the second. For (1) the substantive verb is not used in Hebrew as a mere copula; and (2) the insertion of the past verb (*HaY'THaH*) has no force at all, unless it be used to express what was the condition of the earth in a past time, previous to the rest of the narrative, but in no connection at all with what preceded.

It requires no profound research to disprove both assertions. (1.) In Gen. xxix. 17, the substantive verb is used simply as the copula.† The first clause of that verse runs: "And the eyes of Leah (were) tender." Here the verb substantive is not expressed. The second clause runs: "but Rachel *was* beautiful in form and beautiful in

* Dr. Pusey seems quite unable to see the real difficulties which he has to meet. Speaking shortly afterwards of the Flood, he says, "The assumption of a *partial* deluge, in any sense which would not contradict Scripture, would meet no difficulty of science. A flood which would cover Mount Ararat would cover the globe." Of course; but the sacred text nowhere tells us that Mount Ararat was covered. Again: "The difficulty as to the animals found each in their several habitats, in Australia, New Zealand, &c., is properly no *scientific* difficulty. It lies on the surface. But it presupposes that the 'rest' of God spoken of in Genesis implies that He created nothing afterwards," &c. Such a remark directly contradicts the sacred narrative, according to which two and two of all kinds of animals were to be taken into the ark, in order that thus all necessity of a new creation might be superseded.

† Dr. Pusey repeats his assertion as to the copula in a note elsewhere: "The present relation is expressed by the force of the terms, 'I the God of Abraham.' The simple copula is not and cannot be expressed in Hebrew; but the past or future would have been expressed." This is not the case. The simple copula, as we have seen, may be expressed; it may be omitted even where the past is spoken of. Comp. Ps. lxxvii. 20 (Eng., 19), "Thy way (was) in the sea;" Jer. vii. 12, "Go now to my house which (was) in Shiloh." We regret that want of space does not allow us to unfold what we believe to be the real force of our Lord's argument as based on these words, "I am the God of Abraham," &c. But Dr. Pusey's own exposition, which is better than his grammar, may be consulted with advantage.—(P. 459.)

appearance." Here the substantive verb is expressed. But it would be absurd to say that this introduces any difference whatever into the relation between the subject and predicate in the second clause as compared with the first. The two sentences are exactly equivalent. (2.) So, again, as to the other assertion, that if the writer had intended to speak of past time in immediate connection with what precedes, he would have used a different idiom, *YaT'Hi HaAReTS*—"and the earth was or became,"—it is equally groundless. Turn a single leaf of the Hebrew Bible, and you find a sentence of this kind (Gen. iv. 2), "And she again brought forth his brother Abel; and Abel was (*VaY'Hi*) a shepherd, and Cain was (*V'QaYiN HaYaH*) a tiller of the ground." The first of these clauses, according to the canon so arbitrarily laid down, stands in immediate connection with what goes before; the second merely states a past fact, without any connection at all with what precedes. It is obvious, at a glance, that the different modes of employment of the substantive verb mark no difference whatever in the relation of the two clauses to the previous narrative. And yet Dr. Pusey informs us that "*Moses was directed to choose* just that idiom which expresses a past time anterior to what follows, but in no connection of time whatever with what precedes." After this, surely his own words may without asperity be applied to himself,—"*Human will can persuade itself of anything.*"

The same want of accuracy—the same disposition to strain the meaning of texts—pervades his volume. Take, for instance, his rendering of Psa. xlviii. 14, "This God is our God for ever and ever: He himself will be our guide *over* death." The peculiar difficulty attaching to the last words is familiar to all students of the Hebrew text. Dr. Pusey tries to maintain his rendering by an appeal to the use of the preposition: "It is not *up to* (*עַד*), but *over* (*עַל*)." The distinction is utterly worthless. The latter preposition never occurs in the sense here claimed for it. It means *over* in the literal local sense of being *above* a thing, but it does not mean *over* in the sense of *beyond*. '*Al hayam*, for instance, is not "beyond the sea," but "by (lit., *upon*) the sea." It may unquestionably be rendered here "*up to death*," for the same signification is found elsewhere. So in Psa. xix. 7 (Eng., 6), we read, "His going forth is from (one) end *of* the heaven, and his circuit *unto* (*al*) the other ends of it;" and in Job xxxvii. 3, "His lightning (He directeth) *unto* the ends of the earth." In both passages, it is needless to remark, the preposition can only bear the meaning *up to*, *as far as*, not *over* or *beyond*. It would be easy to multiply instances of a very similar kind. Even Hengstenberg's criticism is very superior to Dr. Pusey's. He takes the preposition in the sense of *with*, a sense into which it passes from that of *upon*, and renders, "He guides us in dying," *i. e.*, if it comes to dying. He

remarks: "The discourse here is not of a blessed immortality, but only of deliverance from the dangers of death—circumstances threatening the people of God with destruction." The choice lies only between this and the rendering we have suggested above—"unto death."

Criticism of the same rash, precarious, untenable kind is indulged in on *Psa. lxxiii.* Dr. Pusey argues, that as the Psalmist learnt *in the sanctuary* that God's righteous judgments do suddenly overtake the ungodly, he must have seen also that this end of an evil life is an earnest of evil hereafter. The remarkable thing is, if this were the case, that the language employed should totally fail to suggest it. Not one word is said of the punishment of the wicked after death. In order to introduce this doctrine, Dr. Pusey mistranslates one of the verses (*ver. 20*): "As a dream when one awaketh, O Lord, *in the awakening* Thou shalt despise their image." There is no pretence for such a rendering. The verb is in a causative conjugation (*Hiphil*) it is true, but so is the verb in the previous clause. It would be just as reasonable to translate the first clause, "As a dream after *the awakening*," *i. e.*, the causing others to awake. This conjugation is, of course, used here intransitively, as it often is in other verbs, and always in this verb. The same two verbs which stand in this passage are found together in *Psa. xxxv. 23*, where Dr. Pusey himself would not venture to dispute their meaning. There we must render, "Stir up thyself, and awake to my judgment;" and here, retaining the same equivalents in English, "As a dream when one awaketh, (so,) O Lord, when Thou stirrest up Thyself, dost Thou despise their image." Similar remarks may be made on the interpretation of the last verse of *Psa. xvii.* (*p. 499*). It is not that we question that there does shine forth in these Psalms the bright hope of everlasting life,—in some of them even the hope of resurrection,—but we feel the strongest repugnance to that kind of criticism which twists words and phrases from their obvious meaning into harmony with a preconceived theory. Nothing can be more prejudicial to the truth than this. We think it very probable that, in the seventeenth Psalm, there is a reference to the waking from the sleep of death. There seems to be a contrast between the satisfaction of the worldly in this life with the satisfaction of the Psalmist in God's presence in another. But it is idle to argue that the expression, "to behold God's face," can mean only a seeing of God in another life, with such passages as *Psa. xi. 7; xxi. 6 [7]*, plainly proving the contrary. Even the expression, "when I awake"—or, as Dr. Pusey will have it, "in the awakening,"—was interpreted by Calvin of an awaking from the night of sorrow and suffering ("ut tantundem valeat ac respirare a tristitia").

But we find the clue to all Dr. Pusey's misrepresentations of the Old Testament when we read (*p. 533*),—"David's words express our

Christian hopes. We whose hopes they express cannot think that they meant less to David, whose hope they first fed."* What but hopeless confusion can spring from such a canon of interpretation as this? Such a canon cuts at the root of all inspiration in the highest sense, for it does not allow that the writers of the Psalms and prophecies were carried beyond themselves in the power of the Holy Ghost. Such a canon is directly at variance with the express testimony of St. Peter. "Unto whom it was revealed," says that Apostle, speaking of the prophets of old, "that not unto themselves, but unto us, they did minister the things which are now reported unto you, by them that have preached the Gospel unto you," &c. Or how can we reconcile such a view with St. Paul's declaration that Christ "shed light upon (ἐφώτισεν) life and immortality"? To expositors like Dr. Pusey, such a passage must be meaningless.

To every candid and thoughtful student of the Bible nothing surely can be clearer than this, that the words of the Old Testament saints are often higher than themselves. This is an evidence, one of the most powerful, of their inspiration. We, it is true, read the Old Testament now with our Christian illumination; we read it, therefore, in a Christian sense; we cannot help doing so. But we should also remember that that sense is not the sense which it once possessed, but one which has superseded, or softened, or transfigured the other. We must not attribute to them of old time a knowledge and an insight which they did not possess, even whilst we thankfully use their words as the best expression of our own Christian faith, and hope, and love.

We take leave of Dr. Pusey's volume with very mingled feelings. It is impossible to read such a work without the profoundest admiration for the depth and varied extent of the author's learning; but it is impossible not also to lament that the glory of this learning has been so grievously tarnished. We do not blame Dr. Pusey for ranging it all on the side of what he believes to be the truth; we do full justice to the sincerity of his convictions; we honour his piety; we even admit the force of his arguments so far as to think that he has shown, and shown far more convincingly than any one who has yet made the attempt, that the Book of Daniel is not a late production of the Maccabæan age, but belongs rightfully to the age to

* Of all the strange proofs that the Old Testament saints believed in a future life, the strangest is that drawn from Bathsheba's language at David's deathbed, "Let my lord king David live for ever." "Bathsheba," says Dr. Pusey, "did not, like the Persian, greet the king, 'Mayest thou reign for ever' (*Ælian.*, V.H. i. 32). I cannot think that, with the knowledge of the life to come which David had, the words 'live for ever' were an unmeaning, heartless formula, a mockery to a dying man." It is a little curious that Dr. Pusey should have gone to *Ælian* rather than to Holy Scripture to ascertain how the Persians were wont to salute their monarch. Daniel tells us (vi. 7) that they greeted the king, "King Darius, live for ever." Is this evidence that they believed in an eternal life?

in one of our great universities should have lent the weight and authority of his name to criticisms and interpretations which are as mischievous as they are untenable. That such criticisms should pass muster and be accepted, only shows at what a deplorably low ebb the study of Hebrew is in England. That study can never rise to its proper dignity so long as it is stifled in our universities: and it is stifled when the most certain results of modern investigation are thrust aside unless they happen to favour some preconceived theory, when imagination is substituted for grammar, rabbinical fancies valued more than sober canons of exegesis, and the wildest licence of interpretation or of criticism indulged in to save a text or to support a doctrine.

Our age has happily seen many indications of a healthier tone, a broader theology, than is to be found in the Regius Professor's "Lectures." There is a far truer conception of what Revelation is, a more correct estimate of its manifold and composite and gradual character. Men have learnt to value it in proportion as they have felt that it is not an image dropped down out of heaven, but as it is in truth, God's name uttered to man through many centuries, "in many portions and in many ways." It was in the time of the Reformation, first since the days of the Apostles, that the Old Testament at least received a real interpretation. It is the glory of two of the great master-spirits of that era of awaking thought and power and liberty to have laid broad and deep the principles of a true exegesis. It is as strange as it is humiliating, that we are only beginning to recognise the value of their method. But it is impossible to shut our eyes to the fact that whilst one party in the Church, which professes to revere the names of Luther and Calvin, has altogether let slip the very principles which they advocated in the interpretation of Scripture, another party has set itself firmly and perseveringly to lead us back to patristic glosses and mediæval conceits. Such an effort, especially when sanctioned by the names of men of learning and piety, may retard the progress of more rational views. It cannot finally destroy them. The whole current of thought is setting in one direction, and that in the main a right direction. And we have no fear as to the result. The true worth of Holy Scripture will be more deeply felt, its true majesty more fully recognised. This is a result that we confidently anticipate, but it is not a result which a work like Dr. Pusey's can help to bring about. That it tends to retard such a result is perhaps its strongest condemnation.

J. J. STEWART PEROWNE.

INDIAN QUESTIONS.

THE indifference to Indian affairs which is so frequently complained of is not confined to questions of politics. Those who live in India look in vain at home for anything like a full discussion of the grave questions which concern the progress of Christianity in that country. The reports of religious societies furnish but one head of information, and that limited, and when they pass the conventional line, they only repeat the well-known opinions of the committee that issues them. The agreement of single writers on those opinions contributes to the harmony of the society and the co-operation of its members, but takes away much from the independence of the information, and does not encourage discussion. Hence the unsatisfactoriness of these reports, and the little interest which they awaken even in those who are keenly sensible of the vast claims of India upon the attention of every Christian man.

The Church at home no less than in India suffers from this indifference. Isolation is foreign to the spirit of Christianity, and is equally baneful to the church which withholds, and the church which is deprived of sympathy. The energies so much needed for preparing the way of the Gospel, for deepening the foundations and building up the edifice of the body of Christ, are misdirected to objects of far less moment, and too often spend themselves upon the forms and questions of party strife. The action that might have gone to found or revive a

from within ; the outcome of it is a scepticism reluctant indeed rather than aggressive, which in some of the best men is rapidly passing the border of intellectual hesitation. But it is to within the Church itself that the root of the evil is to be traced. The destructive results at which some recent criticism aims would have little power to shake the faith which saw through the veil Him who is invisible. Such publications are the expression, not the cause, of the doubt and uncertainty hanging over us. The secret of their success lies in this, that they speak to men already "perplexed in faith, but pure in deeds;" who received, with their first instruction in Christianity, statements of doctrine which in the time of mature reflection appear to contradict the Divine instincts of justice, mercy, and truth—the image of God's own eternity in the heart of man. Theories and representations of doctrine were taught them as necessary inferences from, or identical with, the facts of Christianity—were acquiesced in as the creed of Christendom; and in no few cases a rude repulsion has followed the attempt to read and understand them by the light of reason and conscience. Our object is not to explain but to indicate actual phenomena. Many causes tend to develop such a tone of thought as we are referring to in India. The narrower range of subjects to which the mind for the most part turns, from the want of a present political interest; the dependence upon their own resources to which men are driven, owing to their isolation, and to a forced bodily rest during the heat of long summer days, concentrate the mind upon the subject of its choice. When that subject is a religious one, the doctrine of proportion and sobermindedness is forgotten. Hence the strange vagaries of opinion into which old Indians are seen to fall, *e. g.*, upon unfulfilled prophecy; and hence, too, the tenacity with which they hold the opinions they have once formed. It may be doubted whether any class of our countrymen make their convictions more their own, or hold them more resolutely. All the graver is it, when men thus circumstanced are slowly laying aside the creed of the Church, or are found wanting in hearty co-operation with the spread of it. In every society it is the thoughtful, earnest few who will ultimately lead opinion: it is of these, and not of the many who affect the tone of unbelief, and learn its language, because it is a little the fashion, that we now write.

Each age and country has its own peculiar need. There can hardly be a doubt that the need of the Church in India at the present time is for the ministry of men who shall be competent to form an opinion upon the many theological questions in dispute, which are brought into discussion by every newspaper; above all, of men who are able to sympathize with and understand the thoughts and difficulties of their fellows. It is not zeal, nor discretion, nor devotion

to Christ only, which is now needed. There need be learning and capacity as well; a firmly rooted faith in Him who died and rose again, no less rational than sincere; and the judgment to distinguish in teaching between what is essential and what is accidental, what is for all time and what is growing old and ready to vanish away, in the forms of Christian belief, such as only a large and liberal culture can impart.

Nor is this the need only of the various European churches in India; the ablest missionaries are most conscious that it is theirs also. Unhappily, the present system of selecting and educating missionaries does not tend to meet it. It is unreasonable that the most trying task which a man can take on himself, be he ever so much gifted with Christian graces,—that, namely, of winning unbelievers to inquiry, and of persuading them that the Gospel is true, should be committed to men who have been subjected to a brief, unlaborious training. A short time spent in a Missionary College, an almost exclusively theological course of study, and that confined to some few works of English theology, can hardly be expected to qualify the candidate for a work which demands intellectual conviction of the truth, no less than devotion and benevolence. Without doubt, a personal interest in the Gospel to be preached is more persuasive than the subtlest power of disputation. But there is no reason for supposing such an interest to be necessarily joined to limited knowledge or mental deficiency. Rather, much faith and a thorough devotion to the work of evangelization might be supposed to have its best witness in the most diligent preparation beforehand. The excellent gift with which, of all men, the missionary most needs to be endued, is the bond of other virtues, and is found to inspire a sober-minded piety, not less profound because it is rational and reverent. The lower standard of missionary qualification than that required for ministerial duties at home (except in those cases, becoming unhappily so common, where the University degree is dispensed with), acts injuriously to the cause of missions, especially in India. Without previous mastery of Oriental literature, the teaching of the missionary is necessarily confined to the less instructed, the poor and degraded of the native population.* The Gospel, indeed, should be preached to

* Too much importance is attached to the commonly received statement of the poverty and ignorance of the early Christians. That statement may be fairly challenged. It rests (1) upon the undoubted poverty of the Church of Jerusalem; and (2) upon the one question of St. Paul in 1 Cor. i. 26, 27. But (1) the many exhortations to liberality in almsgiving preclude the supposition that the poor estate of the Church at Jerusalem was shared by other churches; and (2) with reference to 1 Cor. i. 26, 27, it may be doubted whether the slaves and artisans of a Greek city, which as a Roman colony was rapidly recovering its former position of depôt for East and West trade, and "the eye of all Greece," would be men of low intellectual culture. Certainly not because they were slaves, for among these were the writers and librarians, the physicians and teachers of the Roman world; nor necessarily because they were ignoble by birth. In the fifth century B.C., we

these, but not on that account should it be preached less to the other classes. At present, it may be doubted whether the work is not begun at the wrong end. In the valuable report of the Punjab Mis-

know of a certain Athenian leather-dresser, "at that time by far the most persuasive speaker in the eyes of the people;" and his friends the rope-seller, the sheep-seller, and the lampmaker, however unscrupulous as politicians, were men of no mean parts, although they would certainly have been designated *οὐ πολλοὶ δυνατοί, οὐ πολλοὶ εὐγενεῖς*.

A more thorough study of the New Testament, and deeper search into Christian antiquities, tend to modify the too general assertion of Olshausen, quoted in Alford, ii. 481:—"The ancient Christians were for the most part slaves and men of low station. The whole history of the expansion of the Church is in reality a progressive victory of the ignorant over the learned, the lowly over the lofty, until the Emperor himself laid down his crown before the cross of Christ."

On the other hand there is Mr. Merivale's opinion ("Conversion of the Roman Empire," p. 83), which is most interesting for its bearing upon the present state of things in India:—

"St. Paul, himself a man of no mean social rank, and of high intellectual culture, spoke, I cannot doubt, directly to the intellect as well as to the heart of men of refinement like his own. His converts were among the wise and prudent, as well as among the impulsive and devout. I reject, then, the notion, too hastily assumed, too readily accepted, from a mistaken conception of the real dignity of the Gospel, that the first preaching of the Gospel was addressed to the lowest and meanest and least intelligent, the outcasts and proletaires of society. Many reasons, I am convinced, might be alleged for concluding that it was much the reverse. As regards the Christian Church at Rome at least, the direct statements of the Apostle himself—the evidence of existing monuments of antiquity—inferences of no little strength from the records of secular history, and inference, not lightly to be rejected, from the language and sentiments of contemporary heathens—all tend to assure us that it embraced some devoted members, and attracted many anxious inquirers amidst the palaces of the nobles, and even in Cæsar's household. If such be the case—if high-born men and women—if well-trained reasoners and thinkers—if patricians and patrons and counsellors in law, with their freedmen, their pupils, and their clients, did read and appreciate the Apostle's letters—did visit him in his bonds and listen to his teachings—did accept gospel truth from his lips, and ask for baptism at his hands," . . .

See also note R., p. 208.

The opinion of Mr. Merivale is confirmed by the researches of M. de Rossi in the Catacombs at Rome, of which an interesting memoir will be found in the *Revue des deux Mondes* for September 1, 1865. We extract the following as bearing directly upon the subject:—

"Vingt ans de fouilles et d'études dans les Catacombes ont modifié pour lui les idées qu'on se fait d'ordinaire sur la propagation du Christianisme à Rome. M. de Rossi croit que la religion nouvelle a pénétré plus tôt qu'on ne le pense dans les hautes classes de la société, et que le grande monde est venu à elle presque aussi vite que les 'pauvres gens.' Ce n'est donc pas, comme on le répète, une doctrine qui pendant longtemps a fait son chemin sans bruit dans les ergastules d'esclaves ou les échoppes d'ouvriers. Elle est entrée dès l'origine dans les palais du Quirinal ou les riches maisons du Forum, elle n'a pas tardé même à s'insinuer jusque sur le Palatin. . . . Il n'en est pas moins probable que ces gens riches, que ces personnages importants, dont on parle si peu ont dû venir souvent au secours de la communauté en péril, l'aider de leur fortune, ou de leur crédit, et quand on n'est pas disposé à ne voir qu'une série de miracles dans l'établissement du Christianisme ou est en droit de soupçonner que leur argent ou leur influence ne fut pas inutile à ses succès. J'avoue que ce n'est pas que l'on se fait d'ordinaire des premiers temps de l'église; on ne se la figure que misérable et proscrite, . . . je connais des gens qui sauront mauvais gré à M. de Rossi de l'introduire si vite dans le palais des grands. Mais l'imagination n'a que faire ici; le rôle de notre époque est de rompre en toutes choses avec le roman pour revenir à la réalité."

sionary Conference held at Lahore in December and January, 1862-3, to which we shall have frequent occasion to refer, valuable as embodying the opinions (more or less representative) of missionaries of different denominations, this defect in the direction of missionary work is plainly pointed out by one of the most attached friends of missions, who speaks from

"An experience of thirty-four years spent among the natives of India in the performance of official duties which have brought him into close contact with almost all classes of the people, at various times, under circumstances that render a study of their character, their feelings, and their principles of action, to some extent unavoidable.*

"A further principle which I think it well to urge is this, that we neglect or overlook no class from amongst our native brethren; and *least of all, those classes who have at present the most powerful influence over their minds:* for as yet I believe, that as a general rule the missionary rather holds aloof from the learned classes; and where striking instances have occurred of our converts maintaining, after their conversion, a position as men of Oriental learning (three examples are mentioned), '*I consider this to be in spite of the system we have generally adopted, rather than in consequence of it.*'

"It has long appeared to me that there is a want of charity, as well as of wisdom, in the course pursued by our secular educationists generally, of regarding the native mind as a *tabula rasa*, ignoring all the learning of the East as valueless, and commencing on a wholly new foundation, the structure raised upon which is exceedingly ill adapted for amalgamation, in any shape, with the systems of learning which are indigenous to the land. The consequence is that the learned classes, as a body, have cordially reciprocated our contemptuous alienation—they do not understand us. . . . It is an error to disregard them (these classes), and against this error I desire to warn our missionary brethren. It was remarked by Behari Lal Singh at the Liverpool Conference, and remarked truly, that *if we could only secure the hearts of the learned classes, we should secure the hearts of almost the entire population.* . . . What I have chiefly desired to urge in respect to Oriental learning is this, that although the possessors of it are, in some respects, perhaps the most important of all classes, they appear to me to have been, as a class, neglected by us, owing probably, in some degree, to an impression that they are not easily accessible—an impression which I believe to be unfounded, provided they are approached through the medium of their own learning."—(P. 154.)

Another evil of the average low standard of European missionary attainments—from which average must be excepted not a few highly respected names of English, Scotch, and German missionaries—is the still lower standard of that of the native teachers. That a native clergy must ultimately be the instructors of the native Church, that the native missionary will be the real agent for evangelizing India, is becoming more and more evident. The gulf which divides Eastern and Western modes of thought and ways of life, can never be completely bridged by the zeal or love of the foreigner, at least not till some generations, leavened by Christian teaching, shall have passed

* "On a Native Pastorate." Essay by D. F. McLeod, Esq., C.B. Pp. 128—138.

away. This is the witness of one who, of all Europeans, possesses the greatest aptitude for becoming an Oriental to Orientals. Speaking of the higher degree of prosperity and civilization enjoyed by North Arabia when Christianity was widely diffused, and before Mahometanism took rise, and of the practical conclusion drawn from the fact by intelligent Arabians, that Christianity is connected with national well-being, he adds:*

"Were it (this conclusion) one day or other to find such execution, I for one should not be surprised, after what I have heard and seen in several localities, though indeed a similar event could only, it would seem, be brought about by indigenous action on native ground. For between Asiatics and Europeans in general, there is but little sympathy, and less amalgamation; a truth of which, to overstep for a moment the native frontier, a marked example may be too clearly read in the blood-stained annals of the late Indian rebellion. Besides, so little is the East and its inhabitants understood by the West, so few in the latter have of the former even that degree of knowledge which is the first necessary step to influence, that I do not see much probability of serious moral or religious change being brought about in Arabia, or in any Asiatic country elsewhere, by European agency, unless indeed for the worse."

The question then, how best to train and educate the native clergy, is of great moment. The views of the missionaries elicited at the conference showed a wider difference of opinion as to the requisite qualifications than the subject called for. There was a general acknowledgment that "spirituality" is not the only requisite, but most of the speakers seem to have agreed that learning and education were only subsidiary, not essential to the efficiency of a native clergyman's ministry. One thought that "in the case of pastors there could be no particular need of Oriental learning;" and that "even in respect to evangelists, the importance of such learning ought not to be exaggerated." Another, a native clergyman of the American Presbyterian Mission, thought it hardly necessary to "say that pastors must be *educated men*," . . . "the more educated they are, the more able will they be to edify their hearers." He added the humiliating statement, "Our uneducated catechists can say a great deal against Hindooism and Mahometanism; but in preaching to a Christian congregation, they can hardly keep the attention of their hearers for more than five minutes. Their stock of Biblical knowledge is very soon exhausted."—(P. 157.)

There seems to be an error in the point of view from which this question of missionary qualification is usually discussed, as though the choice lay between ability on the one side, and devotion on the other. Now sincerity and devotion are rightly estimated above gifts and attainments which are merely intellectual. But it is forgotten

* W. G. Palgrave's "Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia," 1862-63, vol. i., p. 88.

that it is beyond any man's power to judge the sincerity of another, which can only be inferred from the evidence, the one unerring test of duty done. That the surest evidence of the sincerity of the candidate would be found in his hearty preparation of himself for the office to which he aspires, and that his ignorance—in other words, his idleness—is a presumptive proof of insincerity, can hardly be doubted.

The kind of instruction which the native clergy should receive occupied the attention of the Conference, and it is a subject which deserves careful discussion.

The danger is, lest one method of study be adopted to the exclusion of others, and in every case. Perhaps the recognition of a few simple facts of history would correct some present mistakes, or at least invite a reconsideration of the method which appears generally followed. Christianity is not a religion foreign to the mind or character of the Eastern. Considered as the communion of a Divine life, it is of no one time or place. "The life was the light of men." "Thou canst not tell whence it cometh, nor whither it goeth." Viewed in the aspect of a system of morality and scheme of doctrine which is of universal application, Christianity is of Eastern origin and growth. The books which contain it were written probably without exception by Easterns. The very language belonged as much to the East as the West. In Dean Milman's words,* "Greek was the commercial language, in which the Jews . . . carried on their intercourse."

Now it is an immense advantage to the instructed Hindoo convert, that the one sacred language of Christendom has most affinities with the sacred language of his own country; and further, that the non-Christian literature of that language has still nearer relationship with the legendary worship to which he has been accustomed, to his own previous contemplation of the universe. Witness the light thrown by Mr. Grote upon legendary Greece from the studies of Hindoo life and thought contained in Colonel Sleeman's "Rambles and Recollections."

The study, then, of the Greek language and literature would be no alien study to the convert, would open to him the treasures of Christian knowledge, and if guided by men imbued with the generous spirit of European linguistic science, could not fail to enlarge the mind, and give of itself sufficient training, without the stain of denationalization.

It is a fair question, Why should the teaching of the Gospel not be allowed free course, and, unfettered by later interpretations, utter its own message in its own tongue to the native convert? Why should the channels be forced in a Western direction when the waters might flow through them straight from the primal source? The Christian societies of India might be allowed to stand in the same position towards the sacred literature of our faith, as did the first formed

churches of East and West. The rise of a Hindoo Christianity, the outgrowth of the native mind and character, would then at least be possible; the plant, not transplanted from afar, might take deeper root in its own soil. But if it seem good to withhold from no newly formed society of Christians the large experience and widened thoughts of centuries of Christian culture, then it becomes a grave question which development of Christianity shall be taught as most faithful to the type, and its most incorrupt exponent.

The main divisions of East and West, with their many subdivisions, according to the special character of their own laws, customs, ways of thought, developed each one its own form of Christianity. If the Hindoo convert is to learn from the controversies, speculations, dogmas of Christianity—Greek, Latin, Teutonic—from which shall he learn? The reasonable answer would be, from that of which the genius was least foreign to his own. “Among the Greeks had been for centuries agitated all those primary questions which lie at the bottom of all religions—the formation of the world, the existence and nature of the Deity, the origin and cause of evil—though this seems to have been studied even with stronger predilection in the trans-Euphratic East. Hence Greek Christianity was insatiably inquisitive, speculative. Confident in the inexhaustible copiousness and fine precision of its language, it endured no limitation to its curious investigations.”* Let those deeply read in Oriental learning witness how far this is descriptive of the early Hindoo mind and literature. The Oriental Christian need not want an Oriental Christian literature. He possesses it, and may claim it as his own inheritance, in the noble works of the Greek Fathers of the first four centuries. And until Hindoo Christianity shall have produced a literature of its own, Justin, St. Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Athanasius, St. John Chrysostom, the Gregories, and Basil the Great, might well be studied as the classics of the native Church. These men spoke indeed to the Church of all time, and their writings as a whole are still unrivalled; but, Easterns or half-Easterns themselves, most of all did they speak to the churches of the East; and it may be doubted whether the newly formed churches of the East could find at this day any other literature so well adapted to their wants.

The course of reading which is set the native candidate for the ministry is of a different kind. Pearson, Butler, Paley, or Whately's Evidences, are his class-books, just as if he were preparing for ordination at home. Indeed, the reason given by one missionary at the Conference why they, the native clergy, should know English was, “that they may be able to read English books, and derive from them the requisite information on theological subjects, which they have to

* Milman's “*Latin Christianity*,” Introduction, ii.

communicate to their less informed flocks," as though information on theological subjects were confined to English books, and unobtainable elsewhere. Few English Churchmen but take pride in the past glories of English theological literature; few educated Englishmen but honour the names of Hooker, Taylor, and Butler. But the writings of those great men are set to a purpose for which they are singularly ill-fitted, when they are converted into theological class-books for Orientals. It is not too much to say that, with perhaps the exception of Butler's ethical writings, no literature is less fit for the purpose than our own, and that for the reason that no literature is so thoroughly imbued with the national spirit of its own day, and more thoroughly controversial. Why import into India, together with the Divine message, and the words of inspired writers thereupon, sixteenth and seventeenth century disputes between Catholic and Protestant, Anglican and Puritan, concerning doctrines, rites, and ceremonies, which are wholly alien to the Eastern mind? Why stifle any creative thought which the Divine message awakens in the convert by the deadening weight of traditions and interpretations received from *our* Fathers? There is the dawn of a doubt whether such a training is the best for English clergymen at home, and whether we do the most reverence to our divines by labelling their deepest thoughts as tests of right or wrong theological opinion. Surely there can hardly be a question that such a training is most ill advised in the case of Hindoo candidates for the ministry of the Church. And yet, in a careful paper, read by a much esteemed missionary, after the statement of the fact, of no little interest in itself, that "the most popular works among the Christians themselves" are found, in the writer's own experience, to be "the missionary and apologetic works of the early Fathers," he goes on gravely to recommend the study of Hooker, Butler, Pearson, Hartwell Horne, President Edwards's "History of Redemption," and his Prophetical Course, Elliott's "Horæ Apocalypticæ," Charnock and Goodwin, Birks and Ellicott.

If such a course of instruction is generally followed out in the various Mission Colleges—and there is reason to think it is,—no wonder that the denationalization of the students is complained of; no wonder that weapons forged in such armouries are still powerless against instructed Hindoo and Mussulman belief; no wonder that native Christianity has yet developed no type or character of its own, and that not one single native Christian has risen, of pre-eminence enough to influence, in any appreciable degree, the future of India.

These remarks are made in no spirit of unfriendly animadversion, but in order to provoke discussion, and direct it to subjects which suffer grievously from neglect. But whatever difference of opinion there may be as to the most effectual means of training an efficient ministry

—and it is an open question,—there can or ought to be but one opinion as to the need of a learned and competent ministry, both for European and native churches. The character of the many questions which concern the progress of Christianity in India, makes the need more felt in both communities. Those questions are no less theoretical than practical, and require gifts of judgment and discrimination, together with much knowledge of the past history and literature of the Church. If the unhappy silence of the Church at home continues, and they are left for settlement here, clearly they should be handled by competent men.

II.

One such question is that which, at the instance of Government, is under discussion by the Indian clergy, including the ministers of all denominations of Christians, concerning the remarriage of native converts. A bill to give that liberty was laid before the Council of the Governor General of India at the beginning of last year (1865) by Mr. Maine, and its further progress is only postponed until the general opinion of its merits has been ascertained. Some of our readers will be interested in a *résumé* of the bill, the causes of it, the arguments which are urged for and against it. But in passing, we would again ask, Why is the discussion of this question confined to India? Why should a rule affecting the good order and discipline of native Christian churches, with which Englishmen must be more or less connected while England governs India, be established or rejected without appeal to, or advice of, the Church at home?

The case is this. The married convert to Christianity, in a vast number of cases, finds himself separated from his wife, on and because of his conversion. According to Mahometan authorities, his wife is free from previous obligation, and he is virtually divorced: according to the Hindoos, he is as one dead. He may endeavour to persuade his wife to live with him: unless he can also persuade her to be of one mind with himself, he has the faintest chance of success; if of high caste, he has no chance at all.

Again, his marriage may have been contracted in infancy, and be unconsummated at the time of conversion. In either case the law, as it now stands, affords him no relief. He is bound to the woman who disowns him for her husband, or whose husband he has never been in more than name. In Mr. Maine's words,—

“The great majority of Hindoos were married before they reached the age of reason. Converts to Christianity were, however, brought over by the operation of reason, and the condition of native society was such, that reason had necessarily much greater influence over one sex than the other. Hence the tendency of the law in its present state was to produce a celibate class.

Now Mr. Maine would lay down, even of European countries, that a law which by its direct incidence assisted in creating a class condemned to celibacy, was immoral and bad. And if that was true of Europe, how did matters stand in India? The subject was one which could only be touched upon lightly, but it was certain that all the essential differences between Oriental and Western society tended to augment the immorality of the law in India. . . . To an Oriental trained in the Zenànà, the very conception of such a life (of prolonged celibacy) was probably unintelligible, monstrous, and against nature."

Two separate bills had been previously drawn up to meet an evil which grew with the spread of Christianity, which placed the convert in a position that, considering the associations and surroundings of his life, can only be called intolerable, and which bore hard upon the missionary, who must either consent to the illegal remarriage of the convert, or acquiesce in his concubinage, or leave him to a trial beyond ordinary strength. The reasons of the difference cannot be entered into: but our readers must keep in mind Mr. Maine's words concerning the fact that there is the widest possible difference between voluntary or compulsory celibacy in Europe, and for Europeans, and compulsory celibacy in India.

Mr. Maine, perhaps the most learned and acute of modern legists, proposes to permit the remarriage of converts whose wives or husbands desert and repudiate them, under stringent conditions which render abuse of the permission almost impossible. Remarriage will be allowed, but not before more than a year has passed from the date of conversion, after repeated judicial examination of the parties, and the refusal of the one to live with the other on the sole ground of conversion. Then, and not before, is the convert allowed to remarry. The bill proposed is simply permissive. The convert, whose first desire would be the conversion of his wife, and whose sincerity would be tested by unwearied efforts to win her back to his home, will remain unmarried as long as he has the least hope of persuading his wife. Only when all hope is gone, the bill allows him to use the liberty of the Apostle (οὐ δεδούλωται ὁ ἀδελφὸς ἢ ἡ ἀδελφὴ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις). This is the permission which the law proposes to concede; but no church or religious society is bound therefore to concede it. The missionary may or may not, according to the discipline of the society to which the convert belongs, withhold permission. This is an important point, because it appears that the opinions of the missionaries, as a body, are most strongly divided. The subject was discussed at the Punjab Conference, where the opinion inclined against remarriage. The discussion itself, though assisted by Sir Herbert B. Edwardes, was confined to narrow ground. The plain maxims of right and equity by which such a subject should be weighed, were left out of view: the appeal lay, as indeed was fitting, to the authority of the Scrip-

tures, but those Scriptures were interpreted without reference to history and the past experience of the Church. "All the speakers," says Mr. Maine, "appeared to have been ignorant, or to have designedly omitted all mention, of the fact that the question of the remarriage of Christian converts had an ancient as well as a modern history, and it had only lost its interest through the conversion of the entire Western world to Christianity, and the consequent cessation of marriages between Christians and heathens." Mr. Maine affirmed, that the preponderant weight of authority in the early Church was in favour of divorce, where heathenism, considered to be spiritual adultery, was persisted in. The earliest theological opinion and practice of the Church were in harmony with the bill.

The chief objections from Scripture which are brought against it are these:—

1. "Our Lord's words on S. Matt. xix. 9, and St. Paul's in Rom. vii. 2; 1 Cor. vii. 39, make the marriage bond inviolable *under every conceivable case* except fornication."

2. In 1 Cor. vii. 15, "the language is too general and mild for so solemn a sanction as that to remarriage, and the permission is simply to a separation, not to divorce *à vinculo matrimonii*."

To which it may be answered, (1) that it is more than doubtful how far our Lord's words (S. Matt. xix. 9) are applicable to the present case, how far indeed* "they bear upon the question of a person divorced by judicial authority;" and (2), supposing that they apply to "every conceivable case" of married *disciples*, it seems certain, from St. Paul's own distinction in 1 Cor. vii. 12, "But to the rest speak I, not the Lord," that they do not apply to the case of mixed marriages;† "that was a question with which He did not deal in His recorded discourses." That the question must soon have risen in the Church is certain; that it was submitted to the judgment of the Apostle, and that in this first letter to the Corinthians he gives his own opinion thereon, is almost equally certain.

In answer to objection 2, that the words, "if the unbelieving depart let him depart; a brother or sister is not under bondage in such cases: but God hath called us to peace," are too informal and general to justify divorce,—Mr. Maine speaks not as a theologian, and therefore liable to theological predilections, but with the more authority "as having some acquaintance with legal antiquities." "It was said by some opponents of the measure, that the text justified at most a divorce *à mensâ et thoro*—a judicial separation. That view involved an anachronism. The only divorce known in the world when the words were written was an absolute divorce—*à vinculo matrimonii*."

* Article "Marriage," in Smith's "Dictionary of the Bible," where the subject is ably treated.

† Alford *in loco*.

It was said that the words were not sufficiently strong to warrant the conclusion drawn from them. "Mr. Maine, still speaking as a lawyer, asserted that stronger language could not have been used. The words employed were the technical words of Roman law implying absolute divorce. . . . The ordinary formula of divorce was *abi, discede*, or as the phrase would run when turned into the third person, *let him depart*."*

It was urged in the debate, that St. Paul was not likely to use the technical language of the Roman forum, himself a native of Tarsus, in Asia, and writing to his disciples at Corinth, in Greece. The objection overlooked the fact of which Mr. Merivale has made such good use in his Boyle Lectures, that St. Paul was a Roman citizen, well skilled in the Roman law of persons, and therefore not at all unlikely to employ the language of it when establishing a most important rule; and further, that Corinth was a Roman *civitas*, where such language would be understood.

These are the main objections brought against the bill from the Scriptures, and they are, on examination, more than sufficiently disposed of. They are deduced from the letter of the text. But ought not the *spirit* of Christ's teaching to be taken into account? Something is said concerning binding burdens "too heavy to be borne," which we ourselves do not "touch," not inapplicable to this case. And where choice has to be made between two meanings, one lenient, the other severe, neither of which has been so decidedly expressed as to foreclose doubt of the possibility of the other, would not the mind of Christ persuade us to legislate, at least for others, in the spirit of the lenient rather than the severe?

The non-scriptural objections to the bill, on the ground (1) that the liberty conceded is uncalled for except in few cases; (2) inexpedient, because most often the wife is persuaded to rejoin her husband; and (3) unjust to the wife as the unoffending party, because she does no wrong in refusing to live with a Christian husband, would, if well proved, be most valid. But each statement is doubtful, or denied. (1) In the experience of many missionaries a large number of converts do require the permission to remarry; (2) if the wife returns, it is only likely, according to the objectors' own showing, on her conversion after many years of separation, and there is the obvious rejoinder, "What sort of life has the convert been living in the interval?" and (3) the law which allows the wife to remarry, and protects her personal and proprietary rights, is far juster and more merciful to her than if, according to the principles of all law, civilized

* The Debate in the Council of the Governor General of India on the "Remarriage of Converts Bill," Calcutta, 1865. Pp. 4, 5.

The Contemporary Review.

or barbarous, it compelled her to live with a husband whom, in most cases, "she loathes with a loathing unknown to Europe."

It would be premature yet to say, until more complete statistics have been ascertained, to which side expediency inclines. But such are the main reasons advanced for and against the bill on the grounds of Scripture, reason, and equity, and upon them discussion at home may be fairly invited.

III.

The briefest review of the condition and prospect of the Church in India should contain a notice of its schools. These are of two classes, one for the education of the children of European parents and of half-castes, and the other for that of natives. The neglect of the former has long been a reproach; in consequence of it, European and half-caste children have grown up Indianized in the worst sense of the word, that is, imbued with the vices of both peoples. The rolling away of that reproach is the endeavour of the excellent Bishop of Calcutta, and of others who have been awakened to the duty by his example. Schools are being established, or are established, in most of the larger stations, as well as in the Presidencies. The question concerning them is one of detail rather than of principle, and calls for no particular discussion. The difficulties centre in the want of well-qualified instructors, of whom at present there is a most inadequate supply.

When we come to schools for the education of natives, the case is different: the subject is a large one, and requires reconsideration. The first thing to be said is, that there is a great demand for such schools. Whatever hindrances the missionary meets in other parts of his work, here at least his course is free. The Hindoos are as ready to receive as he is to impart instruction. In some respects they are more ready. Nor is Government less zealous for the education of the people, nor less liberal in aiding it. Hence the school belongs to nearly every missionary station, and where many Europeans reside, is well supported. The natives often prefer it to the Government school, avowedly proselytizing as it is, because it is an English school, and "English is rupees." In many cases it may be hoped that a higher motive exists, and that there is a curiosity felt, and desire of knowledge, independent of the hope of gain.

The point of view of most of the missionaries, as expressed at the Punjab Conference, is this:—The school is essential to our work, because it is the readiest means of Christianizing the young generation, and *only because it is such*. Hence the teaching of the Bible is considered to be "the primary end of mission schools, while instruction in secular subjects is given simply with a view to that end," and, as one of the speakers at the Conference confessed, "because the mission-

aries could obtain no pupils willing to enter for the sake of receiving instruction in the Bible only." The case should be fairly stated from the side of the majority of the missionaries. As a body, and leaving out the opinion of the very few of whom no account need be taken, they would gladly see the natives highly instructed. They have no mean jealousy of the advance of knowledge. But they think that the schoolmaster's task is not theirs, or theirs only by an unavoidable necessity. Setting before them the one object of Christianizing India, and believing that such Christianization of the new generation of natives is to be effected by teaching the truths of the Bible only, they keep school for that object. If they could, they would teach the Bible only; but because they cannot get children together on such terms, they will teach other subjects as well, grudgingly and of necessity. Nay, further, such resolute faith have many missionaries in teaching the letter of the Scriptures, that where native Christians are not to be had as teachers, they will employ Hindoos or Mussulmans to give instruction in the Scriptures. It is true that few missionaries at the Conference defended such a proceeding, but as a matter of fact, because the books of the Vernacular Society, which are in general use, are full of as much Biblical instruction as it is possible on every subject but arithmetic to throw into them, instruction more or less of a Biblical cast falls to the duty of the teachers, whether Christian or heathen.

We have reason to believe that there are many dissentients, among the more thoughtful and educated missionaries, from this view and course of action; but the readers of the proceedings of the Punjab Conference will see that it is the prevalent one, and that we have fairly stated it. It is unquestionably open to grave doubts, if it is not altogether wrong. For it may be asked, What difference is there between the principle which should govern the school for heathen children and that for Christian? If education be in itself, and quite independent of the amount of Biblical knowledge conveyed, a truly religious work in the case of the Christian child, why not also in the case of the heathen? If it is not good for the mind of the Christian child to be dwarfed and stunted, is it good for the heathen? If the spirit which withheld from the children of National Schools at home all other instruction but that of the Catechism, Scripture history, reading, writing, and the four first rules of arithmetic, is a spirit of which we are ashamed, why should it survive to be acted on in India?

Again, it is more than doubtful whether the object of evangelizing the young generation of natives can be reached by means of instruction in the truths of the Bible only. Texts which the teachers suppose to embody the whole scheme of salvation are quickly learned, and the knowledge of Jewish history and antiquities, not to say the discourses, parables, and miracles of our Lord, are soon got by rote

and repeated at examinations; but does such knowledge, learnt as a lesson, bring the learner near to that conversion of heart and life which is the one end of the missionary's labour? Is it not this class which furnishes the scoffers as well as the hardened unbelievers? Can a greater wrong be done to sacred literature, than for the Scriptures to be converted into a reading and class-book?

To leave the ground of mere supposition, what is the actual fact? In the statement of "reasons for signing the clerical petition against the Remarriage of Converts Bill, by the Rev. A. M. Banerjea, second professor of Bishop's College, Calcutta," we find the following:—"The department of Anglo-vernacular schools . . . is one which has, comparatively, been *barren of results*,* and led to but *few* instances of baptism, bearing to the whole body of native Christians a proportion of not more than two or three in a thousand."†

The experience of most readers will bear us out in saying, that the deepest religious impressions which they received in youth were not those which they learned from a book, but from the living voice, tone, manner of him who taught it as a Divine message, and by his own quiet earnestness riveted attention, and imparted the spiritual gift. It is bibliolatry of the worst kind to expect from the letter that which the spirit alone can give. If this be thought an unjust suspicion of the proceeding of so many devoted missionaries, it must be asked, What else is the reason why they place the letter to be taught to the children of their schools in the hands of heathens and unbelievers?

There is a broader view of the question, which need only be hinted at. English science, language, and literature will not do the missionary's work, nor accomplish the conversion of India. But the conviction is more and more gaining ground, and that too we believe among the ablest missionaries, that these are divinely intended to prepare the way for it.

The positive knowledge of the outward world which science gives is the massive hammer to shiver in pieces the whole fabric of Hindoo idolatry. The large inquiry, the patient waiting for results, which is the very spirit of science, surely undermines the dogmatism of the Mussulman, and inspires doubt of the sufficiency of the formula, "It is written." English literature does more. It is the product of genius,

* The Italics are not ours.

† Mr. Banerjea adds in a note,—"I am not depreciating the value of such noble institutions as those of the Free Church, the General Assembly, and the London Missionary Society, or our own Cathedral Mission College. They are doing a great preparatory work in imbuing the minds of the rising generation of Calcutta. But I am using here terms which I have heard missionaries themselves employ, and I am only stating what the conductors of those institutions have never denied, that as regards the present *numerical* strength of the native Church, those seminaries have not yet contributed much to it."

trained in schools of ancient philosophy and Christian learning. It is the noblest fruit of Christian civilization. It will not be supposed that this literature can be studied and appreciated—and the highest Hindoo mind shows no little aptitude for the study, and much power of appreciation,—without that essence of Christian holiness, which more or less pervades it—goodness, justice, mercy and truth,—sinking deep down and taking root. If there is faintness of heart and discouragement because of the seeming slowness of the conversion of India, it is because men look for the story of that conversion in the numerical result of single instances rather than in the progress of the preliminary stages. The Brahma Samaj alone is a convincing proof what high and noble moral aims European education in secular subjects, as they are somewhat slightly called, is capable of inspiring.* That culture may be intended to fill the same place in the preparation of Hindoos as, in the judgment of the most honoured of Christian Fathers, Greek philosophy filled to the Greeks, Hebrew law and prophecy to Hebrews. So too may English law, with its maxims of justice and equity, be the schoolmaster to lead the men of this land to Christ.

Such seems the not extravagant conclusion from any faith in Divine Providence,—which has not left the world to perish in darkness—which works out its own ends no less by English rule and government in India, than by the weak and divided, though noble and strenuous efforts of some few missionaries.

If this conclusion be a reasonable one, then doubt is thrown on the wisdom of those missionaries who consider education in itself a secular work rather than a Divine instrument, equally with preaching, for the conversion of India, or who confine their instructions, as far as they can, to lessons on the Bible. It is only from such schools, in which education itself is considered a sacred duty, that the spirit shall arise to speak with no “stammering lips and other tongue” of the foreigner to the hearts of Hindoos, to reawaken in the millions of the land the prayer for “the adorable light of the Divine Ruler; may it guide our intellects.”†

* This society (the word *samaj* means an association, *ecclesia*) was founded in 1830 by Rajah Rammohun Roy, for the purpose of maintaining and diffusing the pure ethical teaching and the devout Theism which had been the fruit of his contact with Christian truth. It has had considerable influence among the educated class of natives, and has held regular meetings, in Calcutta and elsewhere, for worship and instruction. Recently, I am informed, there has been a division in the body, one section adhering to their founder's principle of leaving caste, as a national institution, untouched; the other, with more earnestness in their protest against old abuses, feeling bound to wage war against it, as also against idolatrous usages.

† The quotation is from the hymn known as the Gayatri in the Rig-Veda, which is recited morning and evening by devout Brahmins.



SUNDAY.

IT will be within the knowledge of most readers that a controversy has sprung up on this subject in a very unexpected quarter, and threatens to assume very formidable dimensions. As often happens, the starting-point was an occasion of comparatively small importance. The North British Railway Company, having come into possession of the line between Edinburgh and Glasgow, signalized its new proprietorship by running Sunday trains where none had run before. The clergy, and many of the laity, of Glasgow were alarmed at what seemed to them to threaten a revolutionary change in the national observance of the Sabbath. A meeting of the Presbytery of the Established Church was convened, and it was agreed to issue a pastoral address on the subject. The language of the address was temperate, that of the speakers far from violent. Their case was rested, however, on the assumption that the Fourth Commandment was at once the ground and the rule of the observance of the Lord's day, and an amendment, with a view to the omission of the clause affirming this, was moved by Dr. Norman Macleod, of the Barony Church, Glasgow, the well-known editor of *Good Words*. At an adjourned meeting on November 16th, he supported the amendment in a speech which took three hours in delivery, and which has since been published, but was defeated by a majority of twenty-three to four.

It is pleasant to be able to acknowledge, as Dr. Macleod himself

has done, the Christian courtesy, candour, and gentlemanly bearing which characterized the discussion of the Presbytery. There was little or nothing of the bitterness which has so often disgraced controversies on this subject—a total absence of the extravagance which led the Presbytery of Strathbogie, in 1658, to condemn an offender accused of sabbath-breaking for saving the life of a sheep,* and which, in 1863, prompted the Free Church Presbytery of the same district (as though their teeth were still set on edge with the sour grapes which their fathers had eaten) to present *Good Words* to the General Assembly of the Free Church because it had admitted a paper by Mr. Thorold, the excellent rector of St. Giles', London, advocating, among other things, the practice of allowing boys at school to write letters to their parents on the leisure hours of Sunday. The speeches of Dr. Macduff, Mr. Charteris, and others,—we may add also, the paper on this subject by Dr. Hanna (the son-in-law and biographer of Thomas Chalmers), in the *Sunday Magazine* for December last,—present a refreshing contrast to this unintelligent narrowness. Concessions were made which would have startled those who, in the General Assembly of 1834, declared a Sunday walk (“wandering in the fields”—grouped together with “riot, drunkenness, and other immoralities”) to be a breach of the commandment. Dr. Macduff spoke with approval of the opening of the parks of Glasgow “when the sabbath services are over.” It was allowed by Mr. Charteris that some cabs and omnibuses might legitimately ply on the Lord’s day; that one morning and one evening train might, if there was fair evidence of their being wanted, legitimately run. In practical suggestions for the observance of the day, Dr. Macleod and his opponents were, for the most part, of one mind. What startled and alarmed them was that he threw overboard the principle on which they laid stress—that the Lord’s day rests upon the Fourth Commandment; that he went on, with a Luther-like boldness, to declare that the Decalogue itself, *quid* Decalogue, was no longer binding on those who had accepted the law of their Master, Christ; that the moral elements of it are of perpetual force, not because they are *there*, but because they *are* moral, part of the eternal will of God, incorporated with the teaching of our Lord.† To them the former position

* Hessey’s “Bampton Lectures,” p. 291.

† Nothing, of course, is easier for those who simply want a “cry to go to the country with” than to repeat incessantly that Dr. Macleod sets aside the authority of all the Ten Commandments. Those who do not shrink from low jesting on the gravest questions will add to that cry that, if his teaching gains ground, they must lock up their spoons and look after their wives. Men who wish to deal with facts as they are, will recognise that what he maintains is simply this, that every commandment but the fourth was binding before the law was given on Sinai, would have been binding now, even if that law had never been given, and is actually binding on the consciences of Christian men, not because it was then

seemed to undermine the only ground on which the holiness of the Lord's day could be maintained, the latter to let in an unbridled "Antinomianism." It is to their honour that, in spite of their fears, they continued to use the language of courtesy and calmness. The vehemence of popular religious feeling, however, has gone far beyond the moderation of the Presbytery, and Dr. Macleod is probably, at present, one of the best abused men in Great Britain. Journal after journal declaims against him, as English religious newspapers have declaimed (with more reason, it must be owned) against the Bishop of Natal and the writers of "Essays and Reviews." Even the harmony of a Scottish benevolent dinner, at which he presided, was not secure from an unseemly interruption by his opponents. In the points which affect him personally he is well able to defend himself, and the heartiness and benignity of his character are a pledge that he at least will not answer "railing for railing." His speech deserves to be studied as a vigorous and remarkable protest against the dominant feeling of his countrymen, and yet more of the clergy of his Church. In most parts of his case his position is a strong one. Even where it seems weakest,—the difficulty of reconciling his teaching with that of the documentary standards which constitute, as it were, the *depositum fidei* of both the Established and the Free Churches,—it may be legitimately contended that the Westminster Confession (xxi. 8) leaves some room for discussion what are "works of necessity and mercy," that the Larger Catechism leaves a like opening when it speaks, as forbidden, of "unnecessary acts, words, or thoughts concerning worldly business or recreation," and leaves the same licence, in the same terms, for "works of necessity and mercy." If it be urged that this leaves Dr. Macleod's statement as to the ground of the duty still at variance with that of his formularies, the answer may be put in to which Principal Tulloch has already given prominence, that confessions of faith, such as those in question, cannot rightfully be held to stereotype all the opinions of their compilers on all questions touched upon—historical, ethical, dogmatical,—and impose them upon the minds of men for ever; and that, so long as they continue, the assent given to them is (as it has been now formulated by Parliament, with the hearty concurrence of the Church of England, so far as that concurrence can be expressed) general, and not special,—to the main tone and current of teaching, not to each individual detail.

written on the tables of stone, but because it is written on the "fleshy tables of the heart," and has been confirmed and expanded by the teaching of our Saviour, Christ. To represent the moral laws of God as *depending* upon the thunders of Sinai for their validity, and all laws so given as equally binding, must lead either to Judaism, if we believe the Sinaitic law, as such, to continue, or to Antinomianism, if we believe it, as such, to have passed away.

It is not without some reluctance that I venture to take any part in a controversy, the literature of which is already so voluminous, and which exposes those who meddle with it to such formidable attacks. If I have been led to overcome that reluctance, it is partly in the hope that, writing at a distance from the passions which it has roused, yet having many points of contact with those who are combatants on either side, and a profound respect for the feelings of both parties, I may be able to gain a hearing, and partly because I believe there are some facts, likely enough to be overlooked in the heat of debate, which are yet of some importance in their bearing on the points at issue.

1. *State of the Question.*

It is well that we should begin by noticing how the matter at present stands, how far both parties are agreed, and where the divergence begins. It is admitted then, I imagine, on both sides, that there is an incalculable gain to the well-being of mankind, physical, social, moral, in thus recognising one day, recurring at fixed and short intervals of time, as a day of general rest; that the rest ought not to be a mere animal cessation from manual or mental labour, but a time for strengthening and refreshing the spiritual life with which that labour tends to interfere; that for this end, it is well that the day of general rest should be also a day of general worship. It is agreed on both sides, further, that there is an indefinitely strong prescription in favour of a fixed order giving one day in seven as the day of rest; that that prescription applies equally whether men reckon the day so kept as the first or last of the seven; that for the whole Christian Church that prescription is now, and has been for eighteen centuries, in favour of keeping the first, and not the seventh; that, on the grounds of its tendency to promote the well-being of the people, it is the right, and may be the duty, of the State to interpose, by positive enactment, and therefore by penalties, to protect those whom the rest would benefit against the selfishness that would deprive them of it. It would be conceded, probably, that the State ought to refrain from this interference if there were the probability of its doing more harm than good, and that something must be left to the judgment and conscience of individual men. It might seem as if this agreement were enough to insure common concert. Men might meet to consider how far a given regulation would make the day of rest so set apart a reality, and lead to the right use of it, how far it could be put in force without the risk of greater evils.

Here, however, the difference begins. "We admit all this," it is said on one side, "but we claim much more. We cannot rest the obligation of the Sabbath on reasons of general expediency. To do so

is to descend from a high and secure position, and fight the battle on a ground chosen by the enemy. We cannot rest any moral commandment on that ground. We cannot begin the discussion from that starting-point. This law rests, as other moral laws rest, on the revealed will of God. We cannot mutilate and modify that law because there is, or seems to be, a balance of gain in doing so. We point to the law given on Sinai as binding still. We see in it traces of a yet more primitive, more universal law. We see in the teaching of our Master, Christ, a sanction, direct or implied, not only of the principle of the law, but of the law itself. We see in the observance of one day in seven by the Christian Church a recognition of the binding character of the law. We look upon the transfer of the observance from the seventh day to the first as a point immaterial. Perhaps it was but a return to the true mode of reckoning, a reform of some error in the Jewish calendar; perhaps it was solemnly sanctioned by the apostles, acting under the guidance of the Spirit, in order to unite with the weekly rest the commemoration of the resurrection of Christ, the expression of the truth that in our rest from labour we too are to rise to newness of life. But, whatever may have been the motive of the change, the obligation has been transferred. We must maintain that the law binds us as strictly as it bound the Jews. We must ask the State to help us in maintaining it; we must protest against any relaxation of existing rigour."

There is much in this feeling with which I profoundly sympathize. I am at one with those who feel that it is a poor thing to rest any duty on mere expediency, and that there is no safe standard but that of conformity to the Divine will. If men maintain this conviction in the face of much scorn, obloquy, and ridicule, they are, so far, worthy of all honour. I cannot set much store on the argument that the Fourth Commandment is *ipso facto* set aside by the mere transfer of the numerical position of the day, seeing that that transfer leaves its commemorative, moral, and even symbolical character unaffected, except in the way of expansion and development. But the position thus taken up suggests two inquiries: (1) What are the logical consequences which flow from it? (2) What are the grounds on which it rests? I deal with these questions in their order.

(1.) It is, I think, clear that if the Fourth Commandment be, as such, and in its letter, binding on all Christians, there should be no tampering with it. The question is reduced simply to the issue, what is "work"? and then, when this has been defined by casuists and lawyers, all acts are to be tried by the definition, and forbidden or permitted accordingly. In interpreting the statute we could have no better guide than the contemporaneous enactments of the same lawgiver; and these, in this instance, forbade the amount of exertion implied in

gathering manna from the ground (Exod. xv. 26), in lighting a fire (Exod. xxxv. 3), in picking up sticks for fuel (Numb. xv. 32). It might be questioned how far later, merely human, legislation would be justified in lowering the sanction of the law by mitigating the penalty, and the law prescribed no lighter penalty than death (Exod. xxxi. 15; Numb. xv. 36). It would seem that if human lawgivers might not take away, neither might they add. The law commands the Sabbath to be "kept holy," but it defines the holiness as consisting in the absence of work (Exod. xxxi. 15), and contains no enactment for religious ordinances, no prohibition of recreation and refreshment. Logically, then, all work—household, commercial, official, military, naval—ought to cease absolutely, and without exception, under the severest penalty. The lighting of a fire, the boiling of water, the supply of milk, is as the running of a railway train. The gnat and the camel stand on the same footing. Those who shrink from these consequences may fall back upon two methods of escape; *—(a) They may say that circumstances are changed, that the rigour and the penalty were needed for the education of the Jews, but are not needed for us; that we must look to the ends which the law contemplated, and be true, not to its letter, but to its spirit. But this is to shift the whole ground. The moment you talk of "circumstances," and "temporary necessities," and "looking to the spirit," you cease to be interpreting a statute. You treat the law as obsolete or repealed, and assume that you have some knowledge of the intentions of the law-giver, and are able to approximate to what he meant in a law which is no longer applicable. It may be that you have; but then the question is, as I said, altered. You cannot press on others the very letter which you have set aside. You must look to other evidence than the commandment itself of what is the mind and will of God. You must have recourse either to general principles of ethics, or to some special, and, if it may be, Divine authority. (b) It may be contended that that authority is not far to seek. "The teaching of Christ," it is said, "at once sanctions and modifies, treats the Sabbath as of binding obligation, 'made for man,' but leaves it open to 'do good' on the Sabbath day, to save the life of man or beast, to heal the sick by supernatural power, and, by parity of reasoning, to attempt to heal by ordinary skill. He manifests Himself as the Lord of the Sabbath, and, with a dispensing power, at once interprets and confirms." I need not say that I look upon our Lord's teaching,

* The Puritans of the seventeenth century did *not* shrink from conclusions such as these. Shaving, walking in a garden, cooking victuals, a mother's kissing her child, were placed by the Pilgrim Fathers of New England under the same anathema. (Hessey, "Bampton Lectures," p. 465.) Men were found to maintain that a man might as well cut his child's throat as play bowls on a Sunday. Who was to say that one Divine command was more binding than another? (Collier, "Church History," vii. 182.)

by word and act, in relation to the Sabbath as of infinite importance. I shall return to it by-and-bye. What I wish to note here is, that while there is an immense unveiling and discovery of the truth in it, if we take His words as substituting in this, as in other things, a principle for a precept,—the starting-point of new applications of a law which does not depend upon the written statute,—they go but a little way if we treat them simply as comments or riders to a statute which continues in full, unabated force. They do not, in their letter, take away the penalty or the strictness except in the specified instances. They sanction works which are directly connected with worship, or with the relief of pain, or with the preservation of life. They leave the lighting the fire, or the gathering of sticks, still under the old condemnation.

(2.) It remains then to ask, what are the grounds on which the supposed obligation rests; and this leads to an historical inquiry.

2. The Sabbath of the Patriarchs.

I am reluctant to enter upon the vexed question of the existence of a Sabbath, with or without a definite law, prior to the Exodus. Where the facts are so few, we need be on our guard against losing our way in the cloudland of conjectures. The chief points seem these :—(1.) There is no trace of such a law in the paradise state of Gen. ii. and iii. The one command which constitutes the trial of Adam is that which forbids him to eat of the fruit of “the tree of knowledge of good and evil.” It is hardly conceivable, if such a command had been given, that it should have remained without a record. It does not enter into the history of the Fall. There is nothing to show even that the Divine Sabbath was revealed to the new-created man. (2.) There is a like negative argument in the history of Noah. Law becomes wider, takes in more sins, and therefore more duties; but this is not among them, and was never reckoned by the Jews as among the precepts given to him (Gen. ix. 1—7). The bow in the cloud, not the Sabbath, was the sign of the covenant then. So in like manner, circumcision, not the Sabbath, was given to Abraham as the sign of the covenant with him (Gen. xvii. 9). There are, on the other hand, it may be allowed, traces of a special sacredness in the number seven (Gen. vii. 3; xxix. 18), traces of an hebdomadal division of time (Gen. vii. 4, 10; viii. 12; xxix. 27), which imply probably *some* observance of one day in seven; and it is possible (but we cannot say more than this) that the observance consisted in some kind of rest, with or without sacrifice.* (3.) At the time of the Exodus, and *before*

* The number seven was throughout, in the symbolism both of Israel and many other ancient nations, the representative of the union between God and man, the harmony of the Creator and the creature, and the Sabbath is but one of a whole series of septenary

the delivery of the law, the *name* appears for the first time, but the mode in which it is brought in suggests that the hebdomadal division of time was already known, and that the seventh day was already in some sort observed, though not with the strictness which was then enjoined (Exod. xvi. 4). At first no reason is given. The command is simply positive. It is illustrated and enforced by the cessation of the manna. It was binding as a positive law upon the Israelites then, but there is so far nothing to show that it had been binding upon them previously, still less to show that it was binding upon mankind at large.

3. The Sabbath of the Law.

The proclamation of the law from Sinai placed it on a new footing. It took its place, not among ritual and ceremonial laws, but side by side with others which all men recognise as essentially moral, and therefore universal. It may legitimately be inferred from this that it was as necessary for them as the moral laws themselves. But it does not follow that it was as universally binding as the laws which the conscience of all men recognises. The distinction between moral, and positive or ceremonial law is that of a later age and higher ethical culture. The Israelites could not and did not draw it at the time of the Exodus. For them all duties were so far alike, all resting on distinct commands, and sanctioned by distinct penalties. We cannot go further than the probability, from its position, that it would be seen one day either to be altogether moral, or to have in it a moral element. The reasons assigned for the Sabbath are various. (1.) It commemorates the Divine rest, and that rest is held forth as an archetype or pattern which men ought to reproduce, the implied principle being that human life should be in conformity with the life and being of God (Exod. xx. 11). (2.) It appeals to their experience of suffering and their sense of sympathy. They have known the bitterness of ceaseless toil when they were slaves in a strange land, and are therefore not only to rest themselves, but to concede rest to their slaves, and the strangers that dwelt with them (Exod. xxiii. 12; Deut. v. 15). (3.) It is a sign of God's covenant with them (Ezek. xx. 12), as circumcision was of His covenant with Abraham, a token of their being a peculiar and separate people. Of these reasons it is clear that the first is the only one which had any character of universality. The last actually excludes it. The only permanent obligation

combinations with this significance. (See Bähr's "Symbolik," i. 187, and ii. 577.). Ewald rightly rejects, with some scorn, the theory of Baur and Von Bohlen, that the Jewish Sabbath rose out of the worship of the planet Saturn, to whom the day was dedicated ("Alterthümer," p. 106); but starts a theory of his own, that the primary idea of the day was that of a *sacrifice*, a renunciation of the profits of labour.

involved in the second is that of extending, to the poorest and most alien, some share of whatever blessings we enjoy ourselves. The principle of the first is separable, and has, by a later oracle of God, been actually separated, from the letter. "God rests; therefore man should rest." But as there is a Divine activity which does not break in upon the rest of the eternal Sabbath (John v. 17), so there may be a human activity, human work, compatible with the principle of a weekly Sabbath, and the question is once more removed from the mere casuistry which defines "work" as a word occurring in a statute, to the wider issue of what is so compatible.

4. The Sabbath of the Prophets.

The history of the period between the Exodus and the monarchy presents, as might be expected, little trace of sabbatical observance. No provision had been made by the law for connecting it with religious acts; and though it is probable enough that it was recognised as a day of rest, the frequent subjugation of Israel, their as frequent apostasy, their adoption of the customs of their neighbours, must have been incompatible with any rigorous obedience, even in that aspect of the law. With the prophets from Samuel onwards a new and better order of things commenced. They, in their schools, colleges, monasteries (the latter word, perhaps, conveys a better notion of their life than any other), saw that the Sabbath rest never could be all that it ought to be unless it were more than rest. They seized on this and on the new-moon festival as instruments for the religious education of the people. They journeyed through the country, stopping at fixed resting-places, and gathered men and women round them (2 Kings iv. 23). In this we may find the first starting-point of what was afterwards developed into the system of the synagogues, and the remote source therefore of the worship of Christian churches, which was based upon that system. They brought new powers of song, and new skill in music, as helps to its observance. Special psalms were written for use on both the days (Psa. lxxxi. ; xcii.). It was welcomed by the poor, and by many, at least, of the rich. It became "a delight, holy to the Lord, honourable." As such the prophets became its zealous guardians and protectors. It was part of their work, as assertors of the rights of the poor, to vindicate their claim to it against the luxury and tyranny of the rich. The greatest of the prophets, the most earnest in all denunciations of mere ritualism, in proclaiming that "even new moons and Sabbaths" (Isa. i. 13) may become an abomination, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, felt that they could not spare the help which the Sabbath gave them (Isa. lvi. 2—6; lviii. 13, 14; Jer. xvii. 19—27; Ezek. xx. 12, 13). It was for the poor and needy, the stranger and the slave, in relation to their

time, what the right of gleaning was in relation to the land. It bore witness that the wealthier and dominant class was to leave them something that they might call their own. The Sabbath became an "abomination," because those who affected to keep it spoiled the poor and wronged the fatherless and the widow. The tendency of the later years of the monarchy was to substitute fasts for Sabbaths, days of penance for days of rejoicing, and Isaiah bore his witness against this, partly because men fasted "for strife and debate," partly because while they, the ostentatiously devout, were "bowing their head as a bulrush," they "exacted all their labours," and called this "an acceptable day to the Lord" (Isa. lviii. 1—7, 13, 14). What was needed was to restore the regularity and joy of the Sabbath to its old prominence, instead of introducing new, uncommanded fast-days, which were a burden and an hypocrisy. Those, it may be noticed, whom Jeremiah charges with the guilt of Sabbath-breaking are the noble and the rich (Jer. xvii. 12). Among those who were most zealous for its honour were the eunuchs and the sons of the stranger, the foreign proselytes of the king's court (Isa. lvi. 3—5).

5. The Sabbath of the Scribes.

After the return from the captivity the old conflict was resumed. On the one side there was the trading, wealthy class, with its old impatience of anything that checked the perpetual accumulation of their riches. On the other, as in the history of Nehemiah, the zeal of the truest reformers and best friends of the people led them to maintain the holiness of the Sabbath against the "nobles of Judah," who were violating it (Neh. xiii. 15—22). This was done partly, we cannot doubt, from the same motives which led Nehemiah to protest against the usury and exaction of the same class (v. 1—13); partly, also, from the feeling that the Sabbath was a sign of the covenant (Ezek. xx. 12, 20), needed to keep up the distinctness of the Jews as a separate people. But the evil which afterwards reached so terrible a height was already beginning to show itself. Though not bearing directly upon the Sabbath, the words of Zechariah and Malachi bear their testimony against the tendency to substitute fasts, festivals, days of penance, for days of refreshing. The former looks forward, with a delight in the spontaneous joy of youth which religious teachers have so often lacked, to the time when "boys and girls should be playing in the streets of Jerusalem," and the fast-days should become "cheerful feasts" (Zech. ix. 4). The latter complains that the priests of his time were rendering their worship offensive, both to man and God, by losing the element of joy, and "covering the altar of the Lord with tears, with weeping, and with crying out" (Mal. ii. 13). These protests were, however, in vain. The age of prophets passed

away, and the age of scribes succeeded, and with it came the multiplied comments, the subtle casuistry, the traditions of the elders, which have made the name of scribe a proverb and a reproach. This was, perhaps, due in part to the political position of the people. Reduced to the position of a Persian province, governed by a Persian satrap, with no country they could call their own to fight for and defend, their intellect turned in upon itself with a diseased activity, and became fruitful in evil. It was natural at such a time that they should lay stress on what gave them a distinctive badge of nationality, and the Sabbath served this end so well that it rose into greater and greater prominence. When the people were called, under the Maccabees, to their contest with the idolatry of Syria, they began with a strictness which had been unknown during their whole previous history, from their departure from Egypt to the destruction of Jerusalem, and refused to defend themselves against their enemies on the sabbath day (1 Macc. ii. 38). The experience of a single campaign was of course enough to break down a superstition which would have left them naked to their enemies, to be massacred without resistance (1 Macc. ii. 40, 41), and the casuists noted this as an exception. They could hardly refuse to extend it to other cases where life was endangered, and so far they recognised the principle (to put it in their own words) that "the Sabbath was delivered into the hand of man, and not man into the hand of the Sabbath." They were compelled, by a like necessity, to look on the work of the priests and Levites and Nethlinim in the temple as another exception, for "the temple knew no Sabbath."* But with these reserved cases, which, of course, did not touch the great mass of the labouring poor, they went on, as they thought, "setting a fence round the law," hedging it up, in reality, with thorns and briars, setting snares and nets for men's consciences. They drew out their multitudinous lists of prohibited employments, which, beginning with ploughing, reaping, baking, descended to tying or untying a knot, writing or erasing two letters of the alphabet, even holding the ink while a publican made out his account, tossing nuts and almonds in play, or climbing up a tree.† But as is usual with casuists of this class, while they laid heavy burdens, and grievous to be borne, on other men's shoulders, they left their own free. They put on white garments and took warm baths on Friday, made the Sabbath a day of feasting, and invited their friends and neighbours to crowded dinners, which became proverbial for their luxury.‡ Their meals could be

* Comp. Schoettgen, "Hor. Hebr.," and Nork, "Rabbinische Parallelen," on Matt. xii. 1-13.

† *Ibid.*

‡ It is remarkable, as throwing light either on the religious customs of the Israelites in the time of Amos, or on those of the later Jews, that the Septuagint translation of that prophet sees in the picture of selfish sloth and luxury, in vi. 3-6, the keeping of a "false Sabbath."

cooked, their charcoal fires lighted (if the time of the year required them), before the Sabbath began. All their censure, their excommunication, their penalties, fell on the poor man who on that day kneaded his cake of meal, or lit his scanty fire, or plucked fruit or ears of corn to satisfy his hunger. Even before the teaching of our Lord there had been a protest against this tyranny. While the school of Shammai, not content with their thirty-nine specified prohibitions, and all the cases that might come under them, went on to add (1) every act which, beginning before the Sabbath, might continue in operation during it; and (2) such acts as distributing alms in the synagogue, instructing children, or visiting the sick and afflicted; that of Hillel maintained that these were true sabbatic acts; that it was lawful to heal the sick, even though life was not in danger, and all that the patient had to endure through delay would have been a prolongation of his pain.

6. The Sabbath of Christ.

Such was the state of feeling, such the received practices of the Jews, when our Lord began His ministry. We have, as constituting the most essential element of the whole question, to note both His action and His teaching respecting them. (1.) It appears plain that He accepted the religious order of the day; attended the synagogue services; read, when called upon, the appointed lessons; taught the people as a Rabbi. But it is not less clear that He accepted also its social aspect. He entered into the house of one of the chief Pharisees (probably one of the Hillel school, who looked on our Lord's teaching with a certain measure of approval) to eat bread on the Sabbath day (Luke xiv. 1), though the banquet-room was crowded with guests struggling for precedence. He led his disciples through cornfields, and did not forbid their plucking the ears of corn, and rubbing them in their hands (Matt. xii. 1; Mark ii. 23; Luke vi. 1), though the casuistry of the Scribes would have forbidden the latter acts as tantamount to reaping and threshing; and the former could hardly fail to involve a longer walk than the Sabbath-day's journey, which the Scribes defined as the limit of permissible exercise. By repeated acts of supernatural power He affirmed the truth for which the school of Hillel concluded—that it was lawful to do good on the Sabbath day. The hypocrisy of the school of Shammai was the one thing that stirred His righteous anger. He looked round with indignant sorrow, being grieved at the hardness of their hearts (Mark iii. 8). Everywhere,—in the synagogues, confronting local prejudices; in the temple at Jerusalem, facing the power of the Sanhedrim,—He exposed Himself to the charge of being a Sabbath-breaker (John v. 10, 16; vii. 23). (2.) But His teaching must have been even more

startling than His acts. He was not content to rest on any tradition of the schools, even though it might make in His favour, but went back to the ground and principle of the law,—“The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath” (Mark ii. 27). It was a means, and not an end: worth nothing unless it conduced to the end,—man’s welfare, man’s refreshment, in body, mind, and spirit. “Therefore the Son of man is Lord also of the Sabbath” (Mark ii. 28). Because He was the Son of man, the representative and brother of all men, knowing their wants and infirmities, He was supreme over the great commandment itself, and proclaimed the truth that man’s welfare was of higher and more permanent importance than any positive enactment. The case of the Sabbath came under the wide range of words which few Scribes would have dreamt of connecting with it—“I will have mercy and not sacrifice” (Matt. xii. 7). The temple of man’s nature, with which He had clothed Himself, had a higher sanctity than that which was the glory of Jerusalem (Matt. xii. 7). It followed, as soon as men learned to think of their bodies as the temples of the living God, that that which ministered to it as such was as little a profanation of the Sabbath as the services of the priests and Levites in the temple (Matt. xii. 6). By laying stress on the letter, and interpreting it rigorously for others, while they were lenient to themselves, they entangled themselves in endless contradictions. They led their ox and ass to water (Luke xiii. 15). They pulled their cattle out of pits (Matt. xii. 11). They circumcised a man on the Sabbath day (John vii. 22). They laid stress on Sabbath-breaking, not because they themselves kept the Sabbath with a literal exactness, but because it was a convenient charge to fling against a teacher whom they hated (Luke xiii. 15). So the character of the command for all the disciples of the New Teacher was altered with a change which, to the Scribes and doctors, must have seemed little short of revolutionary. The true stamp of the Sabbath was to be rest, refreshment, joy. Whatever tended to these ends, without involving the enforced labour of others, or giving to the joy the stamp of sensuous evil, was permissible and right. (3.) Hardly less significant than the positive was the negative side of His teaching. There is no mention of the Sabbath in either St. Matthew’s or St. Luke’s report of the Sermon on the Mount. He never mentions it, as many a Scribe would have done, when He is asked which were the great commandments of the Law (Mark xii. 29, 30). In His answer to the question of the young ruler, whom He had told to keep the commandments, and who asked Him which, He mentions all duties towards man, but not this of keeping the Sabbath holy (Mark x. 19). Without formally repeating, while in act recognising, the moral element, and, as it were, idea of the law, He tacitly allows the latter to

slip into the background of duties. It already takes its place in His teaching among the things that "are decaying, and waxing old, and are ready to vanish away."

7. The Sabbath of the Apostles.

The disciples followed naturally in the steps of their Master. They were Jews, and the framework of Judaism still stood, and they observed the seventh day as they did the temple hours of prayer, and the two weekly fasts, and the cycle of annual festivals. But they observed it, we must believe, as their Master had taught them to do, freely, and without bondage; distributing to the poor, visiting the sick, holding their common meals, their *Agapæ*, or feasts of charity, upon it. The special command which they had received from their Master connected itself naturally enough with a standing custom of the synagogues of Palestine. There, as the Sabbath sun was setting, *at the commencement therefore of the first day*, it was customary, both in the synagogues and private houses, for bread and wine to be passed round, as a farewell to the Sabbath, the grace-cup of the departing king; and over both was uttered a special formula of benediction.* When the members of the new society were compelled, as persecution must soon have compelled them, to withdraw from Hebrew and Hellenistic synagogues, and to have meetings of their own, they carried with them this custom, and met on the first day of the week, the evening of the Sabbath, for what was at once their chief meal of the day, and the "Supper of the Lord." Round it were gathered acts of mercy, hymns and prayers, teaching and exhortation. Such was the life of the Church of the circumcision;—Jewish, and not yet authorized to fling aside any Jewish custom. But from first to last there is not the slightest trace of any extension of the law of the Sabbath to the Gentile converts. It would obviously have been a greater stumbling-block than circumcision itself—exposing every Christian slave or artisan to scourging or fines—every Christian soldier to imprisonment or death. Had it been imposed, it would, from the very first, have been the great point of accusation in the hands of all opponents of the Gospel. An attempt was made to thrust circumcision on the Gentiles, and to compel them to keep the law of Moses, including, of course, the Sabbath (Acts xv. 5), and it was firmly and successfully resisted. In the great charter of the heathen Church, other conditions, most of them ceremonial, named with a view, not to ethical principles, but to the avoidance of offence, were specified; but this found no place in it (Acts xv. 20). It is quite inconceivable that it should have been omitted at that critical emergency, if the apostles had held that what was a sign of God's covenant with Israel was to

* See Jost., "Geschichte des Judenthums," i., p. 180.

be extended, in its rigour, to mankind—that the Fourth Commandment, as such, was binding upon the whole Church. Soon we find the conviction that it was no longer binding on the Jew. St. Paul, as being a Jew to the Jews, would doubtless keep it (keep, *i. e.*, the seventh day's rest), when he was staying in the house of a son of Abraham; but as being a Greek to the Greeks, without law to those that were without law (1 Cor. ix. 21), we can hardly think of him, if staying with a Gentile family, as observing a rigorous Sabbath, either on the seventh or first day, whilst they were working, or going on with the usual order of their lives. When he heard that the Galatian converts were "observing days" in consequence of their subjugation to the Judaizing teachers (Gal. iv. 10), he is afraid that they have fallen from grace. When he writes to the Colossians, it is to warn them to allow no man to sit in judgment, and pass sentence on them, "in respect of a new moon or Sabbath" (Col. ii. 16). More significant still is the absence of any single exhortation bearing upon this point in the whole series of his epistles. Collections for the poor are to be made on the first day of the week (1 Cor. xvi. 2); but there is no precept to observe either that or the seventh with a Sabbath rigour. Among the manifold irregularities of the churches of Corinth and Thessalonica, that of neglecting Sabbaths finds no place, and yet it is indefinitely probable that most of the converts were, from their social position, unable even had they been willing to keep it, unwilling even if they had been able. At Rome, where there were many converts of a wealthier class, and where Jewish influence was strong, there were some who regarded it, or some other day, with a special reverence (Rom. xiv. 5), others who disregarded it, without, as it would seem, substituting any other in its place. How does the Apostle deal with them? Does he assert the binding force of the ordinance—impress the commandment on them? No; far otherwise. He deals with it as he does with the question of clean and unclean meats, with that of total abstinence from wine or flesh. The scrupulous are not to condemn the strong; the strong are not to despise the weak. His own convictions are clearly with the stronger, but his sympathy and tenderness go out towards those who are more sensitive than himself. The Sabbath-keeping which "remains for the people of God" (Heb. iv. 9) is not the recurrence of a weekly festival, but the resting from our own vain and unquiet works, and passing into the tranquillity of the Divine life. "My Father worketh hitherto, and I also work," was to find its analogue in the life of the disciples.*

* My present limits do not allow me to enter into any history of the exegesis of the passages I have here referred to. Students will know that there is, to say the least, ample authority for every interpretation given.

8. The Lord's Day.

The hypotheses that the apostles, acting with a Divine commission, either transferred the obligation of the Fourth Commandment from the seventh day to the first, or solemnly appointed the latter as the great Christian weekly feast-day,* and assigned it a special though not identical honour, have, naturally enough, found many advocates. Of any such decree, however, Scripture makes no mention. There is no trustworthy evidence of its existence in early ecclesiastical writers, and we have no warrant for imagining a fictitious cause, and that one which, if it were real, would be of such unspeakable importance, where a simple and natural explanation lies close at hand. The early believers met, as we have seen, on the evening of Saturday, for the Lord's Supper. To a Jew (and Jews, or Gentiles who had become proselytes to Judaism, and were familiar with Jewish modes of reckoning, formed the nucleus of nearly every church), a meeting on the *evening* of Sunday would have been on the second day of the week, not the first. Gradually the disorders which crept in at Corinth and elsewhere made a change necessary. Men were to take their meal at home, so as not to come with the voracity of hunger. So, step by step, passing, as at Troas, through a midnight service (Acts xx. 7), the Supper of the Lord crept on from what we should call the evening of the seventh day to the early morning of the first,† and so ceased to be a supper in reality. And then it is that we find the special adjective which St. Paul seems to have coined to describe it (*κυριακός*, 1 Cor. xi. 20) transferred to the day, probably by St. John in the Apocalypse (i. 10), certainly in the language of very early Christian writers.‡ By a singular train of consequences, that which had started as, in part at least, receiving its holiness from one day, now imparted a consecrated character to another. Thenceforth the Lord's day was recognised through all the churches of the East and West as a day for joy,—for rest also, where rest was possible,—for works of kindness, and Divine service, and, above all, for sharing in the great act of worship which gave the day its name.§ Here the Church, with a wonderful consent—far more impressive, it seems to me, and far more authoritative, than any formal decree of the apostles could have been, found what met her wants,—the moral element of the Sabbath, and its power to edify or tranquillize, without its rigour—the joy without

* The first of these positions is that commonly maintained by teachers who rest the observance of the Lord's day on the Fourth Commandment; the second is that advocated by Dr. Hessey.

† So in Pliny, Ep. 96, "They were wont to meet on a given day before dawn." *

‡ See the interesting collection of passages in Suicer's "Thesaurus."

§ "Diem Solis lætitiæ indulgemus" (Tertull., "Apol.," c. 16); "jejunium nefas ducimus" ("De Cor.," c. 3); "differentes etiam negotia" ("De Orat.," c. 13).

the severity. There was no handle for harsh judgments, or the minute precision of casuists. The degree in which it was to be observed varied with the circumstances of each church, or town, or household.

As there is no reason for believing that the Lord's day was established by a formal decree, so neither is there any for supposing a formal abrogation of the Sabbath. Like many a time-honoured institution, like other elements of Judaism, it was suffered to die, as it were, a natural death. For a long time, in many churches, and in very varying ways, it still continued to be recognised—sometimes as a feast, sometimes as a fast,—side by side with the Lord's day, though in no case kept with the old Jewish rigour. During the long struggle with the heathenism of the Empire a full observance of either was obviously impracticable. Men who were mixed up officially, commercially, and otherwise, as slaves, soldiers, senators, with their fellow-countrymen, could not have abstained from the routine duties of their station. We never hear of their refusing work on this ground, as we hear of their refusing to wear the garlands, or burn the incense, which connected them with idolatry. When Constantine's decree came out (A.D. 321), making the first day of the week a holiday as regarded most legal proceedings (the manumission of slaves was still permitted) and the labour of artisans in towns, leaving husbandry, ploughing, sowing, planting vines, still lawful, it was with no reference to the Fourth Commandment. It corresponded rather to the transition period of his life, when he was yet halting between two opinions, and he sought by it, on the one hand, to gain the favour of his Christian subjects by recognising the day which they held in honour, and, on the other, to conciliate those who were heathens by another holiday on what was also *Dies Solis*, consecrated to Apollo, the Sun-god, whom Constantine at one time was disposed to look upon as his guardian deity.* When the Council of Laodicea (A.D. 370) followed this up, it was by anathematizing those who kept the Jewish Sabbath, ordering men to hold the Lord's day in honour, and to "rest

* Comp. Euseb., "Vita Const.," iv., c. xviii.—xx. In the law, the day is called *Dies Solis*, not *Dominicus*. On this day the Christian soldiers were to go to church, the heathen were to meet in a field and utter a prayer which the Emperor composed for them. One fact, less generally noticed, is significant enough. Side by side with the law in question was another edict authorizing *markets* to be held on Sunday. The septenary computation by weeks taking the place of the old nonary reckoning of the Roman Calendar, the Sunday was substituted for, or, perhaps, added to the old *nundinæ*. The rougher work of the peasant was to stop, that he might go to the nearest town, get what goods he wanted, be civilized and taught. The practice was afterwards attacked by Charlemagne, but ineffectually (Gruter, "Inscript.," cxliv., quoted by J. C. Hare, in "Philological Museum," i., p. 29). It is clear that such a law would not have been issued by a newly converted Emperor, if the feeling of the Church, which he was anxious to conciliate, had identified the Sunday and the Sabbath.

from labour *if they could*" (Can. xxix.)—hardly the language of men who were enforcing the duty as part of a Decalogue still, as such, binding. The observance became more rigid, it is true, afterwards. Labours of all kinds, agricultural or otherwise, were forbidden; but it was not till the fifth or sixth century, and then not by any action or decree of the universal Church, but only by edicts of Leo the Great (*circa* 457), and by the canons of the provincial churches of Gaul, Auxerre, Mascon, and Orleans.* The honour paid to the Lord's day, even in these cases, however, was never rested on its identification with the Sabbath, and the Council of Orleans expressly recognised the lawfulness of travelling. As knowledge became less clear and superstition more dominant, and in the laws of nations as barbarous as the Israelites were when they settled in Canaan, and needing, as it might have seemed to ecclesiastical rulers, a like discipline, we first find traces of that identification. The period which we commonly think of as the darkest of the dark ages was conspicuous for what we now know as a rigid sabbatarianism.†

9. The Sabbath of the Reformers.

The conclusions which follow naturally from these facts may seem to many men startling and hazardous. Those who think them so may at least be reminded (unwilling as I am to let the question turn at all upon the authority of any names, however venerable) that they are not the principles only of high Anglican divines of the Laudian school, though, doubtless, they would have endorsed them as with one consent, nor of later so-called Neologians, whose advocacy might seem to many a presumptive evidence of error. I have learnt them from the great fathers of the European Reformation. Luther held that the apostles had changed the day, not to transfer the obligation, but to set men free from the yoke of Judaism;‡ that all days were in themselves equal, and that the Lord's day rests on grounds of order, utility, and the precept of the Church. Calvin taught that our Lord's recognition of the Sabbath day was but as an *argumentum ex concessis*, preparing the way for the abrogation of the law which enjoined it, proclaimed by St. Paul; and that the observance of the Lord's day was maintained as a remedial measure, part of a Christian polity.§ In practice he is reported to have joined the citizens of Geneva at their public recreations, bowling and shooting, on the Lord's day.|| Rogers, in

* Bingham, b. xx., c. 2.

† Hessey, "Bampton Lectures," pp. 119 and 120, and notes.

‡ Comment. on Gal. iv. 10, i. 404 (Ed. 1579).

§ Comm. on Matt. xii. 1; Gal. iv. 10; Col. ii. 16. ("Instit. Christ.," viii., 31.) See also the "Catechism of Geneva" on the Fourth Commandment. Bengel throughout takes the same view.

|| Bramhall, "Vindic. of Grotius," ii. 3, c. 9.

the notes to Matthew's Bible, which Cranmer sanctioned, maintained that there might be occasions "turning men's rest into occupation and labour."* Tyndal, the patriarch of English Reformers, the first in the line of English translators of the Bible of the sixteenth century, was even bolder, and asserted that a Christian Church or State might even appoint one day in five or ten, and that with just such a measure of observance as might be deemed expedient for the spiritual instruction of the people.† If the English Reformers, in their panic dread of Antinomianism, were led to take the unparalleled step of beginning their Communion Service with the Decalogue, and so to sanction apparently a different doctrine, they yet, on the other hand, carefully abstained in their Catechism from laying any stress on the observance of the Sabbath as such, not even mentioning it in the duty of man towards God; proclaimed that Christian men were bound only by "the Commandments that were called moral;" and did not settle where the boundary line was to be drawn when moral and positive elements were intermingled in the same law.‡ It was not till the Second Book of Homilies ("Of the time and place of prayer"), when the crying abuses of licence and profligacy on the Lord's day had brought scandal on the English Church, that any distinct connection between it and the Sabbath law was asserted.

One is led naturally to ask how it was that the later Reformers, the Puritans in England and the Covenanters in Scotland, came to maintain a principle diametrically opposed to that of those whom they professed to follow, and to assert, as in the Westminster Confession of Faith, and the Larger and Shorter Catechisms,§ that the obligation of the Lord's day rests on the Fourth Commandment. The answer, I think, is not far to seek, and it is found in the shameless licence of English society under Elizabeth,|| and the measures taken by the English Court under James and Charles, by the advice of, or without remonstrance from, the bishops. When the afternoon of Sunday was given up to the bear-baitings of a brutal populace, or the licentious masques and yet more licentious plays of a higher but not less profligate class, and this under the direct patronage of the Sovereign:¶ when the "Book of Sports" was tyrannically thrust, with-

* Comm. on Jer. xvii.

† Works, iii., p. 97 (Ed. Parker Soc.)

‡ Art. vii. It is worthy of notice that the language of nearly all the Articles and Injunctions issued under Elizabeth practically places Sundays and holidays on the same footing.

§ It is from this identification, apparently, that the practice has grown up, all but utterly unknown through the previous seventeen centuries of Christendom, of speaking of the Lord's day, not only as having a sabbatic character, but as being itself "the Sabbath." It is so spoken of, however, in the Homily already referred to.

|| "Second Book of Homilies," *as above*.

¶ See for bear-baiting, Haweis's "Sketches of the Reformation," p. 155; and for theatres, Prynne's "Histrio-Mastix," pp. 363, 437, 441, 470. During great part of the reign of Elizabeth, it was the *one* day on which many theatres were licensed to be opened

out even a conscience clause, upon clergy and laity, many of whom looked upon all recreation as unlawful: it was no wonder that the Puritan party should seize on what seemed to them the most effective weapon, and convince themselves that they were fighting not only for truth, and purity, and order, as indeed they were, but for a distinct, unchangeable, Divine law.* I cannot but honour them for the protest they thus bore against evils which the Laudian divines never did check,† and apparently never tried to check, as I honour them for their protest against the dramatic literature of the time, foul as it was with the foulness of Aristophanes, and vile with the vileness of a brothel. But for the Puritan element in England, the whole life of the country would have been tainted irrecoverably. It was the suppression of a like element in France, first by the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, and then by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, that brought about the corruption which ended in the fire-baptism of the Revolution—a baptism, one is compelled to add, as yet without a regeneration. I am far from thinking that even the Jewish form which the Sabbath observance of the Lord's day assumed in Scotland has been without a great preponderance of good; and, in spite of its theoretical defectiveness, it was perhaps the condition without which the good could not have been obtained. It has done in the education of Scotchmen what it did in the education of Israelites—has preserved their distinctness, their nationality, their sense of reverence for home life and home worship. Any attempt to revolutionize its observance in Scotland would be a fatal breach of the historical continuity of the national life, and a wilful abandonment of what has proved itself a blessing. But it can scarcely be denied that it has also reproduced, in part at least, the evils of Judaism; that it has been allowed to overshadow the weightier matters of the law—has been turned too often into an occasion for harsh judgments of other men and other

(Gosson, "School of Abuse," 1579). It was *the* day on which the prostitutes of London flocked to them in largest numbers, as being surest of custom. An attempt was made under Elizabeth (A.D. 1580) to check "heathenish plays" in the city; but they took refuge on the Bankside of the river in Southwark. Even the itinerant preachers sent out by Archbishop Parker were conspicuous for going, after their sermons were over, "to tabling, carding, shooting, and bowling" (Haweis's "Sketches," p. 101).

* The new Judaic theory, however, was not allowed to pass without a protest,—on the one hand, from Heylyn, who had been Laud's chaplain, in his "History of the Sabbath," and on the other, from one who had passed beyond Laudianism and Puritanism into a higher region. The case against the view that the Jewish law of the Sabbath is still binding can hardly be found better stated than by John Milton ("Christian Doctrine," c. vii.). He speaks strongly, however, against the "licentious remissness" of Charles I.'s "Sunday theatre" ("Eiconoclast," c. 2).

† Bramhall's somewhat supercilious approval of village dances for "that under sort of people" (*l. c.*) could hardly have been compatible with any strong protest against the dancing and gaming of the upper sort of people in kings' palaces.

nations—has been made more oppressive to the poor than to the rich—has been separated from the idea of refreshment and rejoicing—has been made a weariness and a burden by the endeavour to enforce an impracticable ideal.

10. The Sunday League.

A few words yet remain to be said on what is at present the special English question connected with this controversy. For some years past there has been, it is well known, an association assuming the title of the National Sunday League. How far that title is justified by the magnitude of its operations (the total number of subscribers to the funds for 1865 was 139, and the total amount subscribed £188 16s. 6d., while the sale of its pamphlets had produced the great total of 2s. 4d.), and how far the meeting lately held at St. Martin's Hall may be taken as a repudiation of its claim to represent them, on the part of a large section of the London operatives, are questions on which I shall not now enter. I confine myself to what it has already done, and what it contemplates in the future. It aims, then, generally, at enlarging the range of Sunday relaxation. It has achieved one victory in the establishment of Sunday bands in the London parks, with the sanction of the Chief Commissioner of Woods and Forests. It is now struggling hard to obtain another by pressing Government and Parliament to authorize the opening of public museums, picture galleries, and libraries on Sunday afternoons. The memorial which it presented to the Queen with this prayer, in 1860, was signed by not less than 943 persons more or less eminent in art, science, and literature, including Sir John Herschel, Richard Owen, Thomas Hughes, now M. P. for Lambeth, Charles Dickens, Professor Nicholl of Glasgow, Sir Charles Lyell, Professor Jowett, nearly the whole body of Royal Academicians, and many well-known "men of letters." I have no wish to shirk the responsibility of stating distinctly what position I occupy in relation to this movement. (1.) I look on the opening of our public parks and gardens as a great gain, and cannot object (if the employers of the labour required for locomotion make arrangements to secure partial or alternate rest for those whom they employ) to the omnibus, or steamboat, or railway traffic, without which the boon would be, as regards the majority of the London poor, a mere nullity. I cannot, on the principle which I have here maintained, look on such acts as *Sabbath-breaking*, violations of the letter of a commandment which I regard as, in the letter, no longer binding. And it is, I believe, an evil that those who thus employ a portion of their Sunday should be rebuked and condemned, as they often are, as reckless and godless *Sabbath-breakers*. The sure result of the undiscerning zeal which multiplies these *ficta peccata* is that they lead to real ones. Being told that what they do is incom-

patible with any claim to a religious character, men make no effort to prove the compatibility. The evening walk becomes, not the complement of worship, but the substitute for it. Men and women go on to intemperance, or loose talking, or worse evil, with the sense that, being "in for a penny," they may as well be "in for a pound." Something of this may be traced in the statement, so often occurring, so often appealed to, in the confessions of criminals, that they can trace their first downward step in the path of guilt to the neglect of the Sabbath. Partly, it may be, they say this, because they find, with the peculiar acuteness of convicts, that it is what the prison chaplain expects them to say, and welcomes as the first sign of their amendment. Partly there may be something of the feeling which leads the drunkard to ascribe his morning headache to any cause rather than to the wine of the last night's debauch. With a subtle self-deceit, the convict turns from the act of dishonesty or lust, for which his conscience does accuse him, to the breach of a mere conventional law, where he does not feel it sting, and makes that the scapegoat. But partly also, it can hardly be doubted, the rapid fall was due to the harsh judgments of the few religious people he knew on what might have been blameless and legitimate. He was a "Sabbath-breaker," and so was left to consort with others like himself, worse than himself, with no purer influence to make the rest restful, and the recreation re-creative; and thus the one day which might have helped to raise him only plunged him deeper in the mire and clay.

(2.) I look with far less satisfaction on the Sunday bands. Admitting all that has been said as to the order and decorum of the crowds that flock to them; admitting also that, for many who attend, there may be a change for the better from what might have been their employment of their Sunday leisure, I am compelled to add that their effect, as a whole, seems to me evil rather than good. Precisely because I estimate highly the power of music as an instrument for moral and spiritual culture, and believe that its character has a real and lasting influence on that of nations and individual men, I must deplore the short-sighted kindness which, on the day that Christendom holds sacred with a holy joy, offers to the million music of the most secular and sensuous character, divorced from all high thoughts and noble words, ministering simply to amusement. I never see the crowds that are thus gathered without mourning over the great opportunity wasted; and there floats before me the vision of what might be, if Christendom should put forth its power of speech and song and music, and there, under the shadow of the trees and beneath the evening sky, call on men to rejoice and give thanks. Far off as the fulfilment of that dream may be, it would but be the application to the disorders of our own time of the methods by which Chrysostom met the falsehood and heresy of his. When the Arians drew multi-

tudes after them with stately processions and chants that caught the people's ear, he counteracted them with processions yet more stately, and hymns yet more popular. In the meantime we may at least strive (as has been done in our Metropolitan Abbey and Cathedral, and in many a parish church) to revive something of the beauty and power of Christian music, and so to make that great gift of God not only the utterance of souls already devout, but an instrument, in the Church's missionary work, for attracting and evangelizing the masses. As it is, seeing that the practice has been officially sanctioned for some years, and may plead a long-standing precedent elsewhere, it is wiser, I think, to trust to these counteracting influences, than to agitate with a view of putting a pressure from without on Government, and so suppressing them. Such a pressure, if it were to fail, would leave matters worse than they are; and if it were to succeed, would be the starting-point of a new and perilous phase of the controversy. We should purchase an outward Sabbath decorum at the price of an intense bitterness and irritation in the class which we ought most to endeavour to conciliate, and win over to the truth.

(3.) The opening of museums, galleries, public libraries on Sundays is, for England at least, still future, and it is the right and the duty of every man who acknowledges the importance of the change to weigh well its probable consequences, and not to shrink from declaring his conviction. Not without some reluctance, not without some pain at differing from so many of the foremost men of our time, I am constrained to say, that so far as my voice can have weight with any one, it must be given against the change. I admit the plausible case that may be made on the score of the humanizing effect of art and science, of the possibility of even higher than humanizing effects from the higher forms of each. I admit also that, as in the case of the Sunday bands, it might be for many the least of two evils. If the concession were to be made, though I should oppose it up to the last moment, I should not think it right to bring a railing accusation against our rulers as guilty of a national desecration, nor fling the charge of Sabbath-breaking and profaneness at those who availed themselves of it. But not the less should I regard it as a step downward and not upwards. (1.) It tends directly to a substitution of æsthetic for moral culture, and all experience shows that it never can be so substituted without a fatal deterioration. Practically, the morning's rest, and the dinner, and the museum, and the park, would swallow up the whole day, and leave no time, I will not say for the two religious services which the prescription of many centuries has recognised as a general standard, but even for one. The day so kept may still be a *Dies Solis*, but it will cease to be a *Dies Dominicus*. (2.) If there is the risk of cant on one side, the other is not free from it; and of all forms of cant and platitude, probably the most unreal and platitudinarian is that

which speaks of visits to museums and galleries as leading men directly to "reverence and love of the Deity."* Idle curiosity, vague gazing at new wonders, reference to catalogues to find out the name of an object or an artist—with the more intelligent, some eagerness to add to their stock of knowledge, these are there, and show themselves abundantly; but I desire more evidence than I have yet seen, as to there being any direct religious influence for good coming from such places. It must be added that, as a matter of fact, all art galleries contain, and, to be historically complete, must contain, samples of all schools of art, of what is sensuous and meretricious as well as that which is pure and refined. The Venus and the Madonna, the Satyr and the Saint, stand side by side together; and there is at least the risk that many among those who go there with coarse and prurient tastes may fasten on the former rather than the latter. The danger exists, it is true, at other times, but it is surely worse when it turns the day which might help to purify into a temptation to impurity of thought. (3.) I am not usually disposed to attach much weight to the "thin end of the wedge" argument, so often used by the opponents of any change in Church or State. But it is legitimate, in this instance, to ask where the principle on which it is proposed to act can consistently stop. Whatever may be said of the moral, humanizing effects of art and science, may be said, *à fortiori* almost, of music and poetry. If galleries are open, why not sanction concerts and public readings? At first, perhaps, they would be suggested with sacred music and serious poetry; but the history of all such movements (to say nothing of the recent experience of park music) shows that the limit is soon passed, and before long we should have promenade concerts, with nothing but waltzes and polkas, and Mr. Bellew might be engaged to read "Mrs. Caudle's Curtain Lectures," and "Bob Sawyer's Supper Party," on Sundays, as he now does on weekdays. If the principle, that whatever is a legitimate and improving relaxation on weekdays is legitimate also on the Lord's day, be recognised, those who claim that character for our theatres might make out a very plausible case for opening them also. If actors were willing to perform, and people willing to go, why should Government restrain their liberty in these self-regarding actions? Our greater softness of manners might save us from the atrocities of bull-baiting and cock-fighting, till we reach the stage where extremes meet, and effeminacy requires the stimulus of cruelty to rouse it as much as did the dulness of savagery; but in all other respects we should fall back into the licence of the Sundays of the Tudors and the Stuarts, of the half-pagan society of the Lower Empire, such as called out the penal edicts of Theodosius and Justinian. And then, if the disease were not fatal, the remedy would, in all likelihood, take the old shape. There would be once

* Sunday League's Petition to the Queen.

again a fierce, zealous, sabbatarian reaction—zealous with a true zeal for God, though not according to knowledge, and therefore in its turn tending once again to a violent oscillation to the extreme of licence.

(4.) On these grounds, then, I venture to think that those who have any influence on public opinion would do well to oppose instead of furthering the projected change, and that statesmen, so far as they profess to act on their own convictions, should weigh well the consequences, remote as well as near, of a step which may seem to promise a temporary good, and will certainly gain them a temporary popularity. If, as often happens, they profess to be only the exponents of public opinion, ready to sacrifice private feelings on this side or that, then I think they would do well to wait till that opinion presents itself in a much more authoritative and unmistakeable shape than it has yet assumed.

11. Present Duties.

What then is our duty, in Scotland and in England, in small things and great, in principle and practice, at the present moment? How ought we to speak and act? Disclaiming, as involving the very evil into which the Scribes and Pharisees fell, all attempt at a minute casuistry, I submit the following suggestions as pointing to what is now incumbent on us. (1.) Enough has been said, I think, to show the unprofitableness of a prolonged and fierce controversy on the abstract question. The case of those who rest the obligation of Sunday on the Sabbath law may seem to them strong, but it is at any rate debateable, and it is ill done to divide on that question those who would otherwise be able to act together in securing for the Lord's day the observance which nearly all Christians recognise as legitimate and necessary. (2.) We need to apply the rule which St. Paul laid down in reference to precisely the same controversy. The weak should not condemn the strong; the strong should not despise the weak. Mutual forbearance, respect, courtesy, the absence of whispers and scandals and insinuations, abstinence from the arts which have made theological controversies a by-word, these are conditions of any successful issue of this or any other discussion. I, for one, find much to admire in the courage of those who maintain what they hold to be a Divine law, in the face of an advancing tide of popular opinion; even more perhaps in that of one who risks the loss of position, influence, tranquillity, popularity, in the face of a great majority of his own order, and the opinion of thousands whom he esteems. I should shrink, whatever my convictions might be, from bandying to and fro the words "sabbatarianism" and "Sabbath-breaking." (3.) The rule for personal conduct must be that given of old, "Let every one be fully persuaded in his own mind;" "Let him judge himself, and not another." Those who recognise any religious duty at all in the matter must look to the end

for which the day exists, and, in their observance or non-observance of it, act as St. Paul has counselled. To make the former an instrument of restraint, suffering, weariness, to impose our special rules upon others who do not admit their authority; is so to observe the day as not to observe it "unto the Lord." To make freedom a cloak for licence, to crave only for more opportunities for the amusement of one class at the cost of another, or worse still, for more opportunities for mere money-making that benefits no class and injures many, is a non-observance *not* "unto the Lord."* Each man for himself is bound to strive to use the day for rest, refreshment, acts of kindness, renewal of the ties of friendship and household life, and in this to infringe, as little as may be, on the enjoyment by others of what he claims for himself. Each man is bound also to remember that the name which Christendom has given to the day implies a consecration, which makes it, not the substitute for the dedication of the life, but its representative and type. The rest must not be sloth, nor the refreshment merely sensuous, nor the self-culture merely intellectual and æsthetic. Acts of worship; communion with the Church, which represents the higher life, as well as fellowship with the mixed forms of social intercourse, which may so easily pass into the lower; growth in spiritual knowledge—these must be recognised as essential elements of the true character of the day. And what each man should do for himself that those who have wider influence should do for others. Employers of labour on a large scale are bound, at least to minimize the work, wherever it cannot be stopped altogether without the risk of an evil greater than the gain. The total prohibition of traffic by cabs, omnibuses, railways, cannot, I believe, be attempted without such a risk; and, being there, it is for the individual conscience to decide when there is a sufficient reason for making use of them. I will not condemn one neighbour for the act of so using; I will not condemn another because he permits his children to write letters to their relations, or the boys of his parish to refresh themselves with outdoor exercise or games. I will not revive the old Jewish figment of a Sabbath-day's journey, and say that a walk of two miles is permissible, but one of ten or twenty sinful. I can say to all that a Sunday in which there has been no joy, rest, peace, kindness, prayer, is a day wasted and misused; that to indulge ourselves in pleasure at the cost of making the whole day one of weary labour for others is a sin, not against the Fourth Commandment, but against the law of Christ. (4.) The question of legislative interference, or Government action without legislation, is one of far greater difficulty. The right of controlling unlimited freedom of action for the sake of public good is, of course, conceded; but the public good must be clear and demon-

* The phrase is taken from an admirable letter by the late Mr. Robertson of Brighton ("*Life and Letters*," ii. n. 114).

strable, the legislation must correspond to the feeling of the great bulk of the people, or it will be fruitless. It must not be the triumph of the dogmatism or the recklessness of a mere majority. There is the risk, in all police regulations on religious matters, of producing hypocrisy, secret licence worse than that which shows itself openly, a strong repugnance to what is so enforced, turning the blessing into a curse. The wisest course in such a case for those who think, as I do, that the Sundays of most of our large towns in England are a scandal and a reproach, is to be content with the existing laws, to welcome any Government action which really relieves labour and improves the condition of the labouring poor; to take away the false rigour which makes the Lord's day wearisome and unattractive; to abstain from imputing a fictitious criminality to acts which are themselves indifferent; to adapt our worship and our preaching, more than we have done, to the wants of our own time. A mere police restraint on Sunday traffic or Sunday trading, however necessary it may be to the ends for which a Christian State is justified in imposing it, leads but to a poor result; but public opinion may well be brought to bear upon companies and larger proprietors, that they may give the workers whom they control their share of rest. In the name of the Lord of the Lord's day, we may protest against the tyranny of one class over another, of the class who can pay for pleasure over the class that must work for bread; and so the day may yet become, as the Sabbath was meant to be, "a delight, holy to the Lord, honourable."

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The Lord's day was so ordained:

Therefore, It is of Divine and perpetual obligation.

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
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We agree in finding the measure of that observance in the lessons of experience, in the teaching of Christ and of St. Paul, in a wise expediency, in adapting it to the "diversities of countries, times, and men's manners," in a wide sympathy for those whose knowledge, habits, feelings, are unlike our own.

E. H. PLUMPTRE.



NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Work and Prospects: A Charge to the Clergy of the Diocese of York.

Delivered at his Primary Visitation in October, 1865, by the Most Rev. WILLIAM LORD ARCHBISHOP OF YORK, &c. London: John Murray.

THIS is a genuine, hearty effusion of a chief pastor, anxious for the welfare of his flock, and exceedingly well able to promote it. The statistics and wants of the diocese are carefully summed up; the principal influences which counteract the work of the Church are temperately, but at the same time boldly indicated; and the public topics which are at the present time of moment to the Church are dealt with in a liberal and discriminating spirit.

We hasten to point out the salient matters of interest on which the Archbishop touches. These subdivide themselves, according to the division of the charge itself, into diocesan and general.

Of the former class, to mention only cursorily the great subject in every diocese, the overtaking of the work to be done by the means of doing it,—towards which end we are glad to see that the Common Fund of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners has in York very largely contributed,—we will mention first one matter to which public attention has been lately called by the proceedings at the Social Science Congress: the state of the young people in the manufacturing and agricultural districts of our largest county. That in one of our great centres of industry and intelligence, “lads of seventeen or eighteen do not know the name of Christ, the Bible, or the Queen,” is startling enough to hear: as is it also to learn that youths employed in the glass-works at Castleford are “almost wholly uneducated.” The Archbishop may well say that “there are spots of heathen darkness upon the bright face of this country; and souls as dear to Christ as yours or mine, whom no man has awakened to know their great inheritance, their right to a life for God, and immortality with Him.” The system of farmhouse servitude seems to be still as bad in Yorkshire as in the darkest times of ignorance and irreligion. The Archbishop “trusts the time will come when people will hear with incredulity that farmers used to take into

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
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their homes, where their wives and children dwell, young servants of both sexes without the slightest inquiry into their character: that they so arranged the work of the Sunday, that it should be impossible to some of their dependents to enter a place of worship from the beginning of the contract to the end of it: that they did not attempt to exercise any influence over their character or general behaviour." This miserable system, "gathering periodically its scattered fires of disorder into one flame at the Statute Hiring, when hundreds of young men and women, with no efficient restraint, spend a day at some town, in the streets or in the public-houses," the Archbishop seems to think so firmly established as to render thorough amelioration hopeless. He concludes this part of his charge by saying that "every one who has the influence owes it as a solemn duty to God, to endeavour to remove those features of the system which at present render difficult or almost impossible, I do not say a high religious tone of mind, but even the outward decency which belongs to every civilized society."

The Archbishop speaks of the Bill which he introduced last session to enable public companies to vote money for religious or educational purposes by a majority of three-fourths of their shareholders: about which Bill the Electric Telegraph Company spread the absurd report, that its intention was to compel all railway companies to teach their people the Church Catechism. We are glad to see that it is His Grace's intention to reintroduce the Bill, which, having passed the Lords, was not introduced in the Commons owing to the lateness of the session.

The Archbishop touches slightly on what is called the Free Church movement. We are sorry to see that he gives even the least encouragement to one feature of that plan as now propounded: the opening of our churches without any appropriation at all. We conceive that were this to become the practice, just in that proportion would the rights of parishioners in their parish church be set at nought, and those whose need is most pressing be excluded from public worship. Nothing can be farther from the true Christian view of the matter, than that put forth in the publications of the "Free Scramble" Society. The poor man ought to have his seat as well as the rich man: and till he has, we shall never bring the poor to church. The old, the weak, the timid, will never come, uncertain where they are to be placed, or whether they can be placed at all: and non-appropriation has been universally found to give place in a very short time to the very worst kind of appropriation, the tyranny of the strong and proud over the feeble and modest. The Archbishop states, in favour of the non-appropriation plan, that "it is simple and equal." This is just the temptation which has drawn so many persons into advocating the adoption of it. It shirks the real difficulty of the question, How to get our poor to church? and instead of solving it, proposes a showy and specious evasion of it. We are glad to find that some distinguished persons are making a manful stand against the arrogant pretensions of the Society; and must repeat our sorrow at seeing so truly able a man as Dr. Thompson even apparently giving countenance to them.

Our readers will not be surprised that the Archbishop, in urging the duty of family prayer, should lament the deficiencies of all our existing books of domestic devotion. "Some," he says, "are an agglomerate of phrases from our collects, or of portions of texts of Holy Scripture; others aim at teaching, rather than asking: they are expositions of doctrine in the second person instead of the third. Others, compiled from divines of another generation, speak of wants and difficulties that are not ours, or speak of ours in a language that we are beginning to forget. Prayers should be scriptural, but not made up of fragments of Scripture forced out of their context, and

Notices of Books.

so mixed with phrases of human invention as to gloss and alter them." This is a true testimony, as we hope to show before long in an article devoted to the subject: and such bold words from such a quarter cannot but tend to remove the evil, at least by discouraging the use of our common manuals of family prayer.

The charge concludes with the consideration of a few matters of public interest. Of the late widening of the terms of clerical subscription, the Archbishop speaks with much hope, but at the same time guardedly; and acknowledges that in the new form there is an element of ambiguity which was not found in the old: viz., the expression "*the doctrine therein* (in the book of Common Prayer) contained." But he believes that in the new form we have sufficient security, inasmuch as we have "a promise to use the book and no other, and to use it because of an assent to it: and the assent is not merely negative, but founded on a belief that the body of doctrine which underlies this book of devotion is scriptural, and therefore true."

As to the Articles again, the Archbishop thinks that "it cannot be denied that "a small opening is left," in the new Declaration, "for doubt to creep in;" inasmuch as, whereas the former Declaration extended to "all and every" of the Articles, "the new one acknowledges *the doctrine of the Church contained in the Articles* to be agreeable to the Word of God."

He touches slightly and cautiously on the difficult question of the functions of Convocation, which he naturally regards from the position of President of the Synod of the Northern Provinces.

The Archbishop lastly passes under review the various propositions which have been made for modifying the present court of final appeal in ecclesiastical cases: and while himself decidedly in favour of retaining the present mixed character of the tribunal, thinks that an improvement might be effected, if, while the whole Committee joined in a report to the Crown, each member of it pronounced his judgment separately, so that the reasons of the minority might be declared as well as those of the majority: and if a standing Sub-Committee of the Judicial Committee were carefully selected, who should be always summoned to sit on ecclesiastical causes.

We have gone at greater length into the contents of this charge than will be our general practice. The primary expression of opinion of a bishop like Dr. Thompson must be of interest to all Churchmen; and the interest is in this case increased by the time at which, and the manner in which, that expression of opinion is given. It is no little to the credit of the present Archbishop of York, that the unexampled rapidity of his promotion has not betrayed him into any of the temptations of a novice: that he has set about his work, and about the exposition of it, in an able, judicious, business-like spirit. And it will not discommend the sound advice and practical arguments of this his primary charge, that they are relieved and carried home to the heart by fervent expressions of affection and zeal.

A Charge delivered to the Clergy and Churchwardens of the Diocese of Ely, at his Primary Visitation in October and November, 1865. By EDWARD HAROLD LORD BISHOP OF ELY. London: Longmans.

EVERY one who knows the Bishop of Ely will have expected from him a primary charge showing both acquaintance with the actually existent requirements of the Church, and kindly sympathy with modern thought. But none can have supposed that either of these would move him from the firm foundation of the faith delivered once for all, or dispose him to sacrifice any point of defence for doctrine or discipline.

The charge before us is a clear and bold exposition of the mental character above indicated. Passing over the merely diocesan matters on which it touches, we will make a few remarks on its treatment of the more important subjects which now occupy public attention.

We gather from the Bishop's remarks on the supply of clergy, that he regrets the diminution of the number of attractive prizes in the Church as a profession. In this feeling we confess we do not share. We think that the Church of England has quite enough of these left for all her legitimate wants, if any provision could be made for their being properly bestowed. The mischief is, and will remain as long as the present system lasts, that the number of Church prizes really open to the deserving is not one-half of those which figure in the "Clergy List," and that the majority of them are still conferred by favour, or as the consequence of birth. Besides, we very much doubt whether deaneries, and canonries, and rich Crown livings, either ought to, or do in matter of fact, enter into the minds of young candidates for orders as a motive in the choice of their profession: an hypothesis which has far too often been allowed to pass unchallenged. If every small living were so raised as that none should leave its incumbent without a comfortable competency, the Church would be, as it is now not far from being, the best provided of all the professions. In its case, comparisons with other professions are always fallacious. In them, skill and success are bound together; whereas the best clergymen are often those who are least likely, not seldom those who are least anxious, to move upwards, or to move at all. The absence of ambition from medical men or lawyers would be a detriment to the medical and legal professions: whereas it would be a positive advantage to the Church if there were no ambitious clergymen.

We are glad to see that the Bishop lends a helping word to the excellent methods now being adopted for better parochial organization,—the employment of mission women, and, under due regulations, the ministry of ladies acting together as deaconesses. He remarks:—

"Such, to be efficient, must probably live and work as a body: but it is needless, and inconsistent with the spirit of our own reformed Church, that they should be bound together by a vow. That ladies who feel called to such labours should devote themselves to tending the sick and visiting the afflicted, is surely a thing to be cherished, not to be rejected. All we need is to guard against offence, and to direct with wisdom."

That such ministrations should have been partially discouraged among us, and all their fresh vigour and energy thrown wholly into one section of Church opinion, is one among many signs how completely the once zealous Evangelical party has lost its first love, and become cold and secularized. We are glad also to see that one at least of our bishops has the courage to vow what they all, in common with clergy and laity, must feel, that in the matter of missions, "the system of annual sermons and annual meetings in great towns is insufficient, and has begun to fail." We should be disposed to go farther, and to hold that the annual sermon and meeting, effete and spiritless as both have universally become, are causes of much mischief among us, by preventing warmth of Christian feeling and lively interest from springing up towards our missions. How to supplant these worn-out agencies is a most difficult question, with which we may hope ere long to endeavour to grapple.

The Bishop is sanguine with regard to dissent:—

"I have a very firm persuasion that, if the whole system of the Church and all its lessened teaching can be brought truly to bear upon them, dissenters may be won, and won in great numbers to our faith. I say, can be won: I am sure they cannot be conquered. It is useless to censure them, and not very hopeful to argue with them. In most things,

disputations send men to seek support for their prejudices, not to find conviction of their errors. But if we can show to inquiring minds and burdened consciences and anxious hearts that there is in the Church's system, and in her storehouse of truths, that which can find its way within, which can probe the wounds and yet soothe the sufferings, and at length heal the distemper and satisfy the heart: men will surely witness of us that God is in us of a truth, and many, who have hitherto stood aloof from us, will seek our company as fellow-travellers travelling to an eternal home. If when they ask bread we give them but the stone of lifeless ceremony—if when they ask an egg they find the scorpion of rationalist philosophy—they will think of their Saviour's warning, 'Go ye not after them.' But if, both by life and doctrine, by the solemn reverence of Church ordinances, by the lively teaching of the Gospel, and by the witness of a consistent Christian course, you can set forth and bring home to them Christ, and God in Christ, you will win them to your fellowship here and to a better fellowship hereafter. And never, I repeat, have we had a better vantage ground for such a work than now."

The Bishop's remarks on the prospects of our common faith, in the midst of the modern stir of thought, are deeply interesting. He will pardon us if we characterize them as being pervaded with a timidity, which we suppose of necessity belongs to men whose judgment is chastened by the consciousness that they are placed for the guidance of others, and for the observation of the world at large. That we may show our readers what we mean we will cite his words:—

"But if we look again at our prospects, and at a different side of our horizon, we shall see that all is not bright—that clouds even of unusual darkness are rising up and threatening us. We need not be disheartened, for it is the Church's place in the world to be militant, not triumphant; and in every age it has new dangers and new conflicts. The age in which God has cast our lot is an age likely to be remembered in all future history as one of rapid transition and quick change of thought. Probably, since the Reformation, no period has been so marked in this respect as the last half century. There are many reasons for this. That very growth of the population, on which we all dwell so frequently, has naturally affected it. When a people increases rapidly, that increase is by an unusual addition of young members to its body; and so, in such a period, the proportion of the young to the old becomes vastly greater than in a more stationary condition of mankind. Then again, that disproportion of ages gives an impetus to rapid thought and rapid change, the spreading sails of youth being imperfectly steadied by the heavy ballast of old age and experience. And this in the present century has been coeval with the opening up of new fields in natural science, in ethnology, in criticism, in comparative philology. Men have had to unlearn many an old lesson to take up new stand-points; and so faith has been shaken not only in one but in all old convictions and beliefs. The ambition to seem above vulgar credulity, the pride of sitting loose to prejudices and popular opinions, of being calm and cold where others are zealous and fanatical, is a danger common to all ages, but most besetting a period of rapid enlightenment and teeming youth. And besides, new fields have really opened on us; worlds have become known to us in the distant seas, worlds of past times have imprinted their histories beneath our feet. With all have come fresh problems—historical problems not without their difficulty, and moral problems of far greater perplexity. It has been asked, for instance, How the merciful God revealed to us in the Scriptures can have been the Creator of all those sentient beings, which seem made only to prey on one another? And in the opposite direction, it has been argued that the God whose mercy is over all His works can never will the final punishment of the wicked, or require the sacrifice of the innocent, in place of that final punishment merited by the guilty. We might leave such questions to counteract and extinguish each other; but we cannot be blind to the fact that these and kindred difficulties are leading many to the verge of Pantheism, and many more to difficulty, disquietude, and doubt. We must not judge too sternly of some of them. There is nothing more deeply interesting than a thoughtful mind seeking truth, unable to find it, and almost in its own despite wandering in the mazes of sceptical uncertainty. To recover such to faith and hope and peace would be well worth our most anxious solicitude, our most earnest efforts. But in exact proportion to our interest in such a mind is our natural indignation with those who wantonly or wilfully sow broadcast the seeds of infidelity, careless of all the misery they produce in this world, or of the pain that may be coming in a world of which they cannot, even to themselves, disprove the certainty. Our indignation rises the higher when the disturbers of our peace are those who, by every solemn obligation, are bound to defend, not to assail, the faith. Let us make all the allowance which can palliate such a course. It is easy to imagine men of candid but over-bold spirits thinking they may make the citadel of truth the safer by cutting off from it all outworks which seem indefensible. We may give all credit for such intentions; but there is a limit to the process. A Christianity with no preparatory

without of Judaism, without prophecy, without miracles, without an infallible record of inspired truth, without a present Providence, without atonement, with a doubt thrown even on the personality of its God, may be capable of defence, but would not be worth defending. And we must remember that this principle of surrendering to defend has been put forward, at all times, by those whose acts have been all for surrender and none for defence. Even Strauss, the most destructive of modern infidels, pleaded that he was only placing religion on a surer basis, when he had striven to cut away from it all basis in history or in truth."

Surely if the demand for a charitable judgment on others, so well put forward in the middle of this passage, be a just one, then the sweeping judgment on the dissemination of their own conscientious views, which concludes the passage, can hardly be a just one too. Does the Bishop really think that the citadel of truth is the better for having and maintaining indefensible outworks? Surely he does not. And if not, it cannot be open to him, merely by putting in as a salvo, "there is a limit to the process," to appear to the unsuspecting reader, and to incur the risk of being quoted, as if he condemned the *whole* process of demolition of indefensible outworks, which is to our age its appointed method of proving all things, and holding fast that which is good. Far more nobly, because more boldly and faithfully, does he speak when he says, speaking of the undesirableness of bringing religious discussions into a court of appeal:—

"The law will naturally, and perhaps rightly, give as much latitude as possible to freedom of thought, and even freedom of speech. It will, then, always be difficult to get a conviction; and acquittal is a victory not for the writer only, but for his writings and sentiments. Conviction would be scarcely less disastrous, if it enlisted in their favour public sympathy as for a persecuted cause. But I see a greater danger still. I spoke just now of anxious but honest minds, for which the Christian heart cannot but feel kindness and sympathy. Now, it may be that to them nothing would be so dangerous as that, while looking on with interest at the contest between faith and scepticism, anxious that faith should triumph, yet sorely shaken in their confidence that it would triumph, they should see, or think they saw, free inquiry stifled, freedom of thought stamped out, and the penalties of the law substituted for the reasoning of the apologist. I would for their sakes—and how many such there are!—rather see the raging of the battle-field than the silence of an enforced peace. And I say this, too, because I have the fullest, deepest trust in the truth. I would not check the progress of science nor the inquiries of criticism, as if I feared that history or creation should bear witness against the God of the nations or the Creator of the universe. In these very controversies, which are not yet stilled among us, I think we can see already that Christian truth has really gained a firmer hold over honest thoughtful minds and consciences, from the very fact that, 'when the rain descended and the floods came, and the winds blew and beat upon that house, it fell not, for it was founded on a Rock.' (Matt. viii. 25.)"

The Bishop is for leaving as it is the constitution of the court of final appeal (for such a court he concedes there must be), with the addition to it of some able ecclesiastical lawyers: if indeed, as was remarked last year in Convocation, such a description of animal be existent in the next generation. And this seems to be the view gaining ground among moderate and practical men.

The Bishop deals, in the close of his charge, with the two correlative antagonistic movements, ritualistic development, and the revision of the Liturgy. And we are glad to agree with him in his remarks on both these. The busy looking up of mediæval millinery which is now, with so many of our clergy, usurping the place of the cares and studies to which they have devoted themselves, might be treated as mere childish nonsense, were it not that it originates in, and proceeds upon, hidden disloyalty to the Church of England, and treachery to her principles. The legitimate scope of all such ritualism is, the Bishop maintains, the recognition of the material sacrifice of the Mass: in it, in its glorification and adoration, they all culminate, and from it they cannot be logically dis-

Notices of Books.

joined. Many of those who have been drawn into the present movement are weak men, unable to apprehend the consequences of their actions; but the prime movers of it are too learned and too able, not to know very well what they are about, and whither it is all tending. When we hear it boasted that there are "so many" churches in London where the consecrated elements are "reserved for adoration," we are in no way surprised, however we may be saddened, at learning that logical consequences are working themselves out, in spite of vehement disavowal from the novices of the party. It is all the more lamentable, that a journal hitherto deemed thoroughly loyal to the Church of England, and largely read by the families of Churchmen of all opinions, should have inclined, editorially, to their wretched movements, or opened its correspondence columns to the mischievous discussion of lights and vestments.

On the revision of the Liturgy, the Bishop of Ely speaks plainly and sensibly:—

"We need, no doubt, what may be called a supplement to the Prayer-book. We want harvest prayers and mission prayers and prayers against murrain, shorter forms for special occasions, short earnest services for daily use, and many like forms, which may be supplied without touching what we have already. So, spiritual cravings might be satisfied and spiritual wants supplied. I would not even cut off all discussion, if it were contended that some slight change of phrase or modification of thought might conciliate many to us without sacrifice of doctrine or of principle. Still less would I contend against a revision of the Lectionary, or, if needful, a review of rubrical injunctions. But even here I would rather explain than modify. It is very hard to tell what may follow from the beginning of change. Former efforts for revision have ended as their promoters never contemplated. We cannot foresee what new efforts may draw after them. 'The beginning of' change 'is like the letting out of water.'

"The service specially singled out for review is, of course, the Burial Service. It is unnecessary to specify the objections to it, which are well known and obvious; but the difficulties of change are scarcely less apparent. No one would, perhaps, wish to cut away the words of hope, where those words are suitable; and how to judge when they are not suitable, and who the judge should be, is a question easy to ask but very hard to answer. There is a great principle running through our Prayer-book, and seen in all our formularies, which very signally develops itself in our Burial Service. It is the earnest, trusting belief of those who translated and revised our service-books, in the fulness and freeness of God's love in Christ. The undoubting earnest belief expressed in the Baptismal Service that God would favourably receive the infant then brought to Him—the answer of the child, when catechized, that God the Son had redeemed him, and the Holy Spirit was sanctifying him—the prayer in Confirmation to God as to One who had given to the candidates forgiveness of all their sins—the personal appropriation to every worshipper of God's mercies and lovingkindness—all sprang, not from that recently invented theory of a charitable interpretation, but from a thorough and confident assurance that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself; that God in Christ had forgiven us; that God would have all men to be saved; and that His arms of mercy were wide open to receive them all. This was the signal excellence of Luther's theology, and it was caught up and echoed by those who had the restoring of our own Church from corruption to purity. And when they had to expunge from our Burial Service those prayers for the departed, which had been turned to evil, but which were naturally comforting to the bereaved and sorrowing, they substituted for them, not prayer, but thanksgiving, grounded upon the love of God and the redemption of mankind by Christ. And there surely is great reason why we, in this time of greater coldness and weaker love, should be careful how we remove from our services words which testify of so bright a faith, so blessed a hope."

Our only fear in the prospect of additional services is, lest we should, by our own cold heartless style, and lumbering periods, be congealing and confusing the feelings of our people, instead of adding to them fervency, and directing them to Heaven.

We have noticed this charge of Bishop Harold Browne's at some length, as being the production of as good a man as now lives among us, a man at the same time of high purpose and sober judgment. We hail it on the whole as an omen for good: only hoping that the amiable writer may not, as

time goes on, find the deadening influences of mature Episcopate incompatible with this heartiness of religious life and (for the most part) fearless expression of fresh and unreserved opinion.

Sesame and Lilies. Two Lectures—I. Of King's Treasuries; II. Of Queens' Gardens. By JOHN RUSKIN, M.A. Second Edition, with Preface. London: Smith, Elder, & Co.

MR. RUSKIN'S enemies have, generally speaking, little enough cause to rejoice when he writes a book, provided it be one of those larger works which have set his name so high in modern literature. Nor are his opponents likely to derive much satisfaction from his lectures as lectures: that is to say, as speeches addressed to a fit audience. But many of his friends, including ourselves, must regret that he will turn the spoken word into the word written, without careful mitigations. His mind is, at the same time, intensely sensitive and logical, and he is not so much possessed of, as possessed by, an unparalleled gift of rapid illustrative ideas and words. The consequence is that, partly in the hope of reaching men's hearts by sheer force of style through all their natural mail, and partly in the combative excitement of standing up to a dubious or insensitive audience, half hostile and wholly critical, he says a great deal which had better not be said, still less printed. What except just and angry defiance is ever likely to come of the statement that "our national religion is only the performance of Church ceremonies, and preaching of soporific truths or untruths, to keep the mob quietly at work while we amuse ourselves?" Does Mr. Ruskin really think no clergyman or lay Churchman ever goes into a poor man's house, or pays for poor children's schooling, or that there are no such things as missions, or refuges, or spread of Holy Scripture all over the world? Why, the best means yet discovered of labouring for the crowded poor of London are Church brotherhoods and colleges. A man should know his friends better. Besides, there is a difference between speaking and writing; paradoxes and appeals are allowable in a speech, which ought not to appear in print. *Littera scripta manet*, and spoken words are not canvassed in the same way as writings.

Those who know the ability, kindness, and moderation of Mr. Ruskin's lectures to working men, will understand that these two addresses to an educated audience, though violent, are not inflammatory or offensive, except perhaps to clergy, who are generally considered fair game. But we complain of them because they are calculated to give so much pain to his own side,—to all who already know men's distresses, and are even now labouring for the poor. These will suffer, while unfeeling people will take easy refuge in anger at his violent language. We do not complain particularly of his strictures on the Episcopal bench and clergy in general, because every able writer of the present day seems to find it necessary to avow his entire detestation of all clerical persons. But Mr. Ruskin might consider how many parish clergy not wholly fools, and how many women, tender, active, and intelligent, will be lashed into energetic renunciation of himself and all his works, because he will address to them equally that full bitterness of feeling which the misery of London and the defacement of Lancashire have awakened in him. Why pour out all his vials on those who virtually work with him? He makes no exception for anybody. It really is a question for all who preach—and his lectures are really brilliant, lay sermons run wild—how far it is right to make those who do listen to you suffer as whipping-boys for the neglect of those who will not. It is common enough to do so; and in many cases the severities administered become extremely amusing from

their inapplicability. How often we have heard regular church-goers fulminated at for sabbath-breaking, and seen women of tender conscience sitting patiently under denunciations addressed to profane swearers!

We must not follow this pleasing theme, but enter on "*Sesame and Lilies*" through its Preface, which is simply charming from end to end. It seems to have been written last, like most prefaces: it is pensive, rather than vehement: in short, it is written for thoughtful people who will mind Mr. Ruskin, rather than for energetic manufacturers who will not or cannot. There are sentences in it like grouped statues, where every word is a sharp stroke, and the whole idea stands out at the last blow, complete and complicated. One in particular, about a page and a quarter long, and perfectly clear from beginning to end, refers to the tunnel of Olten and the valley of Chamouni; and the schoolboys' admiring destruction of the bed of Alpine roses is beyond comment. However, "the gods wax angry and weary of praise,"* and it really would seem, by the beginning of his first lecture, as if Mr. Ruskin had had quite enough of it himself, and wanted to spoil the taste of it for others who cannot help thinking of it as Dr. Johnson thought about wall-fruit,—that, at all events, they never yet got as much of it as they would like.

Now we say, that the pages about love of praise are wrong as they are stated, and wrong as they are applied. As a rule, even bishops of the present time want more than to be called *My Lord*; they want also to do a fair day's work every day in consideration of that title. The popular complaint is, not that men who are made bishops do not desire to deserve their position as well as to hold it, but that wrong men are sometimes made, or by wrong means. And this example applies to the whole subject. No man can endure praise unless he deserves it, in part at least.

There is in fact no connection between the various parts of the first lecture, except this feeling in the author's mind—that books are better than men, because they are the voice of the dead, and the dead are better than the living. And so the living generation is flogged unmercifully for the rest of the lecture. We may notice, that the preliminary advice about accuracy in reading, choice of books, and the like, is up to the standard by which we have a right to judge Mr. Ruskin; and that what he says about derivations and etymologies is equally good, though he himself, as well as Dean Trench and Professor Kingsley, have spoken well on the subject before. And as for his accusations against us all, they all centre in one. We have despised art, literature, nature, and compassion, all for gain. We will not make any answer, because it does not become the men of a generation to set forth what good they are trying to do: and our censor's style is not one to call out either tenderness or repentance, or to make men express aspirations they really feel. Most of what he says is quite true, but he seems hardly to care for his own case, or to see that his wildness and exuberance of statement expose his works to sharp sayings which really may prevent their being properly attended to. A large book can bide its time,—a small one may suffer severely from immediate criticism. Somebody said "*Sesame and Lilies*" was "written in a scream." Everybody felt what the saying meant, and it really told against the book. But we remember the remark of an old Oxonian on the critic, "If that party had ever been out hunting, he would know that men generally do scream when they mean to be heard in a crowd."

But as to the four accusations. In literature there is yet in this country careful reading, and careful writing, and proper research in authorities. There is living and growing Art, such as is possible in a manufacturing

* Swinburne, "*Atalanta in Calydon*."

country; and we have not yet seen what art schools, and galleries open in the evenings, and excursion trains, may do to develop the natural instinct for beauty. Pre-Raphaelitism, and its acceptance by the people, shows that nature is not altogether despised; and there is enough feeling for and attempt at charity in the land, to make Mr. Ruskin's red-printed pages very bitter words indeed, both text and comment. Pitiful people will be made more sad by them, whom God has not made sad; ordinary people will be simply irritated and puzzled. But, anyhow, a most important practical question is pointed to in them,—the proper regulation of our workhouses. All metropolitan magistrates will bear witness to the merciless way in which certain boards of guardians act at present; and if Mr. Ruskin would accept the testimony of parish clergy, they would bear him out here at all events.

The second lecture we think of considerable value just at this time, in as far as it holds up something like a high standard of nobleness and purity to women's thoughts, and suggests to young ladies a fact which seems to be a good deal overlooked in these days, that they were born to honour rather than to dishonour, and that it is better on the whole to be one honest man's "revered Isabel," than a *quasi*-Pelagia with countless admirers, despised and despising. What is said too about women's being taught some one branch of learning thoroughly and fully, is a rule for all education:—and the appeal to happy women at the last, to learn and act for the distress of others, is one which has often been made, but seldom more forcibly or delicately.

All Mr. Ruskin's works are well worth reading: all his lectures are well worth hearing: but we think his reputation suffers with almost the whole reading public when he prints lectures as books. To lose temper or betray over-excitement is of all things the most fatal to him who would influence Englishmen: they have a strange, cruel way of turning from the earnest man's matter to analyse him and his earnestness. There is much that we regret in these lectures; but for all that, they ought to be read, and read with patience.

A Commentary on the New Testament. By JOHN TRAPP, M.A.; reprinted from the Author's last Edition. Edited by the Rev. W. WEBSTER, M.A., late Fellow of Queen's College, Cambridge; Joint Editor of Webster and Wilkinson's Greek Testament. (Pp. 851.) London: Dickinson, Farringdon Street.

It will hardly be believed that this reprint of a Puritan Commentary has been edited in these days without so much as one word of notice of the author, and that those who do not happen to know much about him are driven to Biographical Dictionaries for information.* Still, this does not

* To such, the knowledge may not be unwelcome, that John Trapp was born in 1601; was a King's scholar in the free-school at Worcester; went up to Christ Church in 1618; was master of a free-school at Stratford-on-Avon in 1624, and then Vicar of Weston-on-Avon, about two miles from his school: both which offices he retained for nearly 50 years. On the breaking out of the rebellion he sided with the Presbyterians, took the Covenant, "and," says Wood in the "*Athenæ Oxonienses*," "in his preachings and discourses became violent against the King, his cause and adherents, yet lost nothing by so doing, but was a gainer by it, as he was, by the publication of these books following, taken into the hands and admired by the Brethren, but by others not." He died in 1669. The more voluminous author, Dr. Trapp, known chiefly by the epigram "On Glover's 'Leonidas'"

"Equal to Virgil? 'T may, perhaps:
But then, by Jove, 'tis Dr. Trapp's,"—

was grandson to our Commentator.

detract from the value of the book itself. In the ancient title-page, it is designated as "a commentary or exposition upon all the books of the New Testament, wherein the text is explained, some controversies are discussed, divers commonplaces are handled, and many remarkable matters hinted, that had by former interpreters been pretermitted. Besides, divers other texts of Scripture, which occasionally occur, are fully opened, and the whole so intermixed with pertinent histories, as will yield both pleasure and profit to the judicious reader." And the value of the book really lies in these last "pertinent histories." The Commentary is a storehouse of anecdotes: and many of them belong to the stirring times when the book was written. Of these, and of the quaint sayings with which the notes abound, we will give a few specimens.

"Senarclæus (Epist. ad Bucerum) telleth of a plain countryman at Friburg in Germany, that lying on his deathbed, the devil came to him in the shape of a tall terrible man, and claimed his soul, saying, 'Thou hast been a notorious sinner, and I am come to set down thy sins:' and therewith he drew out paper and ink, and sat down at a table that stood by, and began to write. The sick man answered, 'My soul is God's, and all my sins are nailed to the cross of Christ. But if thou desire to set down my sins, write thus, "All our righteousnesses are as a filthy rag, &c."'" The devil set down that, and bid him say on. He did: 'But Thou Lord hast promised, for thine own sake, to blot out our iniquities, and to make our scarlet sins white as snow.' The devil passed by those words, and was earnest with him to go on with his former argument. The sick man said, with great cheerfulness, 'The Son of God appeared to destroy the works of the devil.' With that the devil vanished, and the sick man departed."—On Matt. iv. 6.

"As the lapidary brighteneth his hard diamond with the dust planed from itself, so must we clear hard scriptures by others that are more plain and perspicuous."—On Matt. iv. 7.

The following might teach a lesson to some in our own time:—

"Many of the Romish emigrants, that run thither for preferment, what little respect have they oftentimes, and as little content in their change! Rossensis [qu. Roffensis?] had a cardinal's hat sent him, but his head was cut off before it came. Allin had a cardinal's hat, but with so thin lining (means, I mean, to support his state) that he was commonly called 'the starving Cardinal.' Stapleton was made professor of a petty university, scarce so great as one of our free-schools in England. Saunders was starved. William Rainolds was nominated to a poor vicarage under value. On Harding His Holiness bestowed a prebend of Gaunt, or, to speak more properly, a gaunt prebend. Many others get not anything, so that they wish themselves at home again: and sometimes return in the same discontent in which they went."—On Matt. iv. 8, 9.

"There were eighty opinions among heathens about man's blessedness. These did but beat the bush: God hath given us the bird in this golden sermon."—On Matt. v. 3.

"It is observed of Archbishop Cranmer, that he never raged so far with any of his household servants, as once to call the meanest of them varlet or knave in anger, much less to reprove a stranger with any reproachful word: least of all did he deal blows among them, as Bishop Bonner: who in his visitation, because the bells rung not at his coming into Hadham, nor the church was dressed up as it should, called Dr. Bricket knave and heretic: and therewithal, whether thrusting or striking at him, so it was, that he gave Sir Thomas Josselin, Knight (who then stood next to the Bishop), a good plewet upon the upper part of the neck, even under his ear: whereat he was somewhat astonished at the suddenness of the quarrel for that time. At last he spake and said, 'What meaneth your lordship? Have you been trained up in Will Sommers's school, to strike him who standeth next you?' The Bishop, still in a rage, either heard not, or would not hear. When Mr. Feckman would have excused him by his long imprisonment in the Marshalsea, whereby he was grown testy, &c., he replied merrily, 'So it seems, Mr. Feckman: for now that he is come forth of the Marshalsea he is ready to go to Bedlam.'"—On Matt. v. 22.

"Within the memory of man, Feb. 11, 1575, Ann Averages forswore herself at a shop in Wood Street, London, and praying God she might sink where she stood if she had not paid for the wares she took, fell down speechless, and with a horrible stink died soon after."—On Matt. v. 33.

"Shall the great House-keeper of the world water his flowers, prune his plants, fodder his cattle, and not feed his children? Never think it."—On Matt. vi. 26.

"The good centurion was not a better man than master. So was that renowned Sir Thomas Lucy, of Charlecott, in Warwickshire, to whose singular commendation it was in mine hearing preached at his funeral, and is now since published, by my much honoured friend Mr. Robert Harris, that (among many others that would dearly miss him) a house-

ful of servants had lost not a master but a physician, who made their sickness his, and his cost and physic theirs."—On Matt. viii. 6.

"When the Duke of Bourbon's captains had shut up Pope Clement VIII. [*sic*: but it was Clement VII.] in the Castle St. Angels, Cardinal Wolsey being shortly after sent ambassador beyond seas to make means for his release, as he came through Canterbury toward Dover, he commanded the monks and the choir to sing the Litany after this sort, '*Sancte Maria, ora pro Papa nostro Clemente.*' Himself also, being present, was seen to weep tenderly for the Pope's calamity."—On Matt. ix. 15.

Sometimes we have a shrewd thought: and not unfrequently a strange word, unknown to our English dictionaries:—

"*Ye repented not afterwards.*—No, not after his death, though ye saw Me succenturiated* to him, and preaching and pressing the same things upon you that John did. An hypocrite comes hardlier to heaven than a gross sinner, and hath far more obstacles. As he that must be stripped is not so soon clothed as he that is naked, and as he climbs not a tree so soon that must first come down from the top of another tree where he is perched, so it is here."—On Matt. xxi. 32.

"Every man hath a domestical chaplain within his own bosom, that preacheth over the sermon to him again, and comes over him with '*Thou art the man.*'"—On Matt. xxi. 45.

"Joannes de Temporibus, who is said to have lived in France above three hundred years, died at length: so did the old, old, the very old man, A.D. 1635."†—On Matt. xxii. 27.

"Judge Morgan, who gave the sentence of that peerless Lady Jane's death, presently fell mad: and in all his distracted fits, cried out continually, '*Take away the Lady Jane, take away the Lady Jane from me.*'"—On Matt. xxvi. 24.

"A young scholar reading publicly the fifth of the first of Corinthians for probation sake, at the College of Bamberg, when he came to that passage, '*Expurgate vetus fermentum,*' &c., '*sicut estis azymi,*' he not understanding the word *azymi*, read, '*sicut estis asini.*' The wiser sort of prebendaries there present said among themselves, '*Cum a sapientioribus nolumus hujusmodi audire, a pueris audire cogimur.*' Children and fools usually tell the truth."—On Matt. xxviii. 19.

"Rodolphus Gualther being in Oxford, and beholding Christ Church College, said, '*Egregium opus! Cardinalis iste instituit collegium, et absolvit popinam.*' A pretty business! A college begun, and a kitchen founded."—On Luke xix. 28.

"*Were very attentive to hear him.*—Gr., hanged on Him, as the bee doth on the flower, the babe on the breast, the little bird on the bill of her dam. Christ drew the people after Him, as it were, by the golden chain of his heavenly eloquence."—On Luke xix. 48.

"Every exorcist must not think to do as Paul did, nor every preacher as Latimer did. 'He had my fiddle and my stick,' said he of one that preached his sermons, 'but he wanted my resin.'"—On Acts xix. 16.

Such are a few specimens of the stores of anecdotes and original remarks to be found in this curious Commentary. As an explanation of Scripture, it is of little value. It takes no account of context, and very little of the relative importance of the sayings on which the notes are hung. The writer seems to seek rather opportunity for making a point in rhetoric, than for establishing a point in theology, and cares more to display his varied reading, than to facilitate the reading of Scripture. His favourite source of anecdote is Foxe's "*Acts and Monuments.*" He is moderately well versed in the classics and in the Latin Fathers: and of the Greek, seems chiefly to have studied Chrysostom. We owe Mr. Webster our thanks for having made a rare book, of so much interest, accessible to us: but those thanks would have been more heartily given, had he taken a little pains to collect information about the author.

* To *succenturiate* is to substitute for another. The *succenturiati* were men kept in reserve for the purpose of supplying the place of those soldiers in the *centuria* who happened to fall in battle, or die otherwise. We have noted several other ponderous Latinisms: *plex-animos*, p. 467; *eximios*, p. 468; *agnominaton*, p. 491; *borborology*, p. 550. In p. 25 we read, "All was jolly quiet at Ephesus before St. Paul came thither;" a form of speech which we hardly expected to find in the seventeenth century.

† Respecting one of the two very aged men here mentioned, Joannes de Temporibus, we read in the "*Fasciculus Temporum*" of Rolewinck, printed in the second volume of the "*Germanici Scriptores*," under the year 1134, "*Joannes de Temporibus moritur, qui vixerat cœli annis. Fuit enim armiger Caroli, et usque ad hoc tempora duravit.*" The other was old Parr.

Mozart's Letters. Translated by LADY WALLACE. 2 vols. London: Longmans.

To open these volumes is like opening a painted tomb. We are surrounded by people long dead,—we read the once familiar names forgotten now,—we look curiously at the busy every-day life of a century ago,—we almost catch the ringing laugh and the sound of voices,—the colours are all fresh, the figures are all distinct,—let us select one group. There is Leopold Mozart, the father, with his old threadbare coat, and oaken stick, a God-fearing, sensible, but somewhat narrow-minded man; his wife—the very model of a thrifty housewife. There is pretty little Nanerl, now about fifteen, who “looks like an angel in her new clothes,” and plays the clavier to the astonishment of Herr von Mōlk, the stupid lover, and the other Court musicians who frequent the worthy Capellmeister's house at Salszburg. There is Bimberl the dog, who gets so many kisses, and the canary that sings in G♯; and last there is the glorious boy Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, now about thirteen, in his little puce-brown coat, velvet hose, buckled shoes, and long flowing curly hair, tied behind after the fashion of the day. He has already visited Paris, London, and Rome, and is no less famous for uproarious merriment than for music. At the age of four he wrote tunes, at twelve he could not find his equal on the harpsichord, and the professors of Europe stood aghast at one who improvised fugues on a given theme and then took a ride cock-a-horse on his father's stick.

The first two sections of Letters, which carry us up to his twenty-second year, reach from 1769 to 1778, and are dated variously from Verona, Milan, Rome, Bologna, and Venice. We have also an account of a professional tour in Germany with his mother, in the fruitless search after some settled employment. He seems to have met with many friends, much praise, some jealousy, but so little money that he charged only four ducats for twelve lessons, and could write to Martini, the old Italian Nestor of music, “We live in a country where music has very little success.” Meanwhile, he has excellent spirits, and laughs at everything and everybody—at the ascetic friar, who ate so enormously—at Nanerl's lover, poor Herr von Mōlk, whimpering behind his pocket-handkerchief—at the violin professor, who was always saying, “I beg your pardon, but I am out again,” and was always consoled by Mozart's invariable reply, “It doesn't in the least signify;”—at the Italian singer who had “*una rugged voce e canta sempre* about a quarter of a note too *hardi o troppo o buon ora!*” Contrasted with these lighter moods, it is striking to observe a deep undertone of seriousness, as when he assures his father of his regularity at Confession, and exclaims, “I have always had God before my eyes. Friends who have no religion cannot long be my friends;” “I have such a sense of religion that I shall never do anything that I would not do before the whole world:” and we recognise the loving, unspoiled heart of a boy in the young man's words, “next to God comes papa.” This period was marked by the composition of the greater number of his masses, most of which were written before his twenty-third year.

Little of his music between the years 1778—81 is now extant. The years 1778 and 1779, which he spent in Paris, were probably the most uncongenial of his life. He found the people coarse and intriguing, the musicians stupid and intractable, the nobles poor and stingy, the women unconvertible and dissolute. The whole tone of the French mind displeased him. “The ungodly arch-villain Voltaire has died like a dog,” he writes. But upon the French music he pours all the vials of his wrath. “The French are, and always will be, downright donkeys.” “They cannot sing, they scream.” “The devil himself invented their language.” In 1779, he came back to Germany, resolved to abandon for ever both the French and Italian styles,

and devote himself to the cultivation of a real German opera school. The "Idomeneo" was the firstfruits. It was produced at Munich for the carnival of 1780—a date for ever memorable in the annals of music as the dawn of the great classical period in Mozart's history. From 1781 to 1782, all his letters are dated from Vienna, where he finally settled down. Money is still scarce. "I have only one small room," he writes: "it is quite crammed with a piano, a table, a bed, and a chest of drawers;" but, combined with his almost austere poverty, we notice the same regularity in his religious duties, the same purity in his private life—of this, such letters as Vol. II., No. 180—182, afford the strongest circumstantial evidence. In 1781 his reasons for marrying, though quaintly put, are quite unanswerable—viz., because he had no one to take care of his linen—because he could not live like the dissolute young men around him; and lastly, because he was in love with Constance Weber. The marriage took place in 1782, Mozart being then 26, and his bride 18. The same year witnessed the production of "Il Seraglio," and shortly afterwards we find him dining pleasantly with the veteran composer Glück, who, although of quite another school, and in some sense a rival, was always cordial in his praises of Mozart. So thoroughly indeed had the spirit of the new music begun to revolutionize the public mind, that popular Italian composers engaged Mozart to write arias for them, in order to insure the success of their operas.

The rest of Mozart's life can be compared to nothing but a torch burning out rapidly in the wind. Unwearied alike as a composer and an artist, he kept pouring forth symphonies, sonatas, and operas, whilst disease could not shake his nerve as an executant, and the hand of death found him unwilling to relinquish the pen of the ready writer. In April, 1783, we find him playing at no less than twenty concerts. The year 1785 is marked by the six celebrated quartetts dedicated to Haydn. "I declare to you," exclaimed the old man, upon hearing them, to Mozart's father, "before God and on the faith of an honest man, that your son is the greatest composer who ever lived." In 1786 "*Figaro*" was produced; and in 1787 "*Don Giovanni*" was written for his favourite public at Prague. It will hardly be believed that all this time Mozart was in the greatest want of money. His works were miserably paid for. He visited Berlin, Dresden, and Leipsic to recruit his fortunes: the nobles gave him watches and snuff-boxes, but very little coin, and in 1790 we find Mozart, at the zenith of his fame and popularity, standing dinnerless and "in a state of destitution," at the door of his old friend Puchberg. It is difficult to account for this, as he certainly made more money than many musicians. His purse, indeed, was always open to his friends; he was obliged to mix on equal terms with his superiors in rank; he had an invalid wife, for whom he procured every comfort. There must indeed have been bad management, but we can scarcely read his letters and accuse him of wanton extravagance.

In 1791 he entered upon his thirty-sixth and last year. Into it, amongst other works, were crowded "*La Clemenza di Tito*," "*Il Flauto Magico*," and the Requiem. His friends looked upon his wondrous career, as we have since looked upon Mendelssohn's, with a certain sad and bewildering astonishment. That prodigious childhood—that spring mellow with all the fruits of autumn—that startling haste "as the rapid of life shoots to the fall"—we understand it now. "The world had waited eight centuries for him, and he was only to remain for a moment" (*Oulibicheff*). In the October of 1791 he closes a letter to his wife with the words from "*Zauberflöte*," "The hour strikes. Farewell! we shall meet again!" These are the last written words of Mozart extant.

His wife returned from Baden somewhat invigorated by the waters, but

she noticed with alarm a pallor more fatal than her own upon her husband's face. His passionate love for her never waned, but he had grown silent and melancholy. He would constantly remain writing at the Requiem long after his dinner-hour. Neither fatigue nor hunger seemed to rouse him from his profound contemplation. At night he would sit brooding over the score until he not unfrequently swooned away in his chair. The mysterious apparition of the stranger in black, who came to Mozart and gave the order for the Requiem, has been resolved into the valet of a nobleman who wished to preserve his *incognito*, but it doubtless added to the sombre melancholy of a mind already sinking and over-wrought. One mild autumn morning his wife drove him out in an open carriage to some neighbouring woods. As he breathed the soft air, scented with the yellow leaves that lay thickly strewn around, he discovered to her the secret of the Requiem. "I am writing it," he said, "for myself." A few days of flattering hope followed, and then Mozart was carried to the bed from which he was never destined to rise. Vienna was at that time ringing with the fame of his last opera. They brought him the rich appointment of organist to the Cathedral of St. Stephen, for which he had been longing all his life. Managers besieged his door with handfuls of gold, summoning him to compose something for them—too late! He lay with swollen limbs and burning head awaiting another summons. On the night of December 5, 1791, his wife, her sister, Sophie Weber, and his friend Susmeyer were with him. The score of the Requiem lay open upon his bed. As the last faintness stole over him, he turned to Susmeyer—his lips moved feebly—he was trying to indicate a peculiar effect of kettle-drums in the score. It was the last act of expiring thought; his head sank gently back; he seemed to fall into a deep and tranquil sleep. In another hour he had ceased to breathe.

On a stormy December morning, through the deserted streets of Vienna, amidst snow and hail, and unaccompanied by a single friend, the body of Mozart was hastily borne, with fifteen others, to the common burial-ground of the poor. In 1808, some foreigners, passing through the town, wished to visit the grave; but they were told that the ashes of the poor were frequently exhumed to make room for others, and no stone then remained to mark the spot where once had rested the body of JEAN CHRYSOSTOME WOLFGANG AMADEUS MOZART.

These letters in great measure supply the want of material noticeable in every biography of Mozart between the years 1785-90, and are further valuable as correcting several hasty and ill-advised statements in the otherwise learned and elaborate narrative of M. Oulibicheff, such as, that Mozart had a passion for travelling, when he declares that he could never sleep in his carriage, and hated being from home—or that he was fond of wine and women, when throughout his life he was scoffed at for being chaste and sober—or that he was extravagant, when he continually sent large sums to his father, wore the coarsest linen, and devoted everything else to the comfort of an invalid wife—or that his talents were not recognised at Vienna, where many of his most successful concerts were given—or that "*Figaro*" was received coldly there, when he writes, "There were seven encores," &c.

Of the translation we have little to say; it is not superior to that of Mendelssohn's Letters by the same hand, and very inferior to some real translations from Schumann which have lately appeared in the *Shilling Magazine*. When will translators learn to hold the balance between paraphrase and literalism! We are willing, however, to forgive much to the loving labour of one who has opened to the English public these memorials of the greatest composer that the last, or perhaps any century has yet produced.

Jesus Tempted in the Wilderness: The Combat—The Weapons—The Victory. By ADOLPHE MONOD. (Pp. 121.) London: Nisbet.

THOSE who know the calm reliance, the holy fervour, the affectionate yearning, of the lamented Adolphe Monod's religious works, will not be surprised at our very heartily recommending this little volume. Its contents were first delivered as lectures at Montauban, in the chapel of the Faculté, and then as sermons at Paris. The commentary on our blessed Lord's temptation brings out, and dwells on, the points commonly insisted on, but with a simple, fatherly gentleness which wins the heart, and with much aptness of illustration, characterized by that uniform correctness of taste which distinguishes all the writings of the author. We cannot forbear giving a sample or two, to induce our readers to enjoy the whole.

Holy Scripture as a Weapon against Temptation.—"For the word of God to have the same power in our hand that it had in that of Jesus, it must be for us all that it was for Him. I know nothing in all the history of humanity, nor in the field of Divine revelation, that speaks more clearly than my text in favour of the inspiration of the Scriptures. What? The Son of God, He that is in the bosom of the Father, and who could so easily find sufficient strength in Himself, prefers borrowing it from a book that He finds in our hands, and draws his strength from the same source that [from which?] a Joshua, a Samuel, a David drew theirs! What? Jesus Christ, the King of heaven and earth, calls to his aid in this solemn moment Moses his servant; and He that speaketh from heaven strengthens Himself against the temptations of hell by the word of him that speaketh of the earth! And how can we explain this wonderful mystery,—shall I call it?—or this strange subversion, if the word of Moses were not for Jesus the word of God, and not as the word of men, and if He were not fully persuaded that holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost? I am not unmindful, my young friends (I am speaking especially to young ministers of the word)—I am not unmindful of the objections to which the inspiration of the Scriptures has given rise, nor of the real obscurity that surrounds it; if it sometimes troubles your breast, it has also troubled mine. But at such times I have only had to cast a look at Jesus glorifying the Scriptures in the wilderness, and I have found that, for those who will simply receive his testimony, the most embarrassing of problems is thence formed into a palpable historical fact, perfectly evident."

Concluding Advice to Candidates for the Ministry.—"And you, my future fellow-labourers, I will not quit this subject without giving you a special exhortation that I recommend to your most serious attention. The temptation of Jesus is placed between the end of his personal preparation and the commencement of his public life. There is for you a similar time; the interval between the end of your studies and the beginning of your ministry. Take care of this interval; it may influence the remainder of your ministerial career. Devote it to a spiritual retreat; spend it with Jesus, combating in his solitude; and when you enter the Church, let it be as a man coming out from the wilderness—from the wilderness, and not from the world: if you are full of recollections of the world, if you have been inhaling the corrupt atmosphere of its vanities and pleasures, you are not fit for the service of Jesus Christ. From the wilderness, and not from Nazareth: if you are under the dominion of family affections, if you place on the first line in the choice of a place a father or a mother, a wife or a child, you are not fit for the service of Jesus Christ. From the wilderness, and not from the academy: if you are still covered with the dust of deep study, if your faith and your knowledge come merely from books, you are not fit for the service of Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ must have servants weaned from the world, free of creature engagements, nourished by the teaching of the Holy Ghost. Be men of the wilderness, or be not men of the Church. Amen."

We are sorry to note blemishes, but some have crept in either through fault of the translator, or through carelessness of the printer. In p. 23, the words, "My son, if thou come to serve the Lord, prepare thy heart for temptation," are quoted as from "the beginning of the second chapter of Ecclesiastes (*sic*), one of the apocryphal books:" *Ecclesiasticus* of course being meant. And in a note, p. 79, a quotation from Bengel is given as from "a letter from Bengal." There are too, occasional trips in English grammar, one example of which is noted in the first passage which we have extracted. In a second edition, we hope that these blemishes may disappear.



THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED:

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON AND JOHN STUART MILL.

PART II.

An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and of the principal Philosophical Questions discussed in his Writings. By JOHN STUART MILL. London, 1865.

THE former part of our remarks on Mr. Mill's "Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy" concluded with the statement that, with regard to the three fundamental doctrines of Hamilton's philosophy—the Relativity of Knowledge, the incognisability of the Absolute and Infinite, and the distinction between Reason and Faith—Mr. Mill had, throughout his criticism, altogether missed the meaning of the theories he was attempting to assail. This statement we must now proceed to prove, with reference to each of the above doctrines in succession. First, then, of the relativity of knowledge.

The assertion that all our knowledge is relative,—in other words, that we know things only under such conditions as the laws of our cognitive faculties impose upon us,—is a statement which looks at first sight like a truism, but which really contains an answer to a very important question.—Have we reason to believe that the laws of our cognitive faculties impose any conditions at all?—that the mind in any way reacts on the objects affecting it, so as to produce a result different from that which would be produced were it merely a passive recipient? "The mind of man," says Bacon, "is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things shall reflect according to their true incidence; nay, it is rather like

an enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced." Can what Bacon says of the fallacies of the mind be also said of its proper cognitions? Does the mind, by its own action, in any way distort the appearance of the things presented to it; and if so, how far does the distortion extend, and in what manner is it to be rectified? To trace the course of this inquiry from the day when Plato compared the objects perceived by the senses to the shadows thrown by fire on the wall of a cave, to the day when Kant declared that we know only phenomena, not things in themselves, would be to write the history of philosophy. We can only at present call attention to one movement in that history, which was, in effect, a revolution in philosophy. The older philosophers in general distinguished between the senses and the intellect, regarding the former as deceptive and concerned with phenomena alone, the latter as trustworthy and conversant with the realities of things. Hence arose the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible world—between things as perceived by sense and things as apprehended by intellect—between Phenomenology and Ontology. Kant rejected this distinction, holding that the intellect, as well as the sense, imposes its own forms on the things presented to it, and is therefore cognisant only of phenomena, not of things in themselves. The logical result of this position would be the abolition of ontology as a science of things in themselves, and, *à fortiori*, of that highest branch of ontology which aims at a knowledge of the Absolute* *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, of the unconditioned first principle of all things. If the mind, in every act of thought, imposes its own forms on its objects, to think is to condition, and the unconditioned is the unthinkable. Such was the logical result of Kant's principles, but not the actual result. For Kant, by distinguishing between the Understanding and the Reason, and giving to the latter an indirect yet positive cognition of the Unconditioned as a regulative principle of thought, prepared the way for the systems of Schelling and Hegel, in which this indirect cognition is converted into a direct one, by investing the reason, thus distinguished as the special faculty of the unconditioned, with a power of intuition emancipated from the conditions of space and time, and even of subject and object, or a power of thought emancipated from the laws of identity and contradiction.

The theory of Hamilton is a modification of that of Kant, intended to obviate these consequences, and to relieve the Kantian doctrine

* The term *absolute*, in the sense of *free from relation*, may be used in two applications;—1st, to denote the nature of a thing as it is in itself, as distinguished from its appearance to us. Here it is used only in a subordinate sense, as meaning out of relation to human knowledge. 2ndly, To denote the nature of a thing as independent of all other things, as having no relation to any other thing as the condition of its existence. Here it is used in its highest sense, as meaning out of relation to anything else.

itself from the inconsistency which gave rise to them. So long as the reason is regarded as a separate faculty from the understanding, and things in themselves as ideas of the reason, so long the apparent contradictions, which encumber the attempt to conceive the unconditioned, must be regarded as inherent in the constitution of the reason itself, and as the result of its legitimate exercise on its proper objects. This sceptical conclusion Hamilton endeavoured to avoid by rejecting the distinction between the understanding and the reason as separate faculties, regarding the one as the legitimate and positive, the other as the illegitimate and negative, exercise of one and the same faculty. He thus announces, in opposition to Kant, the fundamental doctrine of the Conditioned, as "the distinction between intelligence *within* its legitimate sphere of operation, impeccable, and intelligence *beyond* that sphere, affording (by abuse) the occasions of error."* Hamilton, like Kant, maintained that all our cognitions are compounded of two elements, one contributed by the object known, and the other by the mind knowing. But the very conception of a relation implies the existence of things to be related; and the knowledge of an object, as in relation to our mind, necessarily implies its existence out of that relation. But as so existing, it is unknown: we believe *that* it is; we know not *what* it is. How far it resembles, or how far it does not resemble, the object apprehended by us, we cannot say, for we have no means of comparing the two together. Instead, therefore, of saying with Kant, that reason is subject to an inevitable delusion, by which it mistakes the regulative principles of its own thoughts for the representations of real things, Hamilton would say that the reason, while compelled to believe in the existence of these real things, is not legitimately entitled to make any positive representation of them as of such or such a nature; and that the contradictions into which it falls when attempting to do so are due to an illegitimate attempt to transcend the proper boundaries of positive thought.

This theory does not, in itself, contain any statement of the mode in which we perceive the material world, whether directly by presentation, or indirectly by representative images; and perhaps it might, without any great violence, be adapted to more than one of the current hypotheses on this point. But that to which it most easily adjusts itself is that maintained by Hamilton himself under the name of *Natural Realism*. To speak of perception as a *relation* between mind and matter, naturally implies the presence of both correlatives; though each may be modified by its contact with the other. The acid may act on the alkali, and the alkali on the acid, in forming the neutral salt; but each of the ingredients is as truly present as the

* "Discussions," p. 633.

other, though each enters into the compound in a modified form. And this is equally the case in perception, even if we suppose various media to intervene between the ultimate object and the perceiving mind,—such, *e. g.*, as the rays of light and the sensitive organism in vision,—so long as these media are material, like the ultimate object itself. Whether the object, properly so called, in vision, be the rays of light in contact with the organ, or the body emitting or reflecting those rays, is indifferent to the present question, so long as a material object of some kind or other is supposed to be perceived, and not merely an immaterial representation of such an object. To speak of our perceptions as mere modifications of mind produced by an unknown cause, would be like maintaining that the acid is modified by the influence of the alkali without entering into combination with it. Such a view might perhaps be tolerated, in connection with the theory of relativity, by an indulgent interpretation of language, but it is certainly not that which the language of the theory most naturally suggests.

All this Mr. Mill entirely misapprehends. He quotes a passage from Hamilton's Lectures, in which the above theory of Relativity is clearly stated as the mean between the extremes of Idealism and Materialism, and then proceeds to comment as follows:—

“The proposition, that our cognitions of objects are only in part dependent on the objects themselves, and in part on elements superadded by our organs or our minds, is not identical, nor *prima facie* absurd. It cannot, however, warrant the assertion that all our knowledge, but only that the part so added, is relative. If our author had gone as far as Kant, and had said that all which constitutes knowledge is put in by the mind itself, he would have really held, in one of its forms, the doctrine of the relativity of our knowledge. But what he does say, far from implying that the whole of our knowledge is relative, distinctly imports that all of it which is real and authentic is the reverse. If any part of what we fancy that we perceive in the objects themselves, originates in the perceiving organs or in the cognising mind, thus much is purely relative; but since, by supposition, it does not all so originate, the part that does not is as much absolute as if it were not liable to be mixed up with these delusive subjective impressions.”—(P. 30.)

Mr. Mill, therefore, supposes that *wholly relative* must mean *wholly mental*; in other words, that to say that a thing is wholly due to a relation between mind and matter is equivalent to saying that it is wholly due to mind alone. On the contrary, we maintain that Sir W. Hamilton's language is far more accurate than Mr. Mill's, and that the above theory can with perfect correctness be described as one of *total relativity*; and this from two points of view. First, as opposed to the theory of partial relativity generally held by the pre-Kantian philosophers, according to which our sensitive cognitions are relative, our intellectual ones absolute. Secondly, as asserting that the object of perception, though composed of elements partly material, partly mental, yet exhibits both alike in a form modified by their relation to

each other. The composition is not a mere mechanical juxtaposition, in which each part, though acting on the other, retains its own characteristics unchanged. It may be rather likened to a chemical fusion, in which both elements are present, but each of them is affected by the composition. The material part, therefore, is not "as much absolute as if it were not liable to be mixed up with subjective impressions."

But we must hear the continuation of Mr. Mill's criticism :—

"The admixture of the relative element not only does not take away the absolute character of the remainder, but does not even (if our author is right) prevent us from recognising it. The confusion, according to him, is not inextricable. It is for us to 'analyse and distinguish what elements' in an 'act of knowledge' are contributed by the object, and what by our organs, or by the mind. We may neglect to do this, and as far as the mind's share is concerned, we can only do it by the help of philosophy ; but it is a task to which, in his opinion, philosophy is equal. By thus stripping off such of the elements in our apparent cognitions of things as are but cognitions of something in us, and consequently relative, we may succeed in uncovering the pure nucleus, the direct intuitions of things in themselves ; as we correct the observed positions of the heavenly bodies by allowing for the error due to the refracting influence of the atmospheric medium, an influence which does not alter the facts, but only our perception of them."

Surely Mr. Mill here demands much more of philosophy than Sir W. Hamilton deems it capable of accomplishing. Why may not Hamilton, like Kant, distinguish between the permanent and necessary, and the variable and contingent—in other words, between the subjective and the objective elements of consciousness, without therefore obtaining a "direct intuition of things in themselves"? Why may he not distinguish between space and time as the forms of our sensitive cognitions, and the things perceived in space and time, which constitute the matter of the same cognitions, without thereby having an intuition, on the one hand, of pure space and time with nothing in them, or on the other, of things in themselves out of space and time? If certain elements are always present in perception, while certain others change with every act, I may surely infer that the one is due to the permanent subject, the other to the variable object, without thereby knowing what each would be if it could be discerned apart from the other. "A direct intuition of things in themselves," according to Kant and Hamilton, is an intuition of things out of space and time. Does Mr. Mill suppose that any natural Realist professes to have such an intuition?

The same error of supposing that a doctrine of relativity is necessarily a doctrine of idealism, that "matter known only in relation to us" can mean nothing more than "matter known only through the mental impressions of which it is the unknown cause,"* runs through

* The assumption that these two expressions are or ought to be synonymous is tacitly

the whole of Mr. Mill's argument against this portion of Sir W. Hamilton's teaching. That argument, though repeated in various forms, may be briefly summed up in one thesis; namely, that the doctrine that our knowledge of matter is wholly relative is incompatible with the distinction, which Hamilton expressly makes, between the primary and secondary qualities of body.

The most curious circumstance about this criticism is, that, if not directly borrowed from, it has at least been carefully anticipated by, Hamilton himself. Of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, as acknowledged by Descartes and Locke, whose theory of external perception is identical with that which Mr. Mill would force on Hamilton himself, Hamilton says: "On the general doctrine, however, of these philosophers, both classes of qualities, as known, are confessedly only states of our own minds; and while we have no right from a subjective affection to infer the existence, far less the corresponding character of the existence, of any objective reality, it is evident that their doctrine, if fairly evolved, would result in a dogmatic or in a sceptical negation of the primary no less than of the secondary qualities of body, as more than appearances in and for us."* It is astonishing that Mr. Mill, who pounces eagerly on every imaginable instance of Hamilton's inconsistency, should have neglected to notice this, which, if his criticism be true, is the most glaring inconsistency of all.

But Hamilton continues: "It is therefore manifest that the fundamental position of a consistent theory of dualistic realism is—that our cognitions of Extension and its modes are not wholly ideal—that although Space be a native, necessary, *à priori* form of imagination, and so far, therefore, a mere subjective state, that there is, at the same time, competent to us, in an *immediate* perception of external things, the *consciousness* of a really existent, of a really objective, *extended* world." Here we have enunciated in one breath, first the subjectivity of space, which is the logical basis of the relative theory of perception; and secondly, the objectivity of the extended world, which is the

made by Mr. Mill at the opening of this chapter. He opens it with a passage from the "Discussions," in which Hamilton says that the existence of *things in themselves* is only indirectly revealed to us "through certain qualities *related to our faculties of knowledge*;" and then proceeds to shew that the author did not hold the doctrine which these phrases "seem to convey in the only substantial meaning capable of being attached to them;" namely, "that we know nothing of *objects* except their existence, and the impressions produced by them upon the human mind." Having thus quietly assumed that "*things in themselves*" are identical with "*objects*," and "*relations*" with "*impressions on the human mind*," Mr. Mill bases his whole criticism on this *tacit petitio principii*. He is not aware that though Reid sometimes uses the term *relative* in this inaccurate sense, Hamilton expressly points out the inaccuracy and explains the proper sense.—(See Reid's Works, pp. 313, 322.)

* Reid's Works, p. 840.

logical basis of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. It is manifest, therefore, that Hamilton had not, as Mr. Mill supposes, ceased to hold the one theory when he adopted the other.*

The key to all this is not difficult to find. It is simply that *objective existence* does not mean existence *per se*; and that a *phenomenon* does not mean a mere mode of mind. Objective existence is existence *as an object*, in perception, and therefore in relation; and a phenomenon may be material, as well as mental. The thing *per se* may be only the unknown cause of what we directly know; but what we directly know is something more than our own sensations. In other words, the phenomenal effect is material as well as the cause, and is, indeed, that from which our primary conceptions of matter are derived. Matter does not cease to be matter when modified by its contact with mind, as iron does not cease to be iron when smelted and forged. A horseshoe is something very different from a piece of iron ore; and a man may be acquainted with the former without ever having seen the latter, or knowing what it is like. But would Mr. Mill therefore say that the horseshoe is merely a subjective affection of the skill of the smith—that it is not iron modified by the workman, but the workman or his art impressed by iron?

If, indeed, Hamilton had said with Locke, that the primary qualities are in the bodies themselves, whether we perceive them or no,† he would have laid himself open to Mr. Mill's criticism. But he expressly rejects this statement, and contrasts it with the more cautious language of Descartes, "*ut sunt, vel saltem esse possunt.*"‡ The secondary qualities are mere affections of consciousness, which cannot be conceived as existing except in a conscious subject. The primary qualities are qualities of body, as perceived in relation to the percipient mind, *i.e.*, of the phenomenal body perceived as in space. How far they exist in the real body out of relation to us, Hamilton does not attempt to decide.§ They are inseparable from

* See "Examination," p. 28.

† Essay ii. 8, § 23.

‡ Reid's Works, p. 839.

§ We have been content to argue this question, as Mr. Mill himself argues it, on the supposition that Sir W. Hamilton held that we are directly percipient of primary qualities in external bodies. Strictly speaking, however, Hamilton held that the primary qualities are immediately perceived only in our organism as extended, and inferred to exist in extra-organic bodies. The external world is immediately apprehended only in its secundo-primary character, as resisting our locomotive energy. But as the organism, in this theory, is a material *non-ego* equally with the rest of matter, and as to press this distinction would only affect the verbal accuracy, not the substantial justice, of Mr. Mill's criticisms, we have preferred to meet him on the ground he has himself chosen. The same error, of supposing that "presentationism" is identical with "noumenalism," and "phenomenalism" with "representationism," runs through the whole of Mr. Stirling's recent criticism of Hamilton's theory of perception. It is curious, however, that the very passage ("Lectures," i. p. 146) which Mr. Mill cites as proving that Hamilton, in spite of his professed phenomenalism, was an unconscious noumenalist, is employed by Mr. Stirling to prove that, in spite of his

our conception of body, which is derived exclusively from the phenomenon; they may or may not be separable from the thing as it is in itself.

Under this explanation, it is manifest that the doctrine, that matter *as a subject or substratum* of attributes is unknown and unknowable, is *totally different* from that of cosmothetic idealism, with which Mr. Mill confounds it;* and that a philosopher may without inconsistency accept the former and reject the latter. The former, while it holds the material substance to be unknown, does not deny that some of the attributes of matter are perceived immediately as material, though, it may be, modified by contact with mind. The latter maintains that the attributes, as well as the substance, are not perceived immediately as material, but mediately through the intervention of immaterial representatives. It is also manifest that, in answer to Mr. Mill's question, which of Hamilton's two "cardinal doctrines," Relativity or Natural Realism, "is to be taken in a non-natural sense,"† we must say, neither. The two doctrines are quite compatible with each other, and neither requires a non-natural interpretation to reconcile it to its companion.

The doctrine of relativity derives its chief practical value from its connection with the next great doctrine of Hamilton's philosophy, the incognisability of the Absolute and the Infinite. For this doctrine brings Ontology into contact with Theology; and it is only in relation to theology that ontology acquires a practical importance. With respect to the other two "ideas of the pure reason," as Kant calls them, the human soul and the world, the question, whether we know them as realities or as phenomena, may assist us in dealing with certain metaphysical difficulties, but need not affect our practical conduct. For we have an immediate intuition of the attributes of mind and matter, at least as phenomenal objects, and by these intuitions may be tested the accuracy of the conceptions derived from them, sufficiently for all practical purposes. A man will equally avoid walking over a precipice, and is logically as consistent in avoiding it, whether he regard the precipice as a real thing, or as a mere phenomenon. But in the province of theology this is not the case. We have no immediate intuition of the Divine attributes, even as phenomena; we only infer their existence and nature from certain similar attributes of which we are immediately conscious in ourselves. And hence arises the question, How far does the similarity extend, and to what extent is the accuracy of our conceptions guaranteed by the

professed presentationism, he was an unconscious representationist. The two critics tilt at Hamilton from opposite quarters: he has only to stand aside and let them run against each other.

* "Examination," p. 23.

† "Examination," p. 20.

intuition, not of the object to be conceived, but of something more or less nearly resembling it? But this is not all. Our knowledge of God, originally derived from personal consciousness, receives accession from two other sources,—from the external world, as His work; and from revelation, as His word; and the conclusions derived from each have to be compared together. Should any discrepancy arise between them, are we at once warranted in rejecting one class of conclusions in favour of the other two, or two in favour of the third? or are we at liberty to say that our knowledge in respect of all alike is of such an imperfect and indirect character that we are warranted in believing that some reconciliation may exist, though our ignorance prevents us from discovering what it is? Here at least is a practical question of the very highest importance. In the early part of our previous remarks, we have endeavoured to shew how this question has been answered by orthodox theologians of various ages, and how Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy supports that answer. We have now to consider Mr. Mill's chapter of criticisms.

It is always unfortunate to make a stumble on the threshold; and Mr. Mill's opening paragraph makes two. "The name of God," he says, "is veiled under two extremely abstract phrases, 'the Infinite and the Absolute.' . . . But it is one of the most unquestionable of all logical maxims, that the meaning of the abstract must be sought in the concrete, and not conversely."*—Now, in the first place, "the Infinite" and "the Absolute," even in the sense in which they are both predicable of God, are no more names of God than "the creature" and "the finite" are names of man. They are the names of certain attributes, which further inquiry may, perhaps, shew to belong to God and to no other being, but which do not in their signification express this, and do not constitute our primary idea of God, which is that of a Person. Men may believe in an absolute and infinite, without in any proper sense believing in God; and thousands upon thousands of pious men have prayed to a personal God, who have never heard of the absolute and the infinite, and who would not understand the expressions if they heard them. But, in the second place, "the absolute" and "the infinite," in Sir W. Hamilton's sense of the terms, cannot both be names of God, for the simple reason that they are contradictory of each other, and are proposed as alternatives which cannot both be accepted as predicates of the same subject. For Hamilton, whatever Mr. Mill may do, did not fall into the absurdity of maintaining that God in some of his attributes is absolute without being infinite, and in others is infinite without being absolute.†

But we have not yet done with this single paragraph. After thus making two errors in his exposition of his opponent's doctrine, Mr.

* "Examination," p. 32.

† See "Examination," p. 35.

Mill immediately proceeds to a third, in his criticism of it. By following his "most unquestionable of all logical maxims," and substituting the name of God in the place of "the Infinite" and "the Absolute," he exactly reverses Sir W. Hamilton's argument, and makes his own attempted refutation of it a glaring *ignoratio elenchi*.

One of the purposes of Hamilton's argument is to shew that we have no positive conception of an Infinite Being; that when we attempt to form such a conception, we do but produce a distorted representation of the finite; and hence, that our so-called conception of the infinite is not the true infinite. Hence it is not to be wondered at—nay, it is a natural consequence of this doctrine,—that our positive conception of God as a Person cannot be included under this pseudo-concept of the Infinite. Whereas Mr. Mill, by laying down the maxim that the meaning of the abstract must be sought in the concrete, quietly assumes that this pseudo-infinite is a proper predicate of God, to be tested by its applicability to the subject, and that what Hamilton says of *this* infinite cannot be true unless it is also true of God. Of this refutation, Hamilton, were he living, might truly say, as he said of a former criticism on another part of his writings,—“This elaborate parade of argument is literally answered in two words—*Quis dubitavit?*”

But if the substitution of God for the Infinite be thus a perversion of Hamilton's argument, what shall we say to a similar substitution in the case of the Absolute? Hamilton distinctly tells us that there is one sense of the term *absolute* in which it is contradictory of the infinite; and therefore is not predicable of God at all. Mr. Mill admits that Hamilton, throughout the greater part of his arguments, employs the term in this sense; and he then actually proceeds to “test” these arguments “by substituting the concrete, God, for the abstract, Absolute;” *i. e.*, by substituting God for something which Hamilton defines as contradictory to the nature of God. Can the force of confusion go further? Is it possible for perverse criticism more utterly, we do not say to misrepresent, but literally to invert an author's meaning?

The source of all these errors, and of a great many more, is simply this. Mr. Mill is aware, from Hamilton's express assertion, that the word *absolute* may be used in two distinct and even contradictory senses; but he is wholly unable to see what those senses are, or when Hamilton is using the term in the one sense, and when in the other. Let us endeavour to clear up some of this confusion.

Hamilton's article on the Philosophy of the Unconditioned is a criticism, partly of Schelling, partly of Cousin; and Schelling and Cousin only attempted in a new form, under the influence of the Kantian philosophy, to solve the problem with which philosophy

in all ages has attempted to grapple,—the problem of the Unconditioned.

“The unconditioned” is a term which, while retaining the same general meaning, admits of various applications, particular or universal. It may be the unconditioned as regards some special relation, or the unconditioned as regards all relations whatever. Thus there may be the unconditioned in Psychology—the human soul considered as a substance; the unconditioned in Cosmology—the world considered as a single whole; the unconditioned in Theology—God in His own nature, as distinguished from His manifestations to us; or, finally, the unconditioned *par excellence*—the unconditioned in Ontology—the being on which all other being depends. It is of course possible to identify any one of the three first with the last. It is possible to adopt a system of Egoism, and to maintain that all phenomena are modes of my mind, and that the substance of my mind is the only real existence. It is possible to adopt a system of Materialism, and to maintain that all phenomena are modes of matter, and that the material substance of the world is the only real existence. Or it is possible to adopt a system of Pantheism, and to maintain that all phenomena are modes of the Divine existence, and that God is the only reality. But the several notions are in themselves distinct, though one may ultimately be predicated of another.

The general notion of the Unconditioned is the same in all these cases, and all must finally culminate in the last, the Unconditioned *par excellence*. The general notion is that of the One as distinguished from the Many, the substance from its accidents, the permanent reality from its variable modifications. Thought, will, sensation, are modes of my existence. What is the *I* that is one and the same in all? Extension, figure, resistance, are attributes of matter. What is the one substance to which these attributes belong? But the generalisation cannot stop here. If matter differs from mind, the *non-ego* from the *ego*, as one thing from another, there must be some special point of difference, which is the condition of the existence of each in this or that particular manner. Unconditioned existence, therefore, in the highest sense of the term, cannot be the existence of *this* as distinguished from *that*; it must be existence *per se*, the ground and principle of all conditioned or special existence. This is the Unconditioned, properly so called: the unconditioned in Schelling’s sense, as the indifference of subject and object: and it is against this that Hamilton’s arguments are directed.

The question is this. Is this Unconditioned a mere abstraction, the product of our own minds; or can it be conceived as having a real existence *per se*, and, as such, can it be identified with God as the source of all existence? Hamilton maintains that it is a mere

abstraction, and cannot be so identified; that far from being "a name of God," it is a name of nothing at all. "By abstraction," he says, "we annihilate the object, and by abstraction we annihilate the subject of consciousness. But what remains? *Nothing*." When we attempt to conceive it as a reality, we "hypostatise the zero."*

In order to conceive the Unconditioned existing as a thing, we must conceive it as existing out of relation to everything else. For if nothing beyond itself is necessary as a condition of its existence, it can exist separate from everything else; and its pure existence as the unconditioned is so separate. It must therefore be conceivable as the sole existence, having no plurality beyond itself; and as simple, having no plurality within itself. For if we cannot conceive it as existing apart from other things, we cannot conceive it as independent of them; and if we conceive it as a compound of parts, we have further to ask as before, what is the principle of unity which binds these parts into one whole? If there is such a principle, this is the true unconditioned; if there is no such principle, there is no unconditioned; for that which cannot exist except as a compound is dependent for its existence on that of its several constituents. The unconditioned must therefore be conceived as one, as simple, and as universal.

Is such a conception possible, whether in ordinary consciousness, as Cousin says, or in an extraordinary intuition, as Schelling says? Let us try the former. Consciousness is subject to the law of Time. A phenomenon is presented to us in time, as dependent on some previous phenomenon or thing. I wish to pursue the chain in thought till I arrive at something independent. If I could reach in thought a beginning of time, and discover some first *fact* with nothing preceding it, I should conceive time as absolute—as completed,—and the unconditioned as the first thing in time, and therefore as completed also, for it may be considered by itself, apart from what depends upon it. Or if time be considered as having no beginning, thought would still be able to represent to itself that infinity, could it follow out the series of antecedents for ever. But is either of these alternatives possible to thought? If not, we must confess that the unconditioned is inconceivable by ordinary consciousness; and we must found philosophy, with Schelling, on the annihilation of consciousness.

But though Hamilton himself distinguishes between the *unconditioned* and the *absolute*, using the former term generally, for that which is out of all relation, and the latter specially, for that which is out of all relation as complete and finished, his opponent Cousin uses the latter term in a wider sense, as synonymous with the former, and the *infinite* as coextensive with both. This, however, does not affect the validity of Hamilton's argument. For if it can be shown

* "Discussions," p. 21.

that the absolute and the infinite (in Hamilton's sense) are both inconceivable, the unconditioned (or absolute in Cousin's sense), which must be conceived as one or the other, is inconceivable also. Or, conversely, if it can be shown that the unconditioned, the unrelated in general, is inconceivable, it follows that the absolute and the infinite, as both involving the unrelated, are inconceivable also.

We may now proceed with Mr. Mill's criticism. He says:—

"Absolute, in the sense in which it stands related to Infinite, means (conformably to its etymology) that which is finished or completed. There are some things of which the utmost ideal amount is a limited quantity, though a quantity never actually reached. . . . We may speak of absolutely, but not of infinitely, pure water. The purity of water is not a fact of which, whatever degree we suppose attained, there remains a greater beyond. It has an absolute limit: it is capable of being finished or complete, in thought, if not in reality."—(P. 34.)

This criticism is either incorrect or *nihil ad rem*. If meant as a statement of Hamilton's use of the term, it is incorrect; *absolute*, in Hamilton's philosophy, does not mean simply "completed," but "out of relation as completed;" *i. e.*, self-existent in its completeness, and not implying the existence of anything else. If meant in any other sense than Hamilton's, it is irrelevant. Can Mr. Mill really have believed that Schelling thought it necessary to invent an intellectual intuition out of time and out of consciousness, in order to contemplate "an ideal limited quantity," such as the complete purity of water?

Mr. Mill continues:—

"Though the idea of Absolute is thus contrasted with that of Infinite, the one is equally fitted with the other to be predicated of God; but not in respect of the same attributes. There is no incorrectness of speech in the phrase Infinite Power: because the notion it expresses is that of a Being who has the power of doing all things which we know or can conceive, and more. But in speaking of knowledge, Absolute is the proper word, and not Infinite. The highest degree of knowledge that can be spoken of with a meaning, only amounts to knowing all that there is to be known: when that point is reached, knowledge has attained its utmost limit. So of goodness or justice: they cannot be more than perfect. There are not infinite degrees of right. The will is either entirely right, or wrong in different degrees."—(P. 35.)

Surely, whatever Divine power can do, Divine knowledge can know as possible to be done. The one, therefore, must be as infinite as the other. And what of Divine goodness? An angel or a glorified saint is absolutely good in Mr. Mill's sense of the term. His "will is entirely right." Does Mr. Mill mean to say that there is no difference, even in degree, between the goodness of God and that of one of His creatures? But, even supposing his statement to be true, how is it relevant to the matter under discussion? Can Mr. Mill possibly be ignorant that all these attributes are relations; that the Absolute in Hamilton's sense, "the unconditionally limited," is not predicable of God at all; and that

when divines and philosophers speak of the absolute nature of God, they mean a nature in which there is no distinction of attributes at all?

Mr. Mill then proceeds to give a summary of Hamilton's arguments against Cousin, preparatory to refuting them. In the course of this summary he says:—

“Let me ask, *en passant*, where is the necessity for supposing that, if the Absolute, or, to speak plainly, if God, is only known to us in the character of a cause, he must therefore ‘exist merely as a cause,’ and be merely ‘a mean towards an end’? It is surely possible to maintain that the Deity is known to us only as he who feeds the ravens, without supposing that the Divine Intelligence exists solely in order that the ravens may be fed.”*—(P. 42.)

On this we would remark, *en passant*, that this is precisely Hamilton's own doctrine, that the sphere of our belief is more extensive than that of our knowledge. The purport of Hamilton's argument is to shew that the Absolute, as conceived by Cousin, is not a true Absolute (*Infitino-Absolute*), and therefore does not represent the real nature of God. His argument is this: “Cousin's Absolute exists merely as a cause: God does not exist merely as a cause: therefore Cousin's Absolute is not God.” Mr. Mill actually mistakes the position which Hamilton is opposing for that which he is maintaining. Such an error does not lead us to expect much from his subsequent refutation.

His first criticism is a curious specimen of his reading in philosophy. He says:—

“When the True or the Beautiful are spoken of, the phrase is meant to include all things whatever that are true, or all things whatever that are beautiful. If this rule is good for other abstractions, it is good for the Absolute. The word is devoid of meaning unless in reference to predicates of some sort. . . . If we are told, therefore, that there is some Being who is, or which is, the Absolute,—not something absolute, but the Absolute itself,—the proposition can be understood in no other sense than that the supposed Being possesses in absolute completeness *all* predicates ;

* In a note to this passage, Mr. Mill makes some sarcastic comments on an argument of Hamilton's against Cousin's theory that God is necessarily determined to create. “On this hypothesis,” says Hamilton, “God, as necessarily determined to pass from absolute essence to relative manifestation, is determined to pass either from the better to the worse, or from the worse to the better.” Mr. Mill calls this argument “a curiosity of dialectics,” and answers, “Perfect wisdom would have begun to will the new state at the precise moment when it began to be better than the old.” Hamilton is not speaking of states of things, but of states of the Divine nature, as creative or not creative; and Mr. Mill's argument, to refute Hamilton, must suppose a time when the new nature of God begins to be better than the old! Mr. Mill would perhaps have spoken of Hamilton's argument with more respect had he known that it is taken from Plato.

is absolutely good and absolutely bad ; absolutely wise and absolutely stupid ; and so forth."*—(P. 43.)

Plato expressly distinguishes between "the beautiful" and "things that are beautiful," as the One in contrast to the Many—the Real in contrast to the Apparent.† It is, of course, quite possible that Plato may be wrong, and Mr. Mill right ; but the mere fact of their antagonism is sufficient to shew that the meaning of "the phrase" need not be what Mr. Mill supposes it must be. In fact, "the Absolute" in philosophy always has meant the One as distinguished from the Many, not the One as including the Many. But, as applied to Sir W. Hamilton, Mr. Mill's remarks on "the Absolute," and his subsequent remarks on "the Infinite," not only misrepresent Hamilton's position, but exactly reverse it. Hamilton maintains that the terms "absolute" and "infinite" are perfectly intelligible as abstractions, as much so as "relative" and "finite;" for "correlatives suggest each other," and the "knowledge of contradictories is one;" but he denies that a concrete thing or object can be conceived as absolute or infinite. Mr. Mill represents him as only proving that the "unmeaning abstractions are unknowable,"—abstractions which Hamilton does not assert to be unmeaning, and which he regards as knowable in the only sense in which such abstractions can be known, viz., by understanding the meaning of their names.‡

"Something infinite," says Mr. Mill, "is a conception which, like most of our complex ideas, contains a negative element, but which contains positive elements also. Infinite space, for instance ; is there nothing positive in that ? The negative part of this conception is the absence of bounds. The positive are, the idea of space, and of space greater than any finite space."—(P. 45.)

* In support of this position, Mr. Mill cites Hegel—"What kind of an absolute Being is that which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil included ?" We are not concerned to defend Hegel's position ; but he was not quite so absurd as to mean what Mr. Mill supposes him to have meant. Does not Mr. Mill know that it was one of Hegel's fundamental positions, that the Divine nature cannot be expressed by a plurality of predicates ?

† "Republic," book v., p. 479.

‡ This confusion between conceiving a concrete thing and knowing the meaning of abstract terms is as old as Toland's "Christianity not Mysterious," and, indeed, has its germ, though not its development, in the teaching of his assumed master, Locke. Locke taught that all our knowledge is founded on simple ideas, and that a complex idea is merely an accumulation of simple ones. Hence Toland maintained that no object could be mysterious or inconceivable if the terms in which its several attributes are expressed have ideas corresponding to them. But, in point of fact, no single idea can be conceived as an object by itself, though the word by which it is signified has a perfectly intelligible meaning. I cannot, *e. g.*, conceive whiteness by itself, though I can conceive a white wall, *i. e.*, whiteness in combination with other attributes in a concrete object. To conceive attributes as coexisting, however, we must conceive them as coexisting in a certain manner ; for an object of conception is not a mere heap of ideas, but an organized whole, whose constituent ideas exist in a particular combination with and relation to each other. To conceive, therefore, we must not only be able to apprehend each idea separately in the abstract, but also the manner in which they may possibly exist in combination with each other.

This definition of *infinite space* is exactly that which Descartes gives us of *indefinite extension*,—"Ita quia non possumus imaginari extensionem tam magnam, quin intelligamus adhuc majorem esse posse, dicemus magnitudinem rerum possibilium esse indefinitam."* So, too, Cudworth,—“There appeareth no sufficient ground for this positive infinity of space; we being certain of no more than this, that be the world or any figurative body never so great, it is not impossible but that it might be still greater and greater without end. Which *indefinite increasableness* of body and space seems to be mistaken for a *positive infinity* thereof.”† And Locke, a philosopher for whom Mr. Mill will probably have more respect than for Descartes or Cudworth, writes more plainly: “To have actually in the mind the idea of a space infinite, is to suppose the mind already passed over, and actually to have a view of all those repeated ideas of space, which an endless repetition can never totally represent to it,—which carries in it a plain contradiction.”‡ Mr. Mill thus unwittingly illustrates, in his own person, the truth of Hamilton’s remark, “If we dream of effecting this [conceiving the infinite in time or space], we only deceive ourselves by substituting the *indefinite* for the infinite, than which no two notions can be more opposed.” In fact, Mr. Mill does not seem to be aware that what the mathematician calls *infinite*, the metaphysician calls *indefinite*, and that arguments drawn from the mathematical use of the term *infinite* are wholly irrelevant to the metaphysical. How, indeed, could it be otherwise? Can any man suppose that, when the Divine attributes are spoken of as infinite, it is meant that they are indefinitely increasable? §

In fact, it is the “concrete reality,” the “something infinite,” and not the mere abstraction of infinity, which is only conceivable as a negation. Every “something” that has ever been intuitively present to my consciousness is a something finite. When, therefore, I speak

* “Principia,” i. 26.

† “Intellectual System,” ed. Harrison, vol. iii., p. 131.

‡ Essay ii. 17, 7.

§ One of the ablest mathematicians, and the most persevering Hamiltono-mastix of the day, maintains the applicability of the metaphysical notion of infinity to mathematical magnitudes; but with an assumption which unintentionally vindicates Hamilton’s position more fully than could have been done by a professed disciple. “I shall assume,” says Professor De Morgan, in a paper recently printed among the “Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society,” “the notion of infinity and of its reciprocal infinitesimal: that a line can be conceived infinite, and therefore having points at an infinite distance. Image apart, which we cannot have, it seems to me clear that a line of infinite length, without points at an infinite distance, is a contradiction.” Now it is easy to shew, by mere reasoning, without any image, that this assumption is equally a contradiction. For if space is finite, every line in space must be finite also; and if space is infinite, every point in space must have infinite space beyond it in every direction, and therefore cannot be at the greatest possible distance from another point. Or thus: Any two points in space are the extremities of the line connecting them; but an infinite line has no extremities; therefore no two points in space can be connected together by an infinite line.

of a "something infinite," I mean a something existing in a different manner from all the "somethings" of which I have had experience in intuition. Thus it is apprehended, not positively, but negatively—not directly by what it is, but indirectly by what it is not. A negative idea is not negative because it is expressed by a negative term, but because it has never been realised in intuition. If infinity, as applied to space, means the same thing as being greater than any finite space, both conceptions are equally positive or equally negative. If it does not mean the same thing, then, in conceiving a space greater than any finite space, we do not conceive an infinite space.

Mr. Mill's three next criticisms may be very briefly dismissed. First, Hamilton does *not*, as Mr. Mill asserts, say that "the Unconditioned is inconceivable, because it includes both the Infinite and the Absolute, and these are contradictory of one another." His argument is a common disjunctive syllogism. The unconditioned, if conceivable at all, must be conceived *either* as the absolute *or* as the infinite; neither of these is possible; therefore the unconditioned is not conceivable at all. Nor, secondly, is Sir W. Hamilton guilty of the "strange confusion of ideas" which Mr. Mill ascribes to him, when he says that the Absolute, as being absolutely One, cannot be known under the conditions of plurality and difference. The absolute, as such, must be out of all relation, and consequently cannot be conceived in the relation of plurality. "The plurality required," says Mr. Mill, "is not within the thing itself, but is made up between itself and other things." It is, in fact, both; but even granting Mr. Mill's assumption, what is a "plurality between a thing and other things" but a relation between them? There is undoubtedly a "strange confusion of ideas" in this paragraph; but the confusion is not on the part of Sir W. Hamilton. "Again," continues Mr. Mill, "even if we concede that a thing cannot be known at all unless known as plural, does it follow that it cannot be known as plural because it is also One? Since when have the One and the Many been incompatible things, instead of different aspects of the same thing? . . . If there is any meaning in the words, must not Absolute Unity be Absolute Plurality likewise?" Mr. Mill's "since when?" may be answered in the words of Plato:—"Οὐδὲν ἱμοιγε ἀποποιῶ δοκεῖ εἶναι εἰ ἐν ἅπαντα ἀποφαίνει τις τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα πολλὰ τῷ πλήθους αὐ μετέχειν· ἀλλ' εἰ ὃ ἔστιν ἐν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ ἀποδείξει, καὶ αὐτὰ πολλὰ δὴ ἐν, τοῦτο ἤδη θαυμάσομαι."* Here we are expressly told that "absolute unity" cannot be "absolute plurality." Mr. Mill may say that Plato is wrong; but he will hardly go so far as to say that there is no meaning in his words. And, thirdly, when Mr. Mill accuses Sir W. Hamilton of departing from his own meaning

* "Parmenides," p. 120.

of the term *absolute*, in maintaining that the Absolute cannot be a Cause, he only shews that he does not himself know what Hamilton's meaning is. "If Absolute," he says, "means finished, perfected, completed, may there not be a finished, perfected, and completed Cause?" Hamilton's Absolute is that which is "*out of relation*, as finished, perfect, complete;" and a Cause, as such, is both in relation and incomplete. It is in relation to its effect; and it is incomplete without its effect. Finally, when Mr. Mill charges Sir W. Hamilton with maintaining "that extension and figure are of the essence of matter, and perceived as such by intuition," we must briefly reply that Hamilton does no such thing. He is not speaking of the essence of matter *per se*, but only of matter as apprehended in relation to us.

Mr. Mill concludes this chapter with an attempt to discover the meaning of Hamilton's assertion, "to think is to condition." We have already explained what Hamilton meant by this expression; and we recur to the subject now, only to shew the easy manner in which Mr. Mill manages to miss the point of an argument with the clue lying straight before him. "Did any," he says (of those who say that the Absolute is thinkable), "profess to think it in any other manner than by distinguishing it from other things?" Now this is the very thing which, according to Hamilton, Schelling actually did. Mr. Mill does not attempt to shew that Hamilton is wrong in his interpretation of Schelling, nor, if he is right, what were the reasons which led Schelling to so paradoxical a position: he simply assumes that no man could hold Schelling's view, and there is an end of it.* Hamilton's purpose is to reassert in substance the doctrine which Kant maintained, and which Schelling denied; and the natural way to ascertain his meaning would be by reference to these two philosophers. But this is not the method of Mr. Mill, here or elsewhere. He generally endeavours to ascertain Hamilton's meaning by ranging the wide field of possibilities. He tells us what a phrase means in certain authors of whom Hamilton is not thinking, or in reference to certain matters which Hamilton is not discussing; but he hardly ever attempts to trace the history of Hamilton's own view, or the train of thought by which it

* Mr. Mill does not expressly name Schelling in this sentence; but he does so shortly afterwards; and his remark is of the same character with the previous one. "Even Schelling," he says, "was not so gratuitously absurd as to deny that the Absolute must be known according to the capacities of that which knows it—though he was forced to invent a special capacity for the purpose." But if this capacity is an "invention" of Schelling's, and if he was "forced" to invent it, Hamilton's point is proved. To think according to all the real operations of thought which consciousness makes known to us, is to condition. And the faculty of the unconditioned is an invention of Schelling's, not known to consciousness. In other words: all our real faculties bear witness to the truth of Hamilton's statement; and the only way of controverting it is to invent an imaginary faculty for the purpose.

suggested itself to his mind. And the result of this is, that Mr. Mill's interpretations are generally in the potential mood. He wastes a good deal of conjecture in discovering what Hamilton might have meant, when a little attention in the right quarter would have shown what he did mean.

The third feature of Hamilton's philosophy which we charged Mr. Mill with misunderstanding, is the distinction between Knowledge and Belief. In the early part of this article, we endeavoured to explain the true nature of this distinction; we have now only a very limited space to notice Mr. Mill's criticisms on it. Hamilton, he says, admitted "a second source of intellectual conviction called Belief." Now Belief is not a "source" of any conviction, but the conviction itself. No man would say that he is convinced of the truth of a proposition *because* he believes it; his belief in its truth is the same thing as his conviction of its truth. Belief, then, is not a source of conviction, but a conviction having sources of its own. The question is, have we legitimate sources of conviction, distinct from those which constitute Knowledge properly so called? Now here it should be remembered that the distinction is not one invented by Hamilton to meet the exigencies of his own system. He enumerates as many as twenty-two authors, of the most various schools of philosophy, who all acknowledged it before him. Such a concurrence is no slight argument in favour of the reality of the distinction. We do not say that these writers, or Hamilton himself, have always expressed this distinction in the best language, or applied it in the best manner; but we say that it is a true distinction, and that it is valid for the principal purpose to which Hamilton applied it.

We do not agree with all the details of Hamilton's application. We do not agree with him, though he is supported by very eminent authorities, in classifying our conviction of axiomatic principles as *belief*, and not as *knowledge*.* But this question does not directly bear on Mr. Mill's criticism. The point of that criticism is, that Hamilton, by admitting a *belief* in the infinite and unrelated, nullifies

* Hamilton's distinction is in principle the same as that which we have given in the former part of this article. He says, "A conviction is incomprehensible when there is merely given to us in consciousness—*That its object is (ὅτι ἔστι)*, and when we are unable to comprehend through a higher notion or belief *Why or How it is (διότι ἔστι)*."—(Reid's Works, p. 764.) We would distinguish between *why* and *how*, between *διότι* and *πῶς*. We can give no reason *why* two straight lines cannot enclose a space; but we can comprehend *how* they cannot. We have only to form the corresponding image, to see the manner in which the two attributes coexist in one object. But when I say that I believe in the existence of a spiritual being who sees without eyes, I cannot conceive the *manner* in which seeing coexists with the absence of the bodily organ of sight. We believe that the true distinction between knowledge and belief may ultimately be referred to the presence or absence of the corresponding intuition; but to shew this in the various instances would require a longer dissertation than our present limits will allow.

his own doctrine, that all *knowledge* is of the finite and relative. Let us see.

We may believe *that* a thing-is, without being able to conceive *how* it is. I believe *that* God is a person, and also *that* He is infinite; though I cannot conceive *how* the attributes of personality and infinity exist together. All my knowledge of personality is derived from my consciousness of my own finite personality. I therefore believe in the coexistence of attributes in God, in some manner different from that in which they coexist in me as limiting each other: and thus I believe in the fact, though I am unable to conceive the manner. So, again, Kant brings certain counter arguments, to prove, on the one side, that the world has a beginning in time, and, on the other side, that it has not a beginning. Now suppose I am unable to refute either of these courses of argument, am I therefore compelled to have no belief at all? May I not say, I believe, in spite of Kant, *that* the world has a beginning in time, though I am unable to conceive *how* it can have so begun? What is this, again, but a belief in an absolute reality beyond the sphere of my relative knowledge?

"I am not now considering," says Mr. Mill, "what it is that, in our author's opinion, we are bound to believe concerning the unknowable." Why, this was the very thing he ought to have considered, before pronouncing the position to be untenable, or to be irreconcilable with something else. Meanwhile, it is instructive to observe that Mr. Mill himself believes, or requires his readers to believe, something concerning the unknown. He does not know, or at any rate he does not tell his readers, what Hamilton requires them to believe concerning the unknowable; but he himself believes, and requires them to believe, that this unknown something is incompatible with the doctrine that knowledge is relative. We cannot regard this as a very satisfactory mode of refuting Hamilton's thesis.*

But if Mr. Mill is unjust towards the distinction between Know-

* In a subsequent chapter (p. 120), Mr. Mill endeavours to overthrow this distinction between Knowledge and Belief, by means of Hamilton's own theory of Consciousness. Hamilton maintains that we cannot be conscious of a mental operation without being conscious of its object. On this Mr. Mill retorts that if, as Hamilton admits, we are conscious of a belief in the Infinite and the Absolute, we must be conscious of the Infinite and the Absolute themselves; and such consciousness is Knowledge. The fallacy of this retort is transparent. The immediate object of Belief is a *proposition* which I hold to be true, not a *thing* apprehended in an act of conception. I believe in an infinite God; *i.e.*, I believe *that* God is infinite; I believe that the attributes which I ascribe to God exist in Him in an infinite degree. Now, to believe this proposition, I must, of course, be conscious of its meaning; but I am not therefore conscious of the Infinite God as an object of conception; for this would require further an apprehension of the manner in which these infinite attributes coexist so as to form one object. The whole argument of this eighth chapter is confused, owing to Mr. Mill not having distinguished between those passages in which Sir W. Hamilton is merely using an *argumentum ad hominem* in relation to Reid, and those in which he is reasoning from general principles.

ledge and Belief, as held by Sir W. Hamilton, he makes ample amends to the injured theory in the next chapter, by extending the province of credibility far beyond any bounds which Hamilton would have dreamed of claiming for it. Conceivability or inconceivability, he tells us, are usually dependent on association; and it is quite possible that, under other associations, we might be able to conceive, and therefore to believe, anything short of the direct contradiction that the same thing is and is not. It is not in itself incredible that a square may at the same time be round, that two straight lines may enclose a space, or even that two and two may make five.* But whatever concessions Mr. Mill may make on this point, he is at least fully determined that Sir W. Hamilton shall derive no benefit from them; for he forthwith proceeds to charge Sir William with confusing three distinct senses of the term *conception*—a confusion which exists solely in his own imagination,†—and to assert that the Philosophy of the Conditioned is entirely founded on a mistake, inasmuch as infinite space on the one hand, and, on the other, both an absolute minimum and an infinite divisibility of space, are perfectly conceivable. With regard to the former of these two assertions, Mr. Mill's whole argument is vitiated, as we have already shown, by his confusion between *infinite* and *indefinite*; but it is worth while to quote one of his special instances in this chapter, as a specimen of the kind of reasoning which an eminent writer on logic can sometimes employ. In reference to Sir W. Hamilton's assertion, that infinite space would require infinite time to conceive it, he says,

* In reference to this last paradox, Mr. Mill quotes from "Essays by a Barrister:" "There is a world in which, whenever two pairs of things are either placed in proximity or are contemplated together, a fifth thing is immediately created and brought within the contemplation of the mind engaged in putting two and two together. . . . In such a world surely two and two would make five. That is, the result to the mind of contemplating two twos would be to count five." The answer to this reasoning has been already given by Archdeacon Lee in his *Essay on Miracles*. The "five" in this case is not the sum of two and two, but of two and two *plus* the new creature, *i. e.*, of two and two *plus* one.

† The sense in which Sir W. Hamilton himself uses the word *conception* is explained in a note to Reid's Works, p. 377—namely, the combination of two or more attributes in a *unity of representation*. The second sense which Mr. Mill imagines is simply a mistake of his own. When Hamilton speaks of being "unable to conceive as possible," he does not mean, as Mr. Mill supposes, physically possible under the law of gravitation or some other law of matter, but mentally possible as a representation or image; and thus the supposed second sense is identical with the first. The third sense may also be reduced to the first; for to conceive two attributes as combined in one representation is to form a notion subordinate to those of each attribute separately. We do not say that Sir W. Hamilton has been uniformly accurate in his application of the test of conceivability; but we say that his inaccuracies, such as they are, do not affect the theory of the conditioned, and that in all the long extracts which Mr. Mill quotes, with footnotes, indicating "first sense," "second sense," "third sense," the author's meaning may be more accurately explained in the first sense only.

"Let us try the doctrine upon a complex whole, short of infinite, such as the number 695,788. Sir W. Hamilton would not, I suppose, have maintained that this number is inconceivable. How long did he think it would take to go over every separate unit of this whole, so as to obtain a perfect knowledge of the exact sum, as different from all other sums, either greater or less?"

It is marvellous that it should not have occurred to Mr. Mill, while he was writing this passage, "How comes this large number to be a 'whole' at all; and how comes it that 'this whole,' with all its units, can be written down by means of six digits?" Simply because of a conventional arrangement, by which a single digit, according to its position, can express, by one mark, tens, hundreds, thousands, &c., of units; and thus can exhaust the sum by dealing with its items in large masses. But how can such a process exhaust the infinite? We should like to know how long Mr. Mill thinks it would take to work out the following problem:—"If two figures can represent ten, three a hundred, four a thousand, five ten thousand, &c., find the number of figures required to represent infinity."*

Infinite divisibility stands or falls with infinite extension. In both cases Mr. Mill confounds infinity with indefiniteness. But with regard to an absolute minimum of space, Mr. Mill's argument requires a separate notice.

"It is not denied," he says, "that there is a portion of extension which to the naked eye appears an indivisible point; it has been called by philosophers the *minimum visible*. This minimum we can indefinitely magnify by means of optical instruments, making visible the still smaller parts which compose it. In each successive experiment there is still a *minimum visible*, anything less than which, cannot be discovered with that instrument, but can with one of a higher power. Suppose, now, that as we increase the magnifying power of our instruments, and before we have reached the limit of possible increase, we arrive at a stage at which that which seemed the smallest visible space under a given microscope, does not appear larger under one which, by its mechanical construction, is adapted to magnify more, but still remains apparently indivisible. I say, that if this happened, we should believe in a minimum of extension; or if some *à priori* metaphysical prejudice prevented us from believing it, we should at least be enabled to conceive it."—(P. 84.)

The natural conclusion of most men under such circumstances would be, that there was some fault in the microscope. But even if this conclusion were rejected, we presume Mr. Mill would allow that,

* Precisely the same misconception of Hamilton's position occurs in Professor De Morgan's paper in the "Cambridge Transactions," to which we have previously referred. He speaks (p. 13) of the "notion, which runs through many writers, from Descartes to Hamilton, that the mind must be big enough to *hold* all it can conceive." This notion is certainly not maintained by Hamilton, nor yet by Descartes in the paragraph quoted by Mr. De Morgan; nor, as far as we are aware, in any other part of his works.

under the supposed circumstances, the exact magnitude of the minimum of extension would be calculable. We have only to measure the *minimum visible*, and know what is the magnifying power of our microscope, to determine the exact dimensions. Suppose, then, that we assign to it some definite magnitude—say the ten billionth part of an inch,—should we then conclude that it is impossible to conceive the twenty billionth part of an inch?—in other words, that we have arrived at a definite magnitude which has no conceivable half? Surely this is a somewhat rash concession to be made by a writer who has just told us that numbers may be conceived up to infinity; and therefore, of course, down to infinitesimality.

Mr. Mill concludes this chapter with an assertion which, even by itself, is sufficient to shew how very little he has attended to or understood the philosophy which he is attempting to criticise. "The law of Excluded Middle," he says, "as well as that of Contradiction, is common to all phenomena. But it is a doctrine of our author that these laws are true, and cannot but be known to be true, of *Noumena* likewise. It is not merely Space as cognisable by our senses, but Space as it is in itself, which he affirms must be either of unlimited or of limited extent" (p. 86). At this sentence we fairly stand aghast. "Space as it is in itself"! the *Noumenon* Space! Has Mr. Mill been all this while "examining" Sir William Hamilton's philosophy, in utter ignorance that the object of that philosophy is the "Conditioned in Time and Space;" that he accepts Kant's analysis of time and space as formal necessities of thought, but pronounces no opinion whatever as to whether time and space can exist as *Noumena* or not? It is the phenomenal space, "space as cognisable by our senses," which Sir W. Hamilton says must be either limited or unlimited: concerning the *Noumenon* Space, he does not hazard an opinion whether such a thing exists or not. He says, indeed (and this is probably what has misled Mr. Mill), that the laws of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, are laws of things as well as laws of thought;* but he says nothing about these laws as predicating infinite or finite extension. On the contrary, he expressly classifies Space under the law of Relativity, the violation of which indicates what may exist, but what we are unable to conceive as existing. Briefly, the law of Excluded Middle (to take this instance alone) is a law of things only in its abstract form, "Everything must be A or not A" (*extended*, if you please, or *not extended*); but in its subordinate form, "Everything extended must be extended infinitely or finitely," it is only applicable, and only intended by Hamilton to be applied, to those *phenomena* which are already given as extended in some degree.

1. We have now examined the first six chapters of Mr. Mill's book,

* "Discussions," p. 603.

containing his remarks on that portion of Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy which he justly regards as comprising the most important of the doctrines which specially belong to Hamilton himself. The next chapter is an episode, in which Mr. Mill turns aside from Sir W. Hamilton to criticise Mr. Mansel's "Bampton Lectures." As our limits do not permit us to carry on the argument at present through the remainder of Mr. Mill's remarks on Hamilton himself, we shall conclude our notice with a few words on this chapter, as closing the properly metaphysical portion of Mr. Mill's book, and as affording ample proof that, in this department of philosophy at least, Mr. Mill's powers of misapprehension do not cease when Sir W. Hamilton is no longer their object.

Mr. Mill's method of criticism makes it generally necessary to commence with a statement of the criticised theory as it really is, before proceeding to his exposition of it as it is not. The present instance offers no exception to this rule. Mr. Mansel's argument may be briefly stated as follows. The primary and essential conception of God, imperatively demanded by our moral and religious consciousness, is that of a *person*. But personality implies intellectual and moral attributes; and the only direct and immediate knowledge which we have of such attributes is derived from the testimony of self-consciousness, bearing witness to their existence in a certain manner in ourselves. But when we endeavour to transfer the conception of personality, thus obtained, to the domain of theology, we meet with certain difficulties, which, while they are not sufficient to hinder us from *believing* in the Divine Personality as a fact, yet hinder us from *conceiving* the manner of its existence, and prevent us from exhibiting our belief as a philosophical conclusion, proved by irrefragable reasoning and secured against all objections. These difficulties are occasioned, on the one hand, by the so-called Philosophy of the Unconditioned, which in all ages has shown a tendency towards Pantheism, and which, in one of its latest and most finished manifestations, announces itself as the exhibition of God as He is in His eternal nature before creation; and, on the other hand, by the limitations and conditions to which our own personality is subject, and which, as we have pointed out in the former part of this article, have from the very beginning of Christian theology, prevented theologians from accepting the limited personality of man as an exact image and counterpart of the unlimited personality of God. These difficulties Mr. Mansel endeavours to meet in two ways. On the one side, he maintains, in common with Sir W. Hamilton, that the Philosophy of the Unconditioned, by reason of its own incongruities and self-contradictions, has no claim to be accepted as a competent witness in the matter; and on the other side, he maintains, in common with many theologians before

him, that human personality cannot be assumed as an exact copy of the Divine, but only as that which is most nearly analogous to it among finite things. But these two positions, if admitted, involve a corresponding practical conclusion as regards the criterion of religious truth or falsehood. Were we capable, either, on the one hand, of a clear conception of the Unconditioned, or, on the other, of a direct intuition of the Divine Attributes as objects of consciousness, we might be able to construct, deductively or inductively, an exact science of Theology. As it is, we are compelled to reason by analogy; and analogy furnishes only probabilities, varying, it may be, from slight presumptions up to moral certainties, but whose weight, in any given case, can only be determined by comparison with other evidences. There are three distinct sources from which we may obtain a knowledge of the ways of God—first, from our own moral and intellectual consciousness, by which we judge *à priori* of what God ought to do in a given case, by determining what we should think it wise or right for ourselves to do in a similar case; secondly, from the constitution and course of nature, from which we may know by experience what God's providence in certain cases actually is; and thirdly, from revelation, attested by its proper evidences. Where these three agree in their testimony (as in the great majority of cases they do) we have the moral certainty which results from the harmony of all accessible evidences: where they appear to differ, we have no right at once to conclude that the second or the third must give way to the first, and not *vice versa*; because we have no right to assume that the first alone is infallible. In the author's own words: "The lesson to be learnt from an examination of the Limits of Religious Thought is not that man's judgments are *worthless* in relation to Divine things, but that they are *fallible*: and the probability of error in any particular case can never be fairly estimated without giving their full weight to all collateral considerations. We are indeed bound to believe that a Revelation given by God can never contain anything that is really unwise or unrighteous; but we are not always capable of estimating exactly the wisdom or righteousness of particular doctrines or precepts. And we are bound to bear in mind that *exactly in proportion to the strength of the remaining evidence for the Divine origin of a religion, is the probability that we may be mistaken in supposing this or that portion of its contents to be unworthy of God*. Taken in conjunction, the two arguments may confirm or correct each other: taken singly and absolutely, each may vitiate the result which should follow from their joint application."*

In criticising the first part of this argument—that which is directed against the deductive philosophy of the Unconditioned—Mr. Mill mani-

* "Bampton Lectures," p. 156, 4th edition.

feels the same want of acquaintance with its meaning, and with the previous history of the question, which he had before exhibited in his attack on Sir W. Hamilton. He begins by finding fault with the definition of the Absolute, which Mr. Mansel (herein departing, and purposely departing, from Sir W. Hamilton's use of the term) defines as "that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other Being." On this, Mr. Mill remarks: "The first words of his definition would serve for the description of a Noumenon; but Mr. Mansel's Absolute is only meant to denote one Being, identified with God, and God is not the only Noumenon." The description of a Noumenon! This is almost equal to the discovery of a Noumenon Space. Does Mr. Mill really suppose that all noumena are self-existent? A *noumenon* (in the sense in which we suppose Mr. Mill to understand the term, for it has different meanings in different philosophies) implies an existence out of relation to the human mind.* But is this the same as being out of all relation whatever, as existing "in and by itself"? Does Mr. Mill mean to say that a creature, whether perceived by us or not, has no relation to its Creator? But Mr. Mill, as we have seen before, is not much at home when he gets among "noumena." We must proceed to his criticism of the second part of the definition,—*"having no necessary relation to any other being."* Of these words he says, that "they admit of two constructions. The words in their natural sense only mean, *capable of existing out of relation to anything else.* The argument requires that they should mean, *incapable of existing in relation with anything else.*" And why is this non-natural sense to be forced upon very plain words? Because, says Mr. Mill,—

"In what manner is a possible existence out of all relation, incompatible with the notion of a cause? Have not causes a possible existence apart from their effects? Would the sun, for example, not exist if there were no earth or planets for it to illuminate? Mr. Mansel seems to think that what is capable of existing out of relation, cannot possibly be conceived or known in relation. But this is not so. . . . Freed from this confusion of ideas, Mr. Mansel's argument resolves itself into this,—The same Being cannot be

* Strictly speaking, the term *noumenon*, as meaning that which can be apprehended only by the intellect, implies a relation to the intellect apprehending it; and in this sense τὸ νοούμενον is opposed by Plato to τὸ ὁρώμενον—the object of intellect to the object of sight. But as the intellect was supposed to take cognisance of things as they are, in opposition to the sensitive perception of things as they appear, the term *noumenon* became synonymous with *thing in itself* (τὸ ὃν καθ' αὐτό). And this meaning is retained in the Kantian philosophy, in which the *noumenon* is identical with the *Ding an sich*. But as Kant denied to the human intellect any immediate intuition of things as they are (though such an intuition may be possible to a superhuman intellect), hence the term *noumenon* in the Kantian philosophy is opposed to all of which the human intellect can take positive cognisance. Hamilton, in this respect, agrees with Kant. But neither Kant nor Hamilton, in opposing the *thing in itself* to the *phenomenon*, meant to imply that the former is necessarily self-existent, and therefore uncreated.

thought by us both as Cause and as Absolute, because a Cause *as such* is not Absolute, and Absolute, as such, is not a Cause; which is exactly as if he had said that Newton cannot be thought by us both as an Englishman and as a mathematician, because an Englishman, as such, is not a mathematician, nor a mathematician, as such, an Englishman.”—(P. 92.)

The “confusion of ideas” is entirely of Mr. Mill’s own making, and is owing to his having mutilated the argument before criticising it. The argument in its original form consists of two parts; the first intended to shew that the Absolute is not conceived *as such* in being conceived as a Cause; the second to shew that the Absolute cannot be conceived under different aspects at different times—first as Absolute, and then as Cause. It was the impossibility of this latter alternative which drove Cousin to the hypothesis of a necessary causation from all eternity. Mr. Mill entirely omits the latter part of the argument, and treats the former part as if it were the whole. The part criticised by Mr. Mill is intended to prove exactly what it does prove, and no more; namely, that a cause *as such* is not the absolute, and that to know a cause *as such* is not to know the absolute. We presume Mr. Mill himself will admit that to know Newton as a mathematician is not to know him as an Englishman. Whether he can be known separately as both, and whether the Absolute in this respect is a parallel case, depends on another consideration, which Mr. Mill has not noticed. The continuation of Mr. Mill’s criticism is equally confused. He says :—

“The whole of Mr. Mansel’s argument for the inconceivability of the Infinite and of the Absolute is one long *ignoratio elenchi*. It has been pointed out in a former chapter that the words Absolute and Infinite have no real meaning, unless we understand by them that which is absolute or infinite in some given attribute; as space is called infinite, meaning that it is infinite in extension; and as God is termed infinite, in the sense of possessing infinite power, and absolute in the sense of absolute goodness or knowledge. It has also been shown that Sir W. Hamilton’s arguments for the unknowableness of the Unconditioned do not prove that we cannot know an object which is absolute or infinite in some specific attribute, but only that we cannot know an abstraction called ‘The Absolute’ or ‘The Infinite,’ which is supposed to have all attributes at once.”—(P. 93.)

The fallacy of this criticism, as regards Sir W. Hamilton, has been already pointed out: as regards Mr. Mansel, it is still more glaring, inasmuch as that writer expressly declares that he uses the term *absolute* in a different sense from that which Mr. Mill attributes to Sir W. Hamilton. When Mr. Mill charges Mr. Mansel with “undertaking to prove the impossibility” of conceiving “a Being *absolutely* just or *absolutely* wise”* (*i. e.*, as he supposes, *perfectly* just or wise), he actually forgets that he has just been criticising Mr. Mansel’s definition of the Absolute, as something having a possible existence “out of all

* “Examination,” p. 95.

relation." Will Mr. Mill have the kindness to tell us what he means by goodness and knowledge "out of all relation;" *i. e.*, a goodness and knowledge related to no object on which they can be exercised; a goodness which is good to nothing, a knowledge which knows nothing? Mr. Mill had better be cautious in talking about *ignoratio elenchi*.

From the Absolute, Mr. Mill proceeds to the Infinite; and here he commits the same mistake as before, treating a portion of an argument as if it were the whole, and citing a portion intended to prove one point as if it were intended to prove another. He cites a passage from Mr. Mansel, in which it is said that "the Infinite, if it is to be conceived at all, must be conceived as potentially everything and actually nothing; for if there is anything in general which it cannot become, it is thereby limited; and if there is anything in particular which it actually is, it is thereby excluded from being any other thing. But, again, it must also be conceived as actually everything and potentially nothing; for an unrealised potentiality is likewise a limitation. If the Infinite can be that which it is not, it is by that very possibility marked out as incomplete, and capable of a higher perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses no characteristic feature by which it can be distinguished from anything else, and discerned as an object of consciousness." On this passage Mr. Mill remarks, "Can a writer be serious who bids us conjure up a conception of something which possesses infinitely all conflicting attributes, and because we cannot do this without contradiction, would have us believe that there is a contradiction in the idea of infinite goodness or infinite wisdom?" The answer to this criticism is very simple. The argument is not employed for the purpose which Mr. Mill supposes. It is employed to shew that the metaphysical notion of the absolute-infinite, as the sum, potential or actual, of all possible existence, is inconceivable under the laws of human consciousness; and thus that the absolutely first existence, related to nothing and limited by nothing, the *ens realissimum* of the older philosophers, the *pure being* of the Hegelians, cannot be attained as a starting-point from which to deduce all relative and derived existence. How far the empirical conception of certain mental attributes, such as goodness or wisdom, derived in the first instance from our own personal consciousness, can be positively conceived as extended to infinity, is considered in a separate argument, which Mr. Mill does not notice.

Mr. Mill continues, "Instead of 'the Infinite,' substitute 'an infinitely good Being' [*i. e.*, substitute what is not intended], and Mr. Mansel's argument reads thus:—If there is anything which an infinitely good Being cannot become—if he cannot become bad—that is a limitation, and the goodness cannot be infinite. If there is any-

thing which an infinitely good Being actually is (namely, good), he is excluded from being any other thing, as being wise or powerful." To the first part of this objection we reply by simply asking, "Is becoming bad a 'higher perfection'?" To the second part we reply by Mr. Mill's favourite mode of reasoning—a parallel case. A writer asserts that a creature which is a horse is thereby excluded from being a dog; and that, in so far as it has the nature of a horse, it has not the nature of a dog. "What!" exclaims Mr. Mill, "is it not the nature of a dog to have four legs? and does the man mean to say that a horse has not four legs?" We venture respectfully to ask Mr. Mill whether he supposes that being wise is being "a thing," and being good is being another "thing"?

But, seriously, it is much to be wished that when a writer like Mr. Mill undertakes to discuss philosophical questions, he should acquire some slight acquaintance with the history of the questions discussed. Had this been done by our critic in the present case, it might possibly have occurred to him to doubt whether a doctrine supported by philosophers of such different schools of thought as Spinoza, Malebranche, Wolf, Kant, Schelling, could be quite such a piece of transparent nonsense as he supposes it to be. All these writers are cited in Mr. Mansel's note, as maintaining the theory that the Absolute is the *ens realissimum*, or sum of all existence; and their names might have saved Mr. Mill from the absurdity of supposing that by this expression was meant something "absolutely good and absolutely bad; absolutely wise and absolutely stupid; and so forth." The real meaning of the expression has been already explained in the former part of this article. The problem of the Philosophy of the Unconditioned, as sketched by Plato and generally adopted by subsequent philosophers, is, as we have seen, to ascend up to the first principle of all things, and thence to deduce, as from their cause, all dependent and derived existences. The Unconditioned, as the one first principle, must necessarily contain in itself, potentially or actually, all that is derived from it, and thus must comprehend, in embryo or in development, the sum of all existence. To reconcile this conclusion with the phenomenal existence of evil and imperfection, is the difficulty with which philosophy has had to struggle ever since philosophy began. The Manichean, by referring evil to an independent cause, denies the existence of an absolute first principle at all; the Leibnitzian, with his hypothesis of the best possible world, virtually sets bounds to the Divine omnipotence; the Pantheist identifies God with all actual existence, and either denies the real existence of evil at all, or merges the distinction between evil and good in some higher indifference. All these conclusions may be alike untenable, but all alike testify to the existence of the problem,

and to the vast though unsuccessful efforts which man's reason has made to solve it.

The reader may now, perhaps, understand the reason of an assertion which Mr. Mill regards as supremely absurd,—namely, that we must believe in the existence of an absolute and infinite Being, though unable to conceive the nature of such a Being. To believe in such a Being, is simply to believe that God made the world: to declare the nature of such a Being inconceivable, is simply to say that we do not know how the world was made. If we believe that God made the world, we must believe that there was a time when the world was not, and when God alone existed, out of relation to any other being. But the mode of that sole existence we are unable to conceive, nor in what manner the first act took place by which the absolute and self-existent gave existence to the relative and dependent. “The contradictions,” says Mr. Mill, “which Mr. Mansel asserts to be involved in the notions, do not follow from an imperfect mode of apprehending the Infinite and Absolute, but lie in the definitions of them, in the meaning of the words themselves.” They do no such thing: the meaning of the words is perfectly intelligible, and is exactly what is expressed by their definitions: the contradictions arise from the attempt to combine the attributes expressed by the words in one representation with others, so as to form a positive object of consciousness. Where is the incongruity of saying, “I believe that a being exists possessing certain attributes, though I am unable in my present state of knowledge to conceive the manner of that existence”? Mr. Mill, at all events, is the last man in the world who has any right to complain of such a distinction—Mr. Mill, who considers it not incredible that in some part of the universe two straight lines may enclose a space, or two and two make five; though he is compelled to allow that under our present laws of thought, or, if he pleases, of association, we are unable to conceive how these things can be.

It is wearisome work to wade through this mass of misconceptions; yet we must entreat the reader's patience a little longer, while we say a few words in conclusion on perhaps the greatest misconception of all—though that is bold language to use with regard to Mr. Mill's metaphysics,—at any rate, the one which he expresses in the most vehement language. Mr. Mansel, as we have said, asserts, as many others have asserted before him, that the relation between the communicable attributes of God and the corresponding attributes of man is one not of identity, but of analogy; that is to say, that the Divine attributes have the same relation to the Divine nature that the human attributes have to human nature. Thus, for example, there is a Divine justice and there is a human justice; but God is just as the Creator and Governor of the world, having unlimited

authority over all His creatures and unlimited jurisdiction over all their acts; and man is just in certain special relations, as having authority over some persons and some acts only, so far as is required for the needs of human society. So, again, there is a Divine mercy and there is a human mercy; but God is merciful in such a manner as is fitting compatibly with the righteous government of the universe; and man is merciful in a certain limited range, the exercise of the attribute being guided by considerations affecting the welfare of society or of individuals. Or to take a more general case: Man has in himself a rule of right and wrong, implying subjection to the authority of a superior (for conscience has authority only as reflecting the law of God); while God has in Himself a rule of right and wrong, implying no higher authority, and determined absolutely by His own nature. The case is the same when we look at moral attributes, not externally, in their active manifestations, but internally, in their psychological constitution. If we do not attribute to God the same complex mental constitution of reason, passion, and will, the same relation to motives and inducements, the same deliberation and choice of alternatives, the same temporal succession of facts in consciousness, which we ascribe to man,—it will follow that those psychological relations between reason, will, and desire, which are implied in the conception of human action, cannot represent the Divine excellences in themselves, but can only illustrate them by analogies from finite things. And if man is liable to error in judging of the conduct of his fellow-men, in proportion as he is unable to place himself in their position, or to realise to himself their modes of thought and principles of action—if the child, for instance, is liable to error in judging the actions of the man, or the savage of the civilised man,—surely there is far more room for error in men's judgment of the ways of God, in proportion as the difference between God and man is greater than the difference between a man and a child.

This doctrine elicits from Mr. Mill the following extraordinary outburst of rhetoric:—

“If, instead of the glad tidings that there exists a Being in whom all the excellences which the highest human mind can conceive, exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world is ruled by a being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, nor what are the principles of his government, except that ‘the highest human morality which we are capable of conceiving’ does not sanction them; convince me of it, and I will bear my fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this, and at the same time call this being by the names which express and affirm the highest human morality, I say in plain terms that I will not. Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do: he shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go.”—(P. 103.)

We will not pause to comment on the temper and taste of this declamation; we will simply ask whether Mr. Mill really supposes the word *good* to lose all community of meaning, when it is applied, as it constantly is, to different persons among our "fellow-creatures," with express reference to their different duties and different qualifications for performing them? The duties of a father are not the same as those of a son; is the word therefore wholly equivocal when we speak of one person as a *good father*, and another as a *good son*? Nay, when we speak generally of a man as *good*, has not the epithet a tacit reference to human nature and human duties? and yet is there no community of meaning when the same epithet is applied to other creatures? Ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον,—the goodness of any being whatever has relation to the nature and office of that being. We may therefore test Mr. Mill's declamation by a parallel case. A wise and experienced father addresses a young and inexperienced son: "My son," he says, "there may be some of my actions which do not seem to you to be wise or good, or such as you would do in my place. Remember, however, that your duties are different from mine; that your knowledge of my duties is very imperfect; and that there may be things which you cannot now see to be wise and good, but which you may hereafter discover to be so." "Father," says the son, "your principles of action are not the same as mine; the highest morality which I can conceive at present does not sanction them; and as for believing that you are good in anything of which I do not plainly see the goodness,"—We will not repeat Mr. Mill's alternative; we will only ask whether it is not just possible that there may be as much difference between man and God as there is between a child and his father?

This declamation is followed by a sneer, which is worth quoting, not on its own account, but as an evidence of the generosity with which Mr. Mill deals with the supposed motives of his antagonists, and of the accuracy of his acquaintance with the subject discussed. He says:—

"It is worthy of remark, that the doubt whether words applied to God have their human signification, is only felt when the words relate to his moral attributes; it is never heard of with regard to his power. We are never told that God's omnipotence must not be supposed to mean an infinite degree of the power we know in man and nature, and that perhaps it does not mean that he is able to kill us, or consign us to eternal flames. The Divine Power is always interpreted in a completely human signification; but the Divine Goodness and Justice must be understood to be such only in an unintelligible sense. Is it unfair to surmise that this is because those who speak in the name of God, have need of the human conception of his power, since an idea which can overawe and enforce obedience must address itself to real feelings; but are content that his goodness should be conceived only as something inconceivable, because they are so often required to teach doctrines respecting him which conflict irreconcilably with all goodness that we can conceive?"—(P. 104.)

On the latter part of this paragraph we will not attempt to

comment. But as regards the former part, we meet Mr. Mill's confident assertion with a direct denial, and take the opportunity of informing him that the conception of infinite Power has suggested the same difficulties, and has been discussed by philosophers and theologians in the same manner, as those of infinite Wisdom and infinite Goodness. Has Mr. Mill never heard of such questions as, Whether Omnipotence can reverse the past?—Whether God can do that which He does not will to do?—Whether God's perfect foreknowledge is compatible with his own perfect liberty?—Whether God could have made a better world than the existing one? Nay, has not our critic, in this very chapter, been arguing against Mr. Mansel on the question, whether the Absolute can be conceived as a Cause acting in time: and what is this but a form of the question, whether power when predicated of God is exactly the same thing as power when predicated of man? Or why has it been said that creation *ex nihilo*—an absolutely first act of causation—is inconceivable by us, but from the impossibility of finding in human power an exact type of Divine power? To attribute discreditable motives to an opponent, even to account for unquestionable facts, is usually considered as an abuse of criticism. What shall we say when the facts are fictitious as well as the motives?

Mr. Mill concludes this chapter with another instance of that *ignoratio elenchi* which has been so abundantly manifested throughout his previous criticisms. His opponent, he allows, "would and does admit that the qualities as conceived by us bear *some likeness* to the justice and goodness which belong to God, since man was made in God's image." But he considers that this "semi-concession" "destroys the whole fabric" of Mr. Mansel's argument. "The Divine goodness," he says, "which is said to be a different thing from human goodness, but of which the human conception of goodness is some imperfect reflexion or resemblance, does it agree with what men call goodness in the *essence* of the quality—in what *constitutes* it goodness? If it does, the 'Rationalists' are right; it is not illicit to reason from the one to the other. If not, the divine attribute, whatever else it may be, is not goodness, and ought not to be called by the name." Now the question really at issue is not whether the "Rationalist" argument is licit or illicit, but whether, in its lawful use, it is to be regarded as infallible or fallible. We have already quoted a portion of Mr. Mansel's language on this point; we will now quote two more passages, which, without any comment, will sufficiently shew how utterly Mr. Mill has mistaken the purport of the argument which he has undertaken to examine.

"We do not certainly know the exact nature and operation of the moral attributes of God: we can but infer and conjecture from what we know of the moral attributes of man: and the analogy between the Finite and the

Infinite can never be so perfect as to preclude all possibility of error in the process. But the possibility becomes almost a certainty, when any one human faculty is elevated by itself into an authoritative criterion of religious truth, without regard to those collateral evidences by which its decisions may be modified and corrected.* . . . "Beyond question, every doubt which our reason may suggest in matters of religion is entitled to its due place in the examination of the evidences of religion; if we will treat it as a part only, and not the whole; if we will not insist on a positive solution of that which, it may be, is given us for another purpose than to be solved. It is reasonable to believe that, in matters of belief as well as of practice, God has not thought fit to annihilate the free will of man, but has permitted speculative difficulties to exist as the trial and the discipline of sharp and subtle intellects, as He has permitted moral temptations to form the trial and the discipline of strong and eager passions. . . . We do not doubt that the conditions of our moral trial tend towards good, and not towards evil; that human nature, even in its fallen state, bears traces of the image of its Maker, and is fitted to be an instrument in His moral government. And we believe this, notwithstanding the existence of passions and appetites which, isolated and uncontrolled, appear to lead in an opposite direction. Is it then more reasonable to deny that a system of revealed religion, whose unquestionable tendency as a whole is to promote the glory of God and the welfare of mankind, can have proceeded from the same Author, merely because we may be unable to detect the same character in some of its minuter features, viewed apart from the system to which they belong?"†

We have now considered in detail all that part of Mr. Mill's book which is devoted to the examination of Sir. W. Hamilton's chief and most characteristic doctrines—those which constitute the Philosophy of the Conditioned. The remainder of the work, which deals chiefly with subordinate questions of psychology and logic, contains much from which we widely dissent, but which we cannot at present submit to a special examination. Nor is it necessary, so far as Sir W. Hamilton's reputation is concerned, that we should do so. If the Philosophy of the Conditioned is really nothing better than the mass of crudities and blunders which Mr. Mill supposes it to be, the warmest admirers of Hamilton will do little in his behalf, even should they succeed in vindicating some of the minor details of his teaching. If, on the other hand, it can be shown, as we have attempted to shew, that Mr. Mill is utterly incapable of dealing with Hamilton's philosophy in its higher branches, his readers may be left to judge for themselves whether he is implicitly to be trusted as regards the lower. In point of fact, they will do Mr. Mill no injustice, if they regard the above specimens as samples of his entire criticism. We gladly except, as of a far higher order, those chapters in which he is content with stating his own views; but in the perpetual baiting of Sir W. Hamilton which occupies the greater part of the volume, we recognise, in general, the same captiousness and the same incompetence which we have so often had occasion to point out in the course of our previous remarks.

"Bampton Lectures," p. 157, Fourth Edition.


† *Ibid.*, p. 166.

It is, we confess, an unpleasant and an invidious task, to pick to pieces, bit by bit, the work of an author of high reputation. But Mr. Mill has chosen to put the question on this issue, and he has left those who dissent from him no alternative but to follow his example. He has tasked all the resources of minute criticism to destroy piecemeal the reputation of one who has hitherto borne an honoured name in philosophy: he has no right to complain if the same measure is meted to himself:—

“*Neque enim lex æquior ulla
Quam necis artifices arte perire sua.*”

But it is not so much the justice as the necessity of the case which we would plead as our excuse. Mr. Mill's method of criticism has reduced the question to a very narrow compass. Either Sir W. Hamilton, instead of being a great philosopher, is the veriest blunderer that ever put pen to paper, or the blunders are Mr. Mill's own. To those who accept the first of these alternatives it must always remain a marvel how Sir W. Hamilton could ever have acquired his reputation; how he could have been designated by his illustrious opponent, Cousin, as the “greatest critic of our age,” or described by the learned Brandis as “almost unparalleled in the profound knowledge of ancient and modern philosophy.” The marvel may perhaps disappear, should it be the case, as we believe it to be, that the second alternative is the true one.

But even in this case, it should be borne in mind that the blow will by no means fall on Mr. Mill with the same weight with which he designed it to fall on the object of his criticism. Sir W. Hamilton had devoted his whole life to the study of metaphysics; he was probably more deeply read in that study than any of his contemporaries; and if all his reading could produce nothing more than the confusion and self-contradiction which Mr. Mill imputes to him, the result would be pitiable indeed. Mr. Mill, on the other hand, we strongly suspect, despises metaphysics too much to be at the pains of studying them at all, and seems to think that a critic is duly equipped for his task with that amount of knowledge which, like Dogberry's reading and writing, “comes by nature.” His work has a superficial cleverness which, together with the author's previous reputation, will insure it a certain kind of popularity; but we venture to predict that its estimation by its readers will be in the inverse ratio to their knowledge of the subject. But Mr. Mill's general reputation rests on grounds quite distinct from his performances in metaphysics; and though we could hardly name one of his writings from whose main principles we do not dissent, there is hardly one which is not better fitted to sustain his character as a thinker than this last, in which the fatal charms of the goddess Necessity seem to have betrayed her champion into an unusual excess of polemical zeal, coupled, it must be added, with an unusual deficiency of philosophical knowledge.



FREDERICK WILLIAM ROBERTSON.

Life and Letters of Frederick W. Robertson, M.A., Incumbent of Trinity Chapel, Brighton, 1847-53. Edited by STOPFORD A. BROOKE, M.A., late Chaplain to the Embassy at Berlin. In Two Volumes, with Portraits.

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An Analysis of Mr. Tennison's "In Memoriam." By the late Rev. FREDERICK W. ROBERTSON, M.A. London: Smith, Elder, & Co.

THIRTEEN years ago the clergyman of a proprietary chapel at Brighton died, and was buried with unmistakeable demonstrations of sorrow. A ministry of six years had endeared him to his people, and he had taken sufficient part in public and local questions to be recognised beyond the bounds of his congregation. But he had only published one sermon, and so many clergymen had lectured at Mechanics' Institutes, and spoken on Ecclesiastical Titles Bills and early closing of shops, that not much heed was taken of one clergyman more. As for any lasting influence, his life seemed to have ended at the grave abruptly, immaturely, for he died young. As for any mark to be traced by him in the religious thought of England, England had never heard of him. In a year or two a volume of his sermons was published, with the drawbacks inseparable from all posthumous publications. He had not written them before they were preached, but after they were preached he had condensed them for some absent friends—a task which he had imposed on himself with exceeding dislike, and executed with great swiftness and brevity. Other volumes followed, more imperfect, less authoritative, less likely to represent him at his best, to fulfil his requirements of what a sermon

ought to be,—too closely packed and merely suggestive, if not skeleton-like, to be popular. Yet their circulation spread with extraordinary rapidity; they ran even with the last novel; they became a staple of the circulating library; Tauchnitz published them, at Leipsic, in his collection of British authors; in America and at home their popularity was unprecedented; and a thirteenth edition, last autumn, proves that it is steadily maintained. Mr. Robertson of Brighton was soon as prominent a name as the Church could point to. People were so ready to catch at almost anything he had said, that there was danger of publishing too much, of letting the world look on his most private and crude thoughts, of trusting to the uncertainty of casual reports by those who had heard him, of being driven by his very fame to be ungenerous to it. There was an eager looking for some particulars of his life, as of a man who had strangely dropped away unknown, though surely among the best worth knowing of his time; and all the while there was a steady growth and penetration of his influence, preparing men to receive his, “*Life and Letters*” with an interest, curiosity, and welcome accorded only to a few.

Some rare and singular power must have dwelt in this modest working clergyman, to account for the story of a fame so unique in our pulpit literature; and whatever may be the secret of his influence, we are not likely to have further means of judging than these now before us in his *Life and Works*.

Frederick Robertson was born in London in 1816, and passed his childhood in Leith Fort, where his earliest recollections were of “my pony, and my cricket, and my rabbits, and my father’s pointers, and the days when I proudly carried his game-bag, and my ride home with the old gamekeeper by moonlight in the frosty evenings, and the boom of the cannon, and my father’s orderly, the artilleryman who used to walk with me hand in hand.” He spent a happy, bright life between Leith, Beverley, and Tours, and at sixteen entered the Edinburgh Academy. He had an iron constitution, and excelled in all athletic games, and he was at the same time studious, quiet, sensitive, imaginative. His love of truth was intense and passionate, only equalled by his noble scorn for meanness, his purity and courage. After winning distinctions at the Academy, he attended the Edinburgh University for a session, and at eighteen was articled to a solicitor at Bury St. Edmunds. A year of this work was enough to test its uncongeniality and prevent its becoming his profession. His father was anxious he should enter the Church: he thought it would be natural to the deep religious feeling of his son’s character; but at last the army was settled, to Robertson’s delight. “I was rocked and cradled,” he said afterwards, “to the roar of artillery, and the very name of such things sounds to me like home; a review, suggesting the

conception of a real battle, impresses me to tears." His name was placed on the list of a cavalry regiment for India, and he threw himself with his usual energy and passion into the needful preparation, studied Indian politics and peoples, Indian campaigns, and Indian Christianity. He had positively declined the Church, saying, "Anything but that: I am not fit for it." To his father's urging he had returned the final reply, "No, never." But while his commission was delayed, accident threw him in the way of the present Bishop of Cashel, who tried to dissuade him from the army. "If I had not met a certain person," he wrote afterwards, "I should not have changed my profession: if I had not known a certain lady I should not probably have met this person: if that lady had not had a delicate daughter who was disturbed by the barking of my dog; if my dog had not barked that night, I should now have been in the Dragoons, or fertilizing the soil of India. Who can say that these things were not ordered?" He left the decision to his father; was matriculated at Oxford; and a fortnight afterwards he received the offer of a cavalry commission. Characteristically, he never flinched from his new life. He would not have chosen it; but he would not go back from it. "He was the most inflexible person, with all his almost morbid delicacy of feeling,—an iron will, impossible to move when it was fixed by principle."

It must have cost him singular pain: not because he was not a Christian, for his ambition had been to confess Christ and do good in the army; but because his whole life was strung to the calling of a soldier. Until he died the soldier spirit would assert itself. He suggested to his father that he might take a military chaplaincy. He continually borrowed his illustrations from the barrack and the camp, and was afraid "they are too military." He longed "for a soldier's spirit in the Church." "I wish," he wrote, after Chillianwallah, "I had been with my own wondrous gallant regiment in that campaign." Walking home one evening, at Brighton, in his dragoon's cloak, he thought he "ought to be lying in it, at rest, at Moodkee, where the Third fought so gallantly." "Often with most unclerical emphasis did he express his wish to die sword in hand against a French invader." For some time he could scarcely pass a soldier in the street without observing—"Well, so I am to have nothing to do with them;" or, "Poor fellows! Few care for their souls!" To the last he "could not see a regiment manœuvre nor artillery in motion without a choking sensation," and would rather "lead a forlorn hope than mount the pulpit stairs."

It was with a soldier's self-sacrifice to duty that he went to Oxford: it was the spirit of a soldier that he carried there into his life, confessing Christ with a bold and manly fervour. His residence at Brasenose passed simply away. But for his scrupulous modesty he

might have taken honours: but for his sensitive reticence he might have made many friends. He read carefully, attended lectures sixteen hours in the week, varied theology with Buckland's geological class, mastered Plato, Aristotle, and Butler, spoke often, though not effectively, at the "Union," noted the drift of the prevailing currents of thought, and recoiled from what he thought the donnishness of University life. The minute detail and technical knowledge asked by the schools seemed to him a waste of time and mental power, yet his Greek compositions evince exquisite taste and grammatical accuracy. If he chafed against the system, it was rather against what he conceived to be its spirit than its requirements. Moral tone and large and comprehensive ideas were what he valued first, and the men he sought were the thoughtful and devout. He felt afterwards that he might have done more. Without yielding his conviction that the prestige of University honours "is forgotten or slightly looked upon by the large world," he advised others that the mental habits they demand "are incapable of being replaced by anything." To choose his own course of reading he felt was "utterly, mournfully, irreparably wrong. The excitement of theological controversy, questions of the day, politics, gleams and flashes of new paths of learning, led me at full speed for three years, modifying my plans perpetually. Now I would give £200 a year to have read, on a bad plan, chosen for me, but steadily."

His first curacy was at Winchester, where "his way of life was most regular and simple. Study all the morning; in the afternoon, hard fagging at visitation of the poor, in the closest and dirtiest streets; his evenings were spent alone, but very often with his rector." He devoted himself to the Sunday schools, and trained the teachers himself. In his study he applied himself to Hebrew and Biblical criticism, and thought afterwards he had developed his mind with more fidelity at Winchester than anywhere. But he says, "I begin to think and tremble as I never did before, and I *cannot* live to Christ. My heart is detached indeed from earth, but it is not given to Him. All I do is a cross, and not a pleasure." His morbid self-analysis tormented him with bitter thoughts, for his impulses still sprang more from duty than from love, and his service was measured by law. After a year of this eager, energetic, but unsatisfied life, he was seized with the impression that the consumptive malady of his family was upon him. It filled him with a depressing "lethargy of body and apathy of mind," from which his rector advised him to escape by relaxation from work and change of scene; and having sorrowfully passed his examination for priest's orders, he turned his steps to Geneva. There, after a short stay, he married; and on returning to England, accepted the curacy of Christ Church

at Cheltenham, where he remained for almost five years, feeling it "far less satisfactory than Winchester, partly from the superficial nature of the place, partly from the effect of the temptations, and frittering away of time," but bound to it by the most devoted attachment to his rector, Mr. Boyd. Here also his gifts as a preacher came to be recognised, though in no way adequate to their largeness and brilliance. And here the half-morbid sadness of his character burdened his heart with the fear that,—

"As it is, I live and die unheard,
With a most voiceless thought, sheathing it like a sword."

He believed his sermons to be unintelligible. He fancied "duties left undone which others might deem only too well performed." In his diary "there are long lists of poor and sick whom he visited, and accounts of sums paid out of a small income to clear off the debts of struggling workmen;" and in the same diary he writes, "Low and dispirited. I mourn, not that I cannot be happy, but that I know not what to do nor how to do it." He accuses himself of neglect of the poor, and yet a friend of that time recollects "his calling on me just before his going abroad, as late as ten o'clock at night, and taking me with him a distance of three miles, through such a storm as Lear was out in, to visit a poor disconsolate old man who seemed to have shut himself out from human sympathies, and therefore all the more enlisted his." But the conviction of failure pressed too heavily to be shaken off. If men talked to him of the seed he was sowing, he would point to the pavement, and ask "if he might reap a harvest there!" His health suffered; and at last he was compelled to try again the healing and rest of foreign travel. After walking for six weeks through the Tyrol, he lingered for nine at Heidelberg, where he took duty for the English chaplain. From Schaffhausen he wrote to his wife—"More and more I feel that I am not a minister and never can be one." But the resumption of active work and the interest of the congregation restored his mind to a healthier tone. Socinians and Swedenborgians and people who had long been absent from church listened to his teaching, yielded, and besought him to remain. He had resigned his curacy at Cheltenham, and was free to choose, but he recognised that his true work was in England, and, rejecting the pleadings at Heidelberg, he begged his father to look out some country parish, where he could deal with the poor only, and have the work to himself,—“My mind has gone through a complete revolution in many things; I am resolved now to act and feel and think alone.”

Not long after his return, he wrote to the Bishop of Oxford, whom he had known at Winchester, asking him for employment. He was at once offered the church of St. Ebbe's, Oxford; and, differing as he

did so widely from the bishop's views, with characteristic manliness, he waited on him, and "frankly told him that he did not hold, and therefore could not preach, the doctrine of baptismal regeneration. The bishop replied, 'I give my clergy a large circle to work in, and if you do not step beyond that I do not interfere. I shall be glad, however, to hear your views on the subject.' An hour's conversation followed, and at the close his lordship said, 'Well, Mr. Robertson, you have well maintained your position, and I renew my offer.' During the three months he served St. Ebbe's, "the rough, poor people of the parish made themselves over to him at once;" though the church was in one of the worst parts of the town, "the undergraduates rushed to hear him in crowds, and hung breathlessly on every word he uttered;" and the depression with which he revisited Oxford, with "its cold, formal, forbidding conventionalisms," yielded a little to these unexpected proofs of influence. He had scarcely begun to feel the brightness stealing over the shadows of his life, when Trinity Chapel, Brighton, was offered to him by the trustees, and out of a chivalrous sense of duty to his bishop distinctly refused. On the offer being renewed, he put aside the treble emolument, the importance of the position, the possible congeniality of the work, and difficulties that had arisen about St. Ebbe's, and left himself entirely in the bishop's hands. "He replied that he thought it my duty to accept Trinity; so I go, reluctantly. . . . The half-way house is behind; and if Brighton be another form of Cheltenham, home cannot be very far off." The incidents of this brief curacy are alike honourable to bishop and curate; refreshing in days when public characters are so hidden by the dust of party strife; yet no more than might be expected from men in whom the feeling of a Christian gentleman is stronger than the narrowness of an ecclesiastic. It is by his work at Brighton that Mr. Robertson will be remembered; it was there that his too brief ministry ripened, his powers were developed, his teaching was enunciated in its fullest form. He entered on it sadly, "with small hope," he says, "and much misgiving:" he writes of "great misgivings as to that kind of success which a proprietary chapel needs:" he felt that he had "only a few years to live." It was a contrast to the enthusiastic and almost fierce energy with which he flung himself into the work at Winchester. His life and mind had each gone through a complete revolution in many things.

All the influences that his early religious life acknowledged were from the Evangelical school of thought. It was the aspect of Christian doctrine and life with which he was familiar, which unconsciously worked itself into his mind and stamped itself upon his conduct, the most earnest and the fairest side of the Church to which he could look in his boyish days. The manifold activities, and benevolent and

chivalrous enterprises, and warm impulses, and the general play and stir of life in the kingdom of God in the England of the nineteenth century, were associated with the Evangelical party. Its leaders had been real and almost heroic men, of vigorous, true, and healthy natures, thoroughly possessed with the ideas they wrought out, thoroughly simple and direct in their relation to God, honest and loyal and surpassingly earnest in their relations to men. Their influence had passed into the age, and, through it, affected the generation beyond them. Newman and Arnold it affected directly, each in his own way; Robertson indirectly; nay, it would be hard to find any great thinker and leader of opinion among us in these last forty years that it has not affected, and who, from whatever point to which recoil has forced him, would not acknowledge its help as gratefully perhaps as Newman. Two elements of it made a deep impression on Robertson—its unworldliness and spirituality. He learned from it his reverence for the Bible, his habit of Bible study, his conviction of the reality of prayer. When dressing, he was accustomed to commit to memory a certain number of verses of the New Testament, and “said afterwards to a friend, that no sooner was any Christian doctrine or duty mentioned in conversation than all the passages bearing on the point seemed to array themselves in order before him.” He liked to mark the incidents of his life, and connect them with the personal watching and love of God. He thought Brainerd’s *Life* stood alone as a specimen of biography, and read in it and Henry Martyn daily. He lingered over books of devotion. He would often retire for prayer, and wrote, “I can always see, in uncertainty, the leading of God’s hand after prayer, when everything seems to be made plain before the eyes.” He set apart certain subjects to be prayed over on each day of the week. He held the pre-millennial reign of Christ, and interested himself in Jewish missions. As he found this Evangelical system in books, as he saw it in his friends, as he measured it by its great services, he yielded to it without resistance, with the full persuasion of its nobility and worth. He must have felt its intensity of spiritual life, its directness, its sympathy with human want and sorrow, the manly, broad, sinewy individuality of its leaders. But when he went to Oxford, it was the traditional and not the primitive Evangelical school that he found, a party whose life was already entering on decay. The older, and braver, and manlier men had passed away, in whom defects were obscured by great services and self-consecration. In the lesser men the weaknesses and deficiencies were exaggerated and palpable. What had once been a transitory jar and dislocation of feeling was now a perpetual irritant. The Evangelical body was confessedly, and already becoming boastfully, narrow. It had originated a movement of spiritual and moral earnestness,

not of intellectual life. Starting from unhesitating and comfortable certainty, certainty that could be grasped in fixed and clearly cut propositions, it had little sympathy with the doubts that weigh heavily on many souls. It would have all things stereotyped and settled as its leaders had left them; it would allow of no advance, no development, no variation. It looked suspiciously on science; was apt to be intolerant, to arrogate to itself the exclusive possession and interpretation of the truth. The sameness of type in it grew to be monotonous: whatever was weak and petty came up to the surface. It was already, as parties will, ringing the changes on phrases of which the full meaning had been lost, that became now party Shibboleths. It had risen up to protest against mere dull orthodoxy and the polished worldliness and heartless Christianity and fashionable Socinianism of the last century. As a movement, it had spent at least much of its force. It was being checked on its way through the Church by friction with coarser and more worldly minds, the less ardent and less holy. A new movement had already risen against it. Keble's Hymns were supplanting Newton's: St. Mary's, at Cambridge, was no longer packed with gownsmen to hear Simeon: but at Oxford, the best intellects of the University were drawn to St. Mary's by Newman. Mr. Robertson encountered the two movements in conflict. He carried to Oxford his instinctive love and passionate desire for truth, a reckless courage in pursuit of it over any new and even perilous ground of inquiry, a mind of great activity and keenness, and a high and chivalrous ideal. Even then he held the truth to be something infinitely higher than systems; and coming in contact with both the religious parties at the University, he committed himself at first to neither. He found good and evil in both; he saw that each was asserting truths that the other was obscuring; he longed to see these truths in unison. Yet he seems to have turned almost fiercely against the "Tracts for the Times:" his copies of "Tract XC." and Dr. Pusey's "Letter to the Bishop of Oxford" are largely annotated by his answers; he formed a society of seven to counteract the tendency of the Tracts by prayer and conversation over the Bible; he called the movement "accursed," because he believed "the curse of God would fall upon it." There was some reason for his strong speaking. Mr. Newman's sermons had exercised their common fascination on his intellect; many sympathies and tastes instinctively led him to the Tractarian party; he was thrown into "a long trance," "a season of utter and inexpressible darkness." He felt the need of a strong recoil. He had calmly examined the Tracts by the help of the Acts of the Apostles; he had convinced himself that their theory of the Church was wrong; it was a conviction for life; and as long as he lived, "the Oxford delusion heresy," as he styled it,

had no more determined opponent—when it came in his way. He wrote some severe and impetuous words; but he joined in no cry against the men whose views he loudly condemned, he spoke cordially of their manliness and devoutness. They were in error; but he called them no names, met them without abuse, strove in this, as in all else, to discern and acknowledge the truth that gave consistency and hold to the falsehoods. With the teaching of the Tracts as a system he had no sympathy. In his sermons he opposed Sacramentalism, Apostolical Succession, and the fixed authority of the early Church; and he speaks of Tractarianism as out of date, as the reproduction of a life in death. And the system he had held by seemed to have little sympathy with him. Over a mind so subtle and quick and eager, a nature so sensitive to doubt, it would have but a feeble intellectual hold at the best. It seemed to repress and not to meet such restlessness and vague seeking of human souls. And when this nature was met by the drifting impulses of thought at the University, acted on by the new forces that were moving in the Church, the hold of the system would be feebler still.

At Winchester there was little change. In a prayer written at college there are the touching words, "Father, I am like a child, blown about by every wind of doctrine;" but he soon writes, "Even the Tractarian heresy has vanished from my mind amid the sterner conflict with worldly passions and pure atheism." It was at Cheltenham that the change seems to have been wrought gradually out, and by such severe pangs and agony of mental conflict as to leave a deep mark upon his life. He was repelled by the superficial nature of the place, and hurt by the sharpness and narrowness of religious party feeling; he found himself "coming into collision with conventional phraseology and several received views." The ideal he had formed of the Evangelical school was rudely shocked; and he says, half bitterly, of some of their newspapers and extreme partisans, "They tell lies in the name of God, others tell them in the name of the devil—that is the only difference." He thinks the state of the Evangelical clergy lamentable. "I see sentiment instead of principle, and a miserably mawkish religion superseding a state which once was healthy. Their adherents I love less than themselves, for they are but the copies of their faults in a larger edition." On the other hand, he thinks Dr. Pusey's doctrine on the Eucharist "just as dangerous, but much more incredible than transubstantiation." "With the Tractarians," he says again, "it is *bellum internecinum*." He quite agrees with a correspondent that "we ought to preach the Calvinistic doctrines in the proportion in which they are found in Scripture, connected always with election unto holiness;" but he becomes more possessed of the idea of Christ as, in His life and aspect to humanity, the sum of the doctrine

of God. With the progressive development of thought, and a larger reading, questions meet him, some of them no more than new aspects of old and apparently settled questions; and he can find no solution, and is too honest, inquisitive, and loyal to the truth to be satisfied with what may pretend to be solution, and will face any difficulty, pain, or bewilderment, so that truth may be won. Carlyle and German metaphysics come into his reading, detaching him still more from the past and driving him forward. "It is an awful moment," he said afterwards, "when the soul begins to find that the props on which it has blindly rested so long are, many of them, rotten, and begins to suspect them all; when it begins to feel the nothingness of many of the traditionary opinions which have been received with implicit confidence, and in that horrible insecurity begins to doubt whether there be anything to believe at all." Clinging to sympathy like a woman, shrinking sensitively like a woman from mental pain and alienation, he found himself becoming a theological Ishmael. His party did not understand him, frowned upon his misgivings, and "profanely bade him stifle doubt;" his teachers terrified him, his friends melted from him; and, hard as it was to break with the past and struggle through the dark with doubt, it was made harder by loneliness, suspicion, and misunderstanding, by the wrenching of affections that had grown into his soul. He seemed to himself insincere; his ministry a vast failure; perpetually bewildering people, and "saying the thing I do not mean—teaching and preaching when my own heart is dark, and lacks the light I endeavour to impart." "The examination of particular forms of belief involved him in the examination of a great deal more. When the rains descended, and the floods came, and the wind burst upon his house, he must needs go down and look at its foundation." Life and work at Cheltenham were no longer possible; for the body craved rest as much as the jaded mind. When abroad, it seemed at first little better; "restless," he writes, "whether I sleep or wake. . . . Take one single night as a specimen—the night before last. I dreamed that some one was telling me that all my friends were mourning over the deterioration of my sermons, &c., their unintelligibility and emptiness. I woke, went asleep again, and then was arraigned for duties left undone—sick unvisited, schools untaught, &c., with a minuteness of detail—names I never heard of, &c., all of which it would be childish to believe." He anxiously insisted that his difficulties sprang up from within, that they were suggested by his own reading and thought, and the freer spirit of inquiry. No man could be unaware of them who had read theological and philosophical controversy, who, "at different times, has lived in the atmosphere of thought in which Jonathan Edwards, Plato, Lucretius, Thomas Browne, Carlyle, Emerson, and Fichte lived,—who has steeped

his soul and memory in Byron's strong feelings—who has walked with Newman years ago to the brink of an awful precipice, and chosen rather to look upon it calmly, and know the worst of the secret of the darkness, than recoil with Newman, in fear and tenderness, back to the infallibility of Romanism."

That there was a morbid and undue sensitiveness at the bottom of much that he felt about Cheltenham and the ministry no one can doubt. The habit of introspection, natural to a spirit like his, was as fatal to his peace as the shattering of his previous system of thought; and it was not till he fell into work at Heidelberg that his letters recovered calmness and justness of tone. Nor would that have been possible, even then, had not his intellectual and spiritual ferment been subsiding. He had—

" — fought his doubts and gathered strength;
 He would not make his judgment blind;
 He faced the spectres of the quind,
 And laid them."

The light was breaking more rapidly than he had hoped, and when he entered on his real life-service at Brighton, the old order had already changed—giving place to the new. It was partly the change from passivity to activity of thought. He had held the system he had been taught, but it had never become part of himself. It was ready to his hand, and he had not rejected it; but it was in no way worked up in his own mind. So long as his mind was not deeply stirred, and the problems he had to face had no visible root in his own existence, it seemed to answer, as well at least as he fancied any system could answer. But when his mind was roused and he was driven to grasp the truth directly, and for himself, the system as such gave way. He has sketched the struggle in his sermon on "The Loneliness of Christ:"—"There is a moment in every true life—to some it comes very early—when the old routine of duty is not large enough; when the parental roof seems too low, because the Infinite above is arching over the soul; when the old formulas in creeds, catechisms, and articles seem to be narrow, and they must either be thrown aside, or else transformed into living and breathing realities." Many a young man is passing through a milder form of the same revolution; comes to a crisis when his thoughts elude the control and ordering of the old dogmatic propositions; finds himself drifting rudderless into the dark; if he bares his heart is shunned or scolded or branded, and is left to seek his own way, or patiently drift somehow into light. Well for those who find some worthier aspect of the Church, whom it does not treat with dogmatic and unphilosophic rebuke, in whom it recognises the effects of a disturbed and inquisitive age, and in its own strength of certainty holds

out to them the help of sympathy. Their doubt and temporary bewilderment may not be the fault of the system. They have accepted it as traditionally right, but they have not proved it, are not masters of it, find it to them no better than a cumbersome Goliath's sword that has been hung up unused in the priestly sanctuary. The fault lies in their apprehension of the system, which had never yet been connected in a living way with the strivings and results of their own thoughts. It may be the very system that they will finally embrace; but necessity is laid upon them of finding that out, necessity of active and developed powers, which by the very life that is in them yield pain.

Such development of thought is natural, and to higher minds essential. But circumstances may greatly stimulate it, and to Mr. Robertson the circumstances were not wanting. If the change showed the growth of his powers, and how men "rise on stepping-stones of their dead selves, to higher things," it was also witness to a change in the religious thought of the country. The fixity, and earnestness, and untroubled faith of Evangelicalism had been a welcome rest, and there were many whom, in its narrowest aspect, it continued to satisfy. But it could not stay the rapid advance of thought and scientific culture, nor prevent fresh ideas from entering the domain of theology. Mr. Robertson's mind was one of the likeliest to catch these new impulses; his party in the Church was one of the last to acknowledge them. An insensible alienation sprang up—a feeling of isolation, and afterwards of bitterness. He recognised the need of a wider view of life, a profounder view of revelation, than was familiar to those about him. Starting from the human, he passionately longed to see it, at every point, in harmony with the Divine. The speculations of philosophy, the results of science, the deeper thoughts of human souls, could not belong to a world outside of the Bible, with which it had no concern. They could not be merely a worldly element and obstruction to the truth. If the Bible could find no room for them, the thought and science of the time would march on independent of the Bible, secretly hostile to it. No excommunication and protest of the Church would arrest them. Could the Church be right to exclude them? Was there not something Divine in thought itself—in the effort to arrange and comprehend all outward phenomena, to penetrate through them up to the laws whereby God impressed His will upon the universe? Could all these be set down as merely secular, and was there no clue and place for them in the kingdom of God? "That Christianity is true, that Christ's character is high, that to do good is better than to do wrong, I suppose are axioms. Such points never seemed uncertain to me, except in moments of very bad dyspepsia. . . . But suppose a man puts the question, *Who* was Christ?

What are miracles? What do you mean by inspiration? Is the resurrection a fact or a myth? What saves a man—his own character or that of another? Is the next life individual consciousness, or continuation of the consciousness of the universe?" These were some of the questions which the time was continually forcing upon the heed of the Church, which, to minds like Mr. Robertson's, demanded a wiser answer and on broader grounds than Church parties were disposed to give. The answer, he conceived, was clear to him now. It had come to him through much darkness, and a long conflict that wore down his spirit. The shock he felt, at finding his old system break up had loosened for the time his hold on everything, and left him with only the prayer of Ajax on his lips. When he came to Brighton he felt that his prayer had been answered, that his faith rested on absolutely sure foundations, that the worst of the puzzle was solved, that the revelation of God was hostile to sin alone, that it furnished the true principles for the final development of humanity. His preaching from that time assumed its distinctive features and force; like his own picture of St. Paul, "he had a heart, a brain, and a soul of fire;"* and if ever there was a man whose bearing and character added weight to his teaching, it was he.

His personal qualities were more like those of ideal knighthood than for a busy world in a busy century. His loyalty to truth and honour, and his friends; his absolute, ready, yet often torturing, self-sacrifice; his chastity of heart, from which all impurity seemed to slink away discarded and rebuked; his dauntless courage, his thoughtful and delicate courtesy at whatever cost to himself, his passionate, reverent worship, were features essentially chivalrous. Exquisitely sensitive, he was also widely sympathetic, and those who came in no nearer contact with him than the pulpit felt that he understood their secret, that they could trust and confide in him. His position as a teacher filled him with an awe that passed into his teaching, and made him shrink from anything frivolous and unworthy. His conversation was brilliant, yet intensely modest. "I have seen him," said a friend, "take a flower, and rivet the attention of his listeners with a glittering stream of eloquent and glowing words, which he poured forth without premeditation and almost in a soliloquy." But he never spoke for display; and if he was expected to shine, would shrink into the most icy reserve. His features and bearing were marked by exceeding refinement and delicacy. In the pulpit, he was "free from trick and affectation in manner, voice, and gesture. He remained long in prayer during the hymn which preceded the sermon, and then stood up with eyes so closed that they seemed sunk into his head." Mr. Brooke must describe what followed:—

* "Lectures on the Epistles to the Corinthians," p. 508.

"If the most conquering eloquence for the English people be that of the man who is all but mastered by his excitement, but who, at the very point of being mastered, masters himself—apparently cool while he is at a white heat, so as to make the audience glow with the fire, and at the same time respect the self-possessive power of the orator, the man being always felt as greater than the man's feelings,—if that be the eloquence which most tells upon the English nation, he had that eloquence. He spoke under tremendous excitement, but it was excitement reined in by will. He held in his hand, when he began his sermon, a small slip of paper, with a few notes upon it. He referred to it now and then, but before ten minutes had gone by it was crushed to uselessness in his grasp; for he knit his fingers together over it as he knit his words over his thought. His gesture was subdued: sometimes a slow motion of his hand upwards; sometimes bending forward, his hand drooping over the pulpit; sometimes erecting himself to his full height with a sudden motion, as if upraised by the power of the thought he spoke. His voice—a musical, low, clear, penetrative voice—seldom rose; and when it did, it was in a deep volume of sound, which was not loud, but toned like a great bell. It thrilled also, but that was not so much from feeling as from the repression of feeling. Towards the end of his ministry he was wont to stand almost motionlessly erect in the pulpit, with his hands loosely lying by his sides or grasping his gown; his pale, thin face, and tall, emaciated form seeming, as he spoke, to be glowing as alabaster glows when lit up by an inward fire. And, indeed, heart and brain were on fire. He was being self-consumed. Every sermon in those latter days burnt up a portion of his vital power."

In this Brighton pulpit he preached thus at a white heat* for nearly six years to a crowd of thoughtful and earnest men and women, of the lowest class and the highest, a congregation in which each individual was attracted to himself, where some came from infidelity and many from doubt that had not yet become disbelief, and each felt the mysterious attraction of a nature that sympathized with them in their strongest and weakest moods, and that penetrated with friendliness into secrets of their heart they scarcely ventured to breathe to themselves. It was a life of little outward interest. Outside the pulpit, its chief incidents were a lecture or two at the Athenæum and a lecture or two to the working men. Suffering, the torture of a sensitive heart constantly and rudely wrung, intense mental effort, quickly con-

* "In December (1850) alone he preached sixteen times—mostly on the Advent of Christ. He delivered to crowded congregations on Friday mornings four Advent lectures on Christianity in contact with the Greek, the Roman, the Barbarian, and the Jew, which were in their way unique. He preached on Sunday mornings such sermons as 'The Means of Realizing the Second Advent,' 'The Principle of the Spiritual Harvest,' and 'The Loneliness of Christ.' In the afternoons he finished his lectures on the Acts of the Apostles, with which he had begun the year. Towards the end of the month he preached—on the day of public mourning for the Queen Dowager—the only sermon published during his lifetime—'The Israelite's Grave in a Foreign Land.'" When it is remembered that these sermons were the purest gold from the mint of his brain; that the Advent lectures were of themselves sufficient to create a brilliant reputation; and, "to complete this account of one month's intellectual work, that almost every day he was engaged in preparing the pupils of the Training School for examination, it is astonishing that he was not more morbid in feeling and outworn in body."—*Life and Letters*, i. 228-9.

suming the energy of body and brain, brought it to a premature end. He was in the habit of "burning his own smoke," a dangerous one for a man of his temperament. A melancholy crept over him that sometimes sunk into gloom; partly the melancholy of profounder thought, of a more intense sympathy with men; partly of the shadow of disease. "It is quite heart-aching to hear you preach," an old acquaintance said to him; "it is no longer the bright, happy Mr. Robertson." And, he says, "she was right; that the shadows of life had settled down." "You mistook me," he writes, "in thinking I did not sympathize. A few years ago, when I felt less, you would have been more satisfied. . . . I no longer wear my heart upon my sleeve 'for daws to peck at.' But there is not a conversation, there is not a book I read, there is not a visit I pay, that does not cut deep traces in the 'Calais' of my heart." The Vicar of Brighton, on grounds intelligible only to himself, refused to nominate a curate whom the congregation had pressed their minister to select, and rather than suffer an unwarrantable imputation to rest upon his friend, Mr. Robertson performed the duty himself. For six months he endured the most exquisite torture. The disease was in the brain, and he felt how it would end: "The causes are irremediable, and they must go on working to their consummation."* The manuscript of one of his last lectures is blotted with a solitary tear. He had "scarcely manhood enough to hold a pen." "Life," he writes to another, "has been for a month one long pain and languor. At night sleepless pain, by day change of powerlessness from two chairs to the sofa, and from the sofa to the ground." "But worse to him than the pain was the prostration of all mental force, the obliteration of large spaces from the memory, and the loss of all power of attention. He retained, however, to the last his deep delight in the beauty of God's world. He got up once when scarcely able to move, at four o'clock, and crept to the window, 'to see the beautiful morning,' . . . A night or two before he died he dreamt that his two sisters came to crown him." At last, on a Sunday in August—it was 1853—his old rector at the Edinburgh Academy, who was taking his place at Trinity Chapel, announced to the congregation that their minister was drawing near to death. "That night the pain returned with bitter violence. Feebly crying at intervals, 'My God, my Father—my God, my Father!' he lived for two hours in a mortal agony, during which he never lost clear consciousness. His mother, wife, and one friend, with his physician, watched over him with devoted care. At last they sought to relieve him by changing his position. But he could not endure a touch. 'I cannot bear it,' he said; 'let me rest. I must die. Let God do his work.' These were his last words. Immediately

* "Letters," ii. 216.

after, at a few minutes past midnight, all was over." He was buried "in a hollow of the Downs he loved so well," where "a careful hand keeps, even in winter, flowers always blooming on his grave."*

There will be no division among men about the rare beauty of his character. Every one who read his Sermons felt the man that spoke in them; and this *Life* has only lifted the veil to let us see that man a little closer. He will take at once his rightful place in the gallery of English worthies. His extreme sensitiveness may have often weakened and did certainly pain him; it crowned his best efforts with thorns, haunted him with magnified views of his failings, and led him more than once into a morbid despondency; but it was only one side of that exquisite purity and delicate feeling which made him shrink with an instinctive recoil from what would scarcely have been thought coarse or mean in another, by which he entered more than other men into the purity of Christ, by which he set forth that feminine side of His character that, as perfect Man, he conceived Him to possess, and apprehended those delicate shades of meaning in His words that make them so vivid and so marvellously touching. The courage with which he forced his horse once to a daring leap, and again, preached with a fixed directness to a congregation of Vanity Fair, because something whispered him—"Robertson, you are a craven; you dare not speak here what you believe!" may have bordered on rashness or defiance, but it was the spirit of a fearless nature, and a moral bravery that dared everything for the right, that prevented him flinching one jot from his convictions, that nerved him, patiently fighting, at tremendous odds, the battle of his life, and when that life was tortured unto death, made him "lie on the rug alone in his room, his head resting on the bar of a chair, clenching his teeth to prevent the groans which the ravaging pain could never draw from his manliness." When he took part with the working men before such sympathy was common; pleaded in 1848 for the true brotherhood and equality of man; spoke to the Chartists against the ballot, and to the infidels against infidel books; and at a time of great class asperity, declared what he conceived to be the mission of a minister of the Church of England;† or

* In the grey dawn of the morning after the funeral, a group was seen weeping over the new grave. It was a mechanic, with his wife and children, dressed in such mourning as they could purchase. The man and his wife had been rank infidels when Mr. Robertson came to Brighton; but chancing one day to drop into Trinity Chapel to hear the new preacher, they had been arrested, became regular worshippers, and brought many more. Making allowance for the natural exaggeration of funeral sermons, there must be much truth in Mr. Anderson's statement,—“I cannot count up conquests in any place, or by any man, so numerous and vast—conquests achieved in so short a period, and in many instances over the hearts and consciences of those whom, from their age or pursuits, it is always difficult to reach.”—(Funeral Sermon, by the Rev. James Anderson, then Preacher of Lincoln's Inn.)

† “Lectures and Addresses,” pp. 2, 3.

when he defended Shelley from the charge of atheism, rebuked the frenzy that followed the Durham letter, and took up the man who, for the time, was down, it was the assertion of a personal daring and dash which he complained the Church of England would not endure,* the relief of that chivalrous desire to protect the weak and avenge the wronged which had attracted him to the army. The spirit of Christ deepened the courtesy of his nature; he would leave those he liked best to converse with, and sit by the side of the most neglected; his consideration for the comfort of servants was so great that they adored him. In the same spirit his sense of wrong and baseness would sometimes break out with a strength that was terrible. "I have seen him," writes one of his friends, "grind his teeth and clench his fist when passing a man who he knew was bent on destroying an innocent girl." He recalls, himself, how "once in my life I felt a terrible might; I knew, and rejoiced to know, that I was inflicting the sentence of a coward's and a liar's hell."

His nature quivered with force and energy, but he respected the dullest intellect; and, setting himself to the lowest and smallest work, he was as patient and earnest, and as eagerly heard, in a Sunday school class as in his pulpit. His earnestness and enthusiasm were intense; he surrendered his heart to a true man and a true thought at once. If he was isolated, lonely, and dwelt apart, it was because his heart had been crushed back upon itself. "Sympathy," he wrote to his wife, "is too exquisitely dear to me to resist the temptation of expecting it; and then I could bite my tongue with vexation for having babbled out truths too sincere and childlike to be intelligible. But as soon as the fit of misanthropy is passed, that absurd human heart with which I live, trusts and confides again; and so I go on—alternately rich and bankrupt in feeling."

For mere popularity he had an invincible contempt. "What is ministerial success?" he asks—"crowded churches, full aisles, attentive congregations, the approval of the religious world, much impression produced? Elijah thought so, and when he found out his mistake, and that the applause in Carmel subsided into hideous stillness,

* "The Church of England will endure no chivalry, no dash, no effervescing enthusiasm. She cannot turn it to account as Rome turns that of her Loyolas and Xaviers. We bear nothing but sober prosaic routine; and the moment any one with heart and nerve fit to be a leader of a forlorn hope appears, we call him a dangerous man, and exasperate him by cold, unsympathising reproofs, till he becomes a dissenter and a demagogue. . . . Well, I suppose God will punish us, if in no other way, by banishing from us all noble spirits like Newman and Manning in one direction, and men like Kingsley in another, leaving us to flounder in the mud of commonplace, unable to rise above the dead level."—*Letters*, ii. 14.

"I hold," he wrote once, "to heart, to manhood, to nobleness, not correct expression. I try to judge words and actions by the man, not the man by his words and actions." "Not a very trustworthy principle, but the expression of a generous nature."

his heart well-nigh broke with disappointment. Ministerial success lies in altered lives, and obedient, humble hearts—unseen work, recognised in the judgment day.”* “If you knew,” he says, “how humiliated and degraded to the dust I have felt in perceiving myself quietly taken by gods and men for the popular preacher of a fashionable watering-place; how slight the power seems to me to be given by it of winning souls, and how sternly I have kept my tongue from saying a syllable or a sentence, in pulpit or on platform, *because it would be popular!*” “Would to God,” he says again, “I were not a mere pepper-cruet to give relish to the palate of the Brightonians.” And when a subscription list for a testimonial was opened in the Athenæum, he secretly carried off the elaborately bound book and committed it to the flames. His sense and reverence of truth were too deep to be moved by display; but the day after his ordination he looked as if he had been through an illness. Through life his soul yielded up a most awful homage to the Right; and when he found it, he clung to it with a grasp that never faltered. The glimpses of him that we get in letters from his friends have all the same interest and unity. His heart was wrung by slander and misrepresentation, but “no acrimonious expression,” says one, “ever escaped his lips.” “I never met with any one,” says another, “so deferential and gentle in argument.” “My friendship with him was directly a clerical friendship: though he was not faultless any more than other human beings, he was, without exception, the most faultless clergyman I have ever known.” His care for parochial work, his minute and self-sacrificing discharge of all its duties, were only the expression of his loyalty to his calling, and the Bishop of Winchester held the account of his diaconate so valuable that he was in the habit of giving it to his deacons to study. It was a fidelity that lay in his nature, that the love he bore to his Master had dedicated to Him. “I remember the quiet words of remonstrance when one of the persons staying in the house said that he should ‘stay at home, because the preacher was not worth hearing,’ and the gentle determination with which he carried his point.” And speaking of another side of his character, its manly freshness, and his delight in nature, the same friend says, “If a ray of sunlight came slanting through the trees on the grass—if a bough hung over the green path with remarkable beauty—if an orange fungus made a bright spot of colour in the way, he was sure to remark them. It was wonderful how he made us see. . . . I shall not easily forget his delight when the woodcocks came, nor the way in which he absolutely ran over with stories of their life. He seemed to me to know all the poetry which referred to animals, and quoted Wordsworth till I wondered at his memory.” So richly dowered,

* “Sermons,” Second Series, p. 94.

so sensitive and sympathetic, so righteous, brave, and tender, so modest, pure, dutiful, and courteous, so many-sided yet so loyal-hearted, so utterly a Christian man, his character stands out distinct and beautiful among the highest types of modern English life.

About his teaching there will be, as there has been, much difference of opinion. His way of seeking truth and his way of handling it were his own. His statement of great truths was sometimes at wide and bitter variance with the common statement. He calls the popular system of the Atonement Brahminical. "It has been represented as if the majesty of Law demanded a victim, and so as it glutted its insatiate thirst, one victim would do as well as another—the purer and the more innocent the better. It has been exhibited as if Eternal Love resolved, in fury, to strike, and so as He had his blow, it mattered not whether it fell on the whole world or on the precious head of His own chosen Son."* He speaks of "a kind of acquiescence in the Atonement which is purely selfish. . . . Christ has suffered, and I am safe. He bore the agony; I take the reward. I may live now with impunity."† "Let no man say that Christ bore the wrath of God: God could not be angry with self-sacrificing love. He could not, without denying his own nature, annex hell—that is, an evil conscience and remorse—to perfect goodness."‡ "We are sometimes told of a mysterious anguish which Christ endured, the consequence of Divine wrath—the sufferings of a heart laden with the conscience of the world's transgressions. . . . Do not go to that absurd nonsense of mysterious suffering that cannot be comprehended, a mystery and so forth of which the Bible says nothing. Mysterious enough they were, as the sufferings of the deepest hearts must ever be, but mysterious only in this sense. All that is unintelligible is the degree of agony."§ "He bore the penalty of others' sin. He was punished. Christ came into collision with the world's evil, and He bore the penalty of that daring: not merely the penalty of his own daring—He bore the penalty of our transgressions. . . . Christ endured the penalty of imputed sin, the sins of others. But imputed sin is not actual sin, though constantly we see it bear the penalty of such, that is, be punished as such. . . . His death was sacrifice, not merely martyrdom." In one aspect "it was a sacrifice for sin;" in another "it was not a sacrifice for a view or a truth, but for *the* Truth." "We say that God needed a reconciliation. On the other hand, the Unitarian view is, that God requires nothing to reconcile Him to us; that He is reconciled already; that the only thing requisite is to reconcile man to God. It also

* "Sermons," First Series, p. 155.

† *Ibid.*, p. 157.

‡ "Sermons," First Series, p. 161. "Letters," i., p. 307.

§ "Sermons," First Series, p. 161. "Letters," i., p. 289.

declares that there is no wrath in God towards sinners, for punishment does not manifest indignation. Nothing can be more false, unphilosophical, and unscriptural.* "The difference between my views and those of the party she expounds (the Evangelical) does not lie in the question of the Atonement,—we agree in this,—but in the question, *What* in that Atonement satisfied God? They say pain; I say, because I think the Scriptures say so, the surrender of self-will. . . . Indeed this is the whole argument of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and a glorious one it is. 'He bore my sins,' I am willing to say, and in deep humiliation, in a deeper sense than many mean. . . . It is often said, 'My sins nailed Him to the Tree.' There is a sense in which this contains a deep and extensive truth. Every time I am a sharer in the spirit to which He fell a victim. . . . Does the sacrifice of Christ save me from the consequences of my sin? Does it break the connection between my sin and its natural result—pain, &c.? No. Does it save me from that which is worse than all pain, the feeling of God's wrath, the sense of banishment from the presence of his beauty and his love? It does. You are redeemed by love from remorse, from the disposition to repeat wrong, from the sense of God's displeasure; and the pain you bear is not taken away but transmuted. The spirit in which you bear it makes all the difference; it changes it from penal fire into wise, loving, corrective discipline."† Baptism, he held, "is the grand, special revelation to an individual by name, A, B, or C, of the great truth Christ revealed for the race, that all, Greeks and barbarians, are the children of God." Starting from this, that Christ died for the sin of the world—came to redeem the world—he declared that "man is God's child, and the sin of the man consists in living as if it were false. It is the sin of the heathen, and what is your mission to him but to tell him that he is God's child, and not living up to his privilege? It is the sin of the baptized Christian, waiting for feelings for a claim upon God. . . . Baptism is a visible witness to the world of that which the world is for ever forgetting. . . . It does not create a child of God. It authoritatively declares him."‡ He held that all the knowledge that we have "is properly inspiration, but immensely differing in value and degree, from a glimmering glimpse to infallibility. If it be replied that this degrades inspiration by classing it with things so common, the answer is plain. A sponge and a man are both animals, but the degrees between them are almost incalculable."§ He believed the Bible "to

* "Lectures on Epistles to Corinthians," p. 410.

† "Sermons," First Series, p. 162. "Letters," i., pp. 307-8. "Sermons," First Series, p. 160. "Letters," ii., p. 139; i., pp. 204-5, 305.

‡ "Letters," i., p. 333. "Sermons," Second Series, pp. 62-3.

§ "Letters," i., p. 276.

be inspired, not dictated. It is the Word of God—the words of man; as the former perfect, as the latter imperfect. God the Spirit, as a Sanctifier, does not produce absolute perfection of human character; God the Spirit, as an Inspirer, does not produce absolute perfection of human knowledge.”* “Inspiration is the deepest question of our day,” he said; “the grand question which is given to this age to solve.”† He thought of writing a book on it, and translated as a pioneer Lessing’s tract on “The Education of the Human Race;” but in the only sermon that bears distinctly upon it he says, “There are many views, some of them false, some superstitious; but it is not our business now to deal with these. Our way is rather to teach positively than negatively. We will try to set up the truth, and error may fall before it.”‡

These statements, grouped together from his own words, may set forward clearly enough his divergence from common views, and what he conceived popular theology. § His conception of Evangelical doctrine was sometimes a caricature. There may be an occasional Mrs. Jellaby; but it is a libel to say that the most narrow-minded Christian woman is like her. There are representations of the Atonement in Mr. Robertson’s sermons which no party in the Church would acknowledge for its own. There are sayings about “the Evangelicals” in his letters that read like bursts of passion. He connected them inseparably with conclusions that he fastened on their teaching, that to him seemed inevitable; he saddled exaggerations on their school of doctrine—on, take it as a whole, the most earnest and productive party that had sprung up within the Church; he ignored its fertility of works in dwelling upon its sterility of thought; he came in contact with a painful and evil side of it; and constructed something which he called Evangelical-

* “Letters,” ii., p. 148.

† “Sermons,” Fourth Series, p. 340.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 341.

§ Divergence far enough and unreasonable enough, and suggesting thoughts of exceeding pain. It is not easy to understand this confused, clumsy, illogical theory of the Atonement, if indeed Mr. Robertson had a theory at all. But it is impossible to excuse his misrepresentation of the Evangelical doctrine,—painful to think that the breadth, insight, and fairness so marked in his conduct and opinions were violated so essentially here. It is not the object of this paper to analyse Mr. Robertson’s opinions, but to estimate his relation to our modern religious life, to help in some way to account for his wide and enduring influence. The way in which the story of his life is told, leaves the impression that his influence was incompatible with the Evangelical system,—that Evangelical doctrine is necessarily narrow-minded. It is scarcely needful to say that that is a wrong impression; that his influence did not spring from system, or the want of it; that men may and ought to wield it within the limits of the soundest orthodoxy. The theological partisan might sketch Mr. Robertson’s opinions darkly enough, might also easily refute them; they are often impulsively and fiercely stated, therefore one-sided and contradictory. Such refutation as that will be abundantly done, and for many persons it will be abundantly necessary. It is surely not the less important to separate the secret of his influence from the errors of his teaching.

calism, which "he abhorred in proportion as he adored Christ." But after making allowance for the strength of his expressions, his divergence is still wide. Yet he reached practical conclusions that were not very different from those of the schools that he opposed. While persuaded that "the Jewish Sabbath is a shadow of things to come," he felt "by experience its eternal obligation because of its eternal necessity. The soul withers without it; it thrives in proportion to the fidelity of its observance." While the law for the spiritual man was the mind of Christ, "it is at his peril that the worldly man departs from the *rule* of the day of rest." Those who know his writings will find it impossible to hold that he did not believe in Christ the eternal Son of God and the Saviour of men, though they may give up in despair reconciling his faith with his speculations on the Atonement. Had he been thrown among the more liberal and, no doubt, larger section of Evangelical Churchmen, the sundering of his later from his earlier convictions might not have been so complete: his teaching might have preserved more system, and lost its occasional contradiction of statement. There are narrow-minded disciples of every school, who conceive nothing but evil beyond their own scanty horizon; and it would be a shame to say that the spirit which repelled Mr. Robertson when living, and reviled him when dead, is the spirit of the great Evangelical party. From the best of them he would have found recognition and sympathy. But society at Cheltenham and Brighton seems to have bristled with the religious polemics of the day. "To speak certain phrases, and feel certain feelings, was counted equivalent to a Christian life," and the loudest voice in party clamour was taken as index of the soundest heart. He was shocked by this bigotry and shallowness, and he shocked them in turn. While partisans assailed each other with hard names, he sought the truth for which they fought. While they were content with their bundle of opinions, he sought to trace up every branch of thought to its issue from the living Vine: while they regarded every step out of the beaten road of phrases with suspicion, he coined the phrases for his own ideas, and taught with a freedom that had no formalism or restraint but the absolute truth in Christ. While such relations subsisted, it was natural that he should "be badgered with old maids of both sexes;" that he should be irritated and repelled by their remonstrance; that his indignation would be kindled by their ignorance and bigotry. They laid down the books he should read and avoid: he quietly persisted in reading his own way. "I don't care," he said at last. "But do you know what 'don't care' came to?" "Yes, madam, he was crucified on Calvary." "God's truth must be boundless," he wrote. "Tractarians and Evangelicals suppose that it is a pond which

you can walk round, and say,—‘I hold the truth!’ ‘What! all?’ ‘Yes; all. Here it is, circumscribed, defined, proved; and you are an infidel if you do not think this pond of mine, that the great Mr. Scott and Mr. Newton and Mr. Cecil dug, quite large enough to be the immeasurable Gospel of the Lord of the universe.’”* He felt that the true Gospel was larger than the party—that the narrower and more minute a creed, it was the more likely to limit some truths and exclude others; he was even prepared to let men look at Christ through different systems, sure that the more they looked at Him the less likely they were to fall into dogmatical enmity with one another. He made it plain that he held this tolerance not from indifference, but loyalty to truth; because he conceived the surest way to dogmatical agreement was to realize the person of the Son of God and man. Men of the profoundest faith have felt and said likewise. He might have been met at this point; and instead, he was opposed. He was sensitively tolerant; respectful to his neighbour’s conscience, and considerate of a good man’s prejudice. No man could be more gentle, courteous, and careful in stating convictions that were opposed to current teaching. If he spoke hardly of one school of thought, he was partly goaded to it. He read German, and people shook their heads over his Neology. “Unitarianism is false,” he held; “Trinitarianism is true:” but a lady came to remonstrate with him for reading Channing’s Life, and called him a Socinian. He protested against infidelity with all his might, and fought it out single-handed among the working men of Brighton; but it was whispered he was an infidel. Pantheism he looked on as “sentimental trash;” but because he was “not afraid of any truth in it,” he was set down as a Pantheist. He preached once in the same church with Mr. Maurice; and though he differed widely from him, was set down as his disciple. He toiled against the socialism of young France; but he lectured on the obligations of capital, and was made out a Socialist. He was labelled Revolutionist and Tory, Chartist and Aristocrat, Roman Catholic and Sceptic: and there is scarcely a bad word to be found in theology that has not been thrown at his memory.† His brilliant intellect and genius deserve a more

* “Letters.”

† It was not without personal experience that he said, “Infidelity is often among the unmeaning accusations brought by timid persons, half-conscious of the instability of their own belief, and furious against every one whose words make them tremble at their own insecurity. It is sometimes the cry of narrowness against an old truth, under a new and more spiritual form. Sometimes it is the charge caught up at second-hand, and repeated as a kind of religious hue and cry, in profoundest ignorance of the opinions that are so characterized. Nothing is more melancholy than to listen to the wild, indiscriminate charges of scepticism, mysticism, pantheism, rationalism, atheism, which are made by some of the weakest of mankind, who scarcely know the difference between mesmerism and mysticism. I hold it a Christian duty to abstain from this foolish and wicked system of labelling men

patient and generous treatment, not so much in his interest as in our own. For as a man who has left his mark broad and deep on our English religious thought, it is of more concern to know how far he was wrong, and at what point he left the right, than that he was wrong—an inquiry quite beyond the limits of this paper, but in which these elements must be taken into account: his intense realization of the human side of theology, the humanity of Christ, and the message of Christianity to human life; his desire to see into the precise meanings of words and creeds, and to ascertain exactly the value of their thoughts, as one who felt that “true religion is really comprehensible, its dogmas consistent with plain reasoning, its teaching in harmony with our consciousness of truth, justice, generosity;”^{*} his large-hearted and philosophic conviction that there is a truth below every form of error, that the strength of the error lies there, that it is the province of Christian thought to seek out the truth and set it in its right place;[†] and that he lived during a time of change, always a restless and unsettled time, a change in the complexion of religious life, in the development of religious ideas, and in the character of religious teaching.

Whatever conclusion men may come to about his theology, his influence is still to be accounted for, as the greatest of any preacher in this generation, or, indeed, except Chalmers, in this century. It must be traced to many sources,—for one, to the force and reality of his convictions. His sermons were the reflection of his own mind, the fruit of his own thought. There was nothing in them taken for granted; but from the foundation up, the truth he preached had been examined, and jealously, almost morbidly tested by himself. At Winchester he preached what he had been taught, and did not disbelieve: at Brighton he preached what he had learnt by experience, held even through infinite struggle with the powers of darkness, and trusted and felt with all the force of his soul. At Winchester he was simply the exponent of the doctrinal system that had come to him, with a large charity indeed, and an absolute freedom from the cant of phrases[‡]—a ground no higher than the pulpit is often content to occupy; theologically safe if the system is theologically sound, but from which there can be won no hold over the thoughtful and eager

with names; to stand aloof from every mob, religious or irreligious in name, which resembles that mob at Ephesus, who shouted for two hours, the more part knowing not wherefore they were come together.”—*Lectures and Addresses*, pp. 5, 8, 9.

^{*} “Letters,” i., p. 143.

[†] “I have almost done with divinity—dogmatic divinity that is—except to lovingly endeavour to make out the truth which lies beneath this or that poor dogma.”—*Letters*, i., p. 181.

[‡] What he said to the artisans of Brighton was applicable to his whole pulpit life: “Let the men of this Association rest assured that they shall hear no cant from me.”

minds of the age, nor command of more than a decent and commonplace respect. Until the truth he preaches has passed into the very being of the preacher, men will hear him with an ordinary Sunday's respectful indifference. His clearness, facility of illustration, power of defence, eloquence of appeal, are effective: but he stops short of the highest effect. He is describing what he has not yet explored; asserting problems that, unconsciously to him, are vexing the minds of men; applying a gauge to truth, which in his hands is trying a spiritual force by a mechanical test. Could Mr. Robertson have remained stationary where he started; had it been possible for him to accept with a smooth acquiescence whatever he received, or to resist and quench those yearnings after higher things that begot in him the beginnings of doubt; or had he been less honest to truth and to himself, and refused to follow where his questions led him, deterred by the risk and difficulty of the way, he would have been perhaps popular, would have escaped much misery and party slander, might have lived longer, and would certainly have been forgotten. But before his settlement at Brighton he had learned thoroughly to think for himself, and what he did preach there was his own, as inseparable from his life as his mind or soul. Another source of his power lay in his mode of preparation. The true speaker will always speak before Christ; will cast himself on Him as the Eternal Word and Truth; will feel the awfulness of standing as interpreter between Him and men. Mr. Robertson felt this with an intensity that consumed his strength; but he felt also that his message was for not only dying men, but living men, in a life beset with problems and duties—a life to which, in its endlessly varied relations, this message was sent. When he lectured on Samuel, he had recourse to Niebuhr's "Rome," Guizot's "Civilization," and books on political economy; when he lectured on Genesis, he studied such books as Pritchard's "Physical History of Man," and Wilkinson's "Egyptians." "I read Shakspeare, Wordsworth, Tennyson, Coleridge, Philip van Artevelde," he says, "for views of man to meditate upon, and I go out into the country to *feel* God, dabble in chemistry to feel awe of Him, read the life of Christ to understand, love, and adore Him, and my experience is closing into this, that I turn with disgust from everything to Christ." His sermons reach the common human heart because they bring the Bible into contact with common human life. Everything—from a jar in the household to a political struggle, the small duties and casuistry of daily life and the profoundest questions of the past and present—was brought to the Bible to have light flung directly upon it there.

There had been a great change in his thought, but there ran through it a clear unity. His first address as a minister was to

a dozen rough boys in a Sunday school, whom he urged to live as Christians, concluding, "Believe me, there is nothing else worth living for." In his last address he might have said the same. Christ, and living Christ, was the starting-point and sum and impulse of his teaching. Round the one he clustered his teaching of doctrine, as the sun that pierced it on every side by his rays; round the other he grouped his teaching of practice. He apprehended Christianity as above all a life. Peculiarly a man of thought, he demanded of it action; and his very thoughts became living things "with hands and feet." Christ was to him the solution for all problems; and as each puzzled him, it was to Christ he carried it, to Christ he led others. Christ by his incarnation had connected Himself with all humanity; and he recognised therefore that everything human must concern Him. He saw and felt Him everywhere, not as a force that had been set in motion, but as a living One among men—Lord and Interpreter of men's intellects, and aim and fulfilment of all genuine, pure, and lofty aspirations. Christian life could never isolate itself from human life, nor Christian thought from human thought. Art, speculation, poetry, politics, tastes, and sensibilities of men—Christian life touched upon them all. The aspect of Christ to men, as human beings living in a present world, and working out in it infinite good and evil to one another, made a deeper impression on him than His aspect to so many souls to be saved. Yet if it was the humanity of Christ that most impressed him,—to the Gospel and to Christ's love that he oftenest turned,—he insisted on the Divinity of Christ as the true explanation of His humanity, and anxiously set out the logical proof of it in the Scriptures—"Divine character, that was given in Christ to worship;". Jesus was "the Human Heart of God." This sympathy—if it may be called—with the humanity of Christ, made itself felt in many directions. A natural gift, it was developed by his struggles, and quickened and purified by his fellowship with God. "My misfortune or happiness," he says, "is power of sympathy. I can feel with the Brahmin, the Pantheist, the Stoic, the Platonist, the Transcendentalist, perhaps the Epicurean. At least I feel the side of Utilitarianism which seems like truth, though I have more antipathy to it than anything else. I can suffer with the Tractarian, tenderly shrinking from the gulf blackening before him, as a frightened child runs back to its mother from the dark, afraid to be alone in the fearful loneliness; and I can also agonize with the infidels, recoiling from the cowardice and false rest of superstition." A power of entering into other minds like that, gave him a sensitive and penetrating knowledge of men. "He seemed to feel character, as if by a sixth sense." No other preacher threw himself so thoroughly into the characters of the Bible. Jacob, Joseph, David, Zacchæus, Thomas,

Paul, even Nabal and Abigail, live before us as they never did before. Men to whom the Bible was only a book felt it to be a life. If he was unintelligible to those whose hearts were hardened by constant traffic of religious words, or narrowed in and bigoted by party, or who had felt no doubt, save about the respective orthodoxy of their teachers, men of the highest thought were attracted to his ministry, and the poor rallied round him. It must have been this sympathy with men that, during one of his vacations at Cheltenham, filled a rural church with country people, breathless in attention, and that drew so many of the simplest to him. He dealt with doubts and questionings as one who had felt them himself, who knew their pain, and that it must be met and not stifled. He treated them as marks of disease, to be as pitifully dealt with as blindness or palsy. His sermons speak of "mental doubt, that most acute of human ailments," and "the aching of a hollow heart, the worst of human maladies." Tenderly he took up the bruised mind, and with a firm compassion probed the wounds and set forth Christ the healer. He complains of the way in which religious men treat doubt; he contrasts it with the treatment and sympathy of Christ. To these undoubted sources of his influence, two must be added—his gift of teaching and his gift of speech. His sermons are teacher's work. The aptness and profusion of the illustrations, the eloquence and poetry, are subordinated to his exegesis of truth. He enforces it without exhortation, and rarely with appeal, but by making men see that it is true. For this he had the rarest power. And yet over and above his lucid logical arrangement and exquisite analysis, the language makes itself felt by its transparency, fitness, and beauty. He often utters a succession of nervous thoughts, each of which is set to its word like an arrow quivering on the tightened string. Open at random any of his lectures, or of these letters, and you are arrested, passage after passage, by such words as "the dissonant, heavy, endless *clang* of the sea;" "the *recklessness* with which the air seems animated," or "cases of persons at Cheltenham, that have come, like the *odour of newly turned earth*, upon my heart."

Such qualities so combined belong to few; but the best of them may be had by any: his reverence for truth, his depth of conviction, his fearless honesty, his sympathy with men, his handling of the Bible as what it is—the word of God to the wants of men. It is by them that men have felt his influence; and they indicate, clearly enough, the source of power which the Church in these days is saying, with feeble and credulous lament, has fled from the pulpit. The humanity of Christ must be developed without surrendering the authority and stringency of His Divinity; and the humanity of the Word of God, and the humanity of the pulpit, and the religious thought and life of

the Bible, shown to encompass and penetrate like an atmosphere all men may think and say and feel and do.

Mr. Brooke has edited these volumes with great ability, yet by no means faultlessly. The tone of the biography is pitched too high, and produces an overstrained effect. There is a vein of quiet sustained panegyric, a more than occasional hero-worship, thoroughly inconsistent with Mr. Robertson's humility, and not justified by his position. A life so simple did not need so elaborate a setting. An impression is sometimes produced not very consistent with the facts. He was not a clerical Crichton; nor need we believe that he had mastered all his theology, nor that parishes yielded to him in a few Sundays. Throughout, too, there is the manifest taking of a side. Mr. Brooke's antipathy to the Evangelical party, and his sympathies with extremely free theology, have the effect of making Mr. Robertson's seem much greater than they were. He is inclined to pit him against "the Evangelicals," and "the Evangelicals" against him; to make the most of their persecution of him; to see in their system of thought only defect, bigotry, and what must pass away. The Evangelical party may have dwindled into a Narrow Church party of late years, bankrupt of scholarship, of high intellectual endowments, and of that higher power which impresses itself upon the time; but its doctrinal and ecclesiastical opinions, its earnestness and philanthropy, are shared by an ever-increasing body, who have no sympathy with its present form, who cordially dislike its bitterness, who are not to be identified with its bigotry, and who must yet pass by its name. It is neither quite accurate nor fair to apply the hard censures of this book to a body at present so variously composed and so loosely held together. They may apply to a body of this body; they are exaggerated and onesided even then. It is easy to fasten on its failings, to rail at its narrowness, to expose its gossip and scandal, its selfish and effeminate policy; but Englishmen owe "the Evangelical succession" too much to speak lightly of its services; and if its leaders have not been replaced, and as a party it has decayed, its impulses as a movement of religious earnestness and truth are still reaching wide, and blessing where they reach. It would have been well to have remembered words that have been fitly applied to another, and which express the temper in which Mr. Robertson taught; that "he felt himself called to bear a continual witness against those who confound the crushing of opponents with the assertion of principles; he believed that every party triumph is an injury to the whole Church, and an especial injury to the party which wins the triumph."*


* Preface to Archdeacon Hare's "Charges," p. lxi. There is a hint in one of the last letters Mr. Robertson wrote that might have saved his biographer from his mistake. "In reading lives, the question too often is, whether it be one which in all respects answers our ideal of a life; whereas the question ought to be, whether it has strongly exhibited some side or other."

Moreover, it is provoking to be reminded at every other page that Mr. Robertson was abused by those who did not agree with him; that he was the victim of old maids of both sexes at Brighton; that his life was a tragedy. He was sensitively organized, and felt pain keenly—the pain of loneliness, suspicion, and slander most of all. But there was nothing surprising if those whom he struck at, struck back, or if neither Evangelical nor Tractarian lent him sympathy. His people were sincerely attached to him; he had loyal friends who could appreciate his worth; he had the power of pressing his convictions on an audience that believed him. He kindled opposition; he could have expected nothing less. “It seems to me,” he says, “a pitiful thing for any man to aspire to be true and to speak truth, and then to complain, in astonishment, that truth has not crowns to give, but thorns.” He gave as well as took, and hotly and rashly enough; in isolation a theological Ishmael, but not without his hand being against every man, when he conceived the truth was at stake. It is a mistake to present him as a pitiful sufferer, desolate, forsaken, victimized to death. He had far too healthy and manly a nature for that. Yet, in judging Mr. Brooke, something must be set down to the difficulty of his task, and he has always written in the spirit of a frank, honourable, highminded gentleman. He had to write a life with little incident, and that was already written in the pulpit; if he sometimes says too much, he says it so well that he may almost be forgiven. From the Brighton Sermons the world had learned the story of the preacher—his solitude, his struggles, his conflict with the religious world, his doubts and certainties, his charity, his passionate love of nature and animal life, his estimate of public events and public men;—nay, they reveal the books he read, and who were his favourite poets; his instincts and tastes, and the complexion of his daily intercourse. For what he said, was said out of himself; and when he had apprehended a truth, he was not satisfied till it was tried in the circumstances about him. This intense and affluent personality only made Mr. Brooke’s task the harder. And another difficulty met him. The Letters are the most interesting to Englishmen since Dr. Arnold’s; packed with most suggestive and various thought; chiefly ethical and theological, but not without vivid sketches of scenery, and flashes of genial and subtle criticism. Few critics brought such happy insight to their work, or gave such promise of excellence. It is enough to mention his defence and analysis of “*In Memoriam*,” his unfinished essay on Wordsworth, his remarks on Timon of Athens and Shakspeare’s use of superstition, his interpretation of single lines from Tennyson and Keble, and the brief notes on books that lie scattered through his correspondence.* But

* “*Lectures and Addresses*,” pp. 125—139, 203—256, 106-7, 167-9. “*Letters*,” i., pp. 208, 269, 279, ii., 79—81.

the Letters and the Sermons are of quite a different character. The thinker, with his unresolved questions, and pain of conscience, and varying moods, appears in the one as characteristically as the teacher in the other. It is some time before we can feel at home with two such various aspects of the same man. The way in which the letters have been selected and printed adds to our perplexity. Statements in a letter are not as dogmatically exact as statements from the pulpit, nor as dogmatically exhaustive. Half their meaning must be gathered from our knowledge of when and to whom they were written. Many of these letters seem to have been written in time of mental and physical torture; many of them to Unitarians and sceptics. It would have been well if these had been more minutely specified; for the former are naturally morbid, and the latter are naturally deficient in comprehensive statements of truth, and both may be easily misapprehended. By unexplained and unbalanced passages from his letters, it would be possible for men of negative creeds to claim him with triumph; to class him with theologians with whom he had scarcely a common principle; to set him down as querulous, and accuse him of much that he condemned. It is questionable whether Mr. Brooke has not been over-considerate, even one-sided, in what he has excluded. There must have been brighter and cheerfuller words than any in these volumes. There must have been the play of warm, natural affections relieving the sombre history of mental struggle. There are truer, manlier, and happier features of character brought out in the sermons for which the letters, as they stand, afford little counterpart. Yet there are some who will hold it unfair to judge him by expressions wrung out by suffering from a weary brain, who will try rather to understand than to condemn him, who, if they wish that he were more, will be thankful for what he is. They will find variance from received and ancient doctrines, sometimes of the widest and, I think, saddest sort; they will also find that it is often more in the way of putting truth than in the truth itself. They may differ from him widely, but the more thoughtful they are they will find the more points of contact with his writings, the more help from the spirit in which he taught. Archer Butler will always rank far above him for eloquence, and Newman for metaphysical and dialectic power; but such as he was, his time has accepted Robertson with a favour not accorded to any other preacher. For indeed he was more a representative than a creative man: in whom the character of the time at its best is plainly seen, and the movement of theology; and who, if very dear to those whom he blessed, may yet be to all as a sign of a changed religious thought and the necessity of reconstructing a great religious party.

W. F. STEVENSON.



CONVOCATION.

A NEW Parliament is always accompanied by the issue of fresh writs to the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, requiring them to summon a new Convocation of the clergy of their respective provinces. As to the usefulness of this ancient assembly, a great difference of opinion has been manifested since the revival of its activity in the year 1852, after a suspension of nearly a century and a half. But there is reason to believe that the last Convocation has succeeded both in attracting to itself far more of the attention of the public than its predecessor did, and, on the whole, in obtaining a firmer footing. The leading daily journal, indeed, especially during the last year, assailed it in several articles, embodying those feelings of antipathy which most Englishmen entertain for whatever they look upon, rightly or wrongly, as indicating the pretensions of a clerical caste. But the effect of those articles was more that of an advertisement than anything else. It was difficult to believe that so much pains should be taken to neutralize the effect of debates which were all the while utterly futile, and must, in their nature, remain barren of all results; while at the same time, indiscriminate attacks upon the active members of Convocation,—men in many instances eminent for ability, and well known both within and without the limits of their profession,—caused some reaction in favour of the assembly to which they belonged. But above everything else, the deepest questions con-

nected with theology have undoubtedly acquired a predominant interest with the educated public during the last five years; and with these Convocation has attempted in a certain way to deal. Whether the attempt was a wise one may be doubted; but of the interest which it excited among the clergy generally, and a large number of the educated laity, there can be no question. It has so thoroughly roused attention to the point of what the legitimate functions of Convocation are, that of all issues the one least likely seems to be that it should again fall into the state of suspended animation from which it was so lately recalled. Whether for good or for evil, the sessions in the Jerusalem Chamber are likely to be resumed, and probably to grow in length and importance, during the interval that may elapse before the next dissolution of Parliament.

The public in general is so ignorant of the legal *status* of Convocation, that a short sketch of its position since the passing of the Act of Submission* (which may be regarded as the commencement of the actual constitution of Church and State) is necessary to enable them to form a judgment as to the limits of future synodical action. The first step towards its assemblage is for the Crown to issue a writ to the Archbishop commanding him to summon the bishops, deans, archdeacons, chapters, and clergy of his province. Unfortified by this writ, the Archbishop cannot now move without incurring the pains and penalties of *præmunire*. Anciently there was no occasion for him to wait for it, and he could summon a synod of the bishops and clergy of his province whenever he thought it necessary. This right is, in fact, traceable in the next part of the proceeding. The Archbishop does not (like the Lord Chancellor in the parallel case of Parliament) act *ministerially*, issuing such and so many writs as may be particularized, but *authoritatively*, by a mandate, in his own name and under his own seal, to the Bishop of London, who is the Dean of the province of Canterbury, and who, acting ministerially, transmits the same to the other bishops for execution. The returns to these writs are deposited in the register of the see of Canterbury, just as the returns to the parliamentary writs are deposited in the Court of Chancery. And although the Royal writ is recited by the Archbishop before his own mandate, this is merely to show that the latter may be obeyed without danger by the parties to whom it is addressed, the ecclesiastical forms themselves remaining exactly the same as before the passing of the statute.

On Wednesday the 1st of June, 1859, the late Convocation met, in accordance with the regular mandate, in St. Paul's Cathedral; and, except that the Archbishop came in his carriage, and not in his barge from Lambeth to Paul's Wharf, the proceedings were precisely in the

same form as that described by Archbishop Parker in the time of Elizabeth. The Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's received the Primate, accompanied by his chaplains and preceded by the Apparitor-General, at the western entrance of the Cathedral, and, conducting him up the central aisle, placed him in the Dean's stall. The bishops took their places on either side in the stalls, and the procession was closed by clergy of the province following after. Then came the Litany in Latin; the anthem, "Oh, pray for the peace of Jerusalem;" and a Latin sermon by Dr. Waldegrave, now Bishop of Carlisle. The "Gloria in Excelsis" was then sung, and the Archbishop wound up the service by pronouncing the benediction in Latin.

After the conclusion of the religious ceremonies, the Archbishop, attended by the bishops and clergy, proceeded to the Chapter-house, where the prelates took their seats and the rest of the clergy stood around. The Registrar then read the Queen's writ ordering the summons of a Convocation, and the Bishop of London returned the Archbishop's mandate, with his own certificate that it had been duly executed. The Registrar then called over (*præconized*) the names of the other bishops, and the Archbishop handed over the certificates transmitted by them to his Vicar-General, Dr. Travers Twiss. All members of Convocation who do not appear in person, or send a sufficient excuse, are pronounced contumacious, and to have incurred the penalty of contumacy; but at the same time the enforcement of the penalty is suspended, and the suspension continued from day to day until the end of the business of Convocation. The "Schedule of Contumacy," after being read on this occasion by the Registrar, was signed by the Archbishop publicly, after which he admonished the clergy below the episcopal dignity to withdraw, under the direction of the Dean of St. Paul's, to a chapel at the north-west end of the Cathedral, to choose a prolocutor, and to present him, for approval and confirmation, in the Jerusalem Chamber on Wednesday the 22nd of June.

- When the Archbishop arrived at the Jerusalem Chamber on the day named, he was met by a written protest, on the part of the Dean and Chapter, against any infringement of their liberties, presented on this occasion by Canon Wordsworth. It was in the accustomed form, and was answered, as on all former occasions, by a written reply, read by the Registrar and formally signed by the Archbishop. The junior Bishop (Llandaff) then read the Convocation Litany in Latin, after which, the Archbishop sitting on the "Tribunal," with the Bishops of Lichfield, Llandaff, and Oxford on either side, and the deans, archdeacons, and inferior clergy standing, Dr. Elliott, Dean of Bristol, the Prolocutor chosen by the Lower House, was presented to and approved by him. The new Prolocutor thanked the Archbishop, and

the latter, after admonishing the clergy of the Lower House to remain with the Prolocutor in the Jerusalem Chamber and commence their proper business, prorogued Convocation to an upper room in the Bounty Office, which is the regular place of assemblage for the so-called Upper House. This prorogation also takes place in virtue of a written document, publicly read by the Registrar and signed by the Archbishop.*

The above forms, the antiquity of which is very great, are all conducted in the Latin language, and they show very plainly the relation in which what are now in common parlance termed the Upper and Lower Houses of Convocation stand to one another and likewise to their president. The whole of the members of Convocation do in fact constitute only one House, the elements of which are, however, regarded as of very different dignity. The paramount superiority of the President is especially manifest. He summons the clergy of his province (when his hands are once untied by the Royal writ) to attend him at the time and place he may select. He judges, in the event of their not appearing, of the validity of the excuses offered; and where these do not seem to him satisfactory he pronounces the offenders contumacious, and reserves to himself the power of inflicting an adequate penalty upon them, whatever their rank in the Church. And this penalty was no light one in some cases. It sometimes took the form of sequestration of the income of their benefices, sometimes that of interdiction from the participation in religious services. In 1416, Archbishop Chicheley sequestered the benefices of a very large number of delinquents; for no less than nineteen of them were formally absolved, not, however, without first making submission, and each taking an oath for better behaviour in the time to come. The members of Convocation, on the other hand, who are below the episcopal rank, occupy an altogether inferior position. Not only do they stand when in the presence of the Upper House, but, except on rare occasions, they are not allowed to be present at all. The Prolocutor is the organ of communication between them and the President. Through

* The public signature by the Archbishop, and in presence of the whole Convocation, is necessary to give the synodical character to any formal act. It is just as indispensable as the Royal assent to an Act of Parliament, and the necessity for it is an additional safeguard against the danger of Convocation, under the influence of a temporary excitement, giving authoritative sanction to erroneous positions. On the 20th of June, 1861, after the new canon (relative to the permission of parents to become sponsors) had been framed in pursuance of licence from the Crown, a formal proposal of the intended signature was sent to the Lower House, which immediately suspended an animated debate to adopt the proposal. At the appointed hour (2 p.m.) the President, accompanied by the Bishops of Oxford, St. Asaph, and Lincoln, appeared in the Jerusalem Chamber. His Grace then proceeded, conjointly with the Prolocutor, to hold the copy of the new canon, and read the same aloud to the assembled synod. It was then signed by all members of both Houses present. The same formalities were observed in a more important matter—the new canons on subscription—on June 29, 1865, the last day of the session.

him all messages (after he is once appointed) come down from the Upper House to them ; and he is the channel through which they are bound to make their wishes (as a House) known to him. At one time the President even nominated the Prolocutor ; he now always approves him before he is allowed to act, and, should he be temporarily disabled, his deputy in like manner. In a word, the whole Convocation, in the idea, depends upon the Archbishop ; it is convened (save for the Act of Submission) at his will ; it deliberates (subject to the same limitation) upon such subjects as he may think proper to bring before it ; it conducts its discussion of those subjects according to the order he may indicate ; it continues sitting so long only as he may judge expedient ; and finally, no conclusion at which it may arrive has any validity, as a synodical act, until reduced to writing by the proper official, and formally signed by himself in the presence of both Houses united in one. The bishops, admitted to the presence of the Primate as *confratres*, have the privilege of tendering their advice as to any particular course of action,—a privilege which may occasionally make a kindly and unsuspecting nature the tool of a coarser and more astute one ; but in the long run it is scarcely possible for an injudicious conclusion to be formally acquiesced in, where proper time has been given for duly ventilating the subject, and considering it in all its bearings, unless on the supposition of the high places in the Church being filled up more recklessly than has yet been done, even by the most reckless of ministers.

The separation of the two Houses, however, brings about a state of things which much obscures the old idea of Convocation. The stiff forms and the Latin are thrown aside together as soon as this operation has been effected, and the Jerusalem Chamber is left to the sole occupation of the lower prelates (as the deans and archdeacons are sometimes called) and the representatives of the chapters and the parochial clergy. Its full numbers are thus made up :—

Deans	24
Archdeacons	56
Proctors for Chapters	24
Proctors for Dioceses	42
Total	146

The chapters each send one representative, and the dioceses two ; but the mode of electing these last varies considerably. In most cases the two are elected, like members of Parliament, by the direct choice of the whole of the clergy of the diocese. In some, each archdeaconry elects a couple, and the bishop selects two from the number thus submitted to him. In the diocese of Lichfield, where there are three archdeaconries, the six, elected in pairs by the three bodies, themselves

select two of their own number to serve as proctors for the whole. There are other anomalies, to none of which there is any occasion here to refer; but it may be mentioned, that in the province of York each archdeaconry returns two proctors, all of whom sit.

It is only the beneficed clergy who vote for the parochial proctors. In most chapters the canons alone elect their representative: in some the prebendaries who are not residentiaries join in the election; but in none do the honorary canons (a class of titular dignitaries which have recently been created) have any share in the privilege. This anomaly admits of an easy explanation. Convocation was in early times summoned, at the instance of the Crown, for the same purposes that Parliament was—viz., to obtain a subsidy; and as only those who possessed taxable property were called upon to contribute, no others were considered to have any interest in the matter. The power of self-taxation remained with the clergy until quite modern times. Down to the year 1664 they had always taxed themselves in Convocation, their proceedings being afterwards confirmed by Parliament. But at that time an arrangement was made between Archbishop Sheldon and the Lord Chancellor (Clarendon), by which the clergy silently waved their privilege, and submitted to be included in the money bills of the House of Commons. Whatever opinion may be entertained of the expediency of this change, there can be no doubt it was the most important, in a constitutional point of view, that could possibly take place. The Crown from that moment lost all interest in the regular assembling of Convocation; and Convocation at the same time lost the power—which not many years ago would have been a most valuable one—of suggesting a fresh distribution of the revenues of the Church, which might perhaps have produced whatever good has been done by the Ecclesiastical Commission, without the evils that, in the estimation of most thinking men, have accompanied the changes effected by a too hasty legislation.

However glaring the anomalies in the representation of the clergy in the Lower House may be, now that a numerous body—that of stipendiary curates—has sprung into existence, without any direct power of sending representatives of its interests to Convocation, it may be doubted whether any practical grievance exists which would not be removed by the synod as at present constituted, were its removal possible without the aid of Parliament. But a decided conviction seems to prevail among the members who possess the greatest influence, and form the most powerful party in the assembly, that the invoking this aid is a policy which must be shunned at all cost. On the other hand, a deeply rooted jealousy of the spirit of ecclesiastical domination has operated upon others—perhaps the majority—and induced them to absent themselves from the meetings of Convocation,

as a sort of protest against the high-flown theories of its functions which they hear propounded. The result has been that the benches of the Lower House have been mainly, and till of late almost exclusively, occupied by the advocates of one class of views, as unpopular as they are decided. But this party, although well organized, and led by an ecclesiastical champion whose abilities and courage are admitted even by those who most deprecate the policy they are employed in furthering, is an extremely small one. Their attendance on Convocation is most diligent; and yet, during the last six years, the numbers present in the Lower House probably never equalled one-third of its members, until the excitement caused by the publication of the noted "Essays and Reviews." And when that excitement was at its climax, in consequence of an unexpected opposition suddenly showing itself to the rash, and (in the opinion of many) altogether irregular proceedings which issued in the condemnation of the book, the number present at the decisive division rose only to fifty-eight! The remaining eighty-eight, from whatever cause, took no part in the matter, although the assertion of a claim to a censorship cannot be regarded as a thing of small importance to Englishmen, whether clerks or laymen; and the magnitude of the religious questions which supplied a pretext for such a claim can hardly be exaggerated.

We are no ardent admirers of Convocation as it is; nor have the doubts of the expediency of its revival, which were suggested at the time when its resuscitation took place, been removed by what has since occurred. But of one thing we feel sure, that it has secured for itself such an amount of recognition, that it becomes a dereliction of duty, on the part of those who are elected to it, to ignore its existence, and refuse to contribute their share of wisdom and discretion to restrain its powers from mischief, and develop, so far as may be, its capacities for good. It should not be forgotten, that even the opponents of the turbulent Atterbury and his party, owing to whose proceedings the regular meeting of Convocation was disused, were by no means willing to purchase peace at such a price. Wake and Gibson thought no less of the necessity of synods than did their adversaries, with whom their sole issue was as to the manner of conducting them. And whether this opinion of their necessity be well or ill-founded, it is clearly impossible to abolish a constitutional right, which cannot be gainsaid, so long as men are found to take advantage of it. If the number of such increases,—if high legal functionaries openly justify their pretensions,—if in fact there is no argument against the constitutional right, except that in the opinion of the greater part of the world it is a pity it should exist, the time for a policy of inaction is certainly past for all who wish to exert their due influence on the fortunes of the Church.

It is only justice, too, to the leaders of the Lower House of Convocation, to declare that they have addressed themselves to the consideration of matters seriously affecting the interests of both clergy and laity, and which cannot be looked upon in the light of party questions ;—such are, the ways and means of extending the operations of the Church, by an increase in the number of bishoprics both at home and abroad ; by missions to the heathen ; by lay co-operation at home ; by the preparation of new services adapted to special occasions. The question of religious sisterhoods, too, and that of the training of the clergy, have been handled ; and on these and cognate matters reports have been drawn up, containing a great deal of information, and valuable, if for no other reason, at any rate for embodying the views of men well acquainted with the subject. The defects of the existing Law of Dilapidations, the burden of the maintenance of chancels, and the difficulties attendant on the enforcement of Church Rates, have likewise not escaped attention ; neither has the abuse of excessive Consecration charges, and the hardship of insufficient endowment of parishes. However inadequate an assembly Convocation may be to settle such questions as these authoritatively, nothing but good can result from their full discussion, especially if all parties in the Church that have its interests sincerely at heart would freely put their opinions forward, and not keep away from the Jerusalem Chamber from a dread of finding themselves in a minority.

The mode of conducting business in Convocation, ill adapted as it is to a legislative body, is very far from being unsuited to that function to which it is to be hoped the synod will ultimately confine itself,—the function of a standing committee of inquiry on church matters. After prayers have been read, and the names of members *præconized*, the next thing is the presentation of petitions. If these take the form of the statement of a grievance and a prayer for its redress, they are called by the technical name of *gravamina*. If they proceed from any member or members of the Lower House, the Prolocutor is bound to take them to the President, to whom and the other bishops they are all addressed. But they are still nothing more than petitions of the individuals from whom they emanate, unless the Lower House chooses to adopt them, from the importance of the matters to which they refer, and to desire the Prolocutor to take them up in the name of the House. A *gravamen*, so adopted, becomes an *articulus cleri*. But when several petitions are brought before the notice of the Lower House, all bearing upon the same grievance, it is not unusual to refer the whole of them (with the consent of the petitioners) to a committee called the Committee of *Gravamina*, to be reduced to some general form embodying the whole, which itself is then submitted as an *articulus cleri*, and goes up to the President in lieu of the *gravamina* on which it is

founded. It is plain, that by this proceeding, if honestly followed out, a great deal of trouble is saved to the Upper House, who get the subject-matter which they have to handle in a highly concentrated form, and complete in all its bearings. But to refer a *gravamen* to such a committee without the consent of its framer, is manifestly unconstitutional, as it amounts to intercepting access to the Upper House by way of petition, which is the common law right of every clergyman, if not even of every lay member of the Church. It has only once been done, and will scarcely be repeated.*

When any matter has been brought, either by petition or otherwise,

This is so important a matter, that we make no apology for the following extracts from the *Chronicle of Convocation* :—

(i.) On the 10th of June, 1858, the Prolocutor (Dr. Elliott, Dean of Bristol) said, “ I have been requested by several members of the Lower House—not by the House itself—to place their several *gravamina* before your Grace. The rule which the Lower House seems inclined to maintain is this, that when a *gravamen* is laid before the Lower House, which claims the attention or interference of Convocation, it cannot be presented to your Grace by the Prolocutor, as representing the Lower House, without its special order. That when the House refuses its sanction in this manner to *gravamina*, or cannot from any other reason entertain their consideration, the individual members of the Lower House are entitled to call upon the Prolocutor to convey them to the hands of the President. For my part, I believe that any person whatever, lay or cleric (and of course members of the Lower House), may address either petition, *gravamen*, or *reformandum* to your Grace as president, either directly or through the intervention of a bishop, being member of the Upper House, and that accordingly the intervention of the Prolocutor is not necessary. I have to repeat that the *gravamina* which I now present are those of the individuals signing them, and not of the Lower House.

“ THE PRESIDENT (Archbishop Sumner).—No doubt clergymen, whether members of the Lower House or not, are at liberty to present petitions to this House; but what I receive through the Prolocutor makes it a measure of the Lower House. It would be contrary to usage to receive their representations in any other way, or petitions which are not petitions of the Lower House, through him.

“ CANON WORDSWORTH (one of the Prolocutor’s assessors).—Have we the right to express our persuasion as to the law and practice of Convocation?

“ THE PRESIDENT.—Only through the Prolocutor. The President knows nothing of the other House but through the Prolocutor.

“ THE BISHOP OF OXFORD.—Will your Grace allow me to consider the point?

“ THE PRESIDENT.—I think the question is decided.”

The Prolocutor and his assessors having retired, a short discussion took place, in the course of which Gibson’s definitions of *gravamina* and *reformanda* were referred to and considered. At the close of the conversation the Prolocutor was sent for, and the PRESIDENT said: “ It has been represented to me by a member of the Upper House that the schedules offered to me contain *reformanda*. As such I am ready to receive them through the hands of the Prolocutor.”

(ii.) A report of a Committee of *Gravamina*, presented to Convocation on the 20th of July, 1854, and adopted by the Lower House the next session, contains the following paragraph:—“ When schedules of *gravamina* and *reformanda* are presented to the House, they may be referred, upon a motion duly made and carried, to a committee of *gravamina et reformanda*, by which they may be recommended as proper subjects to be made *articuli cleri*, to be presented as such to the Upper House through the Prolocutor; but other *gravamina* or *reformanda*, more particularly if they be of a local and special rather than of a general character, may be transmitted to the Upper House through the Prolocutor, in the name of the member who presents them.”

under the cognizance of the Upper House, it is the common practice for them to appoint a committee to report on the matter. Sometimes this committee consists of bishops only; sometimes of members of both Houses; and sometimes a message is sent to the Lower House desiring them to appoint members of their own body to constitute a committee. This the Lower House cannot refuse in direct terms; as neither can they any command of the Archbishop's, the theory being that every member is at the President's disposal, to be made use of in assisting him in any matter that may occur affecting the interests of the Church. In the disputes between the two Houses, which occurred in the few years immediately preceding the suspension of Convocation, the Lower House made strong efforts to escape from this responsibility, but without effect. An indirect consequence of the right is, that any discussion which is going on in the Lower House in a manner unpalatable to the Upper, may be suddenly interrupted by a message to take some other subject into consideration forthwith. But if the Lower House feel strongly on the matter, they usually reply to such a message by a humble request for more time to finish what they are about, or by some similar piece of deprecation. Sometimes the Lower House appoint committees of their own body for purposes connected with their own proceedings, and these are in some cases permanent, as the "Committee of *Gravamina*" above-mentioned; the "Committee of Privileges," who investigate all matters connected with the rights of the House; and the "Committee of Expenses," whose duty is the unpleasant one of regulating the disbursement of funds which have only a very shadowy existence. When the attention of the House was attracted to the publication of the Bishop of Natal, a committee was formed for the purpose of examining the precedents for censuring heretical publications; but its investigations were of too tedious a character for the impatience of the majority, and its report was not presented until after the censors had committed themselves to a mode of proceeding for which it turned out that no sufficient precedents could be found. But however much in particular instances passion or partisanship may work temporary mischief, the method of proceeding by committees is one calculated to insure the fullest consideration of any subject, as well as the most lucid exposition of its various bearings.

When a committee has presented its report, this must wait its turn for discussion, unless its importance is so great that the House deems it desirable to suspend the standing orders in order to take it into consideration at once. No debate can take place on the motion to suspend the standing orders. The mover states the reason which influences him, and the House at once decides Aye or No. Standing orders may in the same way be suspended to allow a motion to come

on at once. The practice in the conduct of debates is to allow every member to speak once on each amendment, and also on the original motion. He cannot speak twice except by way of explanation, unless with the permission of the House; but this is very often given, or at least assumed. There is perhaps no part of its proceedings in which the Lower House appears to less advantage than in the way in which it handles amendments, which sometimes bear scarcely any assignable relation to the original motion, and yet are allowed to be put; while occasionally those which have a totally different bearing from one another are regarded as identical, because they are equally prejudicial to the first motion. The cause probably is the very circumstance which renders Convocation, as we have remarked above, well adapted for a commission of inquiry,—the habit in each member of looking at all questions from one special point of view, in the belief that it is the only possible one, and that no compromise is conceivable without sacrifice of the truth. This is the characteristic—some may call it virtue, some vice—of the clerical mind. The more elaborate speeches which are delivered are simply essays, developing the thoughts of the speaker on the thesis before him, but rarely evincing an ability to enter into the views of an opponent. It is only on rare occasions that there is a real debate in the proper sense of the word,—a grappling with arguments as they arise in the course of the discussion,—a distinct issue joined, and a definite advantage gained. There are, however, some conspicuous exceptions to the prevalent incapacity for practical agonistics, who would do honour to any deliberative assembly; and for courtesy and good temper the Lower House certainly need not fear comparison with Parliament.

As was to be expected, by far the most animated debates which took place in the late Convocation were those which arose out of the attempt to constitute it a tribunal for the censure of heretical books, and (in the sequel of this) the attack upon the constitution of the Court of Final Appeal in doctrinal cases. The principal promoters of the former movement were, as might have been expected from their known ecclesiastical tendencies, Archdeacon Denison in the Lower, and the Bishop of Oxford in the Upper House. On February 26th, 1861, when the matter was first introduced into Convocation, the Lower House, while expressing almost universally a disapprobation of the noted "*Essays and Reviews*," was content, under the influence of Canon Wordsworth, to record its feelings in the following temperate resolution:—

"That the clergy of the Lower House of Convocation of the province of Canterbury, having regard to the censure which has already been pronounced and published by the Archbishop and Bishops of the provinces of Canterbury and York, on certain opinions contained in a book entitled '*Essays*'

and Reviews,' entertain an earnest hope that, under the Divine blessing, the faithful zeal of the Christian Church in this land may be enabled to counteract the pernicious influence of the erroneous opinions contained in the said volume."

This resolution passed by a large majority; but the next day, on a motion being made for communicating it to the Upper House, a member got up to say that he had reason to believe that such a proceeding would give no satisfaction. An explanation of this change of purpose soon appeared. The Bishop of Oxford and Dr. Jelf, in their respective Houses, presented petitions from the *English Church Union*, praying that synodical action might be taken against the obnoxious doctrines, and on the 2nd of March, Archdeacon Denison, although he had himself been the seconder of Dr. Wordsworth's resolution, gave notice that at the next meeting of the House—then about to adjourn for nearly a fortnight—he would move the suspension of standing orders, in order to address the Upper House with a request to appoint a committee to examine the book and report upon it. When the 14th of March arrived, an appropriate *gravamen*, with twenty names attached to it, was handed to the Prolocutor, and in order to avoid the necessity for suspending standing orders, which would perhaps not have been carried, it was proposed that this *gravamen* should be made the *gravamen* of the whole House. But it being urged that this was only an indirect method of making it an *articulus cleri*, it was taken up to the President simply as the *gravamen* of twenty individuals. Yet, momentous as this first step to the establishment of a censorship was, so little were any but the movers of the business aware of the principles at issue, that the twenty signatories were, in the belief of the Prolocutor, the majority of the members present in the Lower House.* The Bishop of Oxford was of course ready to receive it on its arrival in the Upper House, and moved that the Archbishop be

"Requested to direct the Lower House to appoint a committee to examine 'Essays and Reviews,' and report to the Lower House thereon; in order that it may communicate to this House its opinion whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding to a synodical judgment upon this book."

After an animated debate, remarkable for a very curious passage of arms between the Bishop of Oxford and Dr. Baring, then Bishop of Gloucester, and now of Durham,† the motion was carried by a majority of eight to four, and the next day the committee was appointed, with

* *Chronicle of Convocation*, p. 551. It turned out that there were forty members present.

† Dr. Baring expressed, in more contemptuous phraseology than it is usual for dignified clergymen to employ, his opinion that Convocation was not to be regarded as the representative of the Church; whereupon his brother prelate informed him that he had subjected himself to the penalty of excommunication. He replied that on the authority of the Bishop of Oxford himself, such excommunication did not operate till called into action by the diocesan, and that it was not his intention to exercise this power against himself.

Archdeacon Denison as its permanent chairman. On the 18th of June their report was presented to the Lower House, and was taken into consideration on the 20th and 21st, in a most lively and ably conducted discussion, which, after repeated amendments, all tending in one way or other to moderate proceedings, had been moved by the Dean of Ely, Drs. Selwyn and Jeremie, two theological professors of the University of Cambridge, and Canon Wordsworth, at last issued in the adoption of Archdeacon Denison's resolution, that in the opinion of the Lower House there were sufficient grounds for proceeding to a synodical judgment upon the book. This resolution was sent up to the Upper House on July 9th, the day to which Convocation had been prorogued, but in the meantime the Bishop of Salisbury commenced proceedings against one of the writers of the volume, Dr. Williams; and in view of the possibility that some of the bishops might have to sit in judgment upon him in the event of an appeal to the Privy Council (as really turned out), it was resolved to answer the Lower House that it was expedient to adjourn the further prosecution of the matter pending the suit. The resolution to this effect was moved and seconded by the Bishops of Chichester and St. Asaph, two of the prelates who had voted in the majority on the 14th of March. Whether in the interval the danger of the course they were entering upon had been brought home to the Upper House, it is impossible to say; but the resolution was passed without debate or division, although both the Bishops of Oxford and Salisbury were present. Two years afterwards, the latter complained bitterly of the course which was taken, in terms which sufficiently explain the anxiety which he at least felt for synodical action:—

“Of course, if this Synod had expressed a deliberate judgment with regard to the book, *my hands would have been strengthened with regard to the prosecution I had instituted against one of the writers, and my course would have been a much more easy one.*”

Fortunately for the character of the English bench, the notion of utilizing “the Church of England by representation,” to prejudice the position of the defendant in a criminal suit, did not commend itself to them, nor even, as it would seem, to the one among them whom the Bishop of Salisbury made the confidant of his “painful feelings” at the time.*

Convocation did not meet after this for business till February 11th, 1862, when the Bishop of Oxford and the Archdeacon again appeared at their posts. The former threw off in the Upper House with a petition from four churchwardens of the diocese of London, urgently calling for “the resumption of synodical action throughout the Queen's dominions;” while the latter placed a protest against the conduct of

the Upper House, under the form of a *gravamen*, in the hand of the Prolocutor. After reciting the circumstances above-mentioned, he—

“Begs respectfully to state, that it appears to him that the suspension of synodical proceedings in this case is greatly to be regretted for the reasons following;—because, 1. The grounds assigned for such suspension do not appear to him to be valid or sufficient. 2. By resting such suspension on the grounds assigned, two things appear to him to have been mixed up together, which should carefully be kept apart, namely, proceedings in synod, and proceedings in court. 3. Not only do proceedings in synod and proceedings in court appear to him to have been thus mixed up together, but the former appear to him to have been subordinated to the latter. 4. Such subordination would be, for solemn reasons upon which the undersigned does not here enter, unfitting in itself, and, in its effects, injurious to the authority of the Church to guide and warn in controversies of faith.”

This *gravamen* was left for signature by any other members who might choose; but it does not appear to have been taken up to the President. It would be difficult to frame any document more at variance with the fundamental relations of the members to their President, or one more audaciously defiant in its tone; and possibly some consciousness of this fact may have dawned over its framer in his cooler moments. At all events, the *gravamen* did not reach the Upper House, or, if it did, escaped all notice; and the prosecution of the obnoxious volume in synod was suspended for two years. In the meanwhile, the publication of the Bishop of Natal on the Pentateuch was brought under the notice of Convocation, and a censure passed upon it. The suits of the Bishop of Salisbury against Dr. Williams, and of Dr. Fendall against Mr. Wilson, had not sped. The decision of the Court of Arches, though in some points unfavourable to the defendants, was regarded as little less than a victory for them by the laity at large; and when the judgment of the Lower Court was reversed on those points by the Court of Final Appeal, a certain amount of panic as to the preservation of the Church's doctrine not unnaturally prevailed among the clergy. Here, then, was an occasion, such as even cool and clear-headed men might judge it expedient to make use of, for some calm and lucid exposition of the orthodox doctrine, which had been endangered by the loose and rash handling of controversialists on both sides. Such an exposition came forth from the pen of the most learned prelate on the bench. The charge of the Bishop of St. David's, delivered at his eighth Visitation in 1863, is unsurpassed by any one theological treatise in existence for its depth and subtlety of discrimination, as well as for the candour and impartiality with which it surveys the whole range of the prevailing controversies. But it was not enough for the zealots of the day that error should be refuted on grounds of reason. Nothing would content them but a condemnation *by authority*. The synod of the Church must be put in action, to

show that the Church had no complicity with the alleged heretics! The people must be "warned" that a volume of which many thousand copies had been sold, was in the opinion of the Convocation of the Province of Canterbury "dangerous," and "containing erroneous doctrine!" Accordingly, on the 19th of April, 1864, the Bishop of Oxford resuscitated the subject by presenting a petition from the diocese of Norwich, praying for the revival of the suspended proceedings, and the next day the discussion recommenced, and continued through the whole day. It was resumed on the 21st, the Bishops of London, St. David's, Ely, Lichfield, and Lincoln opposing further proceedings, and those of Salisbury, Bangor, Gloucester, Llandaff, and Oxford urging them. The numbers were equally divided, when the Archbishop gave his casting vote in favour of going on. But while the debate was proceeding, a circumstance occurred which put the inexpediency of the course resolved on in the strongest light. Dr. Williams, whose victory over the Bishop of Salisbury had been ascribed to the necessity of treating theological subjects from a legal point of view, petitioned the Lower House of Convocation to be allowed, in the event of synodical judgment being attempted, to appear and reply to the objections against any writings for which he himself was responsible, offering to meet his opponents, not only on the technical issues of a law court, but as scholars and theologians. Here was a challenge which could not be accepted consistently with the practice of Convocation, nor refused without the most manifest injustice; for Dr. Williams had proposed to carry on the discussion precisely in the way which the law courts had been censured for their inability to adopt. But the passion for "synodical action" closed the eyes of the dominant party to the utterly un-English step of denying a prisoner the privilege of defending himself. It occurred to some one, that a censure might be passed upon a book, which of course could not explain itself, considered abstractedly from its author; and that therefore there was no injustice in refusing to hear the latter, if the injury to him was limited to the odium arising out of the process of censuring his book. It was also a safer course from another point of view. Mr. Rolt and Sir Hugh Cairns had been consulted, and gave it as their opinion that Convocation was—

"Not estopped by the 25th Henry VIII., c. 19, or by any other statute, from expressing by resolution, or otherwise, their condemnation or disapprobation of a book, although no special Royal licence is given for the purpose."

Fortified by this view, the Upper House, on the 21st of June, passed a vote, inviting the Lower House to concur with them in the following judgment:—

"That this Synod, having appointed committees of the Upper and Lower

Houses to examine and report upon the volume entitled 'Essays and Reviews,' and the said committees having severally reported thereon, doth hereby *synodically condemn* the said volume, as containing teaching contrary to the doctrine received by the United Church of England and Ireland, in common with the whole Catholic Church of Christ."

It can scarcely be doubted that the important part of this resolution, in the eyes of those who had laboured with extraordinary perseverance for several years to bring it about, resided in the words which we have italicized. The power authoritatively to declare the doctrine of the Church on doubtful points was repeatedly asserted by them to reside in Convocation, nay, to be its primary function. But to exert this power explicitly without Royal licence would obviously, in effect, be making a new canon, and would expose all concerned to the severest penalties of the law. This peril was averted by the general form of the judgment, which avoided specifying what the doctrines were which it authoritatively condemned. It is true that when Bishop Burnett's book on the Articles was proposed as a subject for a similar censure by the Lower House in 1700, the Upper House rejected the application, among other reasons, on the ground—

"That the Lower House of Convocation's censuring the book of the Bishop of Sarum in general terms, without mentioning the particular passages on which the censure is grounded, is defamatory and scandalous."

And in the course of the late debates, it was urged by Archdeacon Hale—probably the highest living authority on the subject—

"That the Church of England, in the days of her full power of declaring what her opinions were, *did not condemn books, but condemned propositions.*"

But both the risk of *præmunire* and that of an action for libel were precluded by the circumstance that the obnoxious volume was the aggregate work of seven writers, who disclaimed all connection with one another; and although the reports to the Upper and Lower Houses had contained large extracts to which exception had been taken by the respective committees, these reports were not regarded as in themselves possessing any synodical authority. When the "Judgment" was sent down to the Lower House, it was obviously expected that a concurrence in it would follow as a matter of course. A debate was going on at the time upon a question of considerable practical importance,—the possibility of making some modifications in the language of the Burial Service, with a view of avoiding the scandal which sometimes arises from the hopeful words of that solemn ritual being applied to persons of a flagrantly wicked life. The House was required to break off and to enter *immediately* upon the "matter of the synodical judgment." It was urged that the matter on which the House was engaged had been sent down from the Upper House, and that it was only reasonable that the first subject submitted to it should

be disposed of before the entrance upon a new one was peremptorily demanded. The Prolocutor replied that there was no alternative but to proceed at once with the business which had just come down, and Archdeacon Denison got up with the appropriate resolution,—

“That this House respectfully and heartily tenders its thanks to His Grace the President and the Bishops of the Upper House for their care in the defence of the faith, as manifested in the report upon the book entitled ‘Essays and Reviews,’ now read to this House; and that this House does thankfully accept and concur in the condemnation of the book by the Upper House, which has been based upon the said report.”

But the dissatisfaction that had been created by the whole course of proceeding produced an opposition of the most formidable character, which, although ultimately overcome, exhibited itself in a debate extending over three days—the 21st, 22nd, and 24th of June. The course it took will be best given in the words of a protest (under the form of a *gravamen*), signed by five deans, six archdeacons, four canons, and five proctors of the parochial clergy, which was subsequently presented. After reciting the “judgment,” this document sets forth,—

“That the undersigned feel grave doubts as to the legal powers of Convocation to censure any book whatever, without licence previously obtained from the Crown for that special purpose; and that divers of them were on that account desirous, before entering on the consideration of the ‘judgment,’ concurrence in which was invited, to await a report of the Committee of Privileges of the Lower House; which committee had already (*viz.*, on the 13th of February, 1863) been instructed to examine the precedents for the censure of books by Convocation, and to report thereon; and that divers of the undersigned did, on the 21st of June, 1864, move the Lower House to await such report, but that the majority of the Lower House refused to agree to the proposal.

“That one of the reports referred to, although not embodied in the ‘judgment’ sent down to the Lower House, was laid before the Lower House at the same time with the ‘judgment’ itself, and not before; and that this report extended to such a length, and embraced so many and such important topics, as to demand much time for its due consideration: and that divers of the undersigned did therefore move the Lower House to request His Grace the President ‘to allow them full time to consider the very important subject submitted to them;’ but that the majority of the Lower House refused to accede to this proposal.

“That one of the writers in the volume on which synodical judgment was invited on the said 21st of June had previously—*viz.*, on the 12th day of April preceding—in the expectation of such a contingency, respectfully petitioned the Lower House that before judgment should pass on any book or proposition for which he was responsible, he might be allowed a hearing in answer to the objections urged against the same; and that divers of the undersigned, in accordance (as they believe) with precedents, as well as with the acknowledged maxims of justice, were desirous that the petitioner’s request should be complied with if possible; and did move the Lower House respectfully to request His Grace the President to advise them what course they ought, under the circumstances, to pursue; but that the majority of

the Lower House nevertheless refused to agree to such application to His Grace.

"That if in any case Convocation may be properly called upon to exercise a judicial function, it must be essential to the efficient discharge of such duty that all its members should have timely notice of the question intended to be brought before them, so that they must be assured of the opportunity of being present; whereas in the case to which this *gravamen* refers, no notice whatever was given to the Lower House, but the consideration of the judgment was pressed upon them, even before it was printed for their use; and except for the delay arising from some of the undersigned moving the House (as above recited) to adopt a more seemly manner of proceeding, the greater part of its members would have learnt the fact of the judgment having been adopted before they were aware of the intention to propose a concurrence in it.

"That the undersigned, considering the proceedings above recited, even if not directly illegal (which, however, they regard as highly questionable), yet to be manifestly opposed to the orderly course of Convocation, as well as to the general principles of English law, and the plain dictates of equity, do earnestly protest against their being regarded as a precedent to guide the practice of Convocation for the future; and do humbly request His Grace the President to take such action as may neutralize the evil they apprehend in the present case, and tend to bring the practice of Convocation into closer harmony with that of those deliberative and judicial bodies which command the general confidence and respect of the English nation."

Immediately after the concurrence of the Lower House in the synodical judgment, Convocation was prorogued, the President and bishops having, in fact, been waiting for some hours in expectation of the decision of the other House. It did not meet again for business till the 14th of February in the next year, on which day the protesting *gravamen* was presented. There had been no intention to move its adoption by the whole House, and accordingly the natural course would have been for the Prolocutor at once to take it up as the *gravamen* of the individuals who had signed it. But the circumstance of four or five of the names having been signed by proxy (although under formal written instructions) furnished an argument for referring the document to the Committee of *Gravamina*. The same defect could not be imputed to another *gravamen* presented at the same time and which met with the same fate. This proceeded from Dr. Elliott, Dean of Bristol, late Prolocutor of the Lower House, and set forth that, although a resolution of Convocation did not become a "synodical act" until the Crown had ratified it and permitted its promulgation, yet that, by assuming to pass a synodical judgment without the assent of the Crown, its members had become subject to the penalties prescribed by the Act of Submission. There being every reason to suppose that the committee to which these *gravamina* were referred would not report upon them for some time, a copy of both was forthwith forwarded to the President of the Upper House by the Dean of Westminster. Few persons will doubt that His Grace exercised a wise discretion in silently acting upon the course suggested in the

former of the two; and that, in finally proroguing Convocation without first publicly affixing his signature to the "synodical judgment," he complied with the prayer "to take such action as might neutralize the evil apprehended in the present case," in an effectual although unostentatious manner.* As regards the future, all that seems requisite is that the President should, at the beginning of each series of sessions, mark out the subjects on which it may be His Grace's wish to obtain the opinion of the bishops and clergy, and not allow the effectual discussion of them to be interrupted by the manœuvres of agitators in either House.

The question of the desirability of an endeavour to obtain an alteration in the constitution of the Final Court of Appeal was introduced by a speech of the Bishop of Oxford in the Upper House on the 17th of February, 1865. An elaborate report had been laid before the Lower House on the 21st of June in the previous year. Archdeacon Denison opened the question in the Lower House at the same time with the Bishop in the Upper, and the great moderation of his tone evinced the advantage of delay before finally deciding on matters which have evoked a passionate interest. The committee which produced the report was originally constituted on the 19th of April, 1864, just when the irritation arising from the issue of the suits against Dr. Williams and Mr. Wilson was at its height. The ten months which had elapsed when their labours came on for discussion had brought with them the natural effects of reflection on an extremely complicated subject. Moreover, the general ignorance which had prevailed among the clergy on the subject of the history of the Court of Appeal had been dispelled by the publication, under the able editorship of Messrs. Brodrick and Fremantle, of the volume containing an account of the cases decided in it. Above all, the debates in Convocation on the "synodical judgment" had shown that there were in the Lower House men who were determined not to yield either to the *civium ardor prava jubentium* or to the terrorism of a party which arrogated to itself a special zeal for the orthodoxy of the Church. It was quite plain that the time for outrageous pretensions on the part of the clergy to decide doctrinal disputes was at an end; and the sole effort of Archdeacon Denison was to induce the House to adopt a scheme excluding all ecclesiastics from the Judicial Committee in appeals affecting doctrine, and providing, as a substitute for their presence, a Board of Reference, to consist exclusively of spiritual persons, who should be consulted by the Judicial Committee as theologians, and thus indirectly guide the lay judges to their decision. But even this plan—moderate as it might be regarded in comparison with the claims put forward some time before by the ultra party—was


* See note on page 253, *ante*.

not adopted. Convocation was prorogued from the 17th of February to the 16th of May, when the adjourned debate was resumed, and continued with great spirit for a couple of days. By able tactics, a great temporary advantage was gained. Archdeacon Denison was allowed to separate the resolution which he wished to carry into two parts, the first being only the vague affirmation—

“That, in the opinion of this House, the constitution of the present Court of Appeal in ecclesiastical causes is open to grave objections, and that its working is unsatisfactory.”

It was justly observed that those who entertained the most trivial objections to the Court, and those who wished wholly to revolutionize it, would unite in this resolution, and, by carrying it, altogether mislead the public as to the opinion of Convocation. The objectors, who on these grounds moved “the previous question,” were indeed outvoted, but Archdeacon Denison’s second resolution, recommending the Board of Reference, was lost by 22 votes to 21. Several amendments had been previously proposed and rejected—one by Mr. Fendall, which contained the strongest assertion of ecclesiastical claims, by no less than 33 votes to 5.

We repeat our opinion that the last two years have done much to strengthen the position of Convocation in the country; and if the attendance of the ultra-ecclesiastical party in the Lower House were imitated by the many temperate and judicious members who have hitherto held aloof, we believe that a great deal of light might be thrown upon the special difficulties which surround the task of bringing up the agencies of the Church to a level with the requirements of the population. When all religious parties are fairly represented and show themselves in their real force within the walls of the Jerusalem Chamber, there may cease to be that jealousy of ecclesiastical domination which has hitherto been excited among the laity by propositions emanating from that quarter. The constitution of the Lower House may possibly, under such circumstances, be remodelled, and adapted to the present exigencies of the clergy, not only with the general acquiescence of every order in the Church, but with the sanction of the Crown itself. There will then be no more attempts to try heretics or censure bad books, but numberless practical questions bearing upon the spiritual amelioration of the people will receive the attention of practical men, well acquainted, through their own experience, with the evils to be remedied and with the necessary conditions for successfully grappling with them. But the essential preliminary to such a consummation is, that the duty of attendance on Convocation should be recognised by those who are now elected to it, and that the preservation of order and regularity and of perfect fairness and candour in the conduct of business should be the first thought of every one.



BECKET LITERATURE.

Spicilegium Liberianum. Digessit et recensuit FRANCISCUS LIVERANI.
Folio. Florentiæ, 1863.

Descriptive Catalogue of Materials relating to the History of Great Britain and Ireland. By THOMAS DUFFUS HARDY. Vol. II.
London, 1865.

WE do not intend to review either of these books as a whole, but only to notice those parts of them which relate to a common subject,—the history of Archbishop Thomas Becket.

Monsignore Liverani may probably be known to many of our readers as the author of some pamphlets against the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, and as an exile from the Roman States on account of the opinions set forth in those pamphlets, although his orthodoxy as to religious doctrines is of the very latest Roman fashion. Before his flight from Rome, he had published five volumes of “Opere,” including a Life of Pope John X., whom he labours to clear from Luitprand’s charges of disreputable connection with the notorious Theodora and Marozia; and he had collected the materials of the “Spicilegium” now before us, which takes its name from the “Liberian Basilica,”—the patriarchal church of St. Mary Major, of which he was (and still maintains himself to be) a canon. It appears from his preface that the announcement of this book as about to appear at Florence has drawn on him much violent abuse from the *Civiltà Cattolica* and other papal organs; which might, perhaps, have spared their fury if the writers had been aware that the “Spicilegium,” instead of betraying any scandalous or damaging secrets of St. Mary’s or the Vatican, was to be merely a collection of innocuous writings, the very latest of which are six hundred years old.

The editor of such a collection is rather to be regarded as putting forth his gleanings to find their own value with readers, than as warranting them to be very precious. If, therefore, we are compelled to think that the world will not gain very much by this addition to the already long series of "Spicilegia," "Thesauri," and the like, we yet feel ourselves greatly indebted to Mgr. Liverani for having enabled us to judge of his materials by casting our eyes over a handsomely printed folio, which comes home to our own firesides. The volume is divided into three parts,—the first containing pieces of date earlier than A.D. 1000; the second entirely taken up with a different version from that hitherto published of certain homilies of Haymo, bishop of Halberstadt, who flourished in the middle of the ninth century; while the third consists of pieces dating between the years 1000 and 1300. It is with this last part only, or rather with so much of it as belongs to the time of Becket, that we now intend to concern ourselves.

We had looked with some eagerness for the appearance of the "Spicilegium," in consequence of announcements in the *Dublin Review*, and in the editor's own pamphlets, that he had discovered, and was about to publish, more than a hundred letters relating to the history of St. Thomas of Canterbury; but our expectations have been considerably disappointed. There is not among the new letters one by Becket himself; and those of his contemporaries, while they fit in perfectly with the letters already published by Lupus and Dr. Giles, contain very little that is really new.

The arrangement of this part of the volume is unsatisfactory and perplexing, inasmuch as it follows no more rational principle than that of placing the writers according to the alphabetical order of their names. Thus, from Gregory IX., who became Pope in 1227, we go back about sixty years to "Gulielmus Papiensis"—Cardinal William of Pavia, a contemporary of Becket; and then a quarter of a century farther back to William of Malmesbury, who is supposed to have died in 1143. We are next required to go forward again to three more of Becket's contemporaries, and after these follows a long leap backwards to Hildebert of Tours, who died in 1134. One odd result of this arrangement is that the canonization of Edward the Confessor, to which many of the epistles relate, comes in from time to time between all sorts of other matters, according as the names of those who wrote about it began with one letter or another. Moreover, in arranging the epistles of the same person, no discoverable rule has been observed. We find, for instance, after having read a letter which belongs to the time after Becket's death, that the next letter of the same writer throws us back into the midst of the quarrels which the Archbishop carried on in life.

We must also remark that Mgr. Liverani is not so conversant as

could be wished with the history of Becket. Of the books which bear on it he seems to know only Dr. Giles's "Sanctus Thomas," and to know it only through the reprint in Migne's "Patrologia." Nor has he made the best use even of his one book. At p. 543, for instance, Pope Alexander III. expresses to Becket an apprehension that the English king might ally himself, "prout olim fecit, illi tyranno et flagitioso inimico ecclesiæ," and the editor supposes that the words point at the antipope Victor; whereas a better acquaintance with the story would have shown him (1) that Henry had never been a supporter of Victor; (2) that Victor was dead at the date of the letter; (3) that the description clearly relates to the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, and not to any antipope.

Again, at p. 548, where Alexander mentions that the magistrates of the Lombard cities had interceded with him in behalf of Henry, the editor has nothing to say except that it is a matter "medullitus investiganda;" whereas he might have found notices in John of Salisbury, Ep. 288, and in Becket, Ep. 47, of the means by which the King got the republicans of Lombardy into his interest.

Again, at p. 610 is a letter from Master David, of which the editor tells us that he was unable to fix the date, because he had not the necessary books at hand. But to any one moderately acquainted with the story, it must be clear, even without the aid of books, that the letter was written in Lent, 1171, when the writer and others had been sent to propitiate the Pope after Becket's murder; and Mgr. Liverani might at least have seen that it was not addressed (as he supposes) to Odo, prior of Canterbury, but to one of the bishops whom Becket had suspended — most probably Gilbert Foliot of London.

Of Foliot himself there are eight letters. One of them (vi.), informing Becket that he had appealed to the Pope by way of warding off any sentence that the Archbishop might pronounce, is remarkable as uniting an extreme profession of deference with an intimation of the most determined opposition; and there is a letter in the same spirit, which bears the name of Joscelin, bishop of Salisbury, but may probably be referred to Foliot's suggestion.

Another prominent ecclesiastic of the time, Arnulf, bishop of Lisieux, appears largely, and in a very characteristic style. There is no mistaking the old intriguer, who feels that he has outlived his influence, yet tries to keep up the idea that he still possesses it by affecting to mediate for all applicants with King Henry and other great personages. In one of the letters, however, telling Master David how to put himself in the way of preferment, Arnulf confesses or complains that the King, although still glad to make use of him as a tool, has of late ceased to attend to his suits (x.). Another of

Arnulf's letters,—probably of earlier date, (i.)—is intended to anticipate the representations which a certain abbot, “a dissolute and mendacious man,” had set off to make against him at the Papal Court; and it gives a very curious picture of monastic discipline. For instance, we are told that when the abbot's monks, on a festival day, found the convent wine weaker than that which they had been accustomed to enjoy at a tavern, they took away the ropes from the bells, shut the chapel doors, and put a stop to Divine offices for some days, until the landlord of the tavern, in pity for the sufferings of his neighbours and customers, presented them with some drink more to their liking.

There are several letters which have a peculiar value as having been written between Becket's return to England and his murder, and as showing the dismay which, until all other feeling was overpowered by horror at the manner of his end, was excited by his displays of violence where wisdom would have dictated a policy of conciliation. Two of these letters are from Arnulf (xi., xx.); another, which is entitled to greater weight on account of the writer's character and impartial position, is from Rotrou, archbishop of Rouen (p. 758). In this last letter, as given by Mgr. Liverani, there is a misreading or misprint which entirely reverses the writer's meaning. In speaking of the coronation of Henry's son, the Archbishop is made to say, “neque de novis constitutionibus mutatio aliqua facta est,” which would mean that an oath to observe the Constitutions of Clarendon in their entirety was exacted of the prince, as Becket's partisans industriously reported. But it is clear from the context, and from other letters of the same time,* that for *mutatio* we ought to read *mentio*; that Rotrou really intended to contradict the rumours which he is here made to confirm.

Of all Becket's contemporaries, the one who figures most largely is Master David, to whom one of Foliot's letters in Dr. Giles's collection is addressed (vi. 18), and whose name, we believe, occurs elsewhere in that collection, although it would be useless to seek for it in such a pathless jungle. David was not, as we might rashly suppose, a Welshman, but a native of London. He was a canon of St. Paul's, and was employed in missions to the Papal Court both by Bishop Foliot and by the King. While there, he seems to have endeavoured to make interest for himself as well as for his employers; and we have a host of testimonials, addressed to Henry and to the Bishop, all eulogizing his ability and his integrity as a negotiator, and, more or less directly, recommending him for preferment. One of these letters, from no less a person than Alexander III., is curious, as illustrating the manner in which the Popes about that time

* Giles, vi. 214; Arnulf, ap. Liverani, pp. 584, 590.

began to invade the patronage of bishops and chapters. The Pope declares David to be deserving not only of a canonry, but of a bishopric, and in a very peremptory style he desires the dean and chapter of Lincoln, during a vacancy of the see, to bestow on him the first prebend that should fall vacant in their church (p. 546). It does not appear how the dean and chapter took this; but when David attempted to get possession of something which was in the Bishop of London's gift by means of a papal recommendation, Foliot cried out very loudly of his base ingratitude for all the favours that had been heaped on him by his old patron (p. 640). Master David, however, knew how to make friends with opposite parties; and we have a letter from Roger, bishop of Worcester, who had always been a strenuous adherent of Becket, telling the Pope that Foliot and the Archdeacon of Middlesex had contrived between them to jockey poor David out of a pension of ten pounds which had been charged on the archdeaconry (p. 757). The editor feels that David's own epistles, and such glimpses of his proceedings in search of preferment as we catch, do not very well bear out the lofty panegyrics pronounced on him by the Pope and other illustrious personages:—

“Hujus viri famæ melius profecto consoluisset oblivio; quoniam scripta ejus, quæ nunc primum evulgantur, fidem elevant laudibus et præconiis a supparibus et amicis et Mecenatibus illi collatis. En enim procacem et garrulum virum, magis quam eruditum et disertum exhibent; dexteritatem et petulantiam assentatoris et legulæi vulgarissimi potius quam eximiam aliquam virtutis et scientiæ excellentiam commendant. Sermonis facilitatem atque volubilitatem, magis quam elegantiam, concinnitatem, venustatem et leporem aliquem, in eo offendimus.”—(P. 603.)

But the picture of such a preferment-hunter in the twelfth century is very curious, and is perhaps as valuable as anything in the volume.

One more letter (p. 551) we may particularly notice. Liverani supposes it to have been written by some unknown bishop, although we do not see why it should be ascribed to a bishop rather than to an ecclesiastic of lower degree. The object of it is to exasperate the Pope against Foliot, who, after the murder of Becket, was on his way to the *curia* for the purpose of soliciting absolution from the sentence pronounced against him by the late primate. The writer argues, with a great appearance of enmity, that Foliot, although he had not assaulted the Archbishop with his own hand, was yet, by his long and bitter opposition to him, in reality the chief cause of his death.

We now pass to the second volume on our list: and in so doing it is needless to express either our respect for Mr. Hardy's high and long-established reputation as an antiquary, or our sense of the very great value of his elaborate “Catalogue.” In this Becket occupies eighty

pages, and Mr. Hardy enumerates no less than 112 articles relating to him, to which Mgr. Liverani's contributions may be added, as still further increasing the number. Yet this long and carefully compiled list of manuscript materials adds hardly anything of importance to the documents which are already in print. Many of the articles are sermons, lessons to be read in church, hymns, and the like, for the most part written long after Becket's time, and of no historical value; some are mere repetitions, abridgments, or abstracts of others—for instance, the Passion, by "Master *Everard*" (No. 428), whose name is a variation for that of *Edward* Grim; others are composite lives, made up of extracts from various biographers, and therefore having no independent value, except in cases where the originals are lost. The only pieces which, on looking through the catalogue, struck us as at once unknown to us and likely to be of any interest, were two which are contained in the Lansdowne MS. 398, and these we have lately examined. The first of them (No. 436), as Mr. Hardy points out, is not noticed in the Lansdowne Catalogue, being undistinguishable in appearance from the MS. of the Life by Fitzstephen with which the volume begins. But with folio 42 the text of Fitzstephen is broken off (far short of the end, as may be seen by a comparison with the published copies), and it is followed by another fragment, which, as Mr. Hardy says, "appears to be a commemorative homily." Mr. Hardy, however, has not observed that this in its turn breaks off with folio 53, and that the next two leaves, which relate chiefly to Becket's consecration, are part of another piece. There are some things worth preserving in both these fragments, the first of which is evidently contemporary, from the manner in which the schism in the Papacy is spoken of; but if they should be printed, it will be well to leave out so much of them as is merely declamatory twaddle.* The other piece in the same volume (No. 435 in the list) is also of the homiletical kind, and the earlier part of it is marked off into twelve lessons, for use in the service of the Church. Dr. Giles, in order to fill some blank pages, has printed the beginning of this, with a polite intimation to the reader that, if he wish to know more, he may go to the MS. for himself.† But Dr. Giles does not seem to have been aware that the real value of the work is in the later part, which relates to the transactions after the murder; and this part it might

* At folio 52 there are some words which, if they had been known to Augustine Thierry, would have been eagerly seized on as confirming his theory that Becket was the champion and martyr of the Anglo-Saxon race,—"*Cognitionem suam cognatus Anglorum posthabuit, nisi quem meritorum qualitas commendaret,*" &c. But the reading ought almost certainly to be *cognatis aliorum*.

† "Typographo me monente deesse materiam quæ plagulam hanc suppleat, adjicio hic prologum et initium Vitæ. . . . Cætera siquis legere velit, in ipso codice requirat."—*Giles*, ii. 316, 326.

be well to print, although the rest might be left in MS. without any loss to mankind.

In noticing the French metrical Life by Garnier of Pont Ste. Maxence, Mr. Hardy says (pp. 338-9) that his book, "for the greater part, almost appears to be Edward Grim versified." We should not object to this statement, if there were not a still closer agreement between Garnier and the writer whom Dr. Giles calls Roger of Pontigny. But we think that Mr. Hardy himself can hardly fail to see that, while there is much likeness between Grim and Roger, and while Garnier has much in common with both, he resembles Roger far more than Grim; and that where the two prose biographers differ (as in the story of Becket's escape from drowning), Garnier holds to Roger.

The whole subject of the connection between the various Lives, and of the sources from which each biographer may be presumed to have drawn his materials, deserves thorough investigation; but as yet hardly anything has been done in this way. It is, however, a matter which requires more of detail than is consistent with the nature of a catalogue, so that we must not be understood as blaming Mr. Hardy for having attempted but little towards the solution of such questions.

Mr. Hardy has anticipated us in much that we might have said as to the composite Life ascribed by Dr. Giles to "Philip of Liège." He has seen that the compiler indicates that his name was really Thomas of Beverley, and has rightly identified him with one Thomas who was a native of that place, and afterwards became a monk of Froidmont, in the diocese of Beauvais.* And we cannot but admire the diffidence with which, after having ascertained so much, Mr. Hardy tells us that there is "some doubt as to whether Philip is the name of the author." The only ground assigned by Dr. Giles for supposing that the compiler of the Life was named Philip is the fact that he found a "sequence" in honour of Becket ascribed to one Philip; and it appears from the very note on which Dr. Giles relies, that this Philip, instead of having been an otherwise unknown monk of Aune (as his editor supposes), was a person whose name often occurs in the history of the time, and who even figures in the Life of Becket himself, as abbot of l'Aumône. Mr. Hardy's modest doubt, therefore, might safely have been expressed as an absolute certainty.

No. 470 in the "Catalogue" is the French metrical Life published by M. Michel with the Chronicle of the Dukes of Normandy by Benedict of Ste. Maure.† The writer who put this Life into its present form addresses his readers towards the end:—

* "Hist. Litt. de la France," xv. 264, 295. This article, however, has several inaccuracies.

† Dr. Potthast, in his very valuable but not immaculate "*Bibliotheca Historica Medii Ævi*" (p. 909), wrongly identifies this metrical Life with that by Garnier.

" Si vus en pri, pur Deu amar
 Ke requerez le bon seignur
 Saint Thomas,
 Ke il eit merci par sa duzur
 De frere Beneit le pecheur
 Od les neir dras,
 Ke ceste vie nus ad mustré;
 De Latin en Romanz translaté
 Par nus aider.
 * • • •
 Nus et lui en ceste vie
 Defende tuz jurs de vilanie," &c.
 (P. 509, ed. Michel.)

Mr. Hardy supposes that the Benedict here mentioned (a different person from the chronicler of the Norman dukes) was himself the author of the French version. Whether he was so, or whether his part consisted in making a prose translation, on which the versifier was to work, is a question which seems to depend on another, —whether we are, in some of the lines above quoted, to read "*nus*" with M. Michel, or "*vus*," which Mr. Hardy suggests as an alternative. It is, however, more important to inquire who was the author of the Latin; and we venture to conjecture that this Life is a translation from the lost work of Robert of Dunstable (No. 330). The form is in favour of this supposition; for Robert's other writings are in Latin verse, and his Life of St. Thomas may be presumed to have been so also, as the Life translated by Benedict "*le Pécheur*" almost certainly was. Moreover, Robert was a monk of St. Alban's; and the Life in question shows a connection between the author and that monastery. We do not wish to make too much of these slight circumstances, or to give our conjecture for more than it may be worth: perhaps a careful perusal of the Life might throw further light on the subject.

There is one biographer of whom we are rather surprised to find Mr. Hardy saying that "no manuscript is now known"—William of Canterbury:* for the existence of a MS. of this writer, bequeathed by William of Wykeham to Winchester College, was announced by Mr. Baigent of Winchester, in the "Journal of the Archæological Association" (x. 77), as long ago as 1854, and has been since mentioned in the *Dublin Review* (Nov., 1860, p. 5), and in the *Quarterly Review* (cxii. 103). The Life fills only about a fourth part of the volume, the remainder being taken up with a collection of "Miracles" in six books, compiled by William, and sent by the monks of Canterbury to Henry II. at the King's own request.† So much

* This biographer was probably the same with a monk of Christchurch, Canterbury, named William, who appears frequently in the correspondence as to the quarrel between his brotherhood and Archbishop Baldwin, lately published by Mr. Stubbs. ("Memorials of Richard I.," vol. ii., in "Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain.")

† We have no doubt that this, and not the book of miracles published by Dr. Giles

of the Life as is important, and yet has not been included in the "Quadrilogus," will probably have appeared in the "Archæologia Cantiana" before these pages see the light; but if ever a new edition of the writings relating to Becket should be undertaken, it is to be hoped that not only this biography in a complete form, but the "Miracula" by the same writer will be included.*

How much a new edition is to be desired we need not say, as the character of Dr. Giles's books is only too well known to all who take any interest in the history of Becket; besides that a great deal of valuable matter is not included in them, such as the Lives by William and Garnier, with that which we suppose to be a translation from Robert of Dunstable. But although we must earnestly wish for a more comprehensive and better edited collection, there is, in so far as appears from Mr. Hardy's extensive list, very little of new matter to be expected, or even desiderated. There is hardly any record of writings on the subject as having existed, in addition to those which are now to be found;† nor, with the exception of William of Canterbury's "Miracula," and of a few such short pieces as those in the Lansdowne MS. 398, is there reason to believe that any known materials of interest remain unprinted. Both for the life of Thomas of Canterbury, and for the consequences of his death, the student may find almost all the information that he can need without the trouble of deciphering crabbed manuscripts, although it is to be gathered at an expense of time, and labour, and temper, which might have been very greatly reduced if the copious stores of biography and correspondence had been more fortunate in their editors.

J. C. ROBERTSON.

as the work of Benedict of Peterborough, is the "magnus codex conscriptus" mentioned by Fitzstephen, in a passage which Mr. Hardy refers to Benedict (p. 333). It may be worth while to inquire whether the book of miracles, of which Mr. Hardy mentions MSS. at Lambeth, Cambridge, and Paris (No. 433), be the same with that in the Winchester MS.

* The "Gesta post Martyrium" (No. 426) are partly taken from William of Canterbury.

† The loss of Benedict of Peterborough's book (although we should be very glad to recover it) is probably not of much importance; for it was not, as Mr. Hardy supposes (p. 340), a complete Life, but merely an account of the "Passion;" and of this so much is given in the "Quadrilogus" that the remainder cannot have been very considerable.



FRÈNCH ÆSTHETICS.

1. *Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien.* Par M. V. COUSIN. Onzième Edition. 1865.
2. *Cours d'Esthétique.* Par THÉODORE JOUFFROY. Deuxième Edition. 1863.
3. *De l'Art et du Beau.* Par F. LAMENNAIS. 1865.
4. *La Science du Beau.* Par CHARLES LÉVÊQUE. 1862.
5. *Le Spiritualisme dans l'Art.* Par CHARLES LÉVÊQUE. 1864.
6. *Philosophie de l'Art.* Par H. TAINÉ. 1865.

IN a volume of poems published by Wordsworth in 1842, appeared a sonnet, which he was impelled to write "by the disgusting frequency with which the word *artistical*, imported with other imper tinencies from the Germans, is employed by writers of the present day." According to Wordsworth, it was used in an approving way of some new and fashionable kind of poetry, produced by an artificial process which he compares to casting in a mould, instead of growing, like the wild flower or the forest tree, free to their very roots, by an inherent vitality. But is such really the application of the word, or has there of late years been this reaction towards artificiality in poetry? When we call Mr. Tennyson a great *artist*, do we mean that "Morte d'Arthur" and "In Memoriam" were manufactured in the same way as area railings or hall-door knockers? No. We have a fine distinction in our language: the late M. Soyer, and other men of mark in his profession, who turn out most agreeable compositions of their own kind, we name *artistes*; Mr. Tennyson, who does not make compositions, or who at least keeps secret his receipt for a lyric or an idyl, is called an *artist*.* We are not yet tired of abusing the

* "Composition," said Goethe to Eckermann, "is a thoroughly contemptible word, for which we have to thank the French, and of which we should endeavour to rid ourselves as soon as possible. How can one say Mozart has *composed* (*componirt*) Don Juan! Com-

poor eighteenth century, nor have we ceased to love certain "Poems of the Imagination" and "Poems of Sentiment and Reflection," nor come to admire much certain "Ecclesiastical Sonnets."

What, then, has in truth called the word "artistical" into frequent use? Chiefly the exigencies of a new idea,—the idea of a common basis or substance of poetry and the other arts, a common centre at which they meet, a common function which they fulfil, and a common kind of creative power from which they proceed. This conception of the unity of art is of comparatively recent origin, yet so readily is it now accepted, that there is danger at the present day of making too little of the differences existing between the several forms of art, and demanding results from one mode of expression which can be obtained only by another. Much is talked of painting with words, and colouring in music, and we hear occasionally of the sculptural school of poetry and the literary school of painters. These are phrases which require to be challenged to render an accurate account of themselves. Yet there is a measure of truth in them; they recognise the fact that words and sounds, and colouring and form, are only different languages by which the same great ideas are uttered (with special powers and felicities of expression in detail); they originate in the right conception of art.

The want of this right conception, the want of perceiving the unity of art, contributed, with many other causes, to delay the growth of the science of æsthetics. A hundred years ago it was in its infancy, and had but just received its name.* It is still young, and capable of manifold development. It does not live, like some branches of psychology which treat exclusively of intellectual phenomena, estranged from the thoughts of the people. Its results, like those of every form of philosophy, become a national possession by depositing themselves in language. But besides this, there is for æsthetics an active medium between the higher thought and the popular in the criticism of literature and art. Indeed, this criticism is now-a-days much more than a medium; it is itself a source of many of the best ideas, and much of the work of æsthetics is done in this unsystematic way. This is especially the case amongst ourselves; and the progress of æsthetics is marked by the growth of a new and better criticism, more disinterested, more sincere, more cultured, which will be fruitful

position! As if it were a piece of cake or biscuit which had been stirred together out of eggs, flour, and sugar! It is a spiritual creation, in which the details, as well as the whole, are pervaded by *one* spirit and by the breath of *one* life; so that the producer did not make experiments, and patch together, and follow his own caprice, but was altogether in the power of the dæmonic spirit of his genius, and acted according to his orders."

—*Conversations of Goethe with Eckermann*, translated by John Oxenford, vol. ii., p. 403.

* "Æsthetica, scripsit Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten. 1750."

of good in the future. We can perceive, from the early days of the *Edinburgh Review*, some advance in the insight of our criticism, in its ascertainment of principles, in its freedom from political and personal bias, in its urbanity, in its openness to new ideas. We are now endeavouring in some degree to see things as they are, and value less the writer who can only find out something smart, or telling, or brutal to say about them. We are growing, it is to be hoped, a little less wilful in matters intellectual, a little less capricious, and a little more reasonable and conscientious.

At the same time we must confess, that in its more philosophical form, although in Hutcheson England had the start of France and Germany, our nation has accomplished little in the science of æsthetics. Set aside the somewhat irregular labours of Mr. Ruskin, which can hardly be called philosophical, and we have no great work to show on this subject, no work that can be put in the first or even in the second rank. This is chiefly to be attributed to the empirical tendency of our national thought. We are not surprised that Mr. Mill has written no "Science of the Beautiful." Even Sir William Hamilton dismisses the subject with a few pages at the end of his *Lectures on Metaphysics*, and Mr. Mansel approves the maxim, "*De gustibus non disputandum est*," in its denial of objective beauty. If, then, there is anything to be learned, it is to French or German teachers that we must resort. In Germany, since the time of Kant, but especially in the hands of Schelling and Hegel, the science of the beautiful, the principles of art, and the history of its development, have been great affairs in the life of philosophy. It is some evidence of the fulness of the current of ideas on these matters in France, that since 1810 thirty *docteurs des lettres* have chosen for the subjects of their theses questions in æsthetics.* My purpose in this article is to give some account of the best thoughts about beauty and art which are to be found amongst French thinkers of this century. Into the last century there is little to induce us to look back. A treatise by Crouzas of very slight value; an essay on the Beautiful by a disciple of Malebranche's, the Jesuit Father André, who may be considered the founder of French æsthetics; and some occasional writings of Diderot and Marmontel, comprise nearly all that the eighteenth century has left us. From M. Cousin the recent development of the science starts, and with him let us begin.

II.

In the early years of the present century what was the position of philosophy in France? It was this. Sensualism had reached its farthest development as a speculative system, and was connecting

* This fact is mentioned by M. Lévêque, "*La Science du Beau*," Préface, p. ix.

itself, under the guidance chiefly of Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy, with a more scientific study of physiology. If, therefore, there was to be any philosophy distinct from the observation and generalizing of physical facts, if psychology and metaphysics were not to be abandoned as futile, a development of thought in some new direction was essential. Materialism had said its last word. To the "*Système de la Nature*" nothing could be added; the *mécanique terrestre* was complete; man was found to be but a link in a great chain of necessity; those grey particles of matter the motions of which produce deceptive sensations of disinterestedness, freedom, love of God, and hope of a future life, lingered only in the brains of peasant women who still went to their country churches, or in those of the Theophilanthropists who worshipped around their symbolical baskets of flowers, and listened to the discourses of a Parisian high-priest. Nothing more remained for materialism to accomplish. But philosophy, the questioning spirit of humanity, exists only by the activity of mind. Its answers never contain the entire truth, and if they stiffen into dogma this becomes at once apparent. A philosophy to live must leave itself room for progress, must be continually receptive, flexible, and in connection with consciousness. This had ceased to be the position of materialism as a speculative system; it had become dogmatic, and the dogmatism of negation is of all dogmatisms the least living and self-sufficing.

Early in this century, then, materialism was about to fall. As usual, an attempt was made to mediate between the decaying system and that which was to take its place. In 1811, M. Cousin, then in his twentieth year, was a listener to the lectures in which La Romiguière, the representative of this neo-sensualism, endeavoured to effect a compromise between the principles of Condillac and Descartes. "C'était un système honorable, spécieux, surtout bien rédigé, et l'on aime tant les bonnes rédactions en France!"* Two years later, M. Cousin was listening to Royer-Collard, who attacked the sensualist philosophy not yet in full front, but by a successful flank movement. Again two years, and M. Cousin himself, in Royer-Collard's place, was sweeping away everywhere the lines of the enemy, and planting the banner of the new philosophy on their abandoned heights.

But what was this banner of M. Cousin's? What was the watch-word of the movement of 1815—1820? Here there has been some misunderstanding. "*Eclecticism*," cry a score of critical voices. But this is what M. Cousin himself denies. Indeed, it ought to be seen that to name a movement simply *eclectic* is to give no hint as to its real tendency. *Eclectic*! Yes; but in what way? Two eclectics may be as much opposed as any two thinkers of opposite schools. I

* Sainte-Beuve: "*Portraits derniers*," p. 458.

may go through life always looking at the bright side of things, and you at the dark; but since life includes both bright and dark, we are both eclectics. It is only by virtue of some tendencies or principles of my own that it is possible for me to make a choice, to select some and reject other parts of a system of thought: without these I must accept the whole or reject it; I cannot discriminate. Hear M. Cousin himself,—“Eclecticism is one of the most important and most useful applications of the philosophy which we profess, but it is not its principle. Our true doctrine, our true banner, is intellectualism (*spiritualisme*).”^{*} To call M. Cousin simply an eclectic is to lose the idea of his movement, and to obscure his relations both to the sensualist generation out of which he sprang, and the present intellectualist generation, of which he is the parent.

The most important part of M. Cousin's work, however, from 1815 to 1820, was not constructive. The interests of philosophy required before anything else that he should follow up the defeat of the sensualists, and M. Cousin's brilliant dialectical powers found in this, no doubt, a highly agreeable exercise. His æsthetical lectures, accordingly, begin with a series of negative propositions. Beauty is not that which is pleasing to the senses: the taste of a peach is delicious, it is not beautiful. “*De gustibus non disputandum est*,” if any one asserts that he gets more pleasure from looking at the Venus of the Hottentots than the Venus of Milo, what right have I to say it should not be so? None; unless this involves the judgment that the Hottentot Venus is the more beautiful, when I take a high tone and pronounce him to be in error. Nor is beauty merely a form of agreeable emotion,—we have just seen that, apart from a judgment of the beautiful, we could not justly condemn any person for admiring anything. Could we make the feeling of the majority a test of what is right in matters of taste? No; we can often declare unhesitatingly that the feeling of the majority is wrong. How so? What right have we? If men differ about beauty in various classes of society, various periods of time, various countries of the world, can we venture to maintain that there is such a thing as real and invariable beauty? Yes; that is what our consciousness affirms, and we have no more doubt of the reality of beauty, because men differ about it, than we have of the reality of right and wrong, because there is some divergence in men's moral judgments.

For a positive theory, M. Cousin falls back on the old doctrine that beauty is composed of unity and variety. But this, a moment's consideration will show us, is quite inadequate. Unity and variety may be the conditions of the perception of beauty, but assuredly they do not constitute it. They are conditions of the perception of everything

^{*} “Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien,” *Avant-propos*, p. xi., 11^{me} Edit.

that has substance and attributes. There are unity and variety in a hog, an ape, a frog, in the same way as in a stag or hound; yet these are beautiful and those are ugly. Besides, these words, "unity" and "variety," have half-a-dozen meanings, and M. Cousin does not tell us in which of these, or if in all, they constitute beauty. There are unities and varieties of place, of time, of end, of cause, of substance. It is worth little to repeat an old phrase without explaining what it here precisely means, or proving it in any meaning to be true.

What is more novel in M. Cousin's theory is the reduction of physical and intellectual to moral beauty. But in this what is new is not true, and has to be abandoned in substance, though the appearance of originality is retained. If the word "*moral*" be taken strictly it is easy to prove that the theory is false. What is the moral character of a rose? Is it more virtuous than a celandine or kingcup? Surely it would not be hard to show in a brilliant exposition, after the manner of some French theorizers, that the celandine, struggling against the rains and frosts of February, possesses a far nobler character than the luxurious (yet, ah, how superbly beautiful!) queen-flower of mid-summer. Here we have beauty apart from morality. Nor is it harder to find morality apart from beauty. It is a moral duty for most persons to get out of bed each morning before eleven o'clock, yet the action of getting out of bed does not impress us as beautiful or sublime. It is just (and M. Cousin has analysed moral beauty into justice and charity) to pay one's tailor's bills; dutiful it certainly is, beautiful it certainly is not. It is just for a mother to send a disobedient child to her bedroom, but there is nothing in this which excites our admiration unless (a most suggestive "unless") her love and pity are so great that it requires a strong effort of the principle of justice to pass the sentence and carry it into execution. M. Cousin, however, anticipated these objections, and makes an explanation which alters the entire character of his system. All kinds of beauty are reducible to moral; but by moral we are to understand, besides what is properly so called, all *spiritual* beauty. The theory becomes much more flexible with this explanation, but the flexibility is gained at the expense of all in it that is original. If there is spiritual beauty of any other kind than justice and charity, it is only confusing names to call it moral. All current British coins may be called half-crowns, —understanding by this, besides half-crowns proper, all sovereigns, shillings, pence, &c. To say this is perfectly legitimate, but it does not give us a clearer view of the currency. M. Cousin's theory, then, amounts merely to the denial of independent physical beauty: all that is visibly beautiful is so only by virtue of the invisible. This, however, is as old as Plato. Plotinus had named the beautiful "the splendour of the good;" and in recent times Reid had taught that.

physical beauty is not primitive but derived, a sign of the beauty which the eye cannot behold.

It is not in his theorizing about beauty, but in his discussion of the principles of art, that M. Cousin's chief contributions to the science of æsthetics will be found. As before, he begins with negative doctrine. The end of art is not the literal imitation of nature. Nothing is more certain, understanding by *nature* the appearances of things. We do not find fault with the Apollo of the Belvidere, because the eyeballs are suppressed. We have not discovered what Beethoven imitated in his sonatas, nor is there any account left of Shakspeare's models for Ariel and Caliban. Yet though no mere imitations, these are profoundly true to nature,—true to its laws though not to its circumstances. Nor is the end of art illusion. A statue makes no attempt to deceive me: if it attempted this, it could not succeed: if it were to succeed, the æsthetical emotion would vanish; I should think the Apollo a very remarkable young man, not a work of art. I should expect motion, and other proofs of life, and feel disappointed when I waited for them in vain. It is a poor kind of art which attempts to deceive. Madame Tussaud's gallery in Baker Street is held by severe judges to contain works of art of a lower order than some of those in the British Museum; yet country children may be observed nightly clutching their mother's gowns in presence of John Knox and Mr. Macready, or gazing with fascination into the eyes of Napoleon's favourite Mameluke. If the wigs could reach even a higher point of realistic art, if the eyes were yet more lustrous blues and greys, and the complexions of a yet more delicate bloom, still the headless Fates, and the noseless and footless Theseus, immortal fragment! would produce a sense of larger and more serious truth, and fill our hearts with a glow of nobler emotion.

It is not easy to say in 1866 what in 1818 was M. Cousin's most important contribution to æsthetics. Two appear especially noteworthy: first, his vindication of the independence of art; secondly, his enunciation of the principle that the end of art is to express the invisible.

Art has an end of its own, enacts its laws freely with reference to this end, is a self-governing republic, and is not a dependency of utility, or science, or history, or politics, or morality, or religion,—these were great truths to proclaim, and yet, in the mind of one who fails to apprehend them, the first idea of art has not yet emerged. Kant (although he makes the theory of taste, like religion, a corollary of morality) clearly saw the independence of art when he declared that it has its principle and end in the idea of beauty. Goethe, by his practice and his theoretical teaching, had formed the true conception of art in the mind of the Germans. "It is based," said he, "on

a strong sentiment of religion, on a profound and mighty earnestness : hence it is prone to co-operate with religion." The origin of art in every nation confirms this : but is it therefore governed at its secret heart by any controlling intention with regard either to religious faith or religious emotion ? Not consciously—not as art. Hear another sentence of Goethe's, a really wonderful sentence, in which the truth on this subject is cut out at a single stroke :—"Religion stands in the same relation to art as any other of the higher interests of life. It is a subject, and its rights are those of all other subjects." Morality and religion are no more the direct ends of art than they are the ends of chemistry or engineering. The supremacy of conscience does not mean that conscience enacts the laws of every form of human activity, but that it has the power of putting a veto upon any measure which is antagonistic to its own laws. The judgment, "This is beautiful," is quite distinct from the judgment, "This is right." It is not of morality or even religion that the wild flowers first speak to a mind of perfect sanity ; but they are living, they are beautiful, and we bow over them with a joy, a yearning, and a tender dread. They do not teach us anything till they have made us feel how Beautiful they are.

"And is there any moral shut
Within the bosom of a rose?"

asks Mr. Tennyson. Beauty has its own largesse and blessing for the heart, quite other than that of moral teaching ; and if the rose, after the manner of roses in the fables, could tell us that "Virtue is its own reward," or that "Falsehood should not be practised," we might think it a very ethical little flower, and feel grateful to it for supplying us with lines for our children's copy-books ; but its beauty would still be something reaching our heart in its own way, quite apart from these moral reflections. The artist who is preoccupied with some moral or religious purpose, which is to enter into his art, and determine the product, even when his work has more to do with life and character than with what we call physical beauty, will inevitably produce bad work. It is not life which he will represent or interpret in its depth and fulness, but his own particular little theory of life. He is not really labouring for art's sake, but using art to prove something,—something, perhaps, giving no larger an account of life than that a working man is the better for joining a total abstinence society, or that a parish is in an enviable condition when the curate's views are high-church or low-church. These things may be worth proving, but it is a poor kind of art which aims at this. Even as teaching, how meagre are the morals drawn from life (life being considered as material for moralizing), compared with the fulness of teaching we receive from any true representation of life itself. Life teaches us in

a thousand ways, and is really inexhaustible. Life analysed in accordance with some theory teaches little, and that little badly; for we have a sense of the inadequacy of the representation. What is the moral of "Lear" or "Hamlet"? If they were intended to teach some set principle, they would have the characteristic of all didactic art, their meaning would be exhaustible; but they are works of genuine art, and therefore we return to them again and again, and find them perpetually full of the mystery of human life, which will not be comprehended in a proposition.

We are beginning now-a-days to acknowledge this. We are beginning to smile at the poetical justice without which, not long ago, it was considered improper to wind up a story. We believe that nobler and fuller teaching comes from representing life as indeed life is. Murder does not always out; the rogues are not always whipped and put in the stocks; they sometimes get off with parchment addresses and presentations of plate. Yes; but no little piece of roguery, no little piece of dishonest work, was ever done without bringing an inevitable consequence—moral injury; and for external punishment in nearly every instance, the *possibility* of unforeseen calamity to oneself or others. If there is an underlying tendency in the nature of crime that it should discover itself on earth, and this is hindered only by accidental circumstances, let the artist make this tendency apparent; only let him develop it in proportion, and, since his work is ideal, make not only this one but all the tendencies of things more apparent than they are in reality. But let him fling away that paltry poetical justice of his, and regard as sufficient the terrible justice of God; let him teach us something nobler than the huckstering virtues, of which the great result is called "success in life;" let his teaching be to show us, really or ideally, life itself, with its capricious and unsuccessful little laws of men's devising, and its solemn laws of God's appointment, which are deep, universal, and never frustrated, though their effects may be delayed; and when his work closes, let it close leaving the sense of unity,—the sad or joyous story of a life on earth, one round of existence,—but not the sense of finality, as if the whole purpose of the life were told. Such art is high art indeed, in the great style, full of noble meaning for human souls. It is not in the *service* of religion or morality; it has its own function to fulfil: but it co-operates with them, as everything earnest and noble co-operates with all else that is earnest and noble in the soul. If it is not in the service of religion or morality, neither can it ever be in the service of irreligion or immorality. All things are not to be represented by art; truth to the laws of our own nature, truth to *its* law of beauty, forbid that. There is nothing in us which demands the representation of what is ugly for ugliness' sake. There is nothing in us—except what

we are trying to expel from our constitution, and which is therefore no elementary part of it—which demands the representation of what is merely sinful and vicious. Both what is ugly and what is wicked have their place in art, but only for the sake of what is noble and beautiful. If we have Duesse we have Una; if we have Regan we have Cordelia; if we have Iago we have Desdemona.

Before speaking of the principle that the end of art is to express the invisible, it will be necessary to explain what is meant by the somewhat vague term, "*the invisible*;" and before doing this we take leave of M. Cousin. Here it is worth observing how this principle and that of the independence of art were adopted and popularized by the leaders of the Romantic movement in literature. First, I believe, from M. Cousin was heard a watchword of theirs now so well known, "*L'art pour l'art*." And the principle that art should express the invisible may be connected, by a very easy perversion, with their disdain of physical beauty, and their attempt to give increased preponderance in art to spirit over matter, soul over body, which had long lost and never can recover their old classical equilibrium.

III.

To introduce here some notice of the greatest work on æsthetics which France has yet produced, I cannot do better than give the reader two quotations,—the first from Emile Saisset, the second from M. Sainte-Beuve.

"In M. Cousin's audience," wrote Emile Saisset, "there was a young man whom the breath of the new spirit had touched. A nature reflective, inward, meditative. Neither philosophical controversy nor erudition attracted him. That Condillac was deceived on the origin of ideas mattered little to him, and he cared not very much to know what Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and Leibnitz had thought on the nature of things; but to lift a little, though but a little it might be, the veil which hides the initial truths of philosophy, this it was which strongly attracted his intellect, and he plunged with eagerness into psychological analysis, not to find a new system, to found a school, or to hear the cries around him of enthusiastic disciples and desperate opponents, and all the noise which is called glory, but rather to enjoy within himself the perception of truth, the happiness of clear-sightedness in his thoughts—more than all, to give some solace to a soul profoundly troubled by the problem of human destiny. Such were the secret tendencies of this student of the Sorbonne, with the mild and melancholy face, lately come from the mountains of the Jura to the Normal School, and which were to render illustrious the name of Jouffroy. To the intellect and the soul of a thinker he united the imagination of a poet, and after his labours, and the austere joys of philosophical reflection, he knew no relaxations sweeter than

* On the relation of M. Cousin's doctrines to the Romantic movement, see an instructive and very disagreeable book by A. Michiels, "*Histoire des Idées littéraires en France*," vol. ii., p. 9.

the contemplation of nature and the exquisite emotions of art. Still at the age of a schoolboy, he wrote for his Doctor's degree a thesis 'On the Emotion of the Beautiful.' The ideas which were then in the germ (in 1816), developed by the fertilizing words of M. Cousin, were not slow to blossom. In 1822 the Normal School was suppressed. M. Jouffroy, driven from his chair, conceived the idea of making another, less exposed to the action of a violent and suspicious government, by gathering around him, in a student's modest chamber, a score of young people, his contemporaries and companions. This little chamber of the Rue du Four has a place in history. The unknown young people bore the names of Duchâtel, Vitet, Damiron, Dubois, Sainte-Beuve. It was *The Globe* in its cradle, growing in obscurity, and preparing by abstract meditation for the great struggles of public life." *

To this circle of friends it was that Jouffroy delivered his "Cours d'Esthétique." M. Sainte-Beuve's recollections of these gatherings of the Rue du Four are given with his usual delicacy of colouring and pureness of outline:—

"These private courses of lectures were very select; some spirits already mature, companions of the master, some physicians since celebrated, a studious and choice few from the *salons*, several representatives of the young and future peerage, composed the usual audience, which was far from numerous, as the room was small, and a more considerable gathering would readily have become an object of suspicion before 1828. To these discourses on philosophy the listeners were invited only once a week: they came with warmth and some degree of caution, as if to drink of a new and forbidden science, from which was expected some of the purer faith of the future. When the audience of fifteen or twenty had slowly come together, when the key had been removed from the outer door, and the last strokes of the little bell had ceased, the professor, standing leaning on the mantelpiece, began in a low voice, and after a long silence. The face, the figure even of M. Jouffroy is one of those which most deeply impress one at first sight, by I know not what of melancholy, of reserve, which makes one feel involuntarily the presence of a mysterious and noble stranger ('inconnu,' *unknown*). Then he began to speak: he spoke of the beautiful, or of moral good, or of the immortality of the soul: in those days his more delicate complexion, his cheeks slightly hollow, the deeper blue of his eyes, added in the mind to the ideal reminiscences of the 'Phædo.' The tone of his voice after the first half, which was monotonous enough, rose and grew animated, while his words followed quicker on one another. His eloquence, now unfolded, continued after the hour was passed, and knew not how to come to an end. The declining day made the scene more solemnly impressive: full of faith, and deeply moved, the listeners went out, congratulating themselves on the fruit-bearing seeds of thought they had received. M. Jouffroy has justified what was expected from him; but for those who heard him in these private discourses, nothing has given back, nor will give back, the charm and influence of the time." †

The "Cours d'Esthétique" consists of forty lectures. It was prepared after Jouffroy's death by his most intimate friend, M. Damiron,

* "L'Ame et la Vie, suivi d'un Examen critique de l'Esthétique française. Par Emile Saisset," pp. 98-100.

† "Portraits littéraires," vol. i., pp. 320-1.

from notes taken by M. Delorme, an attendant at the lectures, and approved by Jouffroy himself. It is a faithful transcription of Jouffroy's thought, but the perfection of form and the charm of style which its author would have given it are in some degree wanting. Hence no doubt in part, and in part from the circumstance of its posthumous publication, the book is less known than it deserves. M. Cousin's lectures on "The True, the Beautiful, and the Good" have reached an eleventh edition, and are translated into English. The "Cours d'Esthétique," a work of sincere thought, with none of the easy magnificence of M. Cousin's views, still remains in a second edition, and is scarcely ever referred to in the æsthetical criticism of our journals. Yet perhaps one of the causes of its comparatively slight popularity in France is the very circumstance that it possesses so largely that spirit of patient research and that carelessness of attaining merely showy results, which we may, in no vainglorious spirit, claim as characteristics of our own great philosophical works. French writers, great and small, exhibit too often a tendency to leap to a striking synthesis before half their analysis is complete. They long to tell you the *idea* of the representative camel before they half know what a camel is. M. Cousin is subject to this weakness. He gives us wonderful views of his own, and applies them to something to which they are, in fairness, wholly inapplicable. He is too impatient to wait till the object before him produces its true impression, but he has so great a genius for misconceiving it in a rapid and brilliant way, that he never disappoints any reader except one who is pedant enough to wish to see things as they are, not as they may be made to appear. Any one who has studied with care his lectures on Locke's philosophy, comparing them with the "Essay concerning Human Understanding," will know that what has been said is strictly just. Not for a page is M. Cousin to be trusted in those lectures, and scarcely a single critical misdemeanour could be named of which he might not, out of them, be convicted. Jouffroy is in this respect the exact opposite of M. Cousin. He does not come to a subject preoccupied with its *idea*, while, on the other hand, he is wholly free from such nervous apprehension of a generalization as we meet with in Stewart. He is sincere, patient, untiring; a man born to follow truth and find it, even though it must be sought through long and devious ways. His intellectual gifts, rare and vigorous as they are, never seduce him into betraying his intellectual conscience. He is not exceedingly anxious to cry *Voilà le Vrai! Voilà le Beau! Voilà le Bien!* to an ecstatic company of youths, the hope of the future, who in turn cry *Voilà!* He does not hurry to his syntheses; his preceding analyses are profound, delicate, thorough, and (to use an admirably appropriate word of Emile Saisset's) *obstinées*, stubbornly persistent.

My readers will remember the Hampton Court maze, with the ladder whereon, some years ago at least, in the merry summer days, a man would stand to direct the puzzled people who began to grow apprehensive lest they should have to spend the remaining term of their natural lives in wandering to and fro from one green impassable alley to another. In the "Cours d'Esthétique" we enter such a maze. There in the centre is the idea of beauty; the misfortune is, there is no man and no ladder visible here. But M. Jouffroy has been at the centre and volunteers to guide us; only we must be in no hurry to get there. Up this path and down that he leads us, and will not have us take it on his word that they end unsuccessfully. Even when we are within a hedge of the centre, and perceive unmistakably the rest of our way, there are discovered still one or two wrong turns to investigate, till at last we are brought to the place our guide intended, while we hear without the Scotch philosophers, and Burke, and Diderot, and Aristotle, and Kant, and Augustine, each in his own blind alley, hallooing that he has just hit upon the right path; and the disappointed people, making the best of their way back, are heard declaring that after all there is nothing to find, no centre—evidently no centre.

And is there a centre after all? Truly one comes at times to doubt that it has ever been quite penetrated to, or indeed can be. I fear there is some subtle and mysterious element in beauty which all our analysis is insufficient to unveil, something which is too spiritual to be riveted in the bonds of a definition. Is the science of æsthetics consequently futile? Yes, if it accomplishes nothing; unless it gives us, in phrases of the understanding, a perfectly adequate account of what such language is too pure a work of thought to contain. But not futile in seeking to learn continually more and more about the conditions of beauty and its relations to the spirit of man. In criticism, too, we meet with an element which defies our analysis, which slips back from our definitions, and yet which is the source of what is best in literature and art, and we call this element "genius." Is criticism therefore futile? Has genius no laws, no conditions for its development? Has literature no principles? Has its history no meaning? Have its schools no characteristics? And has criticism taught us nothing about all these? has it only succeeded in enfeebling our sensibility, and left our intelligence as unilluminated as that of our ancestors who listened, like three-years children, to the old ballads of the land? Not so. Everywhere, in geometry, in astronomy, in morality, in religion, in æsthetics, we find questions—questions in all but the positive sciences—not troubling the philosopher alone, but sounding in the heart of every man; which the world has been trying, age after age, to answer, and which still remain urging us to renewed inquiry. Has the endeavour to find answers for these

questions been idle? No. The hieroglyph is not yet (perhaps never will be) unriddled, but a word here and a word there has found an interpreter, and these have been in themselves a revelation. We should not be poorer only in imagination, but infinitely poorer in reality, if Plato had not written his "Banquet," or Spinoza his "Ethics," or Fichte his "Way towards the Blessed Life." The little things which lie about our feet are perhaps very clear and distinct, but there are great things before and around us which lie in the shadow, and, with creatures like ourselves, the value, the importance of a thought in the spiritual and intellectual life is measured by other considerations in addition to its certainty and its clearness for the understanding. This will apply to metaphysics; but descending to psychology, there are results to show in almost every branch of it, both well secured and numerous, and every year is adding to their number and multiplying their relations.

The great question of the "*Cours d'Esthétique*" is this, "What do I mean when I say of a thing, It is beautiful?" There are two parts in this question—certain facts, and the explanation of the facts. In every perception of the beautiful there is an object which I perceive, and a mental phenomenon produced in me by the object. The question of facts, therefore, is itself twofold:—What are the characteristics of the object which make me call it beautiful? and what is the nature of the mental phenomenon which it produces? The explanation of the facts consists in knowing why such an object, possessing such characteristics, produces such a phenomenon.

What is it in the object which makes me call it beautiful? The usual method adopted by French writers for finding an answer to this question was to compare a number of things differing in as many other respects as possible, but all of which were beautiful. If they could detect some one particular which all agreed in possessing, while they differed in everything else, this evidently was the secret of their beauty. Such is what I may call the metaphysical method. Jouffroy decides to pursue another, viz., the psychological. According to this, we first examine the phenomena which the beautiful produces in human consciousness, then inquire why it produces them, and finally, with so much light already gained, try to discover what is the nature of the beautiful itself.

Now place before you some beautiful object, and observe the impression which ensues. You are conscious of an emotion of pleasure. Try another object, and another: still the result is in this respect the same. Hence you are obliged to conclude that the beautiful, whatever it may be, contains within itself the nature or essence of that which causes pleasure.

This is vague language, but it is so because we are taking nothing

for granted. Let us see if we can make it more definite by finding out the cause of pleasure. Well, then, consider two things which are in the world, matter and force. Matter, inert and dead, is incapable of feeling—can in itself be the subject neither of pleasure nor pain. Force is living, and as force it is that I am conscious of myself. Now whatever opposes the development of this force pains me; whatever assists it is a cause of pleasure. To have my life frustrated, marred, enfeebled, threatened in any way,—life physical, intellectual, moral,—that is painful. To be helped, to be given a sense of fuller power, to have the joy of living quickened and sustained, that is always pleasant.

Let us not push this theory, however, too far. Are there not objects which give us pleasure without producing any development or increased feeling of our life or force? A rose, for instance, cannot be applied to furthering my life in any way, yet it is pleasant to look at. A strange phenomenon! I am glad to see something which is perfectly useless to me. How is this to be explained?

Another curious fact suggests itself. The more any object or being resembles man and partakes of his nature, the more largely does it possess the gift of pleasing me. A human being is capable of giving me greater pleasure than a dog, a dog than a flower, a flower than a stone. But what is our own nature save force? According, then, as anything exhibits force I am attracted by it. If I see force triumphant in it, I rejoice; if I see it failing or overcome, I too am depressed and suffer pain. Here, then, is a second kind of pleasure; and as the first, the pleasure derived from what is useful, has its source in egoism, this, derived from beings of a nature similar to our own, but which neither assist nor hinder our development, has its source in sympathy.

Now do beautiful things please us by being useful, or because they exhibit force and life similar to our own, and with which we sympathize, freely developing themselves? One word out of much that might be said will be sufficient. Many beautiful things are not useful; many useful things are not beautiful. But Jouffroy here seizes on a distinction between the beautiful and the useful which is so full of fine suggestion that I cannot pass it by. If any object affects us agreeably, the emotion of pleasure produces, by a necessity as strict as fate, an emotion of love—a love by which we tend yearningly towards the object; then arises desire. Although it may be incapable of serving us in any way, we wish to be near it, to bring it close to us, to unite ourselves with it. And when we are in possession of it we are quickly at a loss what further to do. "The rose which we see pleases us; we love it, we desire to obtain it, and when obtained we are *embarrassed* with it." So fares it with the beautiful. On the other hand, when our desire is produced, not in this mysterious manner, but by an

object corresponding to some definite want of our condition here below, when the object becomes ours there follows no *embarrassment*. So with the useful. The emotion of the beautiful is essentially disinterested. So distinct is it from that which utility produces, that we cannot fix our attention on the utility a beautiful object may happen to possess without instantly losing sight of its beauty. He who sees most beauty in the world is usually least possessed by the feeling of worldly wants and the desire of satisfying them. He who has the amplest sense of worldly wants, and gives himself up wholly to finding means for their satisfaction, sees the useful everywhere, and is almost unacquainted with beauty. The emotion of the beautiful is disinterested: hence its glory, and hence also its danger and its sorrow. For union with the beautiful—real possession of the beautiful—yearn we never so longingly towards it, is not attainable. I pull the rose, but is it really mine? No more than when it was on the stem. There, in my hand, the beautiful thing seems as far away from me as ever, and my desire remains perpetually unsatisfied. Hence in those who devote themselves to the pursuit of beauty come strange revulsions of feeling,—faintness, weariness, despair, or that incurable melancholy of which the poet of our own who, of all others, was the most passionate lover of beauty, and of none other, wrote with so profound a sense of its truth:—

“She dwells with Beauty—Beauty that must die,
And Joy, whose hand is ever at his lips,
Bidding adieu; and aching Pleasure nigh,
Turning to poison while the bee-mouth sips:
Ay, in the very temple of Delight
Veiled Melancholy has her sovran shrine,
Though seen of none save him whose strenuous tongue
Can burst Joy’s grape against his palate fine;
His soul shall taste the sadness of her might,
And be among her cloudy trophies hung.”*

From Keats let us return to Jouffroy. But now, having got thus far, and led us to believe that we have discovered the mysterious secret of beauty in its expression of force and the resulting sympathy,—having brought us thus far in our progress through the maze,—several paths appear, which Jouffroy tells us look promising (though we have a sure presentiment all the time of what they lead to), and up these we are carried, and back again we return. I shall not take the reader into these blind alleys, but can assure him that, with Jouffroy discoursing by one’s side, the longest does not seem wear-

* The history of this “Ode on Melancholy” is noteworthy. Keats’s first conception of Melancholy was rather in the raw-head-and-bloody-bones style. But his dæmon (as Goethe would say) did not play him false, and he was compelled to abandon his original design, and write the exquisite poem as now it stands.

some. That the pleasure derived from the beautiful does not arise from novelty or from custom (here are two paths going in opposite directions), or the perfection of an object in its kind, or the association of ideas,—all these statements the reader must refer to the “*Cours d’Esthétique*” itself to establish. Of the theory which we found M. Cousin adopting, that unity and variety are the constituents of the beautiful, a few words must here be said.

The beautiful pleases us; therefore the conditions of pleasure must be conditions of the beautiful. Are unity and variety necessary conditions of pleasure? Does variety without unity displease us? That is the first question. If we hear a number of varied sounds, for instance, without discovering anything which connects them with one another, does not the intellect feel unsatisfied? Yes; it seeks some cause, or meaning, or end by which to group them into one. We are displeased by variety without unity.

And now the second question. Are we displeased by unity without variety? A single sound prolonged for ever, does this displease us? Yes; it tires us; our sensibility suffers. But our intellect finds no want here; it is not compelled to look for variety in unity as it was for unity in variety. Variety, then, satisfies the requirements of the sensibility, unity those of the intellect.

These are therefore conditions of the beautiful—a diversity of phenomena, and some centralizing idea around which they are grouped. They are the means of *making us feel* the beautiful, but are they the elements which constitute it? No. There are objects possessing variety and a principle of unity which are ugly. There is unity of life with variety of parts in a hog, an ape, a frog, yet these are not beautiful. Unity and variety are, indeed, attributes of almost everything which we perceive, and if these constituted beauty it would be difficult to find anything ugly in the world.

Another common theory, rightly interpreted, brings us back to the centre of Jouffroy’s system. According to several thinkers (amongst them Aristotle* and Augustine), the constituents of beauty are order and proportion. What do these words mean? Order is an arrangement of parts: proportion, certain relations of those parts in extension or duration; but what *kind* of arrangement, what *kind* of relations? Rejecting the doctrine that there is a type of each species of things by which we judge of the degree of order and proportion each individual possesses, Jouffroy concludes that this degree is determined by the suitability of means to an end: whatever arrangement of parts enables a thing best to fulfil its end being the arrangement according to order. And now, understanding the terms, is the theory true that

* In one passage Aristotle names greatness as a constituent of beauty, τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἔστι.—*Poetic.*, chap. vii.

these two elements constitute beauty? To answer this, we reproduce the hog,—an invaluable companion on an æsthetical tour, and the best of protectors against the philosophers. Nothing is more happily adapted for accomplishing its earthly destiny. His wants are humble; he does not require high intellectual powers or delicate sensibilities to fulfil his lot; he is not swift to pursue or strong to overcome, but then he does not need great strength or swiftness; all his worldly desires are gratified by grubblings in a pile of refuse. Yet he is not a graceful creature. We have even admitted, as a private opinion, that he is ugly. He does not in his unroast appearance, or apart from the association of “crackling,” excite an emotion of pleasure and the consequent yearning love. We do not desire to unite ourselves with him. The mass of his body, and especially that of the representative pig of public shows, seems to weigh down the force which animates him; his movements are heavy, his intelligence dull, his affections not highly developed, matter is clearly preponderant in him. Order and proportion, understood as suitability of means to the *actual* ends of things, assuredly do not constitute beauty.

But is there no other end towards which things tend save the actual—no end save that of fulfilling some assigned part in the great economy of nature? Yes; wherever force exists it tends towards its own perfect evolution and development. It is never content; it acknowledges no limit; it is careless of preserving the characteristics of any natural species. This is the *absolute* end of every creature—its own highest development. The order and proportion which enable it to pursue this end are absolute, are perfect, and of them is beauty constituted.

Concerning force it is that all things in the universe, some only just articulately, some in the eloquence of golden words, in the melody of perfect song, are communing with us. From the sun which strengthens the angels by his light, from the stars which move nightly through the heavens like an army with banners, to the finest needle of moss, nay, to the least drop of dew that lies within the moss's fairy cups, all things are telling of unseen energies and life. The least spiritual-minded of men in every moment of every day acknowledges the presence around him of invisible powers. We are creatures “moving about in worlds not realized.” This is a simple statement of fact. We look around and think we see matter everywhere. Not at all: we only believe in matter,—it is bodies that we see, every quality of which is an expression of force. Extension, what is that but an aggregation of atoms which tells us that force is there at work? Solidity, but the declaration of the tendency of that force as concentrative, binding the particles of matter close to one another? Form, but the explanation of the precise way in which the force is acting? Colour,

taste, odour, not one of them belong to matter; they are qualities of bodies, and owe their existence to force. In fact, to use Jouffroy's striking illustration, "the qualities of bodies are no more the qualities of matter than the characters printed on paper are qualities of the paper, though at the same time there could no more be bodies without matter, than printed characters without paper." Force, then is what I have already spoken of as "the invisible," and the object of art is, by means of the qualities of bodies, to express this force in order and proportion, that is, tending by appropriate means to its absolute end.*

Now observe an important distinction. It is not in the way of allegory that nature speaks to us of force; and art, if it would produce æsthetical emotion, must likewise employ not allegorical symbols but natural signs. The former are a language which represents things for the understanding, but which does not address itself to the feelings. A woman holding scales is Justice: I understand that perfectly; and since the figure possesses some artistic merits, I receive a certain degree of pleasure. But let the face of Justice grow so full of grave and sweet determination that I can read her character without the symbolic scales, and forthwith it becomes a true work of art.

To the invisible alone belongs beauty in the proper sense of the word, but the invisible can affect us æsthetically only in one way—through its natural signs. I am conscious in myself immediately of force, but this does not become a source of æsthetical emotion to me until I can look at myself as if I were another person: if I am ridiculous, I do not smile till I have become estranged from my ridiculous self, till I have projected it, so to speak, outwards in imagination, when, seeing my own personality not directly, but through the medium of natural signs, the interested emotion gives place to one sympathetic or æsthetical. In like manner, no philosophical descriptions of the passions—of love, for instance, or jealousy, or hate, or fear—can succeed in touching my sensibility; but let me see before me Romeo, Othello, Shylock, and my heart is quickly a-glow with sympathy or indignation. Hence we may perceive the mistake of those artists who aim at truth instead of reality. It is not with truth but realized truth that art is concerned. The dramatist, for example, whose characters describe their feelings instead of expressing them as they naturally find expression, has forgotten the conditions of art. This is Racine's manner, and the manner of our own novelist Richardson. "I wail, I wail," cry the earth-spirits in Mrs. Browning's early poem, "A Drama of Exile," and Eve responds pathetically, "I wail." How frigid that is! "And yet the pity of it, Iago! O, Iago, the pity of it, Iago!" How full of terrible pathos is that! more pathos, I think, than if

* It need hardly be said, not vital force alone, but force of intellect, emotions, conscience, will, also.

Othello declared that he wailed, even ten or eleven times. But Mrs. Browning of the "Drama of Exile" was a very different artist from the great poet who wrote "Aurora Leigh."*

We have here come almost unware upon the secrets of the schools of Realism and Idealism in literature and art. The invisible is the source of beauty,—there is the starting-point of idealism; the invisible must be expressed by natural signs,—there is the first principle of realism. It is some passion—love, let us suppose—which the idealist aims at bringing to light; clearness of expression is above all things what he desires, and body, as he finds it in actual nature, seems rather to conceal than to reveal the soul within. He sees also that with all its special varieties, the passion of love has great typical characteristics which never vary, and which constitute its essential nature: these, omitting all details which may obscure them, he will endeavour to seize; and in representing them, he will simplify as much as possible the natural signs. Surely a reasonable procedure enough.

The realist, on the other hand, knows that the passion of love must be represented in an individual lover. But the lover must be male or female: and further, of a certain age, and of a certain rank in society, and of a certain century, and of a certain nation, and of a certain religion, and of a certain character, and of a certain appearance, and of a certain surrounding; and so on, till, as he will tell you, a living person stands before you, and no shadowy abstraction or generalization. It is not clearness, but vagueness of expression which results from omitting these circumstances. It is not the act of a great mind, but of a "vulgar, incapable, and unthinking" mind, to see in all human beings only similar bundles of tendencies and habits: we must separate "to obtain a more perfect unity."† Surely there is reason also in this.

Yes, there is reason both on the idealist's and the realist's side, but to the procedure of each there is a limit. When the idealist describes the invisible apart from its natural signs he falls into the false ideal, and becomes frigid and metaphysical. When the realist crowds his description with insignificant details, or when, in place of giving us the natural signs of emotion, he gives the conventional signs proper to some other age or country, which we hardly understand, and do not at all sympathize with, his realism, which should be called literalism, is false realism,—he has forgotten the conditions of art. But no artist who works with a spirit full of earnest feeling can ever be a mere literalist, for all earnest feeling idealizes more or less, making prominent according to its special character the sadness, the beauty, the love, the

* Jouffroy's definition of beauty—"That with which we sympathize in human nature, expressed by natural symbols which strike the senses." His definition of art—"The expression of the invisible by the natural signs which manifest it."

† Ruskin, "Modern Painters," i., Preface, 2nd Edit., p. 33.

joyousness of all that comes before it, or, if the power of feeling be universal, each of these in turn. In Mr. Hunt's picture of "Christ in the Temple," it is not the faithful reproduction of the doctors' dresses which gives it its high æsthetical value: these have little significance for the mind's eye, and might be read of in a book of antiquities. But the ignorance, the arrogance, the meanness, the sensuality of the men's faces; the unconscious, trance-like fruition of Mary; the tender rapture of her satisfied motherly desire, and the Divine humanity of Jesus,—in these the artist appears, precisely where the antiquarian could render no assistance. These tell us what Mr. Hunt thought and felt about that circumstance in the Temple, and because he thought well, and felt delicately and profoundly, his picture is great. The antiquarianism is valuable too; but it were a serious misfortune for the world if an artist, possessed of any affluence of thought and feeling, should spend his years in erudite researches about the embroidery and fringes of Jewish robes. If Raphael had painted one picture in five years he would have left us four very perfect works, but how little in them could he have told us of all the visions of beauty and tenderness and grace which possessed his brain—how little of what no other man in all the centuries could have told us save Raphael himself! Happily antiquarians are not so rare.*

I have wandered somewhat away from Jouffroy, and have now no great cause to return. The leading ideas of the "*Cours d'Esthétique*" are contained in what has been written, and though they receive many further developments, the vital principles of the system—force, sympathy, order—are still the centralizing points. Jouffroy's distinction between the agreeable and the beautiful, and his analysis of the sublime, which occupy some of the later lectures, are of less interest than the preceding portion of the book, and seem to me not quite so satisfactory. But to the end, even after his system has been elaborated piece by piece till it is almost complete, Jouffroy retains in a remarkable degree his sincerity of investigation. His observations have a purity, and his analyses a richness of result, which one learns to set down at their right value when one has seen many an excellent writer, under the increasing tyranny of his own theory, grow more and more incapable of approaching any subject in the critical spirit, more and more insensible to the fulness of meaning which things possess.

* "Alas!" exclaims M. Milsand, in writing of Mr. Hunt's painting (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, Aug. 15, 1861), "it is hard to satisfy every one. After having examined the painting, a Jewish lady [who went to see it when exhibiting in London] said gravely, 'It is very beautiful, only it is clear the artist did not know the distinctive mark of the race of Judah: he has given the doctors flat feet, which belong to the tribe of Reuben, while the men of Judah have the instep highly arched.'" Who can think much of a picture with so deplorable a departure from truth in it as this!

IV.

Since Jouffroy's "Lectures," nothing of much importance in æsthetics appeared before M. Charles Lévêque's treatise, "*La Science du Beau*." Two years prior to the publication of the "*Cours d'Esthétique*," but several years after the delivery of the lectures, Lamennais brought out some volumes of a work entitled, "*Esquisse d'une Philosophie*," which contained chapters of the highest merit on Art and Beauty. These were last year published in a detached form, and may be read without any feeling of their fragmentary character. Let the reader, however, expect from Lamennais no luminous theory of the beautiful; the most admirable thing about the theoretical part of the volume is its shortness: it is altogether transcendental and unintelligible, a kind of mystical Christianized Platonism, in which the Infinite Beauty, and its manifestation, the Word, are recurring phrases. Nor is the general theory of art much more satisfactory: creation also is the manifestation of the Infinite Beauty; art is the reproduction of creation, and the order of its development is the same as that of the six days' works, beginning with the arrangement of inorganic matter in architecture, and finally crowned by the voice of man going up to God in song. It is not such speculations as these which give the book its value, but the interpretations, full of insight, which it contains, of the meaning of the several historical periods of the various arts. The sketches are slight, but they are from the hand of a master, who seizes the essential characteristics of things by a rare power of vision. "Meyer," said Goethe, laughing, "always says, 'If thinking were not so hard!'" And the worst is, that all the thinking in the world does not bring us to thought; we must be right by nature, so that good thoughts may come before us like free children of God, and cry, "Here we are!" It is in this way, "like free children of God," that good thoughts come to Lamennais: when he tells us what he sees, we trust the penetrating intuitions of genius,—we obtain always one important view at least of the truth: when he goes about to prove something, we cannot follow him; his logic is neither "the incomplete logic of good sense," nor the unfigured syllogisms of the emotions, but of a kind requiring an amount of pure reason which we empirical English have never had the good fortune to possess.

In 1862 was published in two volumes, containing about a thousand pages, "*La Science du Beau*," by M. Charles Lévêque. The Academy of Moral and Political Sciences had proposed, a few years before, this subject for competition, and of five essays M. Lévêque's was that which obtained the Academy's crown. "*La Science du Beau*" is an enlarged, and in some material respects an altered copy of this essay. Its author came to the subject with the natural aptitude derived from a

passionate love of beauty and fine reflective powers, and with special culture obtained in the French school, founded in 1847 at Athens, of which he was one of the first members.

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the work is the completeness of its design; in this respect it is without a rival in French or English philosophical literature, the honour of which is due to the members of the Academy, who, in proposing the subject, traced briefly the line of investigation which should be pursued. The two questions which occupy the greater part of the "*Cours d'Esthétique*" are here first discussed—What are the effects of the beautiful in human consciousness? and What the nature of the beautiful in itself?—the psychological and the metaphysical questions. And in the former of these M. Lévêque has the merit of breaking almost entirely new ground, when he investigates not only the phenomena produced by beauty on the intellect and emotions, but on the *activities* of man. Having arrived at the principles of the science, the author next proceeds to confirm and illustrate them by a study of beauty as it appears in man, in nature, and in God. Further confirmations and illustrations are then sought in each of the fine arts. And, finally, the science of the beautiful is treated historically, in a series of chapters on the chief æsthetical theories of ancient and modern philosophy,—those of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Hutcheson, the Father André, Baumgarten, Reid, Kant, Schelling, and Hegel. This is a great design, and M. Lévêque has shown much ability and culture in his attempt to fill it in.

And yet the book is very unsatisfactory. In the essay as at first written, the metaphysical question was treated before the psychological, and though the order is now reversed, and the earlier part of the work entirely recast, the original fault of method and its results cling to it still. Wherever M. Lévêque is free from the pressure of his theory, his psychology, as Emile Saisset remarked, is natural and sincere; but too often what has been said of the purity of Jouffroy's observation, and the fulness of result in his analyses, must be reversed to become applicable to M. Lévêque, and chiefly because he approaches the psychological facts with a predetermined theory, to which they must be accommodated.

In this theory of M. Lévêque's there is no advance on Jouffroy's, and in many respects it is less capable of defence. The author invites us to analyse the beauty of a lily with him, and satisfies himself that it is constituted of precisely eight elements, among them "the normal liveliness of colour," which is found (so terrible a master is one's own theory) not only in the lily, but in a symphony of Beethoven, the life of Socrates, and the love of a child,—though what the exact colour of each of these may be, whether scarlet, or green, or yellow, M. Lévêque

does not inform us. The blind man in Locke, who supposed red was like the sound of a trumpet, would probably be his best adviser on these questions.

Heine amusingly illustrates the effect of the empirical tendency of our national thought by the story of an English mechanician, who, by an ingenious application of skill, succeeded in constructing a man:—

“The product of his hands could work and act like a man; it bore in its leathern bosom a kind of apparatus of human emotion, which did not materially differ from the habitual emotions of the English; it could communicate its feelings in articulate sounds, and the internal noise of wheel-works, springs, and escapements, produced a genuine English pronunciation. In fine, this automaton was an accomplished gentleman, and to make him altogether a man, nothing was wanting except a soul; but this soul his English creator was unable to give him, and the poor creature, come to a knowledge of his imperfection, tormented his creator night and day, begging him to give him a soul.”

In reading M. Lévêque's books we feel lamentably this our deficiency. The characteristics of beauty in each object (which are ultimately reduced to greatness and order in power and the expression of power) are determined in the easiest way, by the author of “*La Science du Beau*,” through *à priori* conceptions of the pure reason,—which when we look for in our provincial consciousness, alas! we have no soul. Thus, a lily, to be beautiful, must be of a certain size and colour, corresponding to those of an ideal or typical lily, which M. Lévêque, on seeing half a dozen common lilies, immediately perceives emerging, with extraordinary rapidity of growth, in the depth of his consciousness. *Voilà le lis!* In fact, he carries about in his pure reason quite an herbarium and Noah's ark of such types. The ideal lily is, of course, of a dazzling whiteness. Emile Saisset was curious to know what is the colour of the ideal tulip.

This theory of types, if it remained only a theory for philosophers, might be borne with as containing a germ of truth, and representing (though not in the happiest way) a decided tendency of the human mind. But when it is made the foundation principle of art and art-criticism it becomes a serious evil. If the artist is not to record faithfully his impressions of things, but endeavour to exhibit their ideal types, his work quickly loses its sincerity, and grows frigid and academical. If he believes that he is presented with a typical man by his pure reason as soon as he has seen half a dozen human beings (which no artist was ever so theory-ridden as to believe), his figure-drawing will, it is to be feared, be of the same ideal description as the portraits of Uncle George and Aunt Jane which young gentlemen of five or six rapidly sketch from memory for their admiring parents. Of course, there is a common nature which all individuals of the same species possess; of course it is a portion of the artist's duty to interpret and express this common nature; but it is no less a truism that,

the universal can be expressed by art only through the individual, and that these general characteristics are insufficient to make up a real living being. "You now stand," said one of the greatest of critics, Goethe, "at that point where you must necessarily break through to the really high and difficult part of art—the apprehension of what is individual. You must do some degree of violence to yourself to get out of the Idea."* There is nothing high or difficult in apprehending with the understanding the general character of a mountain, or a tree, or a man. There is nothing high or difficult in noting down certain peculiarities in an individual, such as those which Mr. Dickens attaches to some of his *dramatis personæ* to distinguish them from one another, and make readers laugh who can bear the same joke several scores of times. These trifles are in truth the most unessential parts even of the individual. Mr. Jerry Cruncher's frequent use of the word "flop" no more helps to individualize him than if we were told very often that he had a wart on the first finger of his right hand. But to represent the individual as indeed he is, remembering that the elements of character which he possesses in common with his species and his class are the main constituents of his personality, and would be so if the species and class had never existed, remembering too that these common elements in themselves can make up no more than a shadowy abstraction, this, as Goethe said, is the high; the difficult part of art.

Passing over an admirable series of chapters, in which much of M. Lévêque's sincere and natural psychology appears, entitled "Du Joli ou du Charmant," "Du Sublime," "Du Laid et du Ridicule,"† let us see how he explains what may strike some one as an objection to the principle that expression is the law of art. Architecture, it may be said, has surely another end than expression: its first, its chief object is a useful, not an æsthetical one; its primary law must be that each building be adapted to the practical purpose for which it is constructed. And this certainly is true of building; but a little consideration will satisfy us that architecture is no exception to the great law of art.

What, then, does architecture express? In the first place, the powers of inorganic matter, and these in unity, variety, harmony, order, proportion. We can hardly find a more meaningless erection than an obelisk; yet is an obelisk devoid of expression? Imagine it reversed, and fastened point downwards in the ground. Though the stone is the same, do you not feel that the meaning has been altered, and so much altered for the worse, that the monolith is no longer agreeable to look at? Secondly, forms are the means of expressing

* "Conversations with Eckermann," vol. i., p. 82.

† Briefly: "the pretty" is force or power in order, but without greatness; the sublime, its opposite, force indefinitely great, but in which order (though affirmed by the reason) is not perceptible to the senses or imagination; "the ugly" is force in great disorder; "the ridiculous" is force, great or little, *slightly* in disorder.

force, not only physical, but spiritual. An arabesque tracery, for instance, may be imitative of nothing, yet by the mere design full of exquisitely fanciful expression. Thirdly, as Mr. Ruskin, with reference to Gothic architecture, has so amply taught us, the building is an expression of tendencies in the builder's mind, and of dominant thoughts and feelings of the contemporary society. If the mythologies were all lost, we might still guess the great features of the religions of the world from the expression of their religious architecture. We could discover the pantheism of India "combined with a profound feeling of the energies of nature," the presiding sense of death in Egypt, the perfected anthropomorphism of Greece.* But, besides all these modes of architectural expression, every building, as M. Lévêque finely observes, has an occupant, and in its aspect we read something of his character and doings:—"A beautiful temple informs us, without inscriptions and without emblems, that it is the abode of a god; a beautiful palace, that it is the dwelling of a powerful and royal soul; a beautiful *château*, that it is the residence of souls proud of their race; a simple and charming villa, that it is the retreat of souls happy in their mediocrity; a theatre, that it expects to receive upon its vast tiers of benches a multitude of souls eager for sights and shows; a cloister speaks to us of souls disenchanted, solitary, up-gathered in prayer and study; a bridge tells us that it is there for man in his activity, that he may rapidly clear the river, an obstacle in his way; a tomb, low, narrow, without opening, without air, without light, proclaims by its silence and its immobility that the body lies there, but that the soul is fled." It is precisely in so far as it is expressive in these several ways that architecture is an art; precisely where it ceases to be expressive it ceases to affect us æsthetically, and had better be spoken of as building.

M. Lévêque may be taken as the chief exponent amongst recent writers of the æsthetical tendencies of the intellectualist school. M. Taine, in his two lectures entitled "*Philosophie de l'Art*," represents sufficiently well the tendencies of Positivism. These lectures, introductory to a series on the history of painting in Italy, treat of the nature and production of works of art. M. Taine always writes in a vigorous and thought-inspiring way: in so far as it is positive in the common acceptance of the word, this "*Philosophie de l'Art*" is full of instruction and valuable suggestion; in so far as it is positive in the peculiar sense which means negative, in so far as it denies the value of any æsthetic but one derived from the study of the history of fine arts, it is thoroughly unsound and misleading. We shall try to see this.

"The modern method," writes M. Taine, "which I endeavour to follow, and which is beginning to be introduced into all the moral sciences, consists in considering human works—and in particular,

* See Lamennais's chapter on Architecture.

works of art—as facts and products of which we must note the characteristics, and look for the causes; nothing more.” And elsewhere:—
 “It is a sort of botany, applied not to plants, but to the works of men.”
 The intention is excellent, but unfortunately the positive method alone is incapable of making us understand the nature of a single work of art, it is incapable of getting at the facts; and then, secondly, it is equally incapable of giving any satisfactory account of their origin.

At what result does M. Taine himself arrive by this external, historical, positive method? “The end of the work of art,” he writes, “is to manifest some essential or salient characteristic, consequently some important idea, more clearly and more completely than real objects do. It attains this end by employing an *ensemble* of connected parts, the relations of which it systematically modifies. In the three arts of imitation, sculpture, painting, and poetry, these *ensembles* correspond to real objects.” There is the result of M. Taine’s inquiry, and yet the most essential element of a work of art lies outside his definition. Its end, we are told, is to manifest, more clearly than real objects do, some important idea. But if this be so, what has art to do with the emotions? Simply nothing: a thing is none the less a work of art though it address itself purely to the understanding; the distinction between art and science vanishes; the first principle of art is denied. “No,” M. Taine would probably reply; “by adding that the means art employs for making the idea clear is an *ensemble* of connected parts with the relations modified, I indicate that it must operate through the senses or imagination.” But this reply is nothing to the purpose: to employ the senses for the ends of science does not make science one with art. Open a manual of what is called natural philosophy, and look at the diagrams of the electrifying machine, the steam-engine, the pump. To make the modes of their operation clearer, some parts of the diagram are exaggerated,—the real proportions are not exactly preserved. Here is fulfilled every condition of M. Taine’s definition of a work of art: yet are these diagrams really not different in kind from a poem or a piece of music? Do they excite pleasure, or a trace of any æsthetical emotion? Are they works of art? Is their end the same as that, for instance, of the “Moonlight Sonata,” or Shelley’s “Ode to a Skylark”? Certainly not: the end of these diagrams is purely didactic; they are simply a language employed by science which addresses the understanding through the eye. What do they teach us? What can we learn from them? These are the first and last questions they suggest. If they give pleasure, that is accidental; is it so with the poem or the sonata? These diagrams might be produced by creatures who never felt a thrill of nervous sensibility, never an emotion of joy or sorrow, of pleasure or of pain. No, they are not art, they are not the appro-

prate objects of any human emotion. The positive method has failed in attaining even the facts of which it speaks so much.

And this failure was inevitable. The nature of a work of art can be only half, nay, can *not* be half understood, if considered as a fact out of relation to the emotions to which it appeals. The real fact is not a material one; observation supplies only one side of it, reflection must supply the other. Suppose the sense of humour suddenly annihilated in us, and that we go to see a representation of Shakspeare's "Twelfth Night." By observing the visible facts, by scrutinizing the movements and expressions of Malvolio and Sir Toby and Maria, have we mastered the artistic facts? Do we understand the piece, or obtain materials for a philosophy of the humorous? True, we can note down with a grave countenance the strange succession of antics that goes on before us, but do we understand their actual nature? We may institute a comparison between muscular action as it appears in tragedy and in comedy, but have we penetrated to the meaning of the sprightly or the solemn movements of either piece? No; the external facts are but half the facts of art, and are intelligible only through the internal. The common characteristics of groups of external facts must be studied in connection with the common characteristics of groups of internal: if we would define comedy, we must try to define humour; if we would understand art, we must understand all the emotions to which it appeals,—a philosophy of art apart from psychology is indeed futile and absurd.

In its investigation of the causes of works of art and their production, the historical or positive method is again at fault. It can lead us to discover the causes of those characteristics which *distinguish* this and that period of art; it can tell us what material his age supplied to the artist to work upon, what special wants and aptitudes and emotions the age developed; it can tell us why the Grecian sculptor expressed the perfection of physical beauty, and the perfect equilibrium of soul and body; and whence came the mystic glories, the grotesqueness, the teeming naturalism of the Gothic architecture; but of the human tendencies which are the ultimate causes of art, of those tendencies which seek for expression in this peculiar way rather than in that of scientific pursuit, or practical action, or social enjoyment, the historical method has no word to say.

The strength of positivism in æsthetics lies in its successful study of the history of art. The work of the artist is considered not as an isolated object of wonder and admiration, but in connection with the school to which he belonged, and the social condition by which he was surrounded. Even Shakspeare was only the greatest of a group of dramatists who all wrote much in the same style and much in the same spirit. Even Rubens was only the greatest of a school of painters—Seghers, Van Oost, Everdingen, Van Thulden,

Jordaens, Vandyke—who, like him, rejoiced in the glory of colours, the splendour of drapery, and the opulence of a redundant physical life. Comte, in the notices of art contained in "The Positive Philosophy," dwells much on the necessity, for the production of effective work, of harmony existing between the artist and those to whom he addresses himself.* This idea is enlarged on and illustrated by M. Taine. To develop itself, a talent must be favoured by surrounding circumstances. Just as a northern or southern climate *selects* certain seeds, encouraging them to blossom and bear fruit, while it refuses to grant life to others, or at most allows them a stunted and feeble growth, so the moral temperature of each historical period makes a choice of talents, and determines the development of art. The general condition of society produces certain wants, aptitudes, and emotions. The group which these form when embodied in a remarkable degree in an individual, constitutes what M. Taine calls *the reigning personage*, "that is to say, the model which persons of the time surround with their admiration and sympathy: in Greece, the young man unclothed, and of a beautiful race, accomplished in all bodily exercises: in the middle ages, the ecstatic monk and the knightly lover: in the seventeenth century, the perfect courtier: in our own day, Faust or Werther, insatiable and sad." Now it is this *reigning personage* whom artists—the great artists who are in sympathy with their age—will represent for the public.

The present *reigning personage*, according to M. Taine's description, is certainly not a person very magnanimous, or very manly, or even quite sane. Our milder manners have made him delicately sensitive to all the little pains and grievances of life, and a lover of all delicious sensations, excitable and nervous. He is unhappy, sceptical, ambitious, a dreamer, full of vague and never-satisfied desires. M. Taine traces, in a manner most suggestive of further developments, the influence he has exercised on art and poetry. And indeed it is impossible to read much of French literature without becoming aware of his melancholy presence,—in the vague yearnings and aspirations of the "Méditations," in the doubtful notes of the "Chants du Crépuscule," in the sad cries of alternate passion, exhaustion, *ennui*, and despair, of the weariest child of the century—Alfred de Musset; yes, even when we drink the large air of the mountains or wander in the murmurous shadows of old oaks with De Laprade, or listen with Autran to the wash of Mediterranean waves upon their beds of sand. But the "reigning personage" is not so despotic over our own poets. They have not suffered so terribly from *la maladie du siècle*. What a noble sanity, what a unity of nature, what a perfect co-operancy of the emotions, the conscience, the reason, and the imagination, existed in our greatest poet, Wordsworth! Werther is not his favourite cha-

* See H. Martineau's translation, vol. ii., pp. 392—405.

racter. If the Solitary is a somewhat sad figure standing beside Blea Tarn, or walking over the ridge to Little Langdale, had he not real sorrows and disappointments enough to break one's heart, and are there not the Wanderer, and the Pastor, besides another wise speaker, to discourse him into a happy state of mind? It is three against one. And then, as the reader knows, the Solitary was a miserable man who did not confine himself to wholesome English reading, but had once in his possession (it was well the "cottage children" who found it went only to a dame's school)—

"A work

In the French tongue, a novel of Voltaire."

But if the "Excursion" were itself a work in the French tongue (one of the hardest things possible to imagine), the Solitary would have been the chief figure, and have made his confessions in melancholy Alexandrines to the stars and the mountains. It is unquestionably remarkable that the "reigning personage," if he be amongst us, has seldom yet ventured to be lyrical. In a few of Mr. Mathew Arnold's poems we hear the tones of his voice; and it may be that, in the self-conflicting portion of Mr. Clough's nature, he helped, by opposition, to excite those moods in which common work and plain duty were dwelt on as the springs of spiritual strength and solace. But Mr. Tennyson has to become altogether dramatic before he can do homage to the "reigning personage," and the unheroic heroes of "Locksley Hall" and "Maud" rather show Mr. Tennyson's fine power of sympathy than any personal Wertherism or Byronism. The speaker in "Maud" (for convenience of reference, critics ought to agree to call him by some appropriate surname) has the emotive part of his nature and his sensibilities, from many sufficient causes, in excess; he is saved by a sudden uprising of the will, and by action on behalf of a great cause. Remarkably enough, Mr. Browning's nearest approach to a presentation of the "reigning personage"—Paracelsus—is ruined by will and saved by love;—

"Festus, let my hand—

This hand—lie in your own, my own dear friend!

Aprile! Hand in hand with you, Aprile!"

But it is impossible to conceive Robert Browning or Alfred Tennyson wailing lyrically to the public in the language in which Milton wrote. Heaven preserve the manliness of our poetry, or grant us long barren silence and a wholesome self-restraint. As yet we have had little of what Goethe called "lazaretto" literature. It is when we turn to French poetry that we hear the lyrical wail on every side; even on the mountains and by the sea-shore it comes to us like a long sigh upon the wind; but in Paris we find it sometimes hard to believe that we have not entered the second circle of the Inferno.*

* Notably let much of Béranger be amongst the exceptions to these criticisms.

In other ways rather than by his visibly confronting us, do we in England feel the presence of the "reigning personage" of M. Taine. Werther, and Ren , and Manfred have died, and their spirits have departed into the air. Ah! that is the true account of it: there is some strange ingredient in the atmosphere, slight, but enough, if we are not robust, to trouble our blood and make us restless and full of unresolved questionings. Hence, in part (and many other causes concur with this), the modern love of external nature. This vague scepticism, and restlessness, and delicate susceptibility to pleasure and pain, by the quantum of energy they abstract from the will and the active powers, may increase the less determined forms of emotional life. To such a soul the flowers in spring, the blue abysses of the heavens in July noons, the mystery of ocean on still mornings, are like words of God, of which, if the meaning be but dimly seen, the music and the tone sink deep into the heart: for its weariness it finds some repose in all things that live quiet and dutiful lives beneath the sun and rains; in its immense regret and sense of personal nothingness, some self-transcending joy in presence of the inexhaustible life of nature—some passing sympathy in the mournfulness of autumn evenings—some springs of hope (when hope must needs be vague) in the perfect promises of summer dawns. The blue sky at least bends over all—the speedwells blow happily on every bank—the stream still sings the song it sang a thousand years ago—the earth is full of happy murmurs, and there is multitudinous laughter among the leaping waves of the sea.


But in another way than the love of external nature the influence of the *reigning personage* appears yet more remarkably. Whatever lamentations may be pronounced over the decline of the fine arts, there is one art which is at the present day a passion with every nation of Europe. Sculpture may have little real and vital connection with our modern life; our architecture may be grey, and grim, and deathful, or a sterile reproduction of forms which critics instruct us to admire, or for truly modern work, a railway station and a Crystal Palace; our painting may have fallen sadly away from "the grand style" and the glories of "high art:" but the hearts of men are vibrating everywhere to perfect music. And this, as M. Taine remarks, is the genuine language of reverie, and vague emotion, and undefined aspirations, and infinite regret. The last hundred years have not given us a second Phidias, or Raphael, or Shakspeare; but we have had Handel, and Mozart, and Beethoven. We look back to the Middle Ages; and because we find a wonderful palace here, and a bell-tower or a cathedral there, we say they were great days of art. And so they were. But what will future centuries think of the period of art in which "Don Giovanni," "Fidelio," "Elijah" were created? Will the painters of the Renaissance who stood below Rapha l and

Michael Angelo, or the dramatists of the Elizabethan age who stood below Shakspeare, appear a more illustrious group of artists than Rossini, Donizetti, Bellini, Verdi, Weber, Auber, Meyerbeer, Berlioz, Gounod? As unquestionably as sculpture was the supreme art of Greece, architecture of the Middle Ages, and painting of the Renaissance (poetry being common to all), is music the supreme art of the present day. It is that with which we are most in sympathy: it is also the most truly democratic.* How much do nine persons out of ten really care for a tinted Venus or a sleeping faun? What amount of pleasure do they receive from wandering through a picture gallery? A good deal of fine confused pleasure perhaps, of a kind which allows them to make remarks upon about two hundred paintings per hour. But to obtain any *intense* delight from painting, such delight as does not suffer one to make a remark, not a little special culture, except in rare instances, must have gone before. Music, if we set aside poetry, is the only art which can at present give delight of great intensity to persons who have received but slight artistic education, or that preparation for artistic enjoyment which comes from the study of nature and literature. The mere recollection of it is a delicious torture; it is not the remembrance of an object perceived by the senses, but the attempt to revive a state into which our whole emotional nature was thrown; and though this state, while actually experienced, seems more entirely passive and trance-like than that produced by any of the other arts, music, more powerfully than all the rest, awakens the dormant artistic activities in every man, and, by some mysterious dealings with the soul, makes him involuntarily a reproducer. It may be a gain, or it may be a misfortune, that the master art of the present day should be one so purely sensitive and emotional,—one into which, for the listener, so slight an intellectual element enters. But of the fact there can be little question. What may come of this in the future it is not easy to conjecture; but this we know, that the source of a noble development of art is a noble national nature, and that if ever a period comes when clear thought, earnest faith in great things, and vigorous wills, are united in men with a delicate susceptibility, a finer power of sympathy, and a higher culture, our country cannot fail to obtain a freer and more healthful development of art than has yet appeared.†

EDWARD DOWDEN.

* See "A Dialogue on the Influence of Music," by M. Emile Montégut, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, June 1, 1862: and on the common elements in the love of external nature and the love of music, the preface to V. de Laprade's poems, "Les Symphonies."

† M. Taine declines the psychological inquiry in æsthetics: this is no necessary result from Positivism in its idea, from Positivism at rest; but there are instincts as well as ideas belonging to each great system of thought, and these commonly appear when it is in action.



CHURCH GOVERNMENT IN THE COLONIES.

*Judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the Petition
of the Lord Bishop of Natal, March, 1865.*

THE Judgment which was pronounced ten months ago by the highest Court of Justice in the Empire on the petition of the Bishop of Natal was received in some quarters with dismay, in others with exultation. Those who exulted did so on opposite grounds. Some few rejoiced that the Bishop of Natal was free to return to his diocese, and secure in his bishopric; while many more were thankful that the colonial clergy were not delivered over to the will of bishops, whose proceedings might be as arbitrary as that of the Bishop of Capetown. On the other hand, a considerable number of Churchmen, some of them worthy of the highest consideration, raised the cry, "The Colonial Church is free;" while again the more violent, not scrupling to attribute a hostile feeling against the Church to the grave judges who gave their advice to the Sovereign, declared that their subtlety had overreached itself, and that the principles which they had laid down in enmity to the Church had, against their wishes, turned to her best interests. We hope to make clear, in the course of the present review, how far, and in what sense, the Church in the Colonies is free.

But others viewed the discovery of the true position of the colonial bishops with alarm. They had hoped that the Letters Patent were valid, and that the bishoprics created by them were to hold as powerful a position as those in England itself. And when it was found

that the powers to which they had trusted were really non-existent, it appeared as if the whole edifice of the Colonial Church was overthrown. They looked to the past regretfully, with bitter reproaches against the Government and the lawyers who had betrayed them, and to the future with helpless dismay. We hope that we may be able to say something to reassure them. At least, since so much has to be done, let us leave lamenting for the irretrievable past, and for possibilities which no longer exist, and address ourselves to the consideration of what it lies in our power to accomplish. The Church lives on. She is less affected than we are wont to think by questions of discipline; and it is not the first requisite that her internal or external relations should be of a faultless symmetry.

The blow which has fallen is not a thunderstroke which no one could expect or guard against. It is rather comparable to the fall of an ill-built tower which has long been giving evidence of its ruinous state, or like the breaking of a reed on which you had long been warned not to bear too hard. There was enough, any time since 1847, when the case of Tasmania was looked into, to have shown any man who was amenable to conviction, that the Letters Patent granted to bishops in colonies where the right of legislation had been surrendered by the Crown, could not confer coercive powers; and we cannot but think that, had it not been for an overweening conception of the rights and dignity of the episcopal office in itself, the Bishop of Capetown would never have been led to institute the two series of proceedings which have resulted in so sad an exhibition of the invalidity of his claims. He would never have imagined that the Letters Patent in themselves could bear him out in expelling a beneficed clergyman for refusing to assist in establishing a synod, of which the only thing not liable to question was its purely voluntary character, or in deposing another bishop by a process, and on grounds, which the laws and mode of proceeding of the mother Church would not sanction. He had other grounds on which to rest his claim. He imagines that a clergyman, once placed in the position of a bishop or of a metropolitan, acquires certain rights which do not rest on grounds cognizable by the laws of England or her Colonies, but on certain traditions of the second or third century, which his imagination invests with a kind of Divine authority. These traditions are somewhat vague, and if accessible at all, are so only to those who are learned in church history; they belong to an age so different from our own that even customs and words were not the same then as now, and there is • no known method of transferring them from that age to this; and the powers which they are supposed to confer are still more vague. Were they once admitted, there would be no knowing where we stood; we should be embarked on a sea of confusion, where there was no holding-

ground, and the strongest wind which happened to blow would carry us at its will. We shall not attempt to complicate the present questions, which are perplexed enough, by entering upon abstract rights of this kind. If they exist, it is certain that they cannot be put in force except by express laws or compacts, which have to be made by the parties concerned. There are only two grounds on which church government in the Colonies can rest,—the laws and customs of the English Church as it exists at the present day in the mother country, and the laws or compacts which have been or may be made in the Colonies. The notion of a tacit and assumed contract in this case is far weaker than the social contract on which ordinary society is sometimes said to be founded; for the latter theory has this advantage, that it can never be tested, but the former has been brought to the test and has burst to pieces.

Confining ourselves, then, to what is really feasible, according to the circumstances of the present day, we propose to point out,—1st, The facts in which the present difficulties originated; 2ndly, The present state of the different dioceses, in reference to church government, and how they are affected by the present judgment; 3rdly, The best means open to us for setting right the difficulties which have arisen.

I. The efforts to found bishoprics in the great American Colonies extended over the greater part of the last century. There appears to have been a dread on the part of the Government and the colonists of the establishment of an ecclesiastical power, such as had grown up in England in the seventeenth century out of the ruins of the gigantic structure which had lain so heavily on all Europe before the Reformation. In vain did Archbishop Tenison, to whom no man could impute excessive hierarchical claims, leave a munificent bequest for the erection of sees in America, and Bishop Gibson and Archbishop Secker, and others of less distinction, throw their influence into the scale. We cannot say that, with the remembrance of the High Church mobs of the days of Queen Anne fresh in their recollection, and with the claims to dominion over the laity in matters of moral discipline, put forth in such books as Gibson's "*Codex*,"* before their eyes, there was nothing in the apprehensions which so long proved fatal to a well-meant endeavour. Even when, in 1787, the war had shown that the Episcopalians were the most well-affected of all religious bodies in America to the English Government, and it was thought desirable to strengthen a loyal communion, which numbered among its members so many who had bled for the royal cause, by consenting to the establishment of a bishopric of Nova Scotia, it was expressly recommended by the

* We have no complaint against this laborious and useful compilation itself; but the views contained in the Introduction, which were severely commented on at the time as reviving claims to spiritual dominion, and were exposed and refuted by Sir Michael Foster, might well cast suspicion upon the Prelate's efforts for the erection of new bishoprics.

Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and the Colonies—the then Colonial Office,—to which the question was referred, that the new bishop should have no civil authority whatsoever, except what might be necessary for the discharge of his duty *in clerum*, and that he should have no jurisdiction in cases of matrimony, or probate or ecclesiastical dues, nor any power of proceeding *in salutem animæ* in cases of incontinence, brawling, or defamation. These impediments have happily been removed; but we think the fact of their existence should be well laid to heart by those who are inclined to urge episcopal authority beyond the modest limits of English law. They may be assured that every irregular, high-handed act, done in however good a cause, tends to rouse the old spirit of jealous opposition, and to retard the establishment of an organized episcopal system.

It is not a little remarkable that the first colonial bishopric ever founded—that of Nova Scotia, in 1787—was founded in a colony which had for more than thirty years enjoyed representative government, and that the Letters Patent by which it was founded, and which purported to confer the fullest coercive jurisdiction, were drawn by the law officers of the Crown, on the recommendation of the then Colonial Department. The fatal precedent having been set, it is not to be wondered at that it was followed in other cases. In the foundation of the next bishopric, that of Quebec, the warrant appointing Dr. Mountain the first bishop was referred to the law officers, one of whom was Sir J. Scott, afterwards Lord Eldon, and their opinion was that “the document was drawn in proper form.” It is, however, to be noticed (as the Natal Judgment reminds us), that in the establishment of the bishopric of Calcutta (which was effected in the chancellorship of Lord Eldon), the authority of Parliament was invoked to give validity to the Letters Patent, which thus became a part of an Imperial Statute; and further, that when, in 1824, under the same Chancellor, the bishoprics of Jamaica and Barbadoes were established, though the Letters Patent were first issued, an Act of Parliament was passed in the following year, recognising the fact, and authorizing payment from Imperial funds, and acts of the Colonial Legislature were framed which enabled the bishop to exercise jurisdiction over the clergy. It would seem as if Lord Eldon felt the responsibility of having sanctioned the warrant for the appointment of the first bishop of Quebec, and that he was desirous of obviating in other cases the dangers which he perceived to be inherent in the method of procedure adopted in that case. There appears, on this head, to be a mistake in the supposition hazarded by the authors of the Natal Judgment, that the phrases in the Letters Patent purporting to confer coercive jurisdiction were copied from those used in the case of India, in forgetfulness of the fact that Parliament, which had given its supreme authority

for the foundation of the Indian bishopric, had not been invoked in other cases. It is possible that the form of the Patent may have been adapted from that of the Indian bishoprics, but the fact that the earliest precedents were without the sanction of Parliament would naturally check any strong demand for a scrutiny into the matter.

The same remark may be applied to the form of the subsequent Letters Patent, which was used for all the bishoprics which owe their foundation to the movement of Bishop Blomfield in 1840. But the difficulties which Lord Eldon appears to have foreseen, soon after this date began to make themselves felt. The theory of colonial government, which, at the time of the foundation of the earliest bishopric, was somewhat unsettled, has since been worked out by numerous and varied experiments. It might have seemed natural to men who had just emerged from the desperate attempt to enforce by arms the taxation of the American colonists, to hold that the King could, by his prerogative, establish a bishopric in a loyal colony. But it is equally natural to us—who are accustomed to look upon the Colonies almost as independent nations, and to forbear to urge the Imperial authority even in such a matter as the sending of convicts to a willing colony against the wishes of its distant neighbour,—to admit as an axiom that the Crown, having once parted with its legislative power, cannot, by its subsequent act, supersede the functions of the legislature which it has established.

The invalidity, in such cases, of the grant of coercive jurisdiction was first brought clearly to view in the case of the bishopric of Tasmania. Soon after the foundation of that bishopric, in 1842, complaints were made of the powers bestowed by the Letters Patent, and especially of that part of them which authorized the bishop to summon witnesses before the Ecclesiastical Court. This power may be said to represent the exact point at which the colonists have usually recalcitrated against the request for a grant of powers of discipline to the Church. The case of the bishopric of Tasmania was referred to the law officers of the Crown in 1846, and they were of opinion that Her Majesty “had no authority, by Letters Patent, to create the ecclesiastical jurisdiction complained of;” and in accordance with this opinion new Letters Patent were given for Tasmania, and, on the creation of the other Australian sees, the power to summon witnesses and examine them by oath was omitted, as also the express power to punish by suspension and deposition. In fact, the powers given were those denoted by the word “visitation,” not “jurisdiction.”

With this experience, it can hardly be thought that when, in 1853, the Letters Patent for the South African dioceses were given, they would be taken by any man who looked facts in the face to confer, of themselves, a coercive jurisdiction; and we can only wonder at the

rashness and wilfulness which prompted the attempt to enforce, by virtue of these instruments, an episcopal autocracy to which nothing similar has been seen in England since the days of the Court of High Commission. Those who have counselled these proceedings are themselves alone responsible for the disastrous issue of their attempt. Nor can we consider that the issue has been other than disastrous. It is said, indeed, that it is best to know at once where we stand; but this was known sufficiently before. What has been elicited by these attempts is the unfortunate spectacle of a bishop of the Church of England asserting a despotic power for which he had no grounds; appealing to the most solemn sanctions for his support in a manner which, to bystanders, could hardly appear other than ridiculous; scattering accusations of heresy and schism broadcast around him, without the support of any church authority but his own opinion; and conducting the proceedings in a manner which has made every man of any legal experience see here a fresh proof of the unfitness of aspiring ecclesiastics and heated theologians to exercise control in spiritual causes. These proceedings may also well make all thoughtful Churchmen feel that of all risks which the Colonial Church could run, the most desperate would be that of being given over to the uncontrolled will of its priestly rulers.

II. Let us look, then, at the state in which the various dioceses find themselves on this revelation of the insufficiency of the Letters Patent.

We may arrange the dioceses in four categories—(1) Those in which the Letters Patent are valid, as having been established or directly confirmed by acts of the Imperial or local Legislature; (2) those in which the Letters Patent are valid, the Crown having power of legislation; (3) those which, having been constituted without proper authority, gain an authority which they had not on their first erection, by subsequent acts of the Imperial or Colonial Legislature; and (4) those which bear the full effects of the late judgment.

To the first class belong the East Indian bishoprics—Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay; and the West Indian bishoprics—Jamaica, Barbadoes, Antigua, British Guiana, Nassau (Bahamas), and Kingston (Jamaica). In these nine cases the church may be regarded as distinctly established, and governed in matters of clergy discipline, by the ecclesiastical laws of England as though they were parts of the mother country.

To the second class belong Gibraltar, Colombo, Victoria (Hong Kong), Sierra Leone, Mauritius, Labuan, Perth (Western Australia), British Columbia (excepting Vancouver's Island), and St. Helena. In these nine cases the bishops are empowered to exercise spiritual and ecclesiastical jurisdiction according to the ecclesiastical laws now in

force in England, and an appeal is given from the bishop to the Archbishop of Canterbury.

To the third class belong the North American bishoprics; those of Australia (excepting Adelaide); Capetown and Graham's Town in South Africa; New Zealand and Christ Church (New Zealand). These seventeen bishoprics vary in their circumstances and in the mode and extent to which they have received recognition. Nova Scotia is recognised in 31 Geo. III., cap. 36, § 40 (the Act establishing representative government in Canada), which provides that presentations to benefices in Canada shall be "subject to the right of institution and other jurisdiction or authority lawfully granted by His Majesty's Letters Patent to the Bishop of Nova Scotia." It is also recognised by 59 Geo. III., cap. 60, § 3, which allows the persons ordained by the Bishop of Nova Scotia and Quebec to hold preferment in England under certain reservations—a provision hitherto understood to extend to all colonial dioceses. Quebec is thus recognised by an Imperial Act, and it also, with the other Canadian dioceses (Toronto, Montreal, Huron, Ontario), falls under the provision of the General Canadian Act of 1856, which gives power to the English Church in Canada to regulate its own affairs. Fredericstown is recognised by an Act of New Brunswick, which provides very minutely, and in a somewhat summary way, for the discipline of the clergy by means of the civil magistrate. The Australian bishoprics which have been formed out of New South Wales receive a recognition and a certain power from colonial acts relating to the trusts under which chapels and parsonages may be built, and to the grants given for the building of churches and the maintenance of ministers by the Colonial Government; while the Colonies of Tasmania and Victoria have church acts of their own, giving full powers of meeting in synod, and of exercising discipline (even to the extent, in the case of Tasmania, of administering oaths to witnesses). The diocese of Christ Church in New Zealand was separated from the mother diocese by Letters Patent, but an Act of the Imperial Parliament, 15 & 16 Vict., cap. 88, was passed "to clear away doubts as to the constitution of the diocese, and to enable Her Majesty to constitute it, and to divide it from that of New Zealand," so that both dioceses thus receive recognition. Lastly, the dioceses of Capetown and Graham's Town are recognised by a colonial act which, on the separation of the dioceses, gave power to the Bishop of Capetown to transfer to his suffragan certain lands hitherto held in his name.

The case of Rupert's Land is peculiar. But since funds are paid by the Hudson's Bay Company for the bishop's salary, the bishopric there may be said to have received recognition by the governing body.

There remain six dioceses,—that of Natal, those of Wellington,

Waiapu, and Nelson in New Zealand, of Adelaide in South Australia, and of Newfoundland,—which are exposed to the full and unmitigated effects, whatever they may be, of the Natal Judgment. To these may be added Vancouver's Island, which, having representative institutions, is included, with the Crown colony of British Columbia, under a single bishop. On the establishment of the bishopric of New Westminster, the bishopric of Vancouver will fall wholly under the effects of the judgment, while the Letters Patent may probably be granted for the new see without infraction of the principles now laid down.

This review shows at once that there are a large number of colonial dioceses to which the effects of the late judgment do not apply: eighteen out of forty are untouched by it; and of the remainder, sixteen are but partially affected, leaving but six which are in the same case as the diocese of Natal.

This may possibly be too favourable an estimate, yet it is one which has been accepted by some of the best authorities in these matters. If the *obiter dicta* of the Natal Judgment may be taken as determining the course of future legal proceedings, it might seem that the Letters Patent which purport to confer coercive jurisdiction, even in colonies in which the Crown has the power of legislation, are in that respect invalid; for among the reasons given for the invalidity of the powers assumed by the Bishop of Capetown, is the fact that by the Act which abolished the High Commission, the Crown has no power to create new Ecclesiastical Courts. In a former part of the judgment, however, we are told that “in a Crown colony, properly so called, . . . a bishop may be constituted and ecclesiastical jurisdiction imposed by the sole authority of the Crown.”

But it is not merely in respect of actual jurisdiction that this judgment affects the colonial episcopate. The very existence of a diocese in the sense of a territorial limit, within which all members of the Church of England are bound together in subjection to one spiritual head, has been thought to be denied in the cases affected by the judgment. Perhaps this point has been overstrained. The words of the judgment are: “There was no power in the Crown by virtue of its prerogative to establish a metropolitan see or province, or to create an ecclesiastical corporation, whose status, rights, and authority *the colony should be required to recognise*. After a colony or settlement has received legislative institutions, the Crown (subject to the special provisions of any Act of Parliament) stands in the same relation to that colony or settlement as it does to the United Kingdom. It may be true that the Crown, as legal head of the Church, has a right to command the consecration of a bishop; but it has no power to assign to him any diocese or give him any sphere of

action in the United Kingdom." The Judicial Committee were anxious to do away with the supposed *coercive* power of the Letters Patent; and we take the words in which the power of framing dioceses is denied to mean merely that there is no limit within which the episcopal authority acquires a coercive power, either over clergymen or laymen. That the Crown, as head of the Church, has rightly exercised its discretion in the assignment of certain limits, within which such authority as it could confer should be exercised, is not denied; nor is it at all clear that these limits could be violated even in such dioceses as Capetown or Natal, without entailing serious consequences on those who violated them. At all events, the moral authority the Letters Patent possess in this territorial limitation is such as cannot be questioned; for this limitation has gained in most instances the sanction of usage, which not only gives it a kind of power in itself, but also, by the recognition of the bishop in legal documents, such as the trust-deeds throughout the diocese, gives him by degrees a legal status, from which he cannot be dislodged without his consent or by process of law. The assertion, therefore, which has been sometimes made, that the bishops affected by this judgment are left without dioceses, needs to be much modified.

The point, however, of most serious moment, is that of the supposed legal disabilities which might attach in this country to the clergy ordained by the bishops whose position is affected by the judgment. The Act of Parliament which prescribes the conditions within which a clergyman ordained for or in the colonies may officiate in this country, contains a clause which (59 Geo. III., c. 60) absolutely prohibits any person ordained by "any colonial bishop not having episcopal jurisdiction within some diocese, and residing therein," from "holding ecclesiastical preferment anywhere in His Majesty's dominions," or "officiating at any place or in any manner," "as minister of the Established Church of England and Ireland." This of course was intended to limit the powers of colonial bishops to the time of their holding office; and it is easy to see that without some such provision we should have run many dangers, such as the power of ordination and of performing episcopal functions without the responsibility which attaches to the administration of a diocese; and the powers which would thus be given would be quite incalculable. But does not the weight of this provision now fall upon all those who have been ordained by the bishops affected by the recent judgment? We confess that we cannot share in the alarm created by this question. We do not believe that the clause would be applied to bishops who have a known episcopal position appointed them by the Crown. Indeed, the terms of the Act itself seem effectually to guard against the rigorous expansion of its prohibition; for, on comparing the 3rd

and 4th sections, we find a distinction drawn between colonial bishops in the ordinary sense, and bishops unattached and without dioceses. The 3rd section provides that persons ordained by bishops other than of England and Ireland, shall only be capable of officiating in England by special permission of the archbishop of the province and the bishop of the diocese in which they desire to serve. But the 4th section restrains the persons ordained by colonial bishops not possessing episcopal jurisdiction in some diocese, from officiating as ministers of the Church of England anywhere, on any pretence whatever. It is worthy of remark, that two of the bishops named in the 3rd section as having dioceses and jurisdiction, and consequently as contrasted with the non-diocesan bishops, against whom Section 4 is directed, are the bishops of Quebec and Nova Scotia, who stood at that time precisely in the same position as the bishops of Capetown or New Zealand now stand. And if it be contended that these bishops are mentioned in the Act inadvertently, it not having been then discovered that they had no jurisdiction, it may most justly be replied that the inadvertence tells the contrary way, and that the class of bishops against whom Section 4 is directed is evidently not that to which those bishops belong who have been regularly appointed, and are exercising their lawful functions in the places to which they have been sent. The term "jurisdiction," standing in this connection, would hardly be pressed to its extreme consequences in our Law Courts, when, if so pressed, it would lead to the extrusion of many incumbents in England from their livings, and to the invalidating of marriages and other clerical acts in thousands of cases,—nay, to a universal interdict upon the clergy ordained by the colonial bishops, from officiating either at home or in the Colonies. The danger, indeed, which is here supposed, is so great as to produce its own remedy; and the first judicial act which invalidated the position of all clergymen ordained by colonial bishops, would be the signal for an application to Parliament for a remedy which could not be denied. We can hardly think, therefore, that the alarm expressed is more than the transient panic which accompanies the failure of some few cherished ideas. But the clause to which we have referred should make those pause who speak rashly of the consecration of bishops without any authority from the Crown. Should such consecrations take place (and they have taken place in one or two cases), the clergy ordained by the bishops thus consecrated would be debarred not only from officiating in England, but from officiating in any of Her Majesty's dominions, and indeed from officiating in any place whatsoever as ministers of the Church of England. Nor, if it should be found necessary to modify this clause for the relief of the disabilities which might be found unexpectedly to attach to clergy whom it was never meant to touch, is it at all

probable that a change would be effected in the law, such as would give full validity in this country to the acts of bishops consecrated with no better authority than the will of any three colonial bishops who might combine on any occasion that might seem good to them. It is conceivable that Parliament might interfere to relieve from disabilities those whose position was due to a compliance with an authority never hitherto brought in question. It is not conceivable that it would interfere to facilitate a state of things in which colonial bishoprics would be the offspring of the will of irresponsible individuals.

It appears to us, therefore, that the effects of the judgment are really confined to the question of coercive jurisdiction. It is determined that, in those colonies which we have pointed out as affected by the judgment, there is no power, by virtue of the Letters Patent, to compel obedience. Church government must be created by conciliating the free consent of the members of the Church.

III. We may start from the point last touched upon in considering the third division of our subject, by far the most important, viz., What is now to be done? how is the government of the Church to be built up? for this point opens the grand question underlying all plans which we may devise, or wishes which we may form, for the future of our Colonial Church. The question is this: Is the connection between the Church at home and that in the Colonies to be maintained? If that connection is really of little importance, and the "freedom of the Colonial Church," which is so frequently and so rashly desired, mean its independence of and severance from the mother Church, the subject of this article becomes of comparatively small importance to us at home. It only means then, How may we best disentangle ourselves from all responsibility for the acts of a variety of communities who are about to go each its own way? What Chili or Mexico are to Spain, that the colonial churches are on this hypothesis to become to the Church of England. We profess at once that we are not prepared for this. We do not believe that such a state of things is desired by the soundest and most thoughtful Churchmen, either at home or in our Colonies, at the present time: and, whatever may be the evils of retaining the connection, we are persuaded that they are little in comparison of the dangers which would result from abandoning it altogether.

Let us not be misunderstood. We have no idea that it is either desirable or possible to maintain for ever a perfect unity of system or of government in the churches which have sprung or may spring from the Anglican stock. The time will doubtless come, as it has come long ago in America, when the colonial churches will become the churches of separate nations: the time will come still earlier, as

it has come in Canada, when it will be desirable to reduce to a minimum the restraint exercised from England over the churches which are actually connected as branches with the Established Church at home. And it is necessary for all who care for the future of the Church of England to prepare for and facilitate these changes, which must inevitably come. But we believe that in most of the colonies the time for them has not arrived.

The question of the "independence" of the colonial churches is sometimes, indeed, advocated in an absolute manner. Nay, the very ideas of colonization which have usually been current in this country, by which a relation is maintained between the mother country and the colony, are called in question, and the "Greek system of colonization" is advocated as superior to the English. But those who argue thus seem to forget the difference of times and of the present facility of communication. A journey from Marseilles or Trebizond to the mother State was an affair of great danger and uncertainty: the writer of a letter from Australia or New Zealand knows for certain that on the return of the regular mail he will receive an answer. And this difference is not one of form. The ease of communication makes a great difference in the views and habits of the colonists. The better educated and wealthier colonists for the most part look upon the colony as a place in which they may sojourn and employ themselves in lucrative industry, proposing to themselves to spend their gains in England. Nothing would be more distasteful to these men, of whom the governing body is mainly composed, than that the connection of the colony with the mother country should be severed; and nothing would be less advantageous and less noble on the part of this country than that she should thus "expose her offspring," and refuse to watch over the new field to which she has invited them, or to superintend the growth, the defence, and the mutual relations of the new communities. That fostering care may be abused, it is true; nay, it is true that it may even become hurtful both to the party which is its object and also to the party exercising it and claiming a certain authority in consequence. But as in education there is a mean between a total neglect and a fettering supervision, and the control of the parent must by degrees pass into a freer relation, which is a sentiment rather than an outward bond, so it is in the relations between the Colonies and the mother country. Nor does it follow that, because this true mean has not always been observed, the system on which we have hitherto gone is radically wrong. No doubt, of late years we have been awaking to certain evils resulting from a close connection being maintained when the time in which it could be useful was wearing away. But we have no idea that we should have done so well by leaving the infant communities, like the

Greek colonies, unguarded, and liable to endless subdivisions and to fratricidal wars.

Now the analogy of civil government we believe to be applicable to church government; and the ground for the close connection between the colonists and the mother country in church affairs and in matters of civil government is the same, viz., that there is a real and actual dependence of the one upon the other. A theory which supposes the church in a newly formed colony to be an independent community separate from the mother country, is contrary to the facts of the case. The church has not grown out of the colony; it is not chiefly supported by the colonists. The bishops are appointed by the authorities at home from the necessities of the case, and both they and their clergy, in many cases, look forward to a time when they will return to this country. In some instances, the clergy are only asked to volunteer their services for five years; and we have at this moment some six or seven retired colonial bishops resident in England, and some engaged in active duties. Those who are familiar with the mode in which a bishopric is founded in a new colony, ought to be well aware that "independence" is, in such cases, a very equivocal term. Some active bishop, some missionary society, some charitable individual in the mother country, conceives the idea that it is desirable for the spiritual good of the residents in the colony that a bishopric should be founded, and subscribes the necessary funds. The Archbishop of Canterbury and some other prelates are consulted in an informal manner; and it is ascertained that there will be no opposition raised at the Colonial Office. The promoters of the scheme for the most part designate the first holder of the bishopric, who will in such cases usually be a man specially interested in the success of the scheme; and Letters Patent are then obtained, with the usual powers. In all this there is no spontaneous action on the part of the colonists, though it may be that a certain number of them desire the establishment of the bishopric; the fact being, that the wants which the scheme is intended to meet are not such as are strongly felt by the members of a young and rude community. The mother country here acts *as* a mother, providing for wants which her child has not yet learned to appreciate. The colony has as yet no capacity for self-organization in ecclesiastical affairs; and the standing testimony to this is its need of extraneous support for its bishop and clergy. Even at a more advanced stage the colonists have been found to prefer to have a bishop appointed for them in England, when they might have themselves chosen a clergyman of their own colony.

Now we contend that a church which is in this embryo state is in no way capable of self-government—that it will require a long training to make it an independent church. It is as yet lacking in the

following necessary points. First, as has just been stated, it is not self-supporting, and this implies the absence of all the checks and responsibilities which necessarily arise where the clergy and the laity are connected together in their material interests, and are dependent one on the other. Secondly, it lacks that great support of a church, or rather the very essence of it, the presence of a compact, recognised, self-organizing body of laity; for in a new colony, peopled by Englishmen, the theory of the mother country, by which all men are born members of the Church of England, and find a ready-made system working by laws and endowments, with but little assistance from individual energy, still in a measure subsists; and it is some time before they learn to feel that they have to assert themselves distinctively as members of the church, and to assist with money and with counsel in the introduction or working out of the church system. And thirdly, what is of vast moment, in the most delicate points, those relating to doctrine, there is no scope for public opinion, and for the play of different views upon any controverted question. Now the bishop and clergy being educated men, and the bishop usually far superior to the others, and probably having chosen them, and holding practically almost absolute power over them in the first instance, any question which may arise is discussed within a very small circle, in which there is hardly room for more than one opinion. The bishop then becomes almost autocratic. Should any peculiarity of opinion originate with the bishop himself, it almost necessarily carries all before it, and there is no saying, on a system of absolute independence, to what lengths it might go. Should it arise in the mind of another, it has no sufficient field in which to expand itself, and in which it may be fairly judged. It runs the risk of being crushed out before the good, which always lurks even in the most extreme opinions if honestly held, can have its influence on the church.

The consequences of a narrow system in a colony are very serious. The laity of the church are an undefined body, mostly, if disposed to religion, inclining to the "Evangelical" section of the church. They care but little for forms of church government; and on the adoption of a distasteful attitude by the bishop and clergy, they quietly lapse into dissent. These are no imaginary dangers, but are suggested and brought home to us by the cases which the Bishop of Capetown has raised in the assertion of his authority. In the case of Mr. Long, the question turned upon the assertion of the kind of independence we are here speaking of. The Bishop demands that a Synod shall be called to represent "the Church of South Africa in communion with the Church of England." Mr. Long and others object to this, on the ground that the title is illegal, as involving the assertion of a position outside the Church of England, to which church they consider that

they owe allegiance. The Bishop insists that this title shall be adopted, on his sole authority, in the notice calling the Synod, and, on Mr. Long's refusing to give the notice, deprives him of his living as a schismatic.* Here, then, is a double danger before us—first, the demand for an autocratic authority on the part of the Bishop, which is grounded neither on law nor on consent, but on the fancied rights of a bishop, *per se*; and secondly, the exercise of this authority in the formation of a church which is separate from, though for the present in communion with, the Church of England.

Now it might have seemed that Mr. Long, and the other clergymen who with him objected to the calling of the Synod of the Church of South Africa, had raised a dispute on a mere name, and that it was hardly worth while to contest the designation of the church, there being practically no danger of evil consequences from the assumption of an irregular title. But the case of the Bishop of Natal has brought the matter directly to an issue, showing that a very practical meaning is assigned by the Bishop of Capetown to the distinctive title, and also giving illustrations on both sides of the length to which the divergent tendencies would carry these petty churches if their absolute independence should be allowed. The Bishop of Capetown distinctly asserts that he is not to be bound by the decisions pronounced in the Court of Appeal of the Archbishop of Canterbury; and he claims also that there shall be no right of appeal whatever from his authority. He allowed, indeed, in the special case of the Bishop of Natal, an appeal to the Archbishop himself; but he distinctly and avowedly decided the questions on which the Bishop of Natal was arraigned, in defiance of the decisions of the Archbishop's Court of Arches. And whereas the law of England gives all English Churchmen, "for lack of justice," a right of appeal to the Crown from the decisions of the Archbishop, he demands that causes shall not go for appeal beyond the province of South Africa.

These points, as regards the method of judging of the doctrinal issues involved, require to be stated a little more in detail. The recognised principle of the English law in these ecclesiastical suits is, that a man shall be judged by the written standards of the Church of England, and by these alone. The Bishop of Capetown, on the contrary, in his judgment, while recognising our formularies as his first standard, declared "that he did not mean to imply that these were the only tests by which the bishops of the South African Church should try the teaching of its ministers." Not only did he consider the decisions of those councils, which the Church of England regarded

* In speaking of Mr. Long's protest against his assumed jurisdiction, the Bishop of Capetown says,—“To put in such a document is virtually to reject Episcopacy and the Church, and to step on the very confines of schism, if not to have overstepped the line.”

as œcumenical (it being, however, well known that neither the Church nor any argument of her chief writers have settled which are œcumenical, or what authority œcumenical councils possess), might be inflicted as a penal statute upon English clergymen; *i.e.*, that any canon of these councils which an investigator of church history might bring to light, could be made the cause of deprivation; but further, "the received faith of the Church in all ages, even though not defined by any council, if it can be ascertained—as, for example, on such a question as inspiration in connection with the Holy Scriptures,—must also be a guide to them which cannot be disregarded." It is plain that the result of the adoption of this method of judgment would be, that any exaggeration, or even delusion, which may have won its way into popular acceptance—like that of Transubstantiation in the Church before the Reformation, or of the Immaculate Conception in the modern Church of Rome—is, even before its authoritative recognition as an article of faith, to be made the standard by which a clergyman may be condemned. The Bishop consents to be guided by an undefinable standard. On the other hand, when the plain decision of the Court of the Archbishop, to whom he is subject by the instrument of his appointment, stands in the way of his own opinion, he simply thrusts it aside. In dealing with the question of the liberty to criticise portions of the Biblical narrative, he is met by the fact that the Court of Arches has given this liberty in a grave case recently decided. The Bishop of Capetown recognises this as the decision of "a high authority," but observes, "I cannot concur in this decision. It is a wrong to the Church thus to limit the meaning and diminish the force of its plain language." And he proceeds to condemn the Bishop of Natal for holding that the Pentateuch was not written by Moses. So also, in the case of more subtle questions, which have not received any authoritative decision, and which the best divines of our Church have approached with diffidence, and an unwillingness to take up a decided position on either side, he has no difficulty in erecting his own view into the standard of penal judgment. Such a question pre-eminently is that of the weight to be attributed to our Lord's allusions to matters which have since become the subjects of criticism,—a question on which the authority of Jeremy Taylor, as quoted by Bishop Thirlwall in reference to this very controversy, clearly inclines to the side asserted by Bishop Colenso, though with a warning that it led into insoluble mysteries. The Bishop of Capetown, on the contrary, has no difficulty in solving the question. One side alone is permissible with him. To argue that our Lord's authority is not to be quoted in matters of which his contemporaries were ignorant, is with him flat Nestorianism, to be driven from the Church.

But even in points on which great authorities of the Church of

England have expressed a distinct opinion, the Bishop of Capetown is not hindered from making the opposite opinion the rule of his judgment. The most learned prelate of our Church, two years ago, in dealing with the report of Convocation on Bishop Colenso's work, strove to impress upon his clergy that the distinction drawn in that work between the Bible and the Word of God is tenable, and that it is in accordance with the usage both of the New Testament and of our own formularies. The Bishop of Capetown has before him the words which gave occasion to these remarks, and which are as follows:—"The Bible is not in itself God's word, but assuredly God's word will be heard in the Bible by all who will humbly and devoutly listen for it." But he decides that "it is not lawful to say that they (the Scriptures) in such wise contain the word of God as not themselves to be the word of God." We are in no way concerned to pronounce a judgment of our own upon these points; the judgment upon matters which agitate the whole Church of England must, in due course, be pronounced by her central judicial authority. But we are not prepared to see these momentous questions rashly decided by a tribunal which doubtfully represents a small section of the Church, which itself selects the standard for the definition of offences, and which claims to be without appeal. The illustrations which we have given show clearly the dangers entailed by such a course, and the divergence already begun between the Church of England and the new Church of South Africa. Those Churchmen whom the Court of Arches acquits, and who have therefore a settled standing in every English diocese, if they should venture into the diocese of Capetown, the Bishop would proscribe and banish as heretics. A man may be a bishop and revered teacher in England while he is a heretic at Capetown!

On the other side we find the Bishop of Natal, by his words if not by his deeds, giving us a glimpse of what we might expect from unrestrained liberty in other directions. In the preface to the first volume of his work on the Pentateuch, he declared that he could never use the Baptismal Service of our Church, nor ask the questions which the Ordination Service places in the mouth of the bishop. We are aware that he has since explained and modified this statement; but, with every wish to be impartial, we cannot but see in such an assertion a suggestion of the kind of dangers to which the Colonial Church would be subjected under the system of absolute independence so eagerly desired by some good men. If the Bishop of Natal's present tendencies had been somewhat more developed at an earlier stage, and it had been laid down as a maxim that his church was an independent community, owing no allegiance to the Church of England, he would have found himself bishop of a very small band of clergy, each of them, possibly,

appointed by himself and under his uncontrolled authority. What divergence might we not have had, what abandonment of the doctrine and usages of the Church of England, in such a case! And yet, in the face of the facts which render this danger so palpable, we find a number of well-meaning men proposing, as a remedy for the existing evils, to clear away all the checks and restraints by which such dangers may be avoided, and to render any petty knot of clergy with a bishop at their head, who may hereafter be sent out from this country, free to perpetrate and inflict upon the Churchmen in the colony to which they may be sent, any foolish change or tyrannical enactment in which they may be able to agree.

We repeat, we have no wish to bind the daughter churches for ever to the exact rules of worship or discipline which are adopted at home. But until they have grown to maturity, they must be, in some degree, under tutelage.

Now it may be said that the case of the Bishop of Natal is so peculiar that it is not likely to recur. We cannot be sure of this in a time when Biblical studies, such as those in which he has lost his way, are but in their infancy among Anglican Churchmen. But is there but one form of this danger? If we look at the conduct of the Bishop of Capetown, we find the hierarchical spirit developing itself in the strongest manner. No freedom of thought or action could exist under the system which he advocates. And if we look back over the history of the Church, it would be very difficult for Protestants to say that the wild, unrestrained thoughts of individuals have done so much harm as that overbearing of the individual will by arbitrary power or love of systematizing which the Bishop of Capetown would introduce into the colonial churches. We are by no means ready to fly from one danger into the arms of another equally great. But the plan of unrestrained liberty in the Colonial Church would leave us a prey to both.

We say deliberately, would leave *us*; for the Church at home cannot but be drawn into the dispute. It is thought by some an easy thing to leave the colonial churches to themselves. But how leave them to themselves? We must repeat that they do not stand alone. Suppose the Bishop of Capetown to proceed as he proposes, and to follow out his so-called deposition of the Bishop of Natal by appointing a new bishop, who should be consecrated by himself and the two missionary bishops whom he has appointed. At once the church in Natal would be divided: for this the "party of action" seem to be quite prepared. They are not willing that the difference should be decided by English law, but are ready to take the matter into their own hands, and decide it by their own wills. But to which of these parties are we at home to adhere? To whom are the endowments

which have been given by English Churchmen, and are administered by bishops and other functionaries at home, to be assigned? We are already feeling the first waves of this sea of troubles in the case of the Bishop of Natal's application to the Council for Colonial Bishoprics. And we may be thankful that in this case the matter will be decided by the Master of the Rolls, in a well-weighed judgment. If, as seems probable, this judgment should assign the temporalities to the Bishop of Natal, it is proposed, by the Bishop of Capetown and his friends, that this should be borne as a kind of infliction, which, however, will in no wise change their course in setting up a rival bishop. Then which of these two parties will the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, and other Church societies at home, support? The one will have the legal right, the other probably the obedience of the majority of the clergy; and the contributors to the charities at home will be called upon to decide a matter which, it is supposed, cannot be safely left to the highest tribunal of this country. Thus the strife engendered abroad must necessarily be decided at home.

The case which has provoked these comments is one which is complicated by the peculiar position assumed by Bishop Colenso. His opinions have found but scanty sympathy, even among those who might be supposed to lean most towards his views. But had Mr. Maurice been sent to Natal in 1853, instead of one who was then his admirer and intimate friend, he would equally have fallen under the sentence of the Bishop of Capetown, and the sympathy evoked in this country would have been ten times greater. If the Bishop of Exeter had stood towards Mr. Gorham, fifteen years ago, in the relation in which Dr. Gray stands to Dr. Colenso, the Gorham case, instead of being gravely decided by law, would have been the cause of a schism of which no one could tell the end; and the two greatest religious parties in this country would have been supporting, to this day, two rival communions; and every platform, and every collecting-box, would bear the curse of religious animosity.

Now we cannot but think that the evil which is thus threatened is just one for which the simple remedy is to be found in the existing system, by which recourse is had to a well-known course of law, and in the last resort to the Sovereign in Council.

In those colonies in which the Letters Patent are valid, the course which appeals should take is clearly described: as, for instance, in the case of the diocese of Gibraltar, to which most of the others are similar. "If," says this document, "any party shall conceive himself aggrieved by any judgment, decree, or sentence, pronounced by the Bishop of Gibraltar or his successors, . . . it shall be lawful for the said party to appeal to the said Archbishop of Canterbury or his successors, who shall finally decide and determine the said appeal."

The expression "finally" would appear to show that it was thought that the framer of these letters meant to make the Court of Appeal of the province of Canterbury the ultimate resort. The statute of appeals and submission of the clergy (25 Hen. VIII., c. 19), which is quoted in the Natal Judgment, gives a right of appeal to the Crown from the Archbishop's Court, which it is evident that the Judicial Committee of Privy Council would receive. In cases therefore like that of Gibraltar, the course of law is plainly marked; nor could it be changed without grave reason. We have seen that this class of Letters Patent is very considerable.

In some of the Letters Patent which have now been pronounced invalid, similar regulations are made. In the cases of Canada, South Africa, and Australia, the appeals from the suffragan bishops to the Metropolitan are to be finally determined by him; in the case of New Zealand the decisions of the Metropolitan are subject to a further appeal to the Archbishop of Canterbury; and in all cases the Colonial Metropolitans hold their offices subject to the general superintendence (whatever this may be held to mean) of the Archbishop of Canterbury; and in every proceeding originally instituted before the Metropolitan himself, an appeal is allowed to the Archbishop.

It is hardly worth discussing what would have been the course of law under these provisions, since the Letters Patent themselves have been, in all these cases, pronounced invalid so far as jurisdiction is concerned. It is, however, a mistake to suppose that the Letters Patent have no force at all. The judgment now under review "grants or assumes" that the Letters Patent at Capetown were "sufficient in law to confer on Dr. Gray the ecclesiastical status of Metropolitan, and to create between him and the Bishop of Natal and Graham's Town the personal relation of Metropolitan and suffragan as ecclesiastics." What it denies is that the Letters Patent give any power to enforce this relation by coercion. Nor is it denied that there is power among the members of a colonial church to bind themselves together by contract. The judgment, indeed, in dealing with the argument that Bishop Colenso, in taking the oath of canonical obedience, gave jurisdiction to Bishop Gray by voluntary submission, says, "Even if the parties intended to enter into any such agreement" (*i. e.*, by the administration and acceptance of the oath of canonical obedience, couched in the ordinary terms), "it was not legally competent to the Bishop of Natal to give, or to the Bishop of Capetown to accept or exercise, any such jurisdiction." But here again it is "jurisdiction" in the formal sense which is denied. That there is a power to make a contract is not denied; and it is, on the contrary, asserted in the Long Judgment, to the principles of which the Natal Judgment gives its adherence. "The members of the Church of England," says that

document, "may adopt, as the members of any other communion may adopt, rules for enforcing discipline within their body, which will be binding on those who, expressly or by implication, assent to them." It further admits that where, by agreement, a tribunal has been constituted to determine whether the rules agreed upon have been violated, and what shall be the consequence of such violation, the decision of such tribunal will be binding if it has acted justly, and the Courts of Law will give effect to its decisions. There is here, as is explained, no jurisdiction, and the decision of the church tribunal is comparable merely to that of arbitrators in an ordinary contract.

We have an instance of the exercise of this power in the compact signed by the bishops and clergy of New Zealand. It is as follows:—

"All officebearers (clergy included) holding appointments under the General Synod, shall be liable to be deposed or suspended by the General Synod, if from any cause whatever the General Synod shall consider it expedient to exercise such power; and such clergyman shall, when deposed, *ipso facto* cease to hold his office and receive its emoluments. The General Synod shall establish a tribunal in New Zealand for all questions of doctrine and discipline, and also a court of appeal from the decisions of such tribunal."

And the following is the declaration signed by every person accepting office under the General Synod:—

"I do declare my submission to the authority of the General Synod of the branch of the United Church of England and Ireland in New Zealand, established by the constitution agreed on the 13th day of June, 1857, and to all the provisions of the said constitution; and I further consent to be bound by all regulations which may from time to time be issued by authority of the said Synod; and I hereby undertake, in consideration of being appointed to ———, to immediately resign my appointment, and all rights and endowments thereof, whenever I shall be called upon to do so by the General Synod, or any person or persons lawfully acting under the authority of the General Synod in that behalf."

The rights of members of the Established Church are no doubt somewhat peculiar; and it may be doubted whether any body of clergymen have a right to agree among themselves to be governed by rules inconsistent with their position as members of that Church. But if contracts be made in conformity with the laws of the Church, they would be enforced by the Courts of Law. Nevertheless, as it appears to us, these contracts are somewhat insecure; and, inasmuch as they must depend on the laws and the relative duties of members of the Established Church of England, it is very doubtful whether, in any case, the appeal to the Crown could be barred: indeed it appears to be distinctly claimed by the closing paragraph of the judg-

ment which we are now reviewing, in which the Court assign their reasons for taking cognizance of the petition of the Bishop of Natal. We mark by numbers the separate arguments which are here combined :—

“(1.) This important question can only be decided by the Sovereign, as head of the Established Church, and depositary of the ultimate appellate jurisdiction. Before the Reformation, in a dispute of this nature between two independent prelates, an appeal would have lain to the Pope; but all appellate authority of the Pope over members of the Established Church is by statute vested in the Crown. (2.) It is the settled prerogative of the Crown to receive appeals in all colonial causes; and (3) by the 25th of Hen. VIII., cap. 19 (by which the mode of appeal to the Crown in ecclesiastical causes is decided), it is by the fourth section enacted that, ‘for lack of justice at or in any of the courts of the archbishops of this realm, or in any of the King’s dominions, it shall be lawful to the parties grieved to appeal to the King’s Majesty in the Court of Chancery,’—an enactment which gave rise to the Commission of Delegates, for which this tribunal is now substituted. (4.) Unless a controversy, such as that which is presented by this Appeal and Petition, falls to be determined by the ultimate jurisdiction of the Crown, it is plain that there would be a denial of justice, and no remedy for great inconvenience and mischief. (5.) It is right to add, although unnecessary, that by the Act 3 & 4 William IV., cap. 41, which constituted this tribunal, Her Majesty has power to refer to the Judicial Committee, for hearing or consideration, any such other matters whatsoever as Her Majesty shall think fit, and this Committee is thereupon to hear and consider the same, and to advise Her Majesty thereon.”

It is manifest from this, that whatever doubt there may be whether the internal affairs of the colonial churches can be brought within the ordinary course of English Ecclesiastical Law (though the Letters Patent in certain cases, *e.g.*, New Zealand, order that jurisdiction should be exercised according to the Ecclesiastical Laws of England, which are lawfully made and received in England); yet the appeal to the Crown is the recognised right of every member of the United Church, in whatever way his rights as a Churchman may be affected. In cases where two bishops, or a bishop and a clergyman, are at issue, if there is no contract, the matter is similar to that in which the appeal or petition is recognised by the Natal Judgment: if there is a contract, it falls under the class of cases dealt with in the appeal of Mr. Long. The appeal of Mr. Long was, indeed, not from the sentence of the bishop, but from that of the Supreme Court of the Colony; but in the course of that appeal the whole question of the government of the church in the colony necessarily came under review, and the point on which the matter actually turned was whether the Bishop had deprived Mr. Long “for any lawful cause; that is, for such cause as (having regard to any differences which may arise from the circumstances of the colony) would authorize the deprivation of a clergyman by his bishop in England.” Had the case been one not of discipline but of morals or of doctrine, this mode of judging the case

would have brought in the principal matter at issue, and not merely the formal question whether the rules of a small and arbitrarily formed society had been observed. But even if this could not be done, it seems clear that the court would have received an appeal on the principal cause itself. It may indeed be attempted, by the agreement which binds together the members of the church, to subject their affairs to a merely arbitrary authority. But this is all but impossible in a body which begins by professing itself a branch of the Church of England, which church is recognised by English law. The case of Mr. Long illustrates this. It would hardly be possible, with any proper decency and fairness between the contracting parties, to frame a licence in terms more one-sided than that which was held by Mr. Long. The Bishop by that licence "reserved to himself and his successors full power to revoke these presents, and all things therein contained, whenever he or they should see just cause so to do." Yet it was on these very terms that the arbitrary action of the Bishop of Capetown was reversed by the Privy Council. And similarly in the New Zealand declaration just quoted, the terms of which appear to give such absolute power to the Synod, or the tribunal appointed by it, we observe with pleasure that the Synod has no power to diverge from the standards of the Church of England, and that any action of its tribunals must be that of "persons *lawfully* acting under its authority." The case, then, as to consensual compacts may be stated thus: The members of the Church of England have power to bind themselves together; but the rules by which they bind themselves must be those of the church itself. Though in a colony, they are Churchmen still, and the church is not to be narrowed to a sect by the arbitrary action of its members. And against any attempt so to narrow her, the right of appeal to the Crown is our surest guarantee, —a right which is not barred by the substitution of voluntary compacts for the supposed authority of the Letters Patent, but for which the compacts give an additional channel through the civil courts of the colony.

There are two objections urged against this right of appeal,—the one on the ground of expense and inconvenience, the other on that of principle. "It is tyranny," says the one, "to require that causes should be brought from all ends of the world to London." "It is a violation of church rights," says the other, "that a Metropolitan should have to maintain his authority before a tribunal nominated by the Crown, and chiefly composed of laymen." Now to this last objection we cannot here reply at length. The question which it raises has been much argued of late. We shall content ourselves with saying that it appears to us that little can be gained by arguing on abstract rights in such a question. The two great requisites in a supreme court of

law are,—1st, that it should be absolutely impartial, deciding according to strict legal justice, and not according to considerations of policy or by the desire of popularity; and 2ndly, that it should be thoroughly well informed and competent to judge of the matters in hand. If the present courts do not fulfil these conditions, it is most desirable that they should be reformed. But it appears to us that the august body before which the cases of Mr. Gorham or Mr. Liddell were tried, is one for which it would be extremely difficult to find a substitute: and it is not a little remarkable that, wherever the question of change has been discussed, every court which has been proposed as a substitute for the present has failed to carry the general consent, and has been abandoned as more objectionable than the present court; so that the advocates of the court as it is now may claim for it the position of Themistocles, in gaining every man's second vote. Now, if the Privy Council be a fit court for ecclesiastical appeals at home, it is certainly fitted for those which come from the Colonies, being the special court of appeal for all colonial causes.

Is it then true to argue that it is a great hardship that causes should be brought from the Colonies to the appeal court at home? The general proposition can hardly be maintained while all the Colonies carry their appeals to the Crown in temporal causes; and the object to be attained in these is far less than in ecclesiastical affairs, for the Church requires to be kept more closely united than the different communities which compose our vast empire. It is said, indeed, that there is danger of our ecclesiastical system thus becoming a Papacy; and that the worst abuse of the Papacy was the carrying of appeals to Rome. But we must distinguish between the really important causes which come on appeal before the Privy Council and the endless and vexatious suits in private affairs which were carried to Rome in old times for the sake of the gain which ecclesiastics and ecclesiastical lawyers made by them. That every petty suit of matrimony, or of wills, or of tithes, should at every stage be liable to be carried to Rome on appeal was an intolerable tyranny. But who can say that it was an evil that grave matters of doctrine, such as those which caused the Reformation, should not be decided offhand by the voice of a single province of the Church, nor by a single nation, but should, after a long process, be decided by the central tribunal of all Christendom? Had the Popes been just, and the Ecclesiastical Courts kept pure and clear from abuses, the Church might have reformed itself from within, and without violence. And so long as English justice remains what it is, the inconvenience of bringing an important cause to England is very slight when contrasted with the certainty of justice being done, and the supreme importance of the maintenance of unity among the scattered churches whose real centre is in England.

We have argued on the general question, keeping clear of the special case which has brought the matter before us. And we have not discussed one important point, viz., the fact that no adequate provision has been made for the trial of a colonial bishop. It appears, indeed, very questionable whether the same difficulty does not exist in England as in the Colonies. The question so often asked in the late trial, "Who could bring the Bishop of London or the Archbishop of Canterbury to justice?" was never satisfactorily answered; and if it should prove that no means exist for doing this in the Colonies, their case would be only the same with that of the church at home. But there can be no advantage in any functionary being without liability to removal in case of gross abuse of his office, and in future appointments it would appear that this ought to be provided for. Certainly the Crown, in creating an office, can make the terms on which it should be tenable.

The ground, then, is cleared for us as regards several important points:—1st. The colonial churches are not independent, but branches of the Church of England; 2nd. They are in fact and by right under a certain control from this country. It remains, however, to discuss a very important question, that of the best means for their future well-being and expansion.

The first requisite of a body which has to organize itself is that it should have liberty to convoke its own assemblies for deliberation and the regulation of its affairs. It was supposed some time ago that the Act of the Submission of the Clergy, which has for three hundred years restrained the clergy from meeting in synod or passing canons without the express consent of the Crown, held good in the Colonies; and many of the colonial churches were for a long time kept back by doubts on this point from meeting together and organizing themselves. A bill was brought into the Imperial Parliament in 1854 by Sir R. Bethell, the Attorney-General, for the express purpose of legalizing such synods. It was thrown out; but the churches acted for themselves, and there can be no reasonable doubt that no clergyman is in danger of *præmunire*, or any other penalty, for joining in a voluntary assembly, and uniting with other members of the Church of England in a scheme of self-government.

We shall perhaps take the best means of suggesting what may be done for organization if we simply exhibit the stages through which a church may pass from its first planting in a colony to its final and absolute independence. There are five such stages, and we have examples of each before us at the present day.

1. We shall dwell but a moment on the phase in which no attempt whatever has been made to bind the members of the church together by any form of agreement. There are several of our colonial churches

in this condition. It is manifest that in such cases there can be no church government, no exercise of discipline, unless in a Crown colony episcopal power is introduced, and discipline established. But we dwell upon this phase for a moment, because it serves to remind us that government and discipline are not everything. The offering of prayer, the celebration of the sacraments, the great episcopal acts of ordination and confirmation, go on as regularly as if the church was fully organized. And it is possibly no evil that the churches should remain in this phase for a time, that they may win the free allegiance of the colonists before they take any stereotyped form, and that the way for organization may be prepared by the accretion of the raw material which is afterwards to be formed into shape. Even here a bishop has a certain power, through the sanction which he alone can give to the ministrations of the clergy in particular congregations. His licence may not have the legal value which it has in England, and it will always be possible for clergymen to dispense with it. But it soon becomes a discreditable thing to officiate without it; and, when given, it constitutes an agreement between the clergyman and the bishop, which (as the despatch of the Duke of Newcastle, after the judgment of the Privy Council in Mr. Long's case, clearly shows) may be made the basis of a complete organization. A case quite analogous to this is to be found in the Bishop of London's authority over the chaplaincies on the Continent. It is true that in the English communities abroad it is possible that a chaplain should officiate without the bishop's licence. But there is in such cases no adequate security for the character of the chaplain, or even, as it may happen, for his being in Holy Orders at all: the clergymen and people are not bound together by any valid bond; and the succession of clergymen is settled at haphazard. But when organization begins, the bishop is almost necessarily invoked. When the English residents in a foreign town combine to make rules for the election of a chaplain, the first which suggests itself is that the chaplain should have the bishop's licence. And it becomes each year less and less possible for a clergyman to officiate creditably abroad without this licence. This system might be drawn more closely, and possibly will be so drawn. Were the bishops at home to agree to permit no one to officiate in England who has served abroad without the Bishop of London's licence, the licence would soon become all but indispensable. And where the licence exists, it becomes a great power in the settlement of disputes, the question of its continuance or withdrawal being almost vital to the chaplain's position and future prospects. This power, however, is far short of that which can be claimed by a bishop in a small colony, who has the prestige of his appointment by the Crown, and the position which his rank and education give him, and where, in cases of any

dispute, recourse may be had at once to the courts of the colony, which are guided by well-known principles. In the case of Mr. Long, had some definite charge, such as that of immorality or drunkenness, been substantiated against him, the Court of Appeal would have certainly found in the Bishop's favour: for the terms of his licence made him removeable "for just cause," and the judgment of the Privy Council merely affirmed that in such a case the analogy of English Ecclesiastical Law and procedure would hold good, *i. e.*, that an offence which would in England have been a just cause of removal from office, if investigated in a manner similar to that in which such an offence would be investigated in England, would have justly forfeited the licence. There are then, even where no compact or law exists, the means of the church's existence, and, to a certain extent, of her government.

2. The second phase is that in which the members of the church, or their representatives, agree upon terms of union, and are bound by a compact to one another. This form exists in several colonies, such as South Australia and New Zealand. In those colonies, the "consensual compact" is the bond of a voluntary association of clergy and communicants, who, by their representatives, determine on the by-laws or rules by which their relations are to be governed. There are, indeed, considerable difficulties in the way of such a scheme, for it proposes to bind together a section of those who are already bound together by their membership in the church, and to substitute a voluntary compact for the law by which, even in the Colonies, the members of the church are bound in matters of religion. Hence several difficult questions at once arise. First, Who is to decide on the original basis of this voluntary society? Does it include only communicants? And, if so, by what right do the communicants represent the congregation? Secondly, there will be many besides non-communicants who will prefer not adhering to the compact, and these cannot be disregarded. It is not difficult for a bishop to dictate certain moderate terms for a licence, which a clergyman may willingly accept, when they are distinctly laid down; but it is quite another thing to get a number of men to sign a paper binding themselves to submit to a synod with undefined powers. Thirdly, if, in consequence of this objection, it is optional for each person to remain within the compact only so long as he pleases, the compact is of no use at all; and lastly, who is to enforce the decrees of the governing body of the community? It is always doubtful how far such a document gives any security for the administration of justice, or how far it will bear examination in a Law Court. The Bishop of Adelaide once attempted to prosecute a clergyman. But the refractory clergyman brought an action for defamation of character against those who accused him, and

the Bishop, as the person chiefly implicated, had to pay a sum of £200. Besides this, there will always remain a large body of men who will remain outside the compact: few men would exchange the position of a Government chaplain, or the tenure of property of which they were in the enjoyment before, for the position of those under the compact; and the bishop cannot be the bishop of those alone who have signed it. And the fact of the existence of such an attempt is very likely to lead to dissension, and even to schism. When the Bishop of Adelaide endeavoured to obtain an act of the Colonial Parliament to incorporate the church, it was found that more members of the church petitioned against than for the bill, and the bill was lost on those grounds. But the attempt to obtain the Act showed clearly the difficulties of proceeding by a merely voluntary association, as may be seen in minute detail by any one who reads the evidence given by the Bishop of Adelaide before the Committee of the Legislative Council. Still such a compact may, through the wisdom and moderation of its administrators, in the course of time win the consent of the church so completely as to be very efficient for practical purposes. We doubt however, whether, among the anomalies with which the subject is encompassed, it is fitted to take the place of actual law; and we regard it as a state of transition to one in which the church has the direct sanction of the Legislature.

3. This more advanced phase has been brought about in several of the colonies by a variety of causes,—in the West Indies by the desire of the Imperial Government on the first erection of the bishoprics; in the sees of Tasmania and Melbourne by the activity and wisdom of the bishops themselves; and in Canada, which has arrived at a more advanced point, by the force of public opinion.

It may be asked why the Church of England requires more than other churches the assistance of the Legislature. The answer is, that this necessity results from the fact that the church in the Colonies is a part of the Church of England, which is governed and restrained by statute. The position is that of a body which, as regards its status in the colony, is unconnected with the State; but as regards its union with the Church at home, is subject in some degree to the laws of the State. So long as the church in any colony is merely in a missionary stage, it may be well to leave things to take their own course. But as soon as it acquires any strength for self-government, it needs the assurance which an Act of the Legislature alone can give. Possibly matters might in time adjust themselves without such an Act. By resort to the Courts of Law and appeals to the Privy Council, it would be ascertained what were the limits within which the church might move. But this is a most unsatisfactory means of ascertaining men's rights. A bishop is in a state of great uncertainty,

which either paralyzes his action, or is resolved by his taking action in the dark, and running the risk, with the best intentions, of appearing in an invidious light, overstraining his powers, putting himself to great expense in the maintenance of his authority, and occasionally having that authority rudely shaken under him. It is a just claim, then, which the members of the Church of England prefer, that their rights and the scope of their action should be defined for them by the Colonial Legislature. It may be doubtful whether other religious bodies might not be benefited by obtaining similar acts of incorporation, as the Duke of Newcastle appears from his despatches to have wished. But the Church of England in a colony stands on a different footing from any other community; and it is especially in such exceptional cases that the action of the Legislature may rightly be invoked. In the West India islands the Church of England is established by law. But this is both undesirable and hopeless in the newer colonies, in which the religious communities are evenly balanced. What is wanted there is to obtain in distinct terms,—1st, The power to hold property and receive endowments; 2nd, The power to convoke meetings of the members of the church to pass bye-laws and regulations for the conduct of its affairs; 3rdly, Power to enforce the conditions under which the officers of the community hold their positions; 4thly, To define membership of the church, such as will entitle the members to enjoy the advantages of the association. These powers are not beyond those granted to a corporation formed for any commercial undertaking; and we doubt whether the Legislature of any colony in which the church is agreed and efficiently represented would, except through a misunderstanding, object to a measure of this kind. Where objections have been taken, they have for the most part been caused by some misconception of the objects sought by the church; and let the rulers of the colonial churches be assured, there is nothing which can so much tend to the perpetuation of such misconceptions, or rather to the raising of real objections, as any act which savours of violence or of an attempt at ecclesiastical domination. It should be observed that the rights of the Crown are in these cases (*viz.*, those of Tasmania and Melbourne) expressly reserved; and the unity of the Church is maintained (1) by the necessity of obtaining the sanction of the Colonial Office and Archbishop of Canterbury to the bye-laws; (2) by saving the right of appeal to the Queen in Council.

4. A step has been taken beyond these by the Church of Canada, which has obtained power to elect its own bishops and to create new dioceses, the Crown giving merely a nominal sanction to these proceedings, and recognising the votes of the Synod as its reason for action. This liberty was given by an Act of the Colonial Legislature

in 1856, and was at first questioned by the legal authorities at home. Their doubts were so grave that the matter was referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for their advice; and after a lengthened argument, Her Majesty was advised that the Act in question would not conflict with her prerogative. It is, however, instructive to trace the difference between the conduct of a large church like that of Canada, in which public opinion exists and is a real power, and that of a small church like that of Capetown, which is as yet unfit for independence. The latter sees no difficulties ahead, and has no scruple in asserting its power to alter its regulations to any extent. The former is so impressed with the necessity of the maintenance of unity, that it even sees cause for anxiety in the fact that the Convocations of York and Canterbury differ about a canon. May we not safely infer that, while in large and full-grown colonies, which are all but separate nations, the church of the colony may be rightly placed almost in the position of independence, and deal with the Church at home almost on a footing of equality, there would be the greatest danger in permitting every petty community of a bishop and a few clergy to make the laws by which they and those of their own communion should be governed?

5. There is one stage still more advanced, in which there is an absolute and final separation between the mother Church and its daughter, the only instance of which exists in the great nation of which so many parts were originally English colonies. In the United States there is an example of an absolutely independent church in communion with our own; but it exists, as appears to us to be implied by this condition, in a political society which is absolutely independent of our own. It is well worth while to examine one or two points which distinguish such a community from our colonial churches. In the first place the Episcopal Church of America is really a voluntary association. "A parish," says the Bishop of Oxford (p. 245), "in America, has a widely different meaning from that which it bears with us. It is not a certain district of a diocese committed by its bishop to the spiritual care of a presbyter, who is to regard all within it as his charge;" "it was merely a set of persons who associated themselves together, and agreed to act and worship together in a certain place, and under certain rules, because they preferred the Episcopal form to any other. Thus any corporate existence was the consequence of their own choice and will, not the result of care taken of them; and this principle was present everywhere." In the same way, in describing the American diocese, he says that whereas a diocese, in the language of the Church, has always meant a portion of Christ's flock committed to the charge of a chief pastor, it means in America merely a federal commonwealth of parishes, associated on certain prescribed

conditions with each other and the General Convention. He further notices that the canons give the determination of all questions as to discipline, doctrine, and worship, not to the bishops, but to the majority of votes in the Convention. In short, it may be said generally that the principle adopted is, that the power in the church springs from below, not from above. This the Bishop objects to as too democratic. But it is worth while to consider whether it does not necessarily result from the absolute independence of the church in a Protestant country. We put out of the question the case of the Scottish Episcopal Church, which is but the remnant of an establishment clinging to the skirts of the Church of England. We are speaking of new and growing communities. There is, in such cases, no Pope from whom a kind of Divine authority can come; and it would hardly be a theory universally accepted which should set up the bishops of a certain political division of the globe as a divinely appointed source of authority. Yet unless this be the case, on what other principle can we go than that of depending on the free assent of every member of the church, who must necessarily be taken into consultation on every point? If the power of the Pope, with all its checks and modifications, was a burden upon the laity, the power of a few bishops residing on the spot, and able to interfere by their own discretion at every turn, would prove intolerable. Those, therefore, who desire that the colonial churches should be free must count the cost, and see well what it is that they desire. The end can, in our opinion, be none other than that which exists in America.


Nor do we regard this end as undesirable. We think it no unworthy conception of a church which regards it as a voluntary association, which is self-governed by the influence of the Spirit of God upon its individual members; nor do we think it derogatory to the true idea of the episcopal office that a bishop should be under the restraint of law and agreements in all his acts,—that is, in truth, that he should act in harmony with those over whom he presides. The experiment has been worked out in political government, and we see no argument which applies in the one case which fails in the other. It does not follow that, because we have abolished the Divine right of kings in England as much as in America, we are insincere in praying that we, “knowing whose authority they have,” may humbly obey them as God’s ministers; nor would the same expression ill apply to the Governors or Presidents whom democratic communities set over them. And in the same way we have no reason to doubt that the church will be as truly governed by bishops and an Episcopal system after the American model, as it is where a less restricted discretion is allowed to the highest order of the ministry.

But while we say this, we repeat that the time for this in the

Colonies is not yet come. The Colonies are communities varying in all degrees in their administration, from the uncontrolled exercise of the power of the Crown, to an almost nominal dependence on the mother country, while yet in none of them has the Government of this country entirely resigned its power. Now without holding any theory of the necessary dependence of the Church upon the State, we think the capability of a community to organize its own temporal affairs a good index of the capability of its members to handle the delicate questions of church government. And our best hope for the future is that these two may be allowed to advance together, looking in each case to absolute independence as the goal. We trust that this advance may be made by the church, unhindered on the one hand by repression or distrust on the part of the Colonial or English Governments, and, on the other, not hastened into an unusual precocity by efforts springing from crude theories of the abstract rights of bishops and single branches of the church.

What the ultimate relation may be between the various churches springing from the Anglican stock we do not pretend to speculate. We only venture to hope that, as we trust that in temporal things the new nations will live in amity together, so the new churches may be able to hold communion with one another; and that when they become absolutely independent of each other, they may not so far diverge in doctrine or in modes of worship, as to prevent their reciprocity in good offices and their combination for all good works.

W. H. FREMANTLE.



NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Travels in Egypt and Syria. By S. S. HILL, F.R.G.S., Author of "*Travels in Siberia*," &c., &c. London: Longmans. 1866.

"MANY camels have pressed the sand of the desert, yet their steps are not written thereon," says an Arab proverb. As little impression will the footprints of Mr. S. S. Hill leave behind them on the sands of time. We have faithfully, as in duty bound, read through every one of Mr. Hill's 455 pages, but in vain have we searched for any better reason for his committing himself to print than the statement of his preface—that "the impressions received during these travels have been made upon one who has visited many parts of the earth." We can only hope that his impressions elsewhere received have been better worth recording. Mr. Hill spent some weeks in Cairo, to which he devotes nineteen chapters; ascended the Nile as far as Philæ; crossed the desert by Sinai to Jerusalem, whence he made some excursions; hurried northwards to Nazareth and Tiberias, did not even visit Gennesaret, embarked at Acre for Beyrout, went thence to Damascus, and returned by Baalbec and the cedars. Of this familiar journey the portly volume before us is the tardy result. We say *tardy*, for though Mr. Hill conceals the date of his travels, we must, from internal evidence, place them before the massacres of the Lebanon, or the opening of the mosque of Omar to Europeans in the Crimean war. One Horatian maxim Mr. Hill has obeyed,—

"Nopum prematur in annum
Membranis intus positis."

Would that he had not persistently outraged every other caution of the bard!

His history is incorrect, his topography inexact, his description of manners wide of the mark, his jests not racy, his theology maudlin, and his composition uniformly ungrammatical. His absolute ignorance of the vernacular left him to the last day of his sojourn at the mercy of his dragoman, artful enough to interpret, often with cruel pleasantry, what would please rather than what was said, in the interminable prosings with which the journal is filled.

We had waded through 214 pages when we came at last to an idea. "It has appeared to me that" the chibouk "is like the glass, either full of ideas, and a great incentive to conversation, or more soporific and destructive of the flow of intellectual discourse than opium; but if experiment and observation be in this as in other cases the best test of truth, a party of smokers should offer an opportunity to the meanest comprehension to make such quiet observations as to throw a ray or two of useful light upon what should by no means be an indifferent matter to all men both of the civilized and demicivilized world"! Of Mr. Hill's "impressions" we may instance the following of a sheikh:—"Upon his countenance there was great benignity apparent, which we thought indicated his sense of the superiority of the British customs"!—(P. 376.) I could not avoid feeling that the *gloom* of this plain (Damascus) had much aided the conversion of one of the cruel persecutors of the Christians to one of the most active of the immediate followers of the Saviour."—(P. 403.) We had elsewhere read a truer description:—

"The mid-day sun, with fiercest glare,
Broods o'er the hazy, twinkling air."

His historical facts are occasionally startling. At p. 453 he informs us that he examined, at the Nahr el Kelb, "the imperishable monuments of the victories of . . . Cambyses"! At p. 183 he tells us the temples at Denderah are said to be the most ancient remains in Egypt, and partly built by Cleopatra! We read at p. 138 that the Christians "are indebted to the late Sultan, Ali Pasha!! for exemption for military service." Burekhardt was the prince of Oriental explorers, but it was left to Mr. Hill to inform us that Sheikh Ibrahim had visited the Haram at Hebron. The good friars of Mount Carmel will be surprised to learn that their "convent is in the possession of the Greek Church"!—(P. 362.) Nor will the Greeks be more flattered by the circumstantial description of an "exhibition of the Greek Church in the image of the Virgin" in the Carmelite Chapel, or by the statement that the French have supplied the paintings at Mount Sinai.

Does the author expect those who know the East to believe that in one place near Cairo one thousand infants are annually slaughtered to obtain three hundred guardians for the wives of Mussulmans?—that the trade in female slaves is as open and extensive as he represents it?—that one of his muleteers at Jerusalem (a Mussulman) offered to sell him "his young and beautiful wife" for twenty shillings, as a testimony of his regard! (p. 334)—that there is but one dwelling in Samaritan Nablous "better than a mud hovel"? (p. 339)—that there are but few Christians at Bethlehem? (p. 323)—that its inhabitants are savages? (p. 320)—and that not a woman of *any age* is to be seen there! This extraordinary blunder is the more unaccountable, as Mr. Hill never omits an opportunity of dilating, with wearisome repetition, on every woman, veiled or unveiled, whom he met, and too often rudely stared out of countenance (p. 394), during his travels.

Mr. Hill's observations in natural history are sometimes amusing. He saw "an animal of the form of a lizard, but furred."—(P. 222.) He fed his horse on *oats* in Syria—found the neighbourhood of the Dead Sea and the Mount of Olives to be largely composed of granite!—tells us that bakers' ovens are heated "with the excrement of the camels and some other *irrational* (!) animals."—(P. 111.) And after laying down the axiom, "that any creature existing can see in the dark, there can be no doubt is impossible," he triumphantly adds, "nevertheless in this chamber, into which no light can penetrate, bats dwell; and I wish to ask the student in physics how the

bats, confined to chambers where light never enters, live, and what is their food."!!—(P. 78.)

Mr. Hill combines his theology "with the moral principle of humanity," whatever that may be; speaks of Him "through whom all hope for forgiveness of their errors, or the recompence of their faith and their good works," but never omits to express a patronizing contempt for oriental Christianity; sends us to the well-side to "learn the principles of true religion, which must be in accordance with the natural feelings which spring from an uncorrupted heart."—(P. 319.)

Of the style in which these dreary platitudes are involved we will only give an example or two taken at random. "The Isle of Elephantine . . . is now half overgrown with the sycamore; . . . as if it were armed by Nature against the visible effects of the tyranny and superstition which has almost reduced this productive country to a wilderness, and buried its ancient inhabitants, so justly entitled to our remembrance, under the ruins of the noble monuments, even now seen with so much interest."—(P. 194.) Again, describing a lady sketching, we have the following:—"While the lady was engaged with her work, which became the *exact representation of what it presented*, I took the opportunity of a lone walk *over* the slopes and declivities of the surrounding hills."—(P. 351.) We scarcely need to add, that the wildest dragoman renderings suffice for the names of places. El Gedion for Engedi, Dier el Gammaw for Deir el Kanar, Daccarheer for Dhoheriyeh; and in less recondite English orthography, "species" for "specimen," "suit" for "suite," and (can it be the correction of a cockney compositor?) "hollyander" for "oleander"!—(P. 452.)

But we have already spent too much time and space over this most worthless of books, the author of which appears to have dragged at each remove a lengthened chain, not of new ideas, but of ignorance and misconceptions.

On Missions to the Zulus in Natal, and Zululand. By the Right Rev. J. W. COLENSO, D.D., Bishop of Natal. A Lecture delivered at the Marylebone Literary Institution, May, 1865. Published in the *Social Science Review*, 1st June, 1865. Pp. 481—510.

A BISHOP who, for many of the best years of his life, has devoted ability of no common order to work in a distant colony is entitled to be heard with respect and attention when he speaks on the subject of missions. The lecture before us is the result of Bishop Colenso's undertaking to give to the members of the Marylebone Literary and Scientific Institution some account of his work in South Africa, and to show them what good can be expected from missions among savage tribes, and what reasonable ground exists for engaging in labour of that kind.

Beginning with the last part of his theme, the Bishop reminds his readers of the fact—for which he deserves, we think, more credit than he has received in certain quarters—that he took what may be called the Christian side when the question was debated at the Antropological Society, whether savage tribes are capable of receiving European civilization and Christianity—whether they can get any practical good from the instruction of missionaries. He answers this question, and states reasons in favour of engaging in missionary work. The passage is long, but we should injure its force and beauty by abridging it.

"Wherever we meet with the power of speech, with reason and conscience, with tender human affections, we must confess that the owner of such gifts is 'a man and a brother,'—that he has a claim upon us as a member of the great human family,—for in his heart is beating, even now, however faintly, the Life which, we are told, is 'the Light of men,' and 'lighteth every man that cometh into the world.' We are bound to teach him, as God shall give us opportunity for so doing, what we ourselves have learned,—not only what we have been enabled to acquire by our own exertions and industry, but what we have *inherited*, and received through the hands of others, from the Father of all, the Father of lights, 'the giver of every good and perfect gift.' Most of all are we bound to impart that highest knowledge,—that knowledge of God Himself,—in which consists the life eternal—with which we ourselves have been so abundantly blessed,—which has helped to comfort us in sorrow, to strengthen us for duty, to ennoble and glorify our commonest daily doings, to sustain and calm our souls in the presence of death.

"Surely our fellow-man shows sufficiently his right to receive all this at our hands, by showing himself to be capable of it. And it seems to be in the order of Providence that the Briton, more than any other, should go out into other lands from his own beautiful but crowded island home, and take possession of different regions of the earth, where he will be brought at once into connection with races on a lower level of civilization. There, we know, the lower race will be exposed to peculiar dangers, by reason of this very contact; in their transition state they will acquire new vices, become the victims of new diseases, and perhaps pine away and perish before the face of the white man. I doubt very much if this last is an absolutely necessary law of nature, as some seem to suppose. I doubt if the Hindoos will ever be clean swept from their native plains, or the Chinese from their vast territory, or the Malay races from the Eastern Archipelago, or the Kafir and other swarthy tribes from the Central and Southern parts of Africa, where no Europeans can long survive. But, admitting that they even may perish, can it be doubtful whether, *while they yet live*, the more highly privileged people, brought into contact with them, should strive to impart the *blessings*, as they assuredly *will* impart the *evils* of civilization,—should give them instruction, according to their powers of receiving it, in those arts and sciences to which they themselves have attained,—should teach them also those eternal truths of religion and morality which have been already revealed to them,—in one word, should care for the soul as well as for the body—for the spiritual as well as the intellectual development of their younger brother in the Divine family?"

Cogent as this reasoning is, it yet seems calculated to silence rather than to convince; it savours rather of the afterthought of one who is committed to missionary work than of the motives which impel a man to forsake all else and follow Christ in His work. It is not untrue; but as a statement of those feelings and arguments which send forth in every age labourers into the great field of missions, it is very inadequate. The heathen has a claim for something more than human sympathy, civilization, and enlightenment at the hands of a Christian missionary. The greatest Christian missionary regarded his office as the means of supplying other and deeper wants, when he described it as a ministry of reconciliation (see 2 Cor. v. 19, &c.). Only on the supposition that Bishop Colenso's hearers, though addressed as intelligent, inquiring, highly civilized, religious, Christian men, were not qualified to enter on such ground, can he be excused for omitting entirely the most obvious of all reasons for engaging in missionary labour—the direct command of the Redeemer, and the frequent intimations of His desire that His Gospel should be preached to every creature. A deficiency of the same kind is to be noticed in his descriptions of the subjects of missionary teaching. The great fact of the Resurrection of Christ, which was always prominent in the missionary addresses of the Apostles, is nowhere mentioned by Bishop Colenso when he specifies the things which a missionary is bound to teach. In another book, which is not now before us, Bishop Colenso has drawn very large inferences from the frequency or infrequency with which certain sacred names occur in portions of Holy Writ. Without intending to press equally large conclusions from a fact of the same nature, we cannot but regard it as worthy of note that the name of Jesus does not occur in the whole of this missionary lecture, except in quotations from a Zulu catechist.

Many other statements in this address are remarkable for what we would rather call their inadequacy than their incorrectness ; and we refer to them as indicating a habit which we take to be characteristic of Bishop Colenso—a habit of looking earnestly at one half of the truth, and shutting his eyes to the other half, or at least saying nothing about it. Thus the Bishop's view of his own office is, that he “is commissioned by the Queen of England, in the name of our National Church, to be a preacher and a teacher to the heathen, as well as to others, of God's eternal truth and love.” Now, without pretending to accurate knowledge of the terms in which a bishop's patent is written, we very much doubt whether that only commission which Bishop Colenso has received from the Queen contains any such authorization as he states. We do not wish to fasten on him that objectionable tenet of Hobbes by which the authority of the Church is resolved into the authority of the Commonwealth : but surely it must be known to Bishop Colenso, that the commission to teach and preach is given to every minister of the Church of England by the bishop who ordained him in the name of Christ.

If in some of his statements Bishop Colenso errs in the way of deficiency, he cannot in others be acquitted of the opposite fault of exaggeration. How painfully contrasted are the terms in which he magnifies the authority of the deductions of scientific observers, and those in which he depreciates—almost annihilates—the authority of the statements of Scripture ! Thus the *former* are described as God's own revelations of truth, the revelations of modern science, certain results, facts which we ourselves know ; while the *latter* are not infallible, impossible, stories which cannot be taught as credible. We look in vain for a few respectful words as to the authority of Holy Writ, for a few modest words as to the often proved fallibility of human reasoning. The confident language in which absolute certainty is claimed for his own opinions, the triumphant tone in which he anticipates the authoritative promulgation of those opinions on his arrival in Natal, are characteristic of the same habit of mind. Did it not occur to the Bishop that such a tone is not at all in harmony with the shrewd advice which he quotes from a Zulu catechist, “of the necessity of a missionary sent to a people like the Zulus, not beginning at once to speak with violence to them, and lay down the law with a loud voice, saying, I will speak out,” &c. ?

The first subject announced in the beginning of this lecture—the actual result of the Bishop's missionary work among the Zulus—is touched upon only in five or six pages near the end. It is but just to the Bishop to say that we do not look on this as intended to be a complete statement of the results of seven years' labour ; but such as it is we place it before our readers. He appeals first to the establishment of a school of Zulu boys, whom he had under instruction for five years, at the end of which they returned to their homes, and, it is taken for granted, “fell back speedily into the habits of the kraal.” The Bishop, however, is confident that his “work would still abide in some of them ;” and in proof of it he mentions that one has returned to work as a printer, and has corresponded with him in England. He appeals also to extracts from letters and sermons of native catechists employed by him : and he concludes this part by saying to his hearers, “You have seen the methodical business-like way in which my native printer is pursuing his work, and you have heard the tone of my catechists.” Here, too, we must note a deficiency in the Bishop's way of measuring the effect which is to be expected from missionary work. The way of stating results in the earliest records of such work, which also is still followed, we

believe, in many missionary reports, is of this kind,—“so many persons received the Word; so many persons were baptized” (Acts ii. 41, &c.). It is of course possible that all the youths and all the catechists whom Bishop Colenso mentions did receive the Word, and were baptized by him; but we cannot help observing that he does not state this fact with regard to any one of them. If they were thus converted by his instrumentality to Christianity, then it may be that this omission, like other deficiencies which we have noted, is only a mark of the Bishop's skill in adapting his arguments and statements to his hearers: or in so hasty and discursive a composition as this lecture, he may have left out many things inadvertently. We would not treat such deficiencies as sufficient evidence that the writer does not fully accept the Christian Creeds. But they are sufficient to raise a doubt, which the future will solve, not merely as to his adhesion to traditional interpretations of Scripture, nor merely as to the value of the results of his missionary work, nor merely as to his acquaintance with the motives of a true Christian missionary, but also as to his loyalty to the fundamental articles of the Christian faith, and to the Word of God by which that faith cometh to men.

A History of the Commonwealth of Florence. By T. A. TROLLOPE. Vols. iii. and iv. London: Chapman and Hall. 1865.

THE appearance of these volumes could not have been better timed. There scarcely ever was a stranger reacting of the past than when, last November, an Italian Parliament met in the Cinque-Cento Hall of the Palazzo Pubblico at Florence,—that same hall which had been built for a parliament, when parliaments were scarce, three hundred and seventy years ago. There, encircled by tyrannies—with a Sforza at Milan, a Borgia in Rome, with French and Spanish armies marching and remarching on the frontier,—a free popular council deliberated and governed: at a time when, of all Spain, only seventeen or eighteen cities sent delegates to the Cortes, when the Parliament of France was little more than a conclave of lawyers, when the Council of Venice had been closed for two hundred years against free elections, Florence possessed something of a genuine parliament. It certainly was not representative in our sense of that word, for the citizens did not elect to it; they themselves composed it; all of a certain age and social status could claim a seat there. This monster council could meet only by relays; but a third of its members were in power at once. Still it was the people in permanent session, and not, as before, the people merely called now and then to assemble in the open piazza to listen to some bare statement of the Signory, and confirm it by a stereotyped assent. It was a rude attempt towards great things: perhaps it was premature; certainly it was short-lived; but its existence is the centre fact of a period of history teeming with importance. None of those who saw the deputies from all Italy taking their places the other day in the Palazzo Pubblico, who saw the old hall brought again to its old use, and listened to a Capponi and a Ricasoli taking the oaths, but must have had one thought in his mind, one name on his lips—the thought of the Great Council in 1495, the name of him who devised and toughly carried it out step by step; and he no highborn statesman, no merchant of the city, no native Florentine at all; a naturalized Ferraresé, a mendicant monk, but the greatest mind, the truest gentleman of the whole century—Girolamo Savonarola. It was the first time that a constitution was ever built up by sermons; the only time, perhaps, that an ecclesiastic set on foot a really popular reform.

This is the part of his book in which Mr. Trollope is, we think, most successful. The account of the four stirring years, from the flight of Pietro de' Medici to the execution of Savonarola, is written with vigour and taste; there are scenes in it which well suit the powers of a writer hitherto known to us chiefly as a novelist; and here, too, he had the guidance of one of the best of modern Italian biographers, Professor Villari. Of course, the question of Savonarola's prophetic claims comes in for examination,—it is old as the matter of Socrates' *daíμων* or Joan of Arc's visions; but we cannot think Mr. Trollope has set about it as a fair critic should; he has strayed away from his point into flippancy often, sometimes into irreverence. Surely, if we understand it aright, there is no call for such a sentence as this: "Will it be sufficient to attribute his vacillations and contradictions to that obscuration of intellect produced by the too close contact of the mind with the monster-peopled cloud-world of supernaturalism, which, unceasingly protested against as it is by the everlasting fundamental laws of our nature, has dimmed and distorted so many an intelligence as bright and powerful as his?" (iv. 191). We wonder that Mr. Trollope, abundantly alluding as he does in his footnotes to his own historical works, takes no notice of a labourer in the same field who has done as much as himself to draw attention to these times. If the book be a novel, he certainly should have no cause therefore to slight it; and few histories yet written show, we think, more real historical insight than "*Romola*." There is a sentence there which is a volume in itself towards elucidating the character of Savonarola:—"It is not force of intellect which causes ready repulsion from the aberrations and eccentricities of greatness, any more than it is force of vision that causes the eye to explore the warts on a face bright with human expression; it is simply the negation of high sensibilities."

The years of the friar's power in Florence are certainly the most important of the hundred years over which Mr. Trollope's history extends; they form an oasis in the dreary record of how, one after another, the safeguards of the State fell before the encroachments of one merchant family. Time was when it was the habit to look at the Medici exclusively from a literary and artistic point of view. Roscoe threw a halo round the name; others followed who described all the scholars of that day, and could find no parallel for the brilliant gatherings at Careggi without going back to the Porch and Grove at Athens. Mr. Hallam is quite as enthusiastic in his description of that society, but still there is with him an undertone of doubt whether another view might not be taken of all this refinement. When he speaks of Lorenzo de' Medici looking down from Fiesole on all the glories of the city beneath him, "his eye might turn," he says, "to the trophies of a republican Government that was rapidly giving way before the citizen-prince who now surveyed them." This is the "*amari aliquid*" to the real lover of Italy. The price Florence paid for all the brilliancy of Lorenzo's Court was nothing less than her liberty. We know it now better than it was known when Mr. Hallam's "*Literature of Europe*" appeared: the late changes in Tuscany have cleared the matter up. Documents jealously guarded in times of despotism are now brought to the light of day: among many family records so disinterred are memoirs and treatises by Guicciardini. Few students, as they read the old historian's somewhat prosy volumes, ever thought that, by the side of what was to go forth to the world so correct and staid, he was jotting down more familiar, more lively, and certainly more trustworthy accounts, destined to be published in the first years of his city's recovered freedom. Of these remains, perhaps the most interesting is the dialogue on the Government of Florence. "Its object,"

says Guicciardini, "is to give a sincere and faithful narrative of what was in times past discoursed by our wisest and most influential citizens: these discourses I have thought good to preserve in writing, as they were related to me by my father." It is cast just like one of Cicero's dialogues: we have the gossip of the Loggie or the graver arguments in the Council put into the mouths of the different party leaders of the day. We owe much to Mr. Trollope for bringing these fruits of Italian research within reach of English readers. Many new lights are thrown on the old scene and actors: much of what passed before for Medicean magnificence is seen now to have been but stage finery put on to act a part in; the learning is a patter of fashionable Platonism seeking to drown all cries for true freedom; the patronage a way of buying so many applauding hands and mouths.

Without going into detail, we may notice one or two points in which we think Mr. Trollope has rightly understood the spirit of the age he writes of. One is his view of so-called Italian patriotism: there really was no such thing known then, in Florence less than in any place in Italy.

"There was a congenital vice, the presence of which can be noted in the earliest developments of the Florentine political system, that selfishness which could never learn that liberty is an impossible condition for any community save one of which the members love freedom for others as well as for themselves."—(iii. 108.)

The principle, too, which he lays down for the right reading of the old Italian chroniclers is valuable; we are at the outset shocked with what seems to be the laxity of their judgments: they record the vilest acts without a hint of displeasure. The truth is not that this springs from any moral obtuseness; it is the result of the—

"peculiarly objective tendency of the Italian mind, which led her statesmen and historians to examine what was, rather than what ought to be, and to consider what was the best, wisest, and most prudent arrangement of human affairs, on the hypothesis that mankind are moved by such and such passions, rather than to discuss the degree of moral blame due to those who are so moved, or to speculate on the possibility of eliminating the action of the passions in question."—(iii. 440.)

In this view, we agree with Mr. Trollope, lies all the mystery or no mystery of Machiavelli's much-canvassed "*Principe*."

Before taking leave of this history, we must throw in one word of question as to the taste of the style in which it is written. While always lively and interesting, it is occasionally shamefully lacking in dignity. Surely Mr. Trollope should amend such passages as the following, before he asks us to accept him as a grave historian:—"We rather think our young Lorenzo can walk ahead of any prince in Italy in the matter of splendid hospitality" (iii. 279): "The whole pith of the constitution was thimble-rigged away" (iii. 145). "Pietro, seeing that the game was up" (iv. 55). And why not give us shorter and better known words than "repristination," "rivalize with," "exacerbated"?

The Economic Position of the British Labourer. By HENRY FAWCETT, M.P., Professor of Political Economy in the University of Cambridge. London and Cambridge: Macmillan & Co.

THIS volume consists of lectures delivered before the University of Cambridge. The subject is well adapted to the audience; it is treated with spirit and clearness, and with greater impartiality than might have been expected from one who is chiefly known to the public as the advocate of the rights of the working man. The main object of the Lectures is to recom-

mend the principle of co-operation. The Professor begins by pointing out the defects of our present system of labour. These are, the gigantic extension of pauperism, the degraded condition of the agricultural labourer, the absence of all motive for industry and saving, the want of a common interest between employer and employed, the consequent ineffectiveness of labour, and the danger of losing our best workmen as the advantages of emigration become more generally understood. He points out that the position of the labourer cannot be permanently improved by any liberality on the part of the employer, or by increased cost to the consumer; and argues, with great force, that the best remedy lies in co-operation, either in its perfect form, as where a number of operatives combine to purchase a cotton mill, or in its imperfect stage of copartnership, where the capitalist admits his workmen to a share of the profits. He hopes to see the same principle applied in agriculture by the instrumentality of companies of peasant proprietors, and complains of the right of entail and other legal difficulties which now restrict the sale of land. That such associations are possible, he proves by the example of several which are now in successful operation both in France and England. At the same time, he allows that our labouring classes must reach a higher moral and social standard than they have yet attained, before we can hope to see the system widely introduced amongst ourselves; and in order to prepare them for this result, he advocates compulsory education for the poor. In the course of the work Professor Fawcett gives some excellent remarks upon strikes, and the conditions under which they are advisable. He ends with a chapter on emigration and immigration, in which we meet with the somewhat startling suggestion that we may live to see swarms of Chinese pouring into England to replace the native British labourer, who will have disappeared to seek his fortune in the colonies.

We are glad to find that the author has viewed these questions, for the most part, as a statesman and a moralist, and not merely as an economist. We are sure that the reason why the conclusions of political economy have been looked upon with suspicion by practical men generally, and resented as a mockery by the working man, is the perhaps unconscious conviction that one aspect of a great question had been magnified, to the neglect of other aspects no less important. As an instance of the abandonment of the old economical traditions, we may refer to the remarks on population. The "gloomy speculations" of the old political economists are said to have arisen from their not foreseeing the great results of free trade and emigration. Our danger is not now from over-population but from under-population; and as for the limitation on food, "the valley of the Mississippi would provide corn for the world."

The portion of the work which we consider least satisfactory is that on the tenure of land. We might almost conjecture that it was written rather with a view to the Brighton hustings than to the Cambridge schools. Thus we are told that the "custom of primogeniture is wicked and mischievous;" "every feeling of our nature is against selecting one of a family for special favour;" "in a free and enlightened country no body of men will be permitted to exercise legislative power simply because they have inherited rank and wealth." And all this is said without a hint that there is anything on the opposite side, though so distinguished a writer as Montalembert attributes England's greatness mainly to the two effects of this practice, viz., the existence of a great territorial aristocracy, and the absorption of the younger branches of noble families in the mass of the people. Besides the feeling above expressed, the author adduces the following arguments against primogeniture. It is for the interest of the community that land should be culti-

vated with the utmost efficiency. Primogeniture deters the landowner from doing this, because by improving his land he would only enrich the eldest son, who is already favoured beyond the rest. For the same reason he will not venture to employ his capital in any way which is not immediately productive. Lastly, a great landowner does not cultivate his own land, and land is not cultivated effectively except by the owner.

There is not a single step in this argument which is not capable of disproof. First, as Professor Fawcett shows in this very book, when speaking of the enclosing of Epping Forest, it is not always for the interest of the community that land should be cultivated with the utmost efficiency. Secondly, the owner of an entailed estate need not benefit the eldest son exclusively by improving the estate, for the other children are usually provided for by a charge on the estate. Third, as a matter of fact, great works, which are only prospectively remunerative, have in past times been undertaken chiefly by great landowners. Fourth, there is no farming superior to that of Scotland and Norfolk, which is almost entirely in the hands of tenant-farmers.

Professor Fawcett appears to us equally rash in his remarks about tenant right and the condition of the agricultural labourer. He seems to think it nefarious that the rent should be raised in consequence of improvements effected by the tenant. We may fairly ask why the tenant-farmer is to be privileged in this respect beyond other classes. All that he has a right to claim is to have his capital returned with interest. In the same way we may ask, Why is the owner of property in the country to be precluded from taking advantage of the rise in the value of his land any more than the owner of property in London? Yet, in the latter case, no one thinks it unfair that the rent should be raised when the building lease has run out.

Professor Fawcett claims to speak from personal knowledge of the agricultural labourer; but we think few of the clergy, and these are really our best authorities on the subject, would allow his description. "As a general rule," he says, "he can neither read nor write;" "no hope cheers his monotonous career;" "his strength is prematurely exhausted from bad living." Of course, all are agreed that the labourer is, as a rule, badly housed and underpaid; but that is far from justifying the contrast attempted to be drawn between him and the mechanic in such passages as the preceding. Far from premature exhaustion, the agricultural labourer, if he has been a sober man, preserves his health and strength to a greater age than any other class of working men. As to the hopelessness of his life, we cannot agree with Professor Fawcett that the only object of hope is the purchase of land. As long as he may hope for a cottage of his own—hope to be married—hope that his children may do well at school—that one may be a pupil-teacher, another a colonist—that one may succeed in trade, and another in service,—we refuse to consider the labourer destitute of hope, even though he should have to apply to the parish for relief in his old age. We can see no reason why such an application should be considered more degrading to him than the application for a pension in a higher class. Whether it be so or not, the labourer often ends his days without parish relief, being supported either by his own past savings, or by the contributions of his children. Upon the subject of education, we will only say that Professor Fawcett seems to have heard nothing of adult schools, which are now doing so much to civilize the agricultural poor.

Our space will not permit us to dwell upon other points which might provoke criticism. We would, however, remind Professor Fawcett that the

views of Mr. J. S. Mill, with respect to division of property and peasant proprietors, are far from being universally accepted amongst French authorities. About, in his late work, "*Le Progrès*," expresses a very strong opinion against both, and his condemnation is confirmed by that of Lavergne, than whom no one is more competent to form a judgment of the agricultural condition of the different countries of Europe.

In conclusion, we would take the liberty of recommending a few alterations in the next edition of this work. In p. 149, we are told that "machinery is now so perfect that we can hardly anticipate a cheapening in the processes of manufacturing,"—a remark which appears to us about as philosophical as the famous assertion that the subjects for epic poems are now all used up. P. 203 we read that "no tongue can adequately express the sufferings which our poor endured at the time when Malthus wrote." There should be some moderation even in describing the ill effects of the Tory régime. In pp. 148-50, speaking of the probable advance in the price of meat and of raw material, the author appears to have overlooked the efforts that are being now made to bring over fresh meat from abroad, and the constantly increasing rapidity of communication, which tends to equalize the value of commodities at home and in the colonies. There is a more important omission in his inquiry into the future prospects of labour in England. Before introducing his Chinese, he should at least have made the most of our unemployed native labour. We should have been glad to hear his opinion as to the possibility of giving greater efficiency to the work of our soldiers, our prisoners, and our women.

We had noticed several instances of inconsistency or of awkwardness of expression in our perusal of the work ; but will only mention the following as undoubted *errata*:—P. 68, for *epidemic*, read *endemic* ; p. 103, for *Arsenne Hauussage*, read *Arsine Hoursage* ; p. 209, for *married men*, read *monied men*.

1. *A Literal Translation of the Old Testament, on definite Rules of Translation, from the Text of the Vatican Manuscript.* By HERMAN HEINFETTER.
2. *An English Version of the Old Testament, from the Text of the Vatican Manuscript.* By the Same.
3. *A Collation of an English Version, &c., with the Authorized English Version.* By the Same.
4. *Corrections of the Copies of the Septuagint Portion of the Vatican Manuscript.* By the Same.

THESE books, appropriately issued on the 1st of April, 1865, are well calculated to send upon a fool's errand the reader who seeks from their pages his first information respecting their subject. Each of them is but an instalment of a great work ; for, though the title-page in each case implies the whole of the Old Testament, it is only the Book of Genesis which is actually before us. Now if Mr. Heinfetter had read Holmes's "*Prefatio ad Genesin*," or Mai's "*Prolegomena*" to his edition of the Vatican MS., or the note in the text of that edition, which must have met his eye in the course of his collation, but could not have entered his mind, he would have learnt that the Vatican Manuscript, of which he speaks so highly, is deficient up to the word *πάλιν* in Gen. xlv. 29, and would then have hardly given the high honour of Codex B, in one case to two MSS.

now somewhat hard to identify, and in the other to two cursives (Holmes 55 and 58), whose only claim to the distinction lies in this, that they, like it, reside in the Vatican.

Those of our readers who have seen any of Mr. Heinfetter's previous works will know what to expect in his "Literal Translation of the Old Testament." It is indeed a literal translation—so literal as readily to suggest the words, and even in many cases the order of the original,—but one made upon principles which set at defiance the laws of Greek grammar and the usages of Greek idiom. It is needless to give examples of these, or of English phrases utterly unintelligible except by recurring to the Greek; such cases occur on almost every page. It is really a pity that Mr. Heinfetter, whose diligence and sincerity are above question, should waste his own time and money, and the patience of his readers, by translations such as that before us.

In his version, which is apparently made from Mai's text, to the neglect of Carafa's readings, though, in the translation, Mr. Heinfetter seems to regard the two as of equal authority, he has avoided both the affectation of extreme literality and the use of language contrary to the English idiom; but these improvements are balanced here and there by the introduction of paraphrases and explanations which wander widely from the true sense of the original. Who, for instance, would recognise in "Divine energy * was displayed" a proper rendering of *πνεῦμα θεοῦ ἐπεφέρετο*? (Gen. i. 2). The use of italics to denote, as in the Authorized Version, words which have nothing corresponding to them in the original is common in Mr. Heinfetter's version; but we think that the just limits of such use are far exceeded when, for "Let us make man" (Gen. i. 26), he gives "We, *that is, I and My agent man*, should have made man's race."† Such blemishes will be found to render the "Translation" and "Version" absolutely useless to the general reader, for whom we must suppose them to be intended. A recollection of Mr. Heinfetter's peculiarities, and a determination to take all that he gives "*cum grano salis*," may enable the reader to turn his "Collation" to some account, as indicating the more important differences which exist between the Hebrew text and that of the LXX., as supposed to be represented in the Codex Vaticanus.

But after all, are not such translations and versions of the current text of the Septuagint and collations thereof with the Hebrew or with the authorized English version, but little better than waste of time at the present moment? Ought not scholars who are interested in this department of Sacred Literature to set themselves to work to discover, as far as may be, what is the true text of this venerable Greek Version of the Old Testament, by applying to it the same critical labour as has been bestowed by whole generations of learned men on the books of the New? Something has indeed been done in this way. The volumes of Holmes and Parsons are a standing monument of liberality, industry, and perseverance, but unfortunately the statements contained in them cannot be relied on for accuracy, though the errors are probably neither very great nor very important. Tischendorf, too, has published an edition of the LXX., which is very usefully furnished with various readings from three important MSS. The publication of the Codex

* In the "Literal Translation" the passage is rendered, "A spirit from God was moving;" and the paraphrase above quoted is added as an explanation, a note setting forth that, according to Mr. Heinfetter's grammatical principles, the rendering cannot be "*of God*," or the article must be expressed before *God*."

† In the note on this verse in the "Translation" it is argued that the creation of the first man by God, and the co-operation of man in the propagation of his species, are implied in the different numbers of the verbs in verses 27, 26, respectively.

Sinaiticus and of other MSS. by the same scholar, and of "B," by Cardinal Mai, only need to be mentioned, though the errors which have been detected in the New Testament portion of the Cardinal's work must make one cautious in receiving his statements respecting the Old. The most recent addition to our apparatus criticus is found in the third volume of "*Monumenta Sacra et Profana*," now in course of publication at Milan, which contains a reprint of a portion of the Ambrosian MS. (Holmes VII.). But these latter publications are so extravagantly dear as to be quite beyond the reach of most students. Mr. Heinfetter has therefore done well in proposing to set forth the results of a collation of Mai's text with that of the old Vatican edition. His execution of the work is not, however, on a level with the importance of that which he has undertaken. We need not stay to characterise his theory, assumed, but not openly stated (Corrections, &c., Preface, p. iv.), that where the texts of Carafa and Mai agree, we have the true reading of the Codex; but his method of regarding Mai's text will surprise most scholars who have had to deal with diplomatic evidence. He says, "All that he states to be the reading of the 2 M., or to be that which is added to the 1 M., either in its text or margin, I consider to be the true representation of the Vatican Codex; unless, in relation to either of these alterations, Cardinal Mai states that they were made by a more recent hand than the original writer of the Codex: all alterations made by a recent hand I consider to be of no value. When a reading stands in the margin, as another reading of that which is in the text, I consider the marginal reading to be the correct reading." Surely what we want is an exact statement of the phenomena which the MS. presents—the words which were written by the original scribe, whether in the text or in the margin, no less than the alterations, whether by omission, addition, or otherwise, made by the corrector, whom Mr. Heinfetter must suppose to have been a contemporary of the original writer, though the difference in age between the two is clearly marked by the different appearance of the ink used by them respectively. This false principle of Mr. Heinfetter's has caused him to neglect in Gen. xlv. 29, for the more usual *πιοι*, the reading *πλειονι* (1 M.), which may be illustrated by similar variations in Psa. lxxvii. 31; Isa. xvii. 4; in both of which places Cod. B. inserts the λ. It is but fair to state that so far as his conception of its requirements permitted, Mr. Heinfetter's task has been performed with considerable accuracy. In the four chapters and six verses which alone are worthy of examination, he has indeed omitted one curious reading, *ἐπλήρωσεν αὐτοὺς for ἐπλήρωσαν αὐτοῦ* (Gen. i. 3), which is mentioned in Tischendorf's Prolegomena, p. xciv.; but on the other hand he has noticed two readings which had escaped the observation of that experienced collator, *αἰγυπτίων for αἰγυπτίως*, Gen. xlv. 34, and the omission of *ἡμῶν* after *κυρίου* (xlvii. 18); and has been at the pains to note what is a very obvious misprint in Carafa, *τῆς for τοῖς* (l. 24).

Unfortunately, we cannot speak more favourably of the acquaintance which Mr. Heinfetter exhibits with the literature of the subject on which he professes to inform us, than of his critical and grammatical principles. We can hardly suppose that any one who took even the slightest interest in the criticism of the Septuagint should have failed to make himself familiar with a work to which we have already referred, the edition of the Greek Scriptures of the Old Testament by Holmes and Parsons.

Those volumes contain notes of a collation* of the Vatican Manuscript as far as the Book of Job (including, according to the usual MS. arrangement,

* Holmes's "Various Readings" also contain occasional notes of corrections made by the Vatican editors with pen and ink.

which is followed in the original Roman edition, the apocryphal Books of Esdras I., Tobit, and Judith). This collation does not appear to have been very carefully made, but it gives some readings which are not noticed by Mai, *e. g.*, Gen. 4. 16, λέγοντες for εἶπαν, which can hardly be looked upon as erroneous insertions of the collator. And at all events, it should not have been neglected, seeing how little trustworthy information we have respecting the readings of this venerable manuscript. That Mai cannot be depended on is clear from the many corrections of his statements respecting readings in the New Testament which have been made in the second Roman edition by Vercellone, and also after special examination of the Codex by the Dean of Canterbury, Mr. Cure, and others. And this impression is confirmed by a collation of the Book of Daniel, κατὰ Θεοδοτίωνα, given in the edition of that Book according to the Codex Chigianus, and extracted thence by Holmes, who thought he had reason to believe that it represents the readings of the Codex Vaticanus *par excellence*, though its original editor does not state to what MS. in the Vatican Library he refers. The belief which Holmes expresses is confirmed by some remarkable instances of agreement between Mai's readings and those furnished by the editor of the Codex Chigianus: *e. g.*, Dan. ii. 12, Mai's note after *οργῇ* states, "superponitur πολλῇ," while the older collator says, "πολλῇ suprascript, post *οργῇ*." But with this occasional and remarkable agreement, there are also many readings noticed by the old collator which find no record whatever in Mai. It cannot be too much regretted that the endeavours which have from time to time been made to obtain a really accurate representation of this great manuscript should be defeated by the conduct of the authorities at the Vatican. But so it has proved more than once. Dr. Holmes found his collation stopped by the actual removal of the Codex from its place in the library, and was for a long time unable to learn anything respecting it. The publication of the editions of Mai and Vercellone seemed indeed to indicate a reversal of the ancient policy; but if so, it was only for a time, for in 1864 Dean Alford found that "difficulties" were "thrown in the way of" his "consulting it;"* and Mr. Heinfeffer tells us (Preface to "Corrections," &c., p. iv.) that his "several endeavours to obtain a collation, or a third printed copy, of the Septuagint portion of the Vatican manuscript, have all failed, although" he "undertook to provide the labour, and to discharge the expenses attending on it." Let us hope that wiser and more liberal counsels will before long prevail, and that we may be able to ascertain the readings of this precious document without having recourse to the conjectural and utterly unsafe method which Mr. Heinfeffer has adopted.

Religion in Daily Life. By the Rev. EDWARD GARBETT, M.A., Incumbent of Christ Church, Surbiton, Surrey. Small 8vo., pp. 242. London: The Religious Tract Society.

THIS is a modest, but a really able and useful book. Its object is, as explained in the preface, to apply to the details of common life the precepts and examples of Holy Scripture.

"The several essays have been made as short, plain, and practical as possible. They will suffice to prove that, directly or indirectly, Holy Scripture supplies practical lessons for life and conduct of a minute particularity and detail not usually recognised. There is no condition of life to which, in one way or another, they are not applicable. . . . The lessons thus gathered from the Word will be found to be in accordance with the highest human prudence. Many minds may have worked their way independently to

* Advertisement to the Third Edition of vol. iv., part i., of Alford's "Greek Testament."

In this spirit, and under the guidance for the most part of a chastened judgment and fine tact, Mr. Garbett enters on the various departments of our daily practice, and ranges them under the influence of Divine precept and example. It may serve as a recommendation of his work, if we give the heads of his chapters, and thus show how wide is its application to Christian life:—"The Influence of Great Truths on Little Things—Friends: Whom to Choose and Whom to Avoid—Pure Friendship—Conversation: How to Talk, When, and on What—Temperance: Eating, Drinking, Sleeping—Advice: How to Give it, and How to Take it—Manners—Dress—Home: its Pleasures, Duties, and Dangers—Buying and Selling—Self-Control—Ridicule and the Ridiculous—Our Plans for Life—Hastiness of Judgment—The Merriment of the Wise and of the Fool—True Beauty, &c."

1. *Catechizings on the Prayer Book.* By WILLIAM LEA, M.A., Vicar of St. Peter's, Droitwich, and Hon. Canon of Worcester.
2. *The Catechist's Manual.* With an Introduction by SAMUEL LORD BISHOP OF OXFORD.
3. *An Easy Guide to Doctrine and Prayer.* By HENRY A. JEFFRYES, M.A., Incumbent of Hawkechurch, Kent, and Student of Christ Church, Oxford.

THE first two of these books, intended as helps in the work of catechetical instruction, have little in common beside their object, and the evident desire of their authors to carry out their purpose in faithful adherence to the doctrines of the Church of England. The first is a very small book on a somewhat wide subject, the history and structure of the Book of Common Prayer, but it contains a good deal which it would be well for our people generally to know. The style is hardly either simple enough or lively enough to take hold of the minds of those who should benefit by the information conveyed. There are also some inaccuracies of statement. The Doxology is said to be a paraphrase on the song of the Seraphim (Isa. vi. 3), a sentence evidently intended to refer to the Ter-sanctus in the Communion Service, which by some strange oversight is not mentioned at all. The passage relating to the words which accompany the distribution of the consecrated elements is loosely worded, and leads to the inference that they date, in their present form, from Edward VI.'s "Second Book," which simply substituted the second clause for the first, instead of from that of Queen Elizabeth, in which the two clauses were combined. It would have been well too if Mr. Lea had not set down as matters undoubted, some on which there has been great difference of opinion in ancient as well as modern times,—as when he says that Bishops are called Angels in the Book of Revelation.

The "Catechist's Manual" is a book of a very different order. It deals with a smaller subject, but far more completely. It does not consist of questions and answers to be learnt, but is in fact an analysis and exposition of the Catechism, with texts of Holy Scripture, generally very well selected, for nearly every term in the Analysis. Its name is well chosen, for it is just

the book to be in the hands of the catechist, from which he may take the substance, and oftentimes the form of the instruction which he would impart. The younger clergy, and not they alone, will find it a valuable help in the discharge of an important duty.

Mr. Jeffryes' little book seems rather adapted for the private use of those who are, or soon may be, under instruction preparatory to adult baptism or to confirmation. It is well suited, as it appears to have been especially designed, for "a parting gift to children on their leaving school." It contains questions and answers on confirmation and the Catechism, and concludes with prayers selected from Bishop Wilson, Bishop Ken, &c., and the last-named author's three well-known hymns. The Scripture references are generally well chosen, and do not exhibit the too common desire to press into the service passages which, though contained in the received text, have no place in the more ancient copies of the sacred Word. It would have been well if Mr. Jeffryes had so worded his third and fourth answers (p. 2) as to make it clear that the bishop is simply the channel, not the author or source of grace in confirmation.

The Creed and the Church: a Handbook of Theology, &c. By the Rev. EDGAR SANDERSON, B.A., late Scholar of Clare College, Cambridge.

A VERY miracle of condensation. It includes within the limits of 204 pages of very small 8vo. a synopsis of "Pearson on The Creed," and "Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity," Books, and brief papers on Heresies and Schisms, "The Life and Epistles of St. Paul," "The History of the Book of Common Prayer, the Thirty-nine Articles, and the first four General Councils." Yet the type is not so small as to vex the eye, while the abridgment is so fairly done, especially in the case of Pearson, as to retain a well-proportioned resemblance to the argument though not to the style of the original. The summary of truths confessed has been separately extracted, and forms as it were an epitome of the synopsis. The author probably compiled his manuscript as a preparation for a theological examination, and it will find its chief use in the hands of those who wish to have a short *résumé* of the larger works which they have studied, before undergoing a similar ordeal.

The Oracles of God: an Attempt at a Re-interpretation. Part First. The Revealed Cosmos. By HENRY F. A. PRATT, M.D.

THAT "language was given to man to conceal his thoughts" may be a maxim suited to the requirements of a wily diplomacy; but that the "Oracles of God" were given in such a form that their meaning should be utterly hidden from the world and from the Church for more than two thousand years, and that their Divine author condescended to "accept" the erroneous incrustation by which the concealment was brought about, is more than we can bring ourselves to believe. Yet this is the proposition which is maintained by Dr. Pratt in this work, and apparently in one which he gave to the world some time ago, and which is here again referred to.* And it is maintained and supported in detail with an amount of ability and ingenuity which, applied to some more reasonable thesis, might have produced valuable results.

The object of the re-interpretation here attempted is the exhibition of an agreement between the record of Creation in the earliest portion of Genesis, and the discoveries of modern science. The object is one which many able

* "The Genealogy of Creation." London: Churchill, 1861.

men have proposed to themselves, and the attempt should always be received with candour and respect, provided that in dealing with the two things to be reconciled, no violence is done to the principles of language on the one side, or to ascertained facts on the other.

The first step in Dr. Pratt's system is one which has been taken by many before him, and in which, with certain modifications, he may find many followers, the denial of any authority to the Masoretic punctuation of the Hebrew text. But this punctuation is after all only an expression more or less correct of a tradition far more ancient. Whatever differences in detail exist between the sense of the Hebrew as fixed by the Masorites, and that represented by the early versions—and these differences are worthy of careful study,—still there is a very substantial agreement between the two, so that it is futile to rail at the modern origin of the points, unless one is prepared to reject the far older tradition which they represent. This accordingly Dr. Pratt does, classing this tradition with those which were condemned by our Lord,* while he gets rid of the argument which might be founded on the quotations from the Old Testament in the New, first by asserting that Christ and His Apostles accepted the received interpretation, but without vouching for its accuracy (pp. 5, 7, 241), and secondly by suggesting a Hebrew original, not only as some have supposed for the Gospel of St. Matthew,† and even, in the face of its dialectic peculiarities, the Epistle to the Hebrews, but for the entire volume of the New Testament (pp. 8, note ; 241). The effects of this rejection of traditional interpretation is more extensive than might be at first supposed. It renders possible the reconstruction not only of the entire grammatical system, which is closely connected with the Masoretic punctuation, but also of the division into words, the only certain guide to that division being found according to Dr. Pratt in the occurrence of the final letters, of which there are in the first three verses of Genesis, three, five, and one respectively. But even this is not all. Dr. Pratt has imbibed to the very fullest extent the notion of a mystical or oracular meaning underlying the literal sense, and far surpassing it in importance. In applying this idea he brings to the interpretation of each word every root from which it could possibly be derived, and by a combination of the meanings thus obtained arrives at the oracular or hidden sense. Indeed, he is not satisfied with referring a word to the possible roots in its own language, for he gives five separate meanings to the word *oracle*, and three each to *Pentateuch* and *Apocalypse*, all derived from Hebrew roots. Surely it is in this way of all others that, to use his own expression, “Bible becomes identified with Babel,” and, contrary to the teaching of the apostle, God is made the author of confusion.

It is sad to be obliged to write thus of a book which contains abundant evidence of a devout spirit, a sound belief, extensive learning, and patient industry. There is much to interest, much to inform ; but we cannot avoid seeing and pointing out the faulty principle which pervades the whole.

1. *The Guardian Angel's Whispers ; or, Words of Counsel and Words of Comfort, taken from Holy Scripture.*
2. *Watchwords for the Christian Year: drawn from Holy Scripture.*
London : Frederick Warne & Co.

ON turning over these two prettily ornamented volumes, we are forcibly reminded of Bunyan's quaint remark about “Religion walking in her silver

* It is observable that Matt. xxiii. 1, 2, 13, are quoted on the title-page. The third verse, which does not quite agree with the view mentioned above, is not cited.

† This Dr. Pratt asserts as known. Preface, p. xxxi.

slippers," and in consequence, we assign to the books before us a place, not in our closet of devotion, but on our drawing-room table. They contain texts for every day in the year, each one set in a page with elaborately devised borders, and furnished at intervals with engravings of angels and apostles from Overbeck, Thorwaldsen, &c. Before speaking of the texts themselves, we would question whether it is right or profitable to treat Scripture in this way at all. Beyond doubt, much of the misapprehension of passages in the Bible in the present day has been caused by this very isolation of texts, selected according to the fancy of the compiler, ready on the lips of the readers at any time, and that without consideration whether, when taken with their context, they will bear the meaning too often wrenched from them in advocacy of party tenets, or one-sided argument. Surely that close examination and unwearied research, so often—and so properly—bestowed on works of less importance, should be granted in full to the "Watchwords" and "Words of Counsel and Comfort," taken from Holy Scripture. We would say to the young, and to all, Read your Bibles, but read them sensibly, and do not let the thoughts and aims of your day be portioned out in a vague and purposeless way, often to the exclusion of soberer and more faithful dealing with it.


And this leads us to the manner in which these texts have been portioned out. In a book which deals with times and seasons, we naturally look for some reference to those appointed by Him who "has set all the borders of the earth, who has made winter and summer;" but of the returning life in tree and flower from the breath of spring—a twofold type of the birth of man, and of his final resurrection—we find no mention here in the texts, nor emblem in the illustrations; and the same may be said of summer days, and harvest-time—so fertile in suggestion both of words and of objects in nature. Even less pardonable is it, in the selection of Watchwords for every day in the Christian Year, to make no allusion to those wisely appointed seasons for joy and for solemn thought, in which we follow the life of our blessed Lord, and the ministry of His apostles. Christmas Day never changes; and yet we do not find in these volumes a single hint of the great event of that day. We are moreover at a loss to discover any imaginable system of arrangement, by which the texts are chosen.

The designs of the borders, thirty-two in number, and recurring in both books, are prettily done, and will prove valuable to those interested in illuminating, illustrating, &c. We think that in these, greater variety than is found in the methodical rotation of patterns would have been acceptable. The engravings from celebrated artists, are some of them deserving of praise; but in others, the wooden character of the material has carried itself into the work: witness the Magdalen (or Madonna: it is certainly not the *Speranza*) of Guido Reni, at the end of the latter volume.

We very much wish that this kind of meretricious religious gift-books might go out of favour. It is really little less than taking Scripture in vain, to fritter it out thus, aimless and meaningless, merely as the vehicle for illuminated borders.

NOTE TO ARTICLE "SUNDAY," IN NO. I.

THE name of Mr. Thomas Hughes, M.P. for Lambeth, was mentioned, in page 162, as among the supporters of the movement for opening Museums and Galleries on Sunday afternoons. I did not at the time know that he had withdrawn from that movement, on the ground of its being against both the interests and the wishes of the majority of working men, and am glad to place that fact on record. E. H. P.



RATIONALISM.

History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe.
By W. E. H. LECKY, M.A. Two Volumes. Second Edition.
London: Longmans. 1865.

MR. LECKY'S volumes have already attracted much of the attention they so well deserve. They are the work of an able and comprehensive intellect, gifted with a large and perhaps over fertile faculty of generalization, and a very clear, facile, copious, and eloquent power of expression. In reading them in part a second time, we confess that we are struck by a certain slackness both of thought and style; a want of compactness, and tendency to diffusion: but the liberal and luminous comprehension remains everywhere conspicuous; and the reader is carried along a very diversified yet connected field of inquiry with unflinching interest at every step, and with a singularly vivid buoyancy and freshness of movement.

The aim of the volumes is to trace the "History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe,"—something very different, as the reader will at once see, on opening Mr. Lecky's volumes, from the History of Rationalism, in its ordinary acceptation, as a peculiar mode of thinking in theology. It is one of the defects of Mr. Lecky's book, that he has not sufficiently discriminated and defined its object. By the spirit of Rationalism, he says, he understands "not any class of definite doctrines and criticisms, but rather a certain cast of thought or bias of reasoning, which has, during the last three centuries, gained a marked ascendancy in Europe." The nature of this bias is "that it leads men, on all occasions, to subordinate

dogmatic theology to the dictates of reason and of conscience ; and, as a necessary consequence, greatly to restrict its influence upon life. It predisposes men in history to attribute all kinds of phenomena to natural rather than miraculous causes ; in theology, to esteem succeeding systems the expressions of the wants and aspirations of that religious sentiment which is planted in all men ; and in ethics, to regard as duties only those which conscience reveals to be such." This description indicates an indefinite movement of thought and feeling in the modern European mind, rather than any clear aim or progress of reason. And this indefiniteness hangs around Mr. Lecky's whole conception of the subject, and his method of handling it. He repudiates in his Preface the influence of definite arguments and processes of reasoning in carrying on the movement of the rationalizing spirit. This movement is carried on by the general habits of mind which come to pass in successive ages from the apparently accidental growth of knowledge rather than by any clear and intelligible impulse of rational thought. This view is constantly repeated in his pages.

According to him,—

"The pressure of the general intellectual influences of the time determines the predispositions which ultimately regulate the details of belief : and though all men do not yield to that pressure with the same facility, all large bodies are at last controlled. A change of speculative opinions does not imply an increase of the data upon which those opinions rest, but a change of the habits of thought and mind which they reflect. Definite arguments are the symptoms and pretexts, but seldom the causes of the change. Their chief merit is to accelerate the inevitable crisis. They derive their force and efficacy from their conformity with the mental habits of those to whom they are addressed. Reasoning which in one age would make no impression whatever, in the next age is received with enthusiastic applause. And this standard of belief, this tone and habit of thought, which is the supreme arbiter of the opinions of successive periods, is created not by the influences arising out of any one department of intellect, but by the combination of all the intellectual and even social tendencies of the age. Those who contribute most largely to its formation are, I believe, the philosophers. Men like Bacon, Descartes, and Locke, have probably done more than any others to set the current of their age. They have formed a certain cast and tone of mind. They have introduced peculiar habits of thought, new modes of reasoning, new tendencies of enquiry. The impulse they have given to the higher literature has been by that literature communicated to the more popular writers ; and the impress of these master minds is clearly visible in the writings of multitudes who are totally unacquainted with their works. But philosophical methods, great and unquestionable as is their power, form but one of the many influences that contribute to the mental habits of society. Thus the discoveries of physical science, entrenching upon the domain of the anomalous and the incomprehensible, enlarging our conceptions of the range of law, and revealing the connection of phenomena that had formerly appeared altogether isolated, form a habit of mind which is carried far beyond the limits of physics."

Everywhere the same strain occurs. And Mr. Lecky dwells at

length upon a particular illustration of his view—the decay of the belief in witchcraft at the close of the seventeenth century, notwithstanding the advocacy of some of the most distinguished and even liberal minds of which the latter part of that century boasts. So late as 1664, two women were condemned in Suffolk, by Sir Matthew Hale, for witchcraft, on the ground—first, that Scripture had affirmed the reality of witchcraft; and secondly, that the wisdom of all nations had provided laws against persons accused of the crime. Sir Thomas Browne, the well-known author of the “*Religio Medici*,” was called as a witness at the trial, and swore “that he was clearly of opinion that the persons were bewitched.” Not only so, but Henry More and Cudworth, both of them belonging to the enlightened band of Cambridge Platonists, strongly expressed their belief in the reality of witchcraft; and more than all, Joseph Glanvil, the author of the “*Scep-sis Scientifica*,” and the most daring theological thinker perhaps of his time, wrote a special defence of the decaying superstition, under the name of “*Sadducismus Triumphatus*,” probably the ablest book ever published in its defence. So far as mere arguments were concerned, the divines seemed to have it all their own way. “The books in defence of the belief were not only far more numerous than the later works against it, but they also represented far more learning, dialectic skill, and even general ability.” The mass of evidence seemed in favour of it. “Those who lived when the evidences of witchcraft existed in profusion, and attracted the attention of all classes and of all grades of intellect, must surely have been as competent judges as ourselves of the question, were it merely a question of evidence. . . . It is, I think, difficult to examine the subject with impartiality without coming to the conclusion, that the historical evidence establishing the existence of witchcraft is so vast and varied that it is impossible to disbelieve it without what, on other subjects, we should deem the most extraordinary rashness.” Yet the belief of it sunk towards the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, rapidly, irretrievably. No accumulation of evidence, no cleverness or strength of argument, were of any avail. At this particular period of English history there was manifested an irresistible disposition to regard witch stories as absurd. With the foundation of the Royal Society in 1660 a passion for natural philosophy, very similar to that which preceded the French Revolution, became general; and the whole force of the English intellect was directed to the discovery of natural laws. In this manner there was generated a prevailing disinclination to accept supernatural stories in explanation of events however extraordinary. “The disbelief in witchcraft is to be attributed to what is called the spirit of the age. . . . It is the result,

not of any series of definite arguments, or of new discoveries, but of a gradual, insensible, yet profound modification of the habits of thought prevailing in Europe."

This instance more clearly than any other brings out the characteristics of Mr. Lecky's thought and manner of treatment, in behalf of which much may be said; but his language, at the same time, evidently covers some confusion of ideas. No doubt changes of belief are wrought largely according to the way described. The changes, that is to say, are the issue apparently not of special processes of reasoning, but of some comprehensive alteration in the intellectual point of view of one age in comparison with a preceding age. A mode of thought so prevailing as scarcely to admit of question disappears, and a new mode of thought takes its place, while the mere logical defences of the former may remain unassailed, or, if assailed, unsubdued. The tide of advancing thought can be seen moving onwards till it covers the loftiest eminences of the old opinion, which yet refuses to surrender in its argumentative strongholds. But nevertheless, the movement is in no sense accidental or unaccountable. It is in no sense the mere upspringing of new ideas as spontaneous or unreasoned growths, a conclusion to which Mr. Lecky's language might point, and which a careless reader would certainly draw from it. The old and vanishing beliefs, however valiantly they may fight to the last, and in seeming logic have the best of it, are yet really weakened and beaten in the field of fair reason before they retire. The rationalistic movement, although it gathers its final strength from many impulses which may have little to do with the immediate object of faith—witchcraft, or any other—which it is sweeping away, is yet truly a movement of reason, and not a blind issue of sentiment or feeling. The "spirit of the age" is a mere expression, and has no power, save in so far as it represents some real growth of enlightenment, some expansion of man's powers of comprehension of the world around him, or of the world of thought within him.

In the case of witchcraft, for example, men ceased to believe in it not merely because they came to laugh at it "as palpably absurd, as involving the most grotesque and ludicrous conceptions," as in itself essentially incredible,—not merely because of "a gradual and insensible modification of the habits of thought prevailing in Europe," but mainly because their reason, quickened, disciplined, and enlarged by diverse sources of new information and culture, attained to clearer perceptions of the nature of evidence, and of the relation of evidence to the alleged fact to be proved. The general disbelief of witchcraft was no doubt greatly accelerated by the ludicrous associations which came to be attached to it, and by a general change in the habits of thought;

but these causes of disbelief were themselves the effect of a deeper cause. Men only began to laugh at witchcraft when they had already perceived its unreasonableness—the many presumptions of evidence against it. Their changed habits of thought were the result of increased knowledge,—of increased width of comprehension. The primary source, therefore, of the decay of this and of all superstition and error, is not any mere fluctuating power called “the spirit of the age,” not any indefinite movement of public opinion, but a clear and steady advance of reason—an advance effected by innumerable influences, and, it may be, at times losing itself in sceptical or negative extravagances, but which is not to be confounded with any of these mere accessories of its development. In the present case the advance of reason—or of knowledge, its complement—was of a two-fold kind. Men came to understand nature better, and what was possible or impossible within the order of its operations: Men further learned to have higher and wiser notions of the agencies of good and evil in the world. To make use of the illustration employed by Mr. Lecky,—the allegation of an old woman riding through the air on a broomstick became utterly incredible, because, first of all, the alleged fact, when examined, was found to rest on no evidence which could for a moment be put in comparison with the evidence of the stability of nature’s operations; and secondly, because the idea of the supernatural, out of which the witch-imagination had grown, had begun to disappear. Supposing that there were a devil with power to transport old women in such a manner, the doing so scarcely seemed a worthy or adequate employment even for the devil. As the horizon of human reason became expanded and illuminated, the clouds of superstition dispersed, and men learned to look with incredulous wonder and amazement at the vanishing shapes of horror which had fascinated them.

The same confusion or want of discrimination leads Mr. Lecky constantly to contrast theology and rationalism, as if they were forces working in opposite directions; he does not, indeed, err in this respect as Mr. Buckle did, whose hard positivist turn of mind prevented him from rising to any intelligent conception of theology at all. Mr. Lecky’s mind is of a far more sympathetic and spiritual order. Still, he by no means sufficiently apprehends the great part which theology itself has had in the formation of the rationalistic movement. The highest impulses of the movement have, in fact, come from within the theological sphere, and can be plainly traced in a succession of great writers, beginning with Hooker, Hales, and Chillingworth in England, down to the present time. These writers were no doubt influenced by the general spirit of their age, in so far as it was, in science or philosophy, an age of awakening enlightenment;

but they were also themselves in an eminent degree the enlighteners of their time, and of all succeeding time. They gave far more than they received. In the exercise of their own high reason on Divine things, they rose far above their age, and communicated to the stream of religious thought a direct impulse of a more truly rational character than some of the vaguer influences of which Mr. Lecky makes so much. This is particularly true of Hooker, who stands singularly alone in his lofty rationality.

A history of rationalism, properly so called, would concern itself mainly with the labours of the succession of theological thinkers who have recognised the rights of reason, and sought to bring these rights into harmony with the revelations of spiritual truth in Scripture and in conscience. The work of these men within the domain of theology would at any rate share the attention of the historian with the mixed intellectual and scientific influences bearing upon this domain from without, and indirectly modifying it. Theology would not be supposed to constitute a charmed circle, lying outside of the rationalistic movement while continually yielding to it. It would not, in short, be confounded with the mere dogmatic teaching of the Church in any age, nor would its true range and power be supposed to be narrowed because various items of this teaching have already vanished before the modern spirit of inquiry, and others are obviously destined to do so. Theology as a science is quite independent of such supposed encroachments upon its territory, and is so far from losing its genuine interest and importance with the advance of the rationalistic spirit, that it may be said to possess in our own day a growing attraction for all higher intelligences, who have not divorced themselves from spiritual culture.

In truth, the term rationalism is in itself so entirely vague and indeterminate, that previous to definition it is impossible to say what it denotes relative to theology. It is one of the greatest misfortunes both of theological and philosophical discussion, that words frequently come to be used with such complex and even contradictory meanings, as to obscure altogether the real points at issue, and to keep controversialists fighting for years in the dark. Many instances might be given of this abusive employment of words, but there is none more noted, or more influential in the confusion which it is constantly breeding, than the word rationalism. It is used at least in two distinct and nearly opposite senses. In its current use, with a large class of theologians it denotes a certain exercise of the natural intellect, always opposed to Christianity. It means the deliberate rejection of Divine revelation as inconsistent with the dictates of the natural reason. It is the same, in short, as irreligion. It is the spirit of the world, the spirit of undevout science, of undevout philo-

sophy, as opposed to Christ and the spirit of the Divine which in Him is seeking to bless the world. In this sense rationalism is aggressively hostile, not merely to certain truths of religion, but to the very foundation of religion in human nature,—the spiritual instincts and principles which separate man from other creatures, and make him, in contradistinction to them, a religious being.

Perhaps it may be questioned whether there is any form of thought thus deliberately opposed to religion in our day, as there is certainly no special philosophy which makes it its business to proclaim such an opposition. But no one who knows anything of the subject can doubt that there are forms of thought, and even a prevailing school of thought, which, according to its fundamental principles, leaves no room for religion as a valid element of human existence. It may not directly oppose it, but it leaves it out of sight; nay, it asserts as its basis, principles inconsistent with any idea of special Divine revelation. The great school of thought known as Positivism restricts the sources of our knowledge to the senses, and if not explicitly, yet implicitly, denies the reality of a Divine constitution in man separating him from other animals, and making him, in a true and not merely an accidental or superstitious sense, a subject of religion. It is not necessary for us to say whether the name of Rationalism is or is not rightly applied to such a school of thought as this. There is no doubt that it is largely applied by theologians in a sense in which it is applicable to no other system,—in which, in short, it is identical with anti-Christian philosophy.

But the expression is also applied often, by the same theologians, to describe a mode of thought which has no connection with the preceding, but which, on the contrary, is its most active and enlightened opponent. It is applied to the exercise of reason within the sphere of religion, with a view to the enlargement and purification of religious ideas in consistency with the necessities of an advancing spiritual culture. In the former case, thought takes its stand outside the circle of spiritual truth altogether, and it never comes within the circle. It lays the foundations and tries to build the structure of Truth outside of the Church, and the special principles which lie at the root of the Church. In the present case, thought is born within the Church: it starts from spiritual principles: it is essentially Christian in its fundamental ideas; but it does not hold to these ideas merely as they have been elaborated and dogmatically expressed by the Christian intelligence of former ages. On the contrary, it recognises a living movement in Christian knowledge, no less than in every other department of knowledge. There is, "through the ages," a growth of religious intelligence and comprehension, just as there is a growth of philosophical intelligence and comprehension; and the labours

of past generations of Christian thinkers, while claiming all honour and respect, are no more infallible than the labours of past generations of philosophers. According to this view, the increase of general knowledge, and of humane and enlightened principles in society, inevitably carries with it an increase of spiritual illumination. Higher, juster apprehensions are developed, not only of the relations of man to man—a fact admitted on all hands,—but moreover of the relations of man to God, and of the Divine intentions for man's good. If man, in the course of the Christian centuries, has come to understand better his own position and rights in relation to the position and rights of others, and to find in the Christian revelation the warrant of this higher knowledge, which for long he failed to see, or at least to realize, there seems every ground for concluding that he will also come to understand better from the same source his relations to God, and God's thoughts towards him. Why should not the Christian reason grow and become more full of light, as well as the scientific intellect? It is no satisfactory answer to say, as has been so often said, that the sum of Christian knowledge is contained once for all within the books of the New Testament, from which nothing is to be taken, and nothing added. The question is not one as to the original completeness of the Christian revelation, but one solely as to the interpretation of this revelation. Allowing all that can be said as to the perfection of Holy Scripture, even on the untenable supposition of verbal inspiration, this settles nothing as to the validity of past interpretations of Scripture. Least of all does it settle anything as to the validity of the dogmatic opinions which have grown up within the Church at successive periods, and which have frequently owed their rise far more to the changing currents of human feeling and thinking than to any direct result of scriptural study. These opinions must stand or fall on their own merits. They cannot, on any ground of reason, be considered beyond re-examination, and hence of possible expansion or correction. The mere fact that they are stamped with the authority of the Church, or in other words of the highest Christian intelligence of the past, is enough to secure for them respect, but by no means enough to place them beyond criticism. The Christian intelligence of to-day possesses every right that the Christian intelligence of the fourth century, or the twelfth century, or the sixteenth century, possessed. And not only has it the same rights, but there can be no doubt that, upon the whole, it possesses a higher capacity of exercising these rights. In many respects it has both more insight into spiritual truth, and more freedom from spiritual prejudice. And it claims, therefore, not only in one church, but in all living churches, to reabsorb, as it were, the great spiritual ideas of the past, and review them in the light of

Scripture ; to take them up from the dogmatic moulds in which they are apt to lie dead in an uninquiring age, and to bring them face to face once more with the living Word and with all true knowledge. This process of constant inquest regarding religious ideas, and consequent purification of them from the admixtures of error and false philosophy, which mark human progress in all its relations, is, according to this school, the necessary condition of all real thought about religion. Theology ceases to be a living science when it ceases to move, when it imposes itself as a mere mass of dogma upon the conscience, instead of soliciting the continual criticism and purification of the spiritual reason. Nor is such a process of movement necessarily of an unsettling character in theology any more than in other sciences. Whatever true principles theology has reached in the past remain true principles. Truth has nothing to fear anywhere from the most rigorous inquiry. But whatever is not of the truth, whatever has been imported into theology from the darkness of human error or the misconception of human reason, or, in other words, from the misreading of Divine revelation, this is no doubt liable to be unsettled and exploded. Unsettling of this kind is the very purpose of the movement, but only that in the end the truths of Divine revelation, the great thoughts of God towards us in Christ, may be seen more clearly and understood more comprehensively.

It must be plain that the application of the term rationalism to two such distinct modes of thought as we have now described is absurd. And yet this absurdity is constantly practised. Accusations of rationalism are frequently heard, which couple together such theologians as Strauss and Neander, such writers as Mr. J. Stuart Mill and Dean Stanley. The spirit of living Christian inquiry represented by the great Berlin theologian, in some respects the highest expression of the Christian reason in this century, is indiscriminately confounded with the anti-Christian dogmatism which it was the main labour of his life to controvert. And who is not familiar with the association of the names of the Dean of Westminster and of the member for Westminster, merely because the former ventured to vote for the latter, and has spoken favourably of certain portions of his writings, although it would be difficult to conceive two writers more contrasted. And the same confusion occurs in many other cases. Writers whose whole culture springs out of Christian principles, across the clear light of which a shadow is never thrown, are classed together with writers whose principles lie quite outside the range of Christian ideas, and present, if not an open hostility to these ideas, yet certainly no rational consistency with them. What may be the real relation of some of this latter class of writers to Christianity it is not our present business to inquire. But in any case it can admit of no

question that the judgment which classes together under a single name tendencies of opinion so opposite is utterly superficial and misleading. It is not a critical judgment at all, but a mere blind and stupid prejudice. It must be further evident that a "History of Rationalism" is bound to discriminate carefully between such tendencies in their relation to Christian theology. For, should it be granted that there is an active movement of thought in the modern European mind opposed to Christian truth, it must also be allowed that there has always been a living movement of thought within the Church, which has based itself professedly on the recognition of the rights of reason, as not only not inconsistent with the claims of Christian truth, but as absolutely essential to the true statement and defence of those claims. Theology itself, in its historical development, is nothing else than the work of the latter movement; it is the fruit of the exercise of the Christian reason upon the data of spiritual truth revealed in Scripture, and in the spiritual consciousness. In short, the history of theology is the history of rationalism in this latter sense. Any other conception of theology, save as the product of the continued and ever-expanding action of the Christian reason, degrades it into a mere tradition or a mere superstition, the dicta of an unreasoning sacerdotal authority, or the dicta of an equally unreasoning popular Biblicism. In neither of those aspects has it any pretension to rank as a science or a true department of knowledge, still exercising a living influence over human culture and progress.*

We are glad that Mr. Lecky, although he has nowhere cleared up the relation between rationalism and theology, but in some respects embroiled the subject with confusions of his own, yet clearly acknowledges the substantive perpetuity of Christian truth under all the modifications of opinion which it has undergone, and many of which

* It may perhaps be asked, in the view of this classification of rationalism, what term we would apply to such writers as Paulus of the older school, and Gesenius, De Wette, and Ferdinand C. Baur, of the more recent school of German divines; and further, to such writers as Bishop Colenso, and the "Essayists and Reviewers"? Are they not Rationalists? Are they not opposed to Christianity? Rationalists certainly they may fairly be regarded; but whether opposed to Christianity or not must be determined in each case by the spirit animating the writer. In so far as the bias of anti-supernaturalism is discovered by any theological writer, we feel bound to regard him as opposed to Christianity, which professedly bases itself on the supernatural. But within the reverent recognition of the supernatural witnessed in Scripture, no "free handling" of Scripture, however opposed to our own preconception, is necessarily anti-Christian. To say that such an event in Scripture cannot be true because it is supernatural, is wholly different from saying that such an event need not be conceived as supernatural, when all the circumstances of the case, and the character of early literature, are considered. The former opinion attacks the idea of the supernatural and the very substance of Scripture; the latter merely attacks traditional notions of Scripture. The former is anti-Christian, the latter may be essentially Christian. The difference between the two is all the difference between reason expelling faith in mere pride of negation, and reason accepting and illumining faith.

he so well describes. He recognises, in short, while constantly speaking of the conflict between the rationalistic spirit and theology, that the conflict is not necessary or essential. Christianity survives, Christian theology, in the highest sense, survives, all encroachments of the scientific spirit. What this spirit has destroyed, or may seem further destroying, is not Christianity in any of its vital elements, but only external additions to it, mixtures of past prejudice or erroneous philosophy. He admits, although not so far as we would claim the admission, that Christianity continues a living power in the face of all scientific progress. In this way he separates himself entirely from Mr. Buckle and the Positive school, while he speaks of Mr. Buckle, as a writer, with great admiration. He recognises the enduring life of Christianity in the strongest manner, and in the very decay of old forms of belief sees the seed of a higher spiritual culture which can never perish out of human history. He says,—

“No one can doubt that if the modes of thought now prevailing on these subjects, even in Roman Catholic countries, could have been presented to the mind of a Christian of the twelfth century, he would have said that so complete an alteration would involve the absolute destruction of Christianity. As a matter of fact, most of these modifications were forced upon the reluctant Church by the pressure from without, and were specially resisted and denounced by the bulk of the clergy. They were represented as subversive of Christianity. The doctrine that religion could be destined to pass through successive phases of development was pronounced to be emphatically unchristian. The ideal Church was always in the past, and immutability, if not retrogression, was deemed the condition of life. We can now judge this resistance by the clear light of experience. Dogmatic systems have, it is true, been materially weakened; they no longer exercise a controlling influence over the current of affairs. . . . Ecclesiastical power throughout Europe has been everywhere weakened, and weakened in each nation in proportion to its intellectual progress. If we were to judge the present position of Christianity by the tests of ecclesiastical history, if we were to measure it by the orthodox zeal of the great doctors of the past, we might well look upon its prospects with the deepest despondency and alarm. The spirit of the Fathers has incontestably faded. The days of Athanasius and Augustine have passed away never to return. The whole course of thought is flowing in another direction. The controversies of bygone centuries ring with a strange hollowness on the ear. But if, turning from ecclesiastical historians, we apply the exclusively moral tests which the New Testament so invariably and so emphatically enforces—if we ask whether Christianity has ceased to produce the living fruits of love and charity and zeal for truth, the conclusion we should arrive at would be very different. If it be true Christianity to dive, with a passionate charity, into the darkest recesses of misery and of vice, to irrigate every quarter of the earth with the fertilizing stream of an almost boundless benevolence, and to include all the sections of humanity in the circle of an intense and efficacious sympathy—if it be true Christianity to destroy or weaken the barriers which had separated class from class and nation from nation, to free war from its harshest elements, and to make a consciousness of essential equality and of a genuine fraternity dominate over all accidental differences—if it be, above all, true Christianity to culti-

vate a love of truth for its own sake, a spirit of candour and of tolerance towards those with whom we differ,—if these be the marks of a true and healthy Christianity, then never, since the days of the apostles, has it been so vigorous as at present, and the decline of dogmatic systems and of clerical influence has been a measure if not a cause of its advance.”—(Vol. i., pp. 203-5.)

Again he says,—

“There is but one example of a religion which is not naturally weakened by civilization, and that example is Christianity. In all other cases the decay of dogmatic conceptions is tantamount to a complete annihilation of the religion; for although there may be imperishable elements of moral truth mingled with those conceptions, they have nothing distinctive or peculiar. The moral truths coalesce with new systems; the men who uttered them take their place, with many others, in the great pantheon of History, and the religion, having discharged its functions, is spent and withered. But the great characteristic of Christianity, and the great moral proof of its Divinity, is that it has been the main source of the moral development of Europe, and that it has discharged this office not so much by the inculcation of a system of ethics, however pure, as by the assimilating and attractive influence of a perfect ideal. The moral progress of mankind can never cease to be distinctively and intensely Christian as long as it consists of a gradual approximation to the character of the Christian Founder. There is, indeed, nothing more wonderful in the history of the human race than the way in which that ideal has traversed the lapse of ages, acquiring a new strength and beauty with each advance of civilization, and infusing its beneficent influence into every sphere of thought and action. At first men sought to grasp, by minute dogmatic definitions, the Divinity they felt. The controversies of the Homoousians, or Monophysites, or Nestorians, or Patripassians, and many others whose very names now sound strange and remote, then filled the Church. Then came the period of visible representations. The handkerchief of Veronica, the portrait of Edessa, the crucifix of Nicodemus, the paintings of St. Luke, the image traced by an angel’s hand which is still venerated at the Lateran, the countless visions narrated by the saints, show the eagerness with which men sought to realize, as a palpable and living image, their ideal. This age was followed by that of historical evidences—the age of Sebonde and his followers. Yet more and more, with advancing years, the moral ideal stood out from all dogmatic conceptions; its Divinity was recognised by its perfection, and it is no exaggeration to say that at no former period was it so powerful or so universally acknowledged as at present. This is a phenomenon altogether unique in history, and to those who recognise in the highest type of excellence the highest revelation of the Deity, its importance is too manifest to be overlooked.”—(Vol. i., pp. 336-8.)

Mr. Lecky arranges his work in six chapters. The first two of these chapters deal with the “Declining Sense of the Miraculous,” first in the special forms of “Magic and Witchcraft,” or generally of diabolic influence; and secondly, in reference to the “Miracles of the Church.” We have already so far indicated his treatment of the subject of Witchcraft, which is in many respects the most striking and interesting part of his work, while it shows at the same time most clearly the charac-

teristics of his mode of thought. It is a melancholy chapter of human history, and it certainly loses none of the darkness of its colouring in Mr. Lecky's pages. He appears to us particularly successful in explaining the intensity of the superstition in the twelfth century, and again in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, following the Reformation. The very movement of intellectual doubt, characteristic of these epochs, only served to deepen the horror of Satanic agency. For as yet the spirit of doubt did not venture to attack the reality of this agency, even in the most gross and fantastic results which had been attributed to it. Luther, as is well known, was a slave to the wildest delusions on this subject. In every critical event, in every mental perturbation, he recognised Satanic agency. "In the monastery at Wittenberg he continually heard the devil making a noise in the cloisters. The black stain in the Castle of Wartburg still marks the place where he flung an inkbottle at the devil. . . . The devil could transport men at his will through the air. He could beget children; and Luther had himself come in contact with one of them. An intense love of children was one of the most amiable characteristics of the great reformer; but on this occasion he most earnestly recommended the reputed relatives to throw the child into the river, in order to free their house from the presence of a devil. As a natural consequence of these modes of thought, witchcraft did not present the slightest improbability to his mind." And Luther's case was not in this respect an exaggerated type of the Christian mind in the sixteenth century. Even in the latter half of the seventeenth century, as we have seen, such men as Sir Matthew Hale, Sir Thomas Browne, and Joseph Glanvil, profoundly believed in witchcraft, or, in other words, in the power of Satan incarnated in old women to hurt and destroy their neighbours.

But, as Mr. Lecky explains, while this undoubting belief in the presence of diabolic power as a destructive agent in the world continued, the counterpart belief, so prevalent during the Middle Ages, of the influence of sacred charms—such as the sign of the cross, or a few drops of holy water, or the name of Mary—to dispel the evil presence, had begun to decline with the first movement of awakening thought in the twelfth century, and in the progress of the Reformation altogether disappeared. The necessary consequence of this was an increased religious terrorism. The old protections against witchcraft were undermined or destroyed, and yet there remained an unhesitating belief in its reality. And so it was that the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, so glorious in many respects, are yet so disgracefully darkened by the prevalence of this ignoble and debasing superstition. Puritanism, amidst all its moral dignity, was in this matter specially blameable. It encouraged and stimulated the darkest views of human life. It attributed, with-

out any hesitation, opposition to its peculiar tenets to the direct inspiration of Satan. Its enemies were sorcerers and children of the devil. In Scotland, as Mr. Lecky shows, the spread of Puritanism gave a fearful impulse to religious terrorism. Previously to the Reformation there, witchcraft in its darkest form was so rare that no law existed on the subject. A law was made for the first time in 1563, but it was not till 1590 and subsequently, under the influence of what is sometimes called the second Reformation, that it attained to its full severity.

"The clergy all over Scotland applauded and stimulated the persecution. The ascendancy they had obtained was boundless ; and in this respect their power was entirely undisputed. One word from them might have arrested the tortures, but that word was never spoken. Their conduct implies not merely a mental aberration, but also a callousness of feeling which has rarely been attained in a long career of vice. Yet these were men who had often shown, in the most trying circumstances, the highest and the most heroic virtues. They were men whose courage had never flinched when persecution was raging around—men who had never paltered with their consciences to attain the favours of a king—men whose self-devotion and zeal in their sacred calling had seldom been surpassed—men who, in all the private relations of life, were doubtless amiable and affectionate. It is not on them that our blame should fall : it is on the system that made them what they were. They were but illustrations of the great truth, that when men have come to regard a certain class of their fellow-creatures as doomed by the Almighty to eternal and excruciating agonies, and when their theology directs their minds with intense and realizing earnestness to the contemplation of such agonies, the result will be an indifference to the suffering of those whom they deem the enemies of their God, as absolute as it is perhaps possible for human nature to attain."

We have already adverted to the decay of this horrible superstition, and the processes of reason which were influential in this decay. Of all the beneficial results of a scientific knowledge of nature, and of a purified idea of the supernatural, there is none more signal or more beneficent than the utter destruction which has overtaken the particular idea of Satanic agency on which witchcraft rested. When we think of the countless sufferings it entailed on those least able to defend themselves, and of the active support which it derived from a religion which, in its true character, is a gospel to every afflicted soul, one is appalled at the picture suggested to the mind, the picture at once of human misery and of human perversity. No class of victims probably endured such unalloyed sufferings. Neither the raptures of martyrdom nor the endurance of exulting-heroism was theirs,—

"They died alone, hated and unpitied. They were deemed by all mankind the worst of criminals. Their very kinsmen shrank from them as tainted and accursed. The superstitions they had imbibed in childhood, blending with the illusions of age, and with the horrors of their position,

persuaded them, in many cases, that they were indeed the bond-slaves of Satan, and were about to exchange their torments upon earth for an agony that was as excruciating, and was eternal. And besides all this, we have to consider the terrors which the belief must have spread through the people at large; we have to picture the anguish of the mother, as she imagined that it was in the power of one whom she had offended to blast in a moment every object of her affection; we have to conceive, above all, the awful shadow that the dread of accusation must have thrown on the enfeebled faculties of age, and the bitterness it must have added to desertion and to solitude."

It is painful to reflect that ministers of the Christian religion should have been amongst the prime agents in promoting such a miserable delusion; that they should have clung to it with blind tenacity when the lay intellect had begun to rise above it; that the fear of the devil should for ages have so wholly paralyzed and darkened in their hearts the love and the light of God, and that at last they should have been driven from it as much by the laughter of folly as by the progress of reason. While we think gratefully of all that we owe to such men, it is good for us also to remember that there are subjects on which they—or at least the mass of them—have never been leaders, but rather blind followers of the blind. Human progress and freedom owe much to them, but there is also, as in this case, a heavy reckoning on the other side, and the march of real enlightenment and even of Christian truth has been sometimes made not by means of them, but in spite of them.

In his second chapter Mr. Lecky treats of the "Decline of the Miraculous" as a general belief in the Church. He shows clearly that there is no definite age of miracles in the history of the Church. With Middleton, he rejects the old Protestant theory, that "miracles became gradually fewer and fewer, till they at last entirely disappeared;" and accepts without reserve the statement of this intrepid writer in his "Free Inquiry," that as far as the Church historians can illustrate or throw light upon anything, "there is not a single point in all history so constantly, explicitly, and unanimously affirmed by them all as the continual succession of these (miraculous) powers through all ages, from the earliest Father who first mentions them down to the time of the Reformation." So far from being "rare and exceptional phenomena," miracles were supposed to be of familiar and daily occurrence in the lives of the early and mediæval saints. "They were a kind of celestial charity, alleviating the sorrows, healing the diseases, and supplying the wants of the faithful." They were the signs of saintly distinctions everywhere, and there were no bounds to the credulity with which they were received. "There was scarcely a town that could not show some relic that had cured the sick, or some image that had opened and shut its eyes or bowed its head to an earnest worshipper."

The Church, in short, lived for fifteen centuries more or less in a supernatural atmosphere, which has at length almost entirely disappeared, not only in Protestant but in Roman Catholic countries. The few alleged miracles which are still sometimes heard of, such as the liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius, or the performances of the Holy Coat at Treves, are subjects of derision rather than of exultation, even among Roman Catholics. "Educated persons speak of them with undisguised scorn and incredulity; some attempt to evade or explain them away by a natural hypothesis; a very few faintly and apologetically defend them." All this has been the result of an insensible modification of human belief regarding the supernatural. Men have ceased to think of it as they once did.

Here, as in the former chapter, Mr. Lecky speaks more of the general spirit of civilization, and the changed habits of thought which have come with the growth of this spirit, than of the special processes of thought which have contributed to it and made it what it is. And with something of the same vagueness he avoids the all-important question of the true import of the supernatural in relation to Christian history. There is nothing in his remarks, indeed, nor in his mode of thinking, which compels the inference that the supernatural, as a living fact lying at the root of Christianity, must in his estimation be abandoned along with the thousand puerile excrescences of miraculous legend which have grown out of the fact. As a mere historian of opinion he was not perhaps bound to do more than sketch accurately the changes of belief which he passes under review. We should have liked, at the same time, that he had expressed himself more clearly on this subject, and that while exposing the excesses of supernaturalism he had cleared the true idea of the supernatural from all connection with these excesses. There is no section of the Christian Church which any longer welcomes the assertion of miraculous powers as an attribute of even the most exalted piety. Enlightened Christian thought no longer holds to the once universal notion that miracles are to be regarded as mere arbitrary interferences with the operations of nature, marking their Divine origin by their exceptional character. All higher intelligence now recognises the universal "reign of law;" but the same intelligence, whenever it is reverent and open, and, in a word, Christian, also recognises that the reign of natural law can never be held as validly excluding the personal agency of the great Being who established it, and who, for some fitting and unexampled purpose, may see fit to supersede it by the manifestation of a higher law.

We cannot follow Mr. Lecky through the details of his next chapter, which are very interesting but very multifarious. He traces in rapid succession the "*Æsthetic, Scientific, and Moral Developments*"

of Rationalism," collecting, especially under the first point of view, many interesting particulars of the modification of art under the changing conceptions of the supernatural. He describes the simplicity and the cheerfulness of early Christian art, notwithstanding that it was an exclusively sepulchral art:—"The places that were decorated were the catacombs; the chapels were all surrounded by the dead; the altar upon which the sacred mysteries were celebrated was the tomb of a martyr. . . . It would seem but natural that the great and terrible scenes of Christian vengeance should be depicted. Yet nothing of this kind appears in the catacombs: with two doubtful exceptions there are no representations of martyrdoms. Daniel unharmed amid the lions, the unaccomplished sacrifice of Isaac, the three children unscathed amid the flames, and St. Peter led to prison, are the only images that reveal the horrible persecution that was raging. There was no disposition to perpetuate forms of suffering, no ebullition of bitterness or complaint, no thirsting for vengeance. Neither the Crucifixion, nor any of the scenes of the Passion, were ever represented; nor was the Day of Judgment, nor were the sufferings of the lost. The wreaths of flowers, in which Paganism delighted, and even some of the more joyous images of the Pagan mythology, were still retained, and were mingled with all the most beautiful emblems of Christian hopes, and with representations of many of the miracles of mercy."

It was not till the close of the tenth century that Christian art began to lose its originally peaceful character, and became familiar with images of suffering and torture. Then, with the first access of religious terrorism, art is found faithfully reflecting the gloomy impulses of the time. The Good Shepherd which adorns almost every chapel in the catacombs is no more seen; the miracles of mercy cease to be represented, and are replaced by the details of the Passion and the terrors of the Last Judgment. "The countenance of Christ became sterner, older, and more mournful. About the twelfth century this change becomes almost universal. From this period, writes one of the most learned of modern archæologists,* Christ appears more and more melancholy, and often truly terrible. It is indeed the *Rex tremendæ majestatis* of our *dies iræ*." Similarly, he shows how, with the revival of Greek literature and the knowledge of ancient art, religion ceased to be the mistress and became the servant of art. At first the religious conception was everything; æsthetic elements were scarcely considered. Then, in the first bloom of Italian art, the glorious creations of the Florentine school, we see the two united. Finally, the religious sentiment disappears, and the conception of beauty alone remains. Mr. Lecky considers Michael Angelo to mark

* Didron, "Iconographie Chrétienne."

this last stage of development. "Scarcely any other painter so completely eliminated the religious sentiment from art; and it was reserved for him to destroy the most fearful of all the conceptions by which the early painters had thrilled the people. By making the Last Judgment a study of naked figures, and by introducing into it Charon and his boat, he most effectually destroyed all sense of its reality, and reduced it to the province of artistic criticism. This fresco may be regarded as the culmination of the movement. There were, of course, at a later period some great pictures, and even some religious painters; but painting never again assumed its old position as the normal and habitual expression of the religious sentiments of the educated."

The main contributions of the progress of science to rationalism are reckoned by Mr. Lecky to be the destruction of the old theological conceptions of creation, and of the penal character of death. The science of geology he considers to have disproved both of these conceptions. It has "thrown back to an incalculable distance the horizon of creation," and "renovated and transformed all the early interpretations of the Mosaic cosmogony." Particularly "it has proved that countless ages before man trod the earth, death raged and revelled among its occupants; that it so entered into the original constitution of things that the agony and the infirmity it implies were known, as at present, when the mastodon and the dinotherium were the rulers of the world. To deny this is now impossible; to admit it is to abandon one of the root-doctrines of the past."

In speaking in this chapter, again, of the substitution of the idea of law for supernatural intervention, he has some notable remarks, showing how much he is separated from the materialism of the Positive school. Supposing, he says, it were proved, according to the rapidly growing morphological conception of the universe, that it was an organism rather than a mechanism—the result of gradual and slow evolution from within rather than of special interference from without, this would not really affect the theistic conclusion which has been drawn from the complexities and adaptations which it displays. It would merely change the form of its statement:—

"That matter is governed by mind—that the contrivances and elaborations of the universe are the products of intelligence,—are propositions which are quite unshaken, whether we regard these contrivances as the results of a single momentary exercise of will, or of slow, consistent, and regulated evolutions. The proofs of pervading and developing intelligence, and the proofs of a co-ordinating and sustaining intelligence, are both untouched, nor can any conceivable progress of science in this direction destroy them. If the famous suggestion that all animal and vegetable life results from a single vital germ, and that all the different animals and plants now existent were developed by a natural process of evolution from that germ, were a demonstrated truth, we should still be able to point to the evidence of intelligence displayed in the

measured and progressive development, in those exquisite forms, so different from what blind chance could produce, and in the manifest adaptation of surrounding circumstances to the living creature, and of the living creature to surrounding circumstances. The argument from design would indeed be changed ; it would require to be stated in a new form, but it would be fully as cogent as before. Indeed, it is perhaps not too much to say, that the more fully this conception of universal evolution is grasped, the more fully a scientific doctrine of Providence will be established, and the stronger will be the presumption of a future progress."

The chief moral development of rationalism which our author brings into view is the transformation which he believes to have come over the once universal conception of hell as a place of material fire and endless torture. He draws a vivid picture of the influence of this conception in early and mediæval Christianity, and then shows how entirely it has passed away from any but the coarsest representations even of orthodox theology. The hideous pictures in which the theological mind once curiously delighted, which kindled the gloomy genius of Tertullian with a wild flow of eloquence, and gave a darker hue to the awful statements of Augustine and Aquinas, which were once so carefully elaborated, and so constantly enforced in the pulpit, have been replaced by a few vague sentences on the subject of "perdition," or by the general assertion of a future adjustment of the inequalities of life. And this gradual and silent transformation of the popular conceptions he traces to the progress of the moral sentiment, to "the habit of educing moral and intellectual truths from our own sense of right rather than from traditional teaching." It is impossible, he says, for men who have attained to higher spiritual ideas of right and wrong, of truth and falsehood, than those which prevailed in the Patristic and mediæval Church, to rest in such coarse and hopeless representations of the future, and of the dealings of God with his creatures when they have passed beyond this life, as were formerly accepted without hesitation. The eternity of punishment is indeed still strenuously defended ; but the dogmatism with which it used to be so confidently expounded has entirely disappeared.

Our limits will only further permit us to advert to Mr. Lecky's fourth chapter, on "Persecution." His concluding chapters, on the relations of the rationalistic spirit to politics and commerce or industry, although unfolding some fine and interesting views, stand very much apart from the rest of the work. The lengthened chapter on "Persecution," however, is closely connected with his preceding expositions, and, of itself, eminently important. It is divided into two parts—the first entitled the "Antecedents of Persecution ;" the second, the "History of Persecution." In the first part he traces the dogmatic basis of persecution in the doctrine of exclusive salvation. Then we think of the horrible character of the religious persecutions

which have desolated the world, we are apt to attribute them to the character of the men who directed and encouraged them. It was customary for the *illuminiſts* of last century—Voltaire and his school—to explain them in this manner, by imputing them to the interested motives of the clergy, and their mere desire of upholding their power. But this is a very inadequate explanation. The higher explanation is, undoubtedly, to be found in the nature of the principles professed by these men, and for many ages by the Church universally:—

“If men believe with an intense and untiring faith that their own view of a disputed question is true beyond all possibility of mistake—if they further believe that those who adopt other views will be doomed by the Almighty to an eternity of misery, which with the same moral desperation, but with a different belief, they would have escaped,—these men will, sooner or later, persecute to the extent of their power. If you speak to them of the physical and moral suffering which persecution produces, or of the sincerity and unselfish heroism of its victims, they will reply that such arguments rest altogether on the inadequacy of your realization of the doctrine they believe. What suffering that men can inflict can be comparable to the eternal misery of all who embrace the doctrine of the heretic? What claim can human virtues have to our forbearance, if the Almighty punishes the mere profession of error as a crime of the deepest turpitude?”

The doctrine of the sinfulness of error, therefore, or, in other words, the doctrine that salvation is only to be found within a community or church professing a definite faith in certain Divine mysteries, is, according to Mr. Lecky, the basis and warrant of persecution. He maintains that such a doctrine necessarily springs out of the notion of hereditary guilt once universally diffused. “To a civilized man, who considers the question abstractedly, no proposition can appear more self-evident than that a man can only be guilty of acts in the performance of which he has himself had some share. The misfortunes of one man may fall upon another, but guilt appears to be entirely personal. Yet, on the other hand, there is nothing more certain than that the conception both of hereditary guilt and of hereditary merit pervade the belief and the institutions of all nations, and have, under the most varied circumstances, clung to the mind with a tenacity which is even now but beginning to relax.”

Of the fact there can be no doubt, that the Church of the fourth century, under the influence of Augustine, strongly embraced these notions. Men, and even children, “were doomed to eternal damnation, not only on account of their own transgressions, but also on account of the transmitted guilt of Adam. The only escape was entrance into the Church through the rite of baptism, through which this guilt was washed away.” The whole body of the Fathers are represented as pronouncing that “all infants who died unbaptized were excluded from heaven. In the case of unbaptized adults a few exceptions were admitted but the sentence on infants was

inexorable." Even Pelagius, "one of the most rationalistic intellects of the age," while denying the reality of hereditary guilt, did not venture to deny the necessity of infant baptism. The majority of the reformers, according to our author, made little or no advance in this direction. He admits, indeed, that Calvin was in some respects more favourable to unbaptized infants than Luther and his followers. He taught that "the children of believers were undoubtedly saved, and that the intention to baptize was as efficacious as the ceremony." "But these views," he adds, "arose simply from the reluctance of Calvin and his followers to admit the extraordinary efficacy of a ceremony, and not at all from any moral repugnance to the doctrine of transmitted guilt. No school declared more constantly and emphatically the utter depravity of human nature, and the sentence of perdition attaching to the mere possession of such a nature, and the eternal damnation of the great majority of infants." Such, in Mr Lecky's judgment, was the basis of the principle of persecution, whose melancholy history he sketches in the second part of his chapter on this subject. He traces the first workings of the principle in the edicts of Constantine against the Jews, and the enforced destruction of the heathen temples in the country districts, where the old religion still lingered, and from which it came to be called Paganism. It was only in the hands of Augustine, however, according to our author, that the theology of persecution became systematized. He draws a vivid but somewhat over-coloured portrait of this great theologian—one of the most striking passages in his work. We present it to our readers because we think that, notwithstanding its exaggerations, it brings out features in Augustine's character apt to be overlooked in the blaze of his acknowledged fame, which have yet a not insignificant bearing upon some of the principles of his theology. Mr Lecky writes:—

"A sensualist and a Manichean, a philosopher and a theologian, a saint of the most tender and exquisite piety, and a supporter of atrocious persecution, the life of this Father exhibits a strange instance of the combination of the most discordant agencies to the development of a single mind, and of the influence of that mind over the most conflicting interests. Neither the unbridled passions of his youth, nor the extravagances of the heresy he so long maintained, could cloud the splendour of his majestic intellect, which was even then sweeping over the whole field of knowledge, and acquiring, in the most unpropitious spheres, new elements of strength. In the arms of the frail beauties of Carthage, he learned to touch the chords of passion with consummate skill; and the subtleties of Persian metaphysics—the awful problems of the origin of evil and of the essence of the soul, which he vainly sought to fathom—gave him a sense of the darkness around us that coloured every portion of his teaching. The weight and compass of his genius, his knowledge both of men and of books, a certain aroma of sanctity that imparted an inexpressible charm to all his later writings, and a certain impetuosity of character that overbore every obstacle, soon made him the master intellect of the Church. Others may have had a larger share in the

construction of her formularies ; no one, since the days of the apostles, infused into her a larger measure of her spirit. He made it his mission to map out his theology with inflexible precision, to develop its principles to their full consequences, and to co-ordinate its various parts into one authoritative and symmetrical whole. Impatient of doubt, he shrunk from no conclusion, however unpalatable. He seemed to exult in trampling human instincts in the dust, and in accustoming men to accept submissively the most revolting tenets. He was the most staunch and enthusiastic defender of all those doctrines that grow out of the habits of mind that lead to persecution. No one else had developed so fully the material character of the torments of hell, no one else had plunged so deeply into the speculations of predestinarianism, very few had dwelt so emphatically on the damnation of the unbaptized. For a time he shrank from and even condemned persecution, but he soon perceived in it the necessary consequence of his principles. He recanted his condemnation ; he flung his whole genius into the cause ; he recurred to it again and again, and he became the framer and the representative of the theology of intolerance.”—(Vol. ii., pp. 22-3.)

But while the idea of persecution was thus elaborated by Augustine—tempered, it should be said, in his case, by practical recommendations to mercy—it was not till the twelfth and following centuries that the idea attained to its full prominence, and persecution became the recognised and systematic form of cruelty which it so long continued in the Church. The same causes of excitement which carried the horrors of witchcraft to their full height,—the symptoms of insurrection in European thought, and the growing jealousy of the Church,—developed the agency of persecution to a fearful extent. In 1208, Innocent III. established the Inquisition. In 1209, De Montfort began the massacre of the Albigenses. In 1215, the fourth Council of the Lateran enjoined all rulers to exterminate from their dominions all heretics. The results are dreadful to contemplate. The conclusion of Mr. Lecky is probably unexaggerated, that “the Church of Rome has shed more innocent blood than any other institution that has ever existed among mankind.” Nor, it is sad to think, did the Reformation in this respect at first greatly benefit mankind. The evil spirit passed over into the Protestant churches, not in all its practical virulence, yet with only slightly abated force, as a dogmatic instinct. Luther, Calvin, Knox, Cranmer, alike advocated the lawfulness of persecution. It was not till the rise of a higher philosophical and religious spirit, in the close of the sixteenth century, that the counteracting idea of toleration began to take hold of the European mind. Our author has dwelt chiefly upon the services rendered by Montaigne, Descartes, and Bayle in this respect, and these services certainly deserve every recognition. The keen, wide, lively intellect of Bayle did perhaps more than any other to carry forward the great movement. A treatise of his, comparatively unknown, on the text, “Compel them to enter in,” was among the


first clear expositions of the right and necessity—as men are constituted—of intellectual differences in religion, and the consequent duty of toleration to these differences. There is another great name, political and religious rather than philosophical, which Mr. Lecky should not have omitted to mention—that of the first William of Orange. No mind had so clearly seized the idea of toleration before the end of the sixteenth century, while no struggle did more to gain a practical footing for the idea than that which he headed and consecrated by his blood.

Mr. Lecky does full justice to the great names in our own country associated with the cause of religious freedom, and does not here omit the services of the liberal theologians of the seventeenth century. The succession of rational divines in the Church of England, which reckons among its numbers, besides Hooker, Chillingworth, and Hales, already mentioned, Jer. Taylor, in his earlier and better years, Milton, the Cambridge Platonists, and their successors, the divines of the Revolution, have as yet received but scanty justice for their labours in behalf of the highest religious thought. They have been overshadowed by the higher dogmatic fame of the Anglo-Catholic and Puritan theologians of the same century. The study of their works, however, will amply show that the stream of religious thought which is still flowing onwards, with gathering volume and vitality, is that which they commenced and carried forward amidst the extreme currents of opposing dogmatism, which alike sought to overpower them. These men were all more or less Rationalists in the right and comprehensive meaning of the word; men, that is to say, who saw, long before the world was prepared to see it, that theology must vindicate its place among other sciences, and at their head, not by any mere appeal to authority, however venerable, but by the ever renewed and more enlightened comprehension of the great truths of Revelation.

But we cannot pursue this interesting subject further at present, nor can we dwell longer on Mr. Lecky's volumes. We have confined ourselves mainly, in the latter part of our paper, to an exposition of his course of thought, not that we entirely agree with his representations, any more than with his original definition of Rationalism, but because we wished in some degree to "review" his work, and not merely make it a text for our own thoughts. We have said enough to show that genuine Christianity, and a genuine Christian theology, has nothing to fear from "the rise and influence of the spirit of Rationalism." Forms of belief which may no longer seem exerting a living influence over cultivated thought, should they even pass away, would leave Christianity powerful as ever. It is the very business of theology to sift them, and all theological

conceptions, anew in the light of Divine Revelation. Whatever is true in any of them will come forth from the trial purified and exalted—instinct with a more vigorous life than ever for the conviction of human sin, and of Divine righteousness and judgment. There never was a more unsound fear than the fear that Christianity will not stand every trial of the reason. The “wood, hay, and stubble” may indeed be consumed in the fire of this trial, but the “only foundation” will stand all the more secure after the fire of purification has passed over it. And indeed, may it not be said that the great truths of Christianity—the love of God our Father, the sacrifice of Christ our Saviour, and the ministering grace of the Holy Spirit our Sanctifier—shine more luminously in the higher intelligence, and exert a more real influence over the varied activities of the higher culture, in our generation than in many previous generations? Let it be that there is a wide sphere of modern philosophical thought which is working outside of Christianity, and whose radical principles seem in conflict with the great conceptions of Divine Personality, Mediation, and Influence, no less than with the essentially Christian conception of the Divine dignity of man, on which all spiritual philosophy rests,—let this be, Christianity has no need to fear, even in the face of such an enemy. For Positivism, temporarily powerful as it is, is only a partial growth of reason; a growth which has shot up into extraordinary vigour from the previous depression and neglect of the side of thought in which it originates, but which is destined to the extravagance and ultimate decay of all partial growths. Christianity transcends all such partial philosophies, both by the larger and more enlightened conception of reason which it holds forth to view, and by the more living Divine activity for human good which it carries in its bosom. One thing alone it has to fear, that is, the cowardice which shrinks from the freest light of inquiry, or clings, in the hour of danger, to props of sacerdotal or dogmatical tradition, which the advancing tide of thought may be destined to sweep away.

JOHN TULLOCH.



MODERN PORTRAIT PAINTING.

Life and Times of Sir Joshua Reynolds; with Notices of some of his Contemporaries. Commenced by CHARLES ROBERT LESLIE, R.A.; continued and collected by TOM TAYLOR, M.A. Two Volumes. London: Murray.

A NEW Life of Reynolds, the great English portrait painter, can hardly fail to awaken more than common interest at the present time, when good portraiture is at once very rare and very highly prized. It is not, however, our purpose in the present article to criticise the work of Messrs. Leslie and Tom Taylor, which has now been for several months before the public—we only venture to give expression to some thoughts suggested by the subject, bearing upon the art of portraiture in England in the present day.

Reynolds is rightly looked upon as the most complete and brilliant of our native English portrait painters. By the force of his genius he not only struck out a new path for himself in the country where Holbein, Antonio More, Vandyke, and Lely had lived before him, and had left so many of their master-works; but he made himself their compeer, and was able fearlessly to place his pictures in competition with the best examples of Venetian and Flemish art, and to extort from adverse criticism the admission that, whatever his technical deficiencies might be, they were more than compensated by the manifestation of a grace and purity that no portrait painter had exhibited before him.

• The English school still looks to Reynolds as its founder, and the exhibition of his pictures marks the time when art ceased to be an exotic plant in England. The school he founded was naturally based

upon his practice rather than upon his teaching; and few students probably paid much heed to his exhortations, or attempted to walk in the footsteps of Michael Angelo. The practice of Gainsborough also helped to direct the attention of the rising school to portraiture; for his exquisite feeling for colour, his taste and refinement, were only fully brought out in his portraits, which rivalled, in some respects, the masterpieces of Reynolds. The influence of these two painters predominated for many years over that of Hogarth and Wilson, their great contemporaries in figure painting and landscape; and to this day portraiture continues to be, in spite of its decadence, the most popular branch of art in England.

Portrait painting has always been, and, as long as the national character remains the same, will continue to be, a necessity in England. When we had no native artists, we invited the most accomplished painters on the Continent to take up their abode with us; and our country houses contain a rich collection of portraits of Englishmen by those Dutch and Flemish masters who were domiciled amongst us, as well as of the rarer portraits of princes and burghers by Titian, Velasquez, Rembrandt, and Vanderhuyt, which it has been the object of so many great proprietors to possess.

In the display of miniatures at South Kensington, comprising specimens of the art as it has existed amongst us for more than three centuries, and reflecting, as it does, the kindly affections, or the innocent vanity, of generations passed away, we have another proof, if evidence were wanting, of the absolute craving that exists in this country for portraiture of some kind,—good if it can be had, bad rather than none at all. We cannot live without it. The grandest portraits in existence were undoubtedly painted on the Continent, by the great Italian and Spanish artists:—kings and princes, knights and ladies sat for them; but England is not the less the true home of portrait painting. We love to look at the portraits of our distinguished and historical Englishmen, even more than to read about them; more than this, we must have the likenesses of our fathers and mothers and sisters, and we are not sparing of encouragement and money to the painter whose canvas shall at once speak to our affections. Portrait painters who would have starved on the Continent have attained position and fortune in England.

Yet, in spite of all the encouragement given amongst us to this branch of art, portrait painting has gradually but certainly declined since the days of Reynolds and Gainsborough. These masters, indeed, can hardly be claimed as modern painters. Reynolds especially, though in every sense an original artist, was drawn by the force of sympathy into the company of the old masters. If we could see his “Mrs. Siddons” or his “Duchess of Devonshire” in one of our Royal

Academy exhibitions, we should at once feel how little our portrait painters have in common with him, or he with them; yet so great was the influence of his example and success, that his manner was adopted by his immediate followers, and the portraits by Romney, Hoppner, Opie, Jackson, and Raeburn derive their excellences, and also their defects, from a reverential following of his practice. There was a certain breadth and force in their works, and especially a luminous flesh painting, the result perhaps of greater technical knowledge, which is conspicuously absent in the pictures of Lawrence and his successors down to the present time.

The advent of Lawrence was unfortunate for the cause of British art, and particularly damaging to portrait painting. A highly gifted and accomplished artist, he became the slave of fashionable caprice and vanity. The proof of his powers may be seen in such works as "Pius VII." and "Cardinal Gonsalvi," which in the finer elements of portraiture have never been equalled since; but generally speaking, his portraits, when compared with those of Reynolds, are but hollow masks of faces. His studio became a vast manufactory, of which he was not competent to assume the direction; that is, he had not the power, which Reynolds possessed, of making the work of his assistants his own by the force of a vigorous understanding and a few hours of well-directed labour. His brilliant capacity was impaired by the empty idolatry of the fashionable world which thronged to his painting-room; he vitiated the taste that Reynolds had created, and he founded the worst school of painting we have yet seen in England, in which affectation and emptiness reigned supreme, and which was happily destined to be destroyed by the first thoughtful student who should denounce its meretricious conventionalisms, and proclaim the study of Nature as the only safe ground of practice.

The state of portrait painting is, it must be admitted, better than it was forty years ago. The imitators of Lawrence have disappeared. Earnest students, like Watts and Boxall, have done much to restore and elevate the practice of this difficult branch of art: it is now apparently advancing with the general progress of the school; and while fully admitting, upon the whole, the fairness of the criticism applied to the portraits in every succeeding exhibition, we shall probably find that, though immeasurably inferior to those produced by Titian, Vandyke, and Rembrandt, they hold their ground as well, when compared with these masters, as the works of our figure and landscape painters do when they are put in comparison with the masterpieces of Paul Veronese and Nicholas Poussin. The production of a grand portrait is one of the highest efforts of the human mind. Among all the painters who have ever lived, only the greatest have succeeded in fixing upon canvas the impress of the soul, as well as the features of the indivi-

dual man or woman : and these are just the works that are priceless, that possess an undying interest for the learned and unlearned of each succeeding generation, far beyond that created by all the Martyrdoms and Assumptions that have ever been painted.

There has been very little intelligent criticism written upon the portraiture of the present day : that which passes for it in the columns of the daily press is, for the most part, but a mere sweeping denunciation of all modern portraits alike. As an example of the penny-a-line style that passes for criticism, we may quote from a morning journal, which enjoys the reputation of being well-informed upon all subjects connected with Art, a sentence at the close of two columns devoted to a notice of the last exhibition in Trafalgar Square, in which the portraits are thus introduced and dismissed :—"The portraits are more obtrusive than ever ; they scowl and grin and leer from every corner." We need not stop to inquire whether a sentence like this would be tolerated as criticism in any continental journal ; rather let us consider the assumptions of better informed critics, whose dicta are received by a public too careless to question their accuracy, and adopted at once as self-evident truths.

The most plausible suggestion which has been offered to account for the inferiority of modern portraiture has been set forth by the accomplished critic of the *Times*, and loudly echoed by many of those who deplore the present condition of this branch of art.

It is asserted that portrait painting should not be given over to a special class of painters, but that it should rather be the occasional practice of serious subject painters, who have studied the art of painting in its widest scope. By painters of this order, it is urged, portraits would be painted with greater knowledge and with higher aim ; the most famous, the noblest, and the most beautiful models only would be represented on canvas, and photography might be left to reproduce the countenances of the mighty commonplace world who invade and disturb the serenity of our exhibitions.

This suggestion, which at first recommends itself as pointing directly to the cause of our weakness, and to the remedy which may remove it, will be found, on very slight examination, to be based on a fallacy ; while any attempt to act upon it would prove to be utterly impracticable. Even admitting for a moment that commonplace ladies and gentlemen would be content to leave statesmen and soldiers and Court beauties in the hands of one or two historical painters, remaining satisfied themselves with the tender mercies of photography, it is not true, as a rule, that the best portraits have been the exceptional productions of historical painters, and not the everyday work of painters who have made portraiture the special branch of their practice. The claims, indeed, of Da Vinci, Raphael, and Titian

to the broadest dominion in the realm of art, will hardly be disputed, and their portraits, no less than their historical compositions, bear witness to the regal character of their intellect; but we cannot forget that Holbein, Velasquez, Vandyke, and Reynolds, were specially portrait painters, and only occasionally practised historical painting, and that their portraits are distinguished by the presence of all those high qualities of art, the absence of which in modern portraits we rightly deplore.

The degeneracy of our portrait painters could only be fairly ascribed to the special character of their occupation, if we found that the practice of their contemporaries, who are engaged in painting subject pictures and domestic pieces, enabled them to compete with, and occasionally to surpass, the productions which they also are probably inclined to hold in light esteem. But do we find that the few portraits painted by our most distinguished modern subject painters are in advance of the best of those displayed in our annual exhibitions? Because, in order to estimate fairly the modern practice, by which portrait painting is relegated to a special class of artists, we must inquire what sort of portraits our modern subject painters are capable of producing.

With the single exception of G. F. Watts, whose admirably drawn heads are apparently so many experiments in quest of the technical excellences of the Venetian Painters, we should have little hesitation in affirming that not a single living subject painter has produced a portrait in all respects as good as those which have been annually exhibited by the best of our portrait painters—by Watson Gordon, Grant, or Boxall. It is unnecessary here to refer pointedly to the failures of some of our most justly esteemed painters in their occasional trials at portraiture; but the essays in this direction of three painters occur to us at once in illustration of our position—namely, those of Landseer, Wilkie, and Haydon. Landseer is only weak when he is painting pictures like that of the Ellesmere family in “The Return from Hawking,” and those royal portrait subjects, painted by command, which bear on the face of them manifest signs of weariness; Wilkie notably failed when he turned from the domestic life of the Scotch peasantry, with which he fully sympathized, to paint life-sized portraits of William IV. and O’Connell; and Haydon proved the shallowness of his claims to rank with the Venetians, in the first place by his affected contempt for portrait painting, and afterwards by his egregious failure to produce a portrait above the level of sign-painting.

The superiority of the portrait painter in the branch of art which he follows is naturally to be expected; if he is a true painter, he has a special individualizing power which fits him for his work. This is a gift or faculty which he possesses in common with many men who

are not artists by profession—caricaturists, profilists, and others, who are in the habit of taking notes of human countenances: a faculty which, though absolutely essential to a successful prosecution of their profession, is certainly not confined to portrait painters among artists: it must have been possessed, in the most eminent degree, by many of those painters whose range has been the widest; but looking to the totally different circumstances and teaching of modern schools, the probability is that it will be most highly cultivated by those students in whom it is most strongly developed; and we find that in our own school, dating from the time of Reynolds to the present day, the painters who have succeeded in portraiture are those who have been impelled to make it a special branch of study.

Painting is probably the most difficult and varied of all the arts, and in its completeness can only be compassed by intellect and skill of the highest order. That Titian, Raphael, and Rembrandt painted portraits that are rightly reckoned among the priceless treasures of Europe, is a proof of their transcendent genius; but it is only the rounded intellect and consummate skill of a Titian that can grapple with all the infinite difficulties of painting; and ordinary capacities must be content to achieve excellence in some special branch of it,—figure painting, landscape, or portraiture. A very few names would exhaust the catalogue of those who, in the intervals of what is wrongly called more important work, could produce a portrait, the like of which no modern hand can approach. With a grand subject before him, and with a power over the mechanical difficulties of his art which no modern painter possesses, the great Venetian, heir to all the knowledge bequeathed in the works of his predecessors, was able to paint a portrait indeed; but we must not therefore infer that a subject painter of our days shall be competent to paint a better head than the man who has devoted all his days to portrait painting. Both are men of limited powers, and both have special aims; for even our figure painters all run in little separate ruts, out of which they seldom step without coming to a fall.

There are one or two considerations which may perhaps help us to account in some measure for the admitted inferiority of our portrait painters. One cause of weakness is the prevailing tone of modern society, which is totally opposed to the display of marked character in every shape. The statesmen, soldiers, and beautiful women, from whom Reynolds painted some of his noblest pictures, would probably now be esteemed vulgar, loud, and improper. It has been said that we are now, more than at any other period of our history, tied down by conventionalisms to a dead level of outward expression. That we all seem tending towards a family likeness, may readily be seen by examining the contents of a photographic album, wherein we find a

collection of similarly simpering portraits, among which it is difficult to distinguish between a king and a conjurer, or between a duchess and her children's nurse. Our portrait painters reflect pretty accurately the wishes of their sitters, who would shudder if they were represented otherwise than as acting their parts properly, according to the conventional ideas attached to them. A portrait painter who would paint men, and especially women, honestly, as Holbein did, would be likely enough to starve. Lines must be softened, expression must be modified, action must be decorous, colours must be subdued, or the prevailing taste of the fashionable world would be offended, and its patronage withdrawn. Those who have cultivated an acquaintance with the principle and practice of the old portrait painters, protest rightly against the modern violation of them—against that subserviency to the fashionable affectations of the day which in the last generation vitiated the splendid talent of Lawrence, and now-a-days spoils many a promising painter. An artist of transcendent ability might indeed reclaim the school; but short of this there seems little hope of any great advance at present: we can but point out and applaud honest effort wherever we find it, and continue to protest against affectation and weakness.

Another and a very important element of the weakness of modern painters is that lack of technical knowledge which indeed is common to all modern schools. A Venetian picture was not only an expression of great mental power, but the triumphant chemical result of a thoroughly understood process. We do not know how Titian and Bellini painted, but we know that in all the acres of canvas covered in the nineteenth century, not a single square inch could be found that in the slightest degree resembles their work in quality. All true painters of later times have sought and sighed for the attainment of a similar result. Rubens, who was one of the most brilliant painters in the world, was fascinated by the perfection of Venetian colouring, and it was during his Italian travel, and when he was under the influence of the impression made upon him by the great works around him, that his finest portraits were painted; and they were painted with an evident intention to inform himself of the process commonly practised by the Italians of the previous century. Reynolds sacrificed, or at least endangered, his future reputation by his continual experiments to attain the technical knowledge of painting which was possessed by the Italians, and the recovery of which he felt to be of such great importance. Earnest painters of our own day, sick of and disgusted with the leathery flesh-painting of the last generation, are ever intent upon the acquisition of that technical knowledge which alone can enable them to determine the value of grounds, the qualities of colours, and the action of oils and varnishes upon the surfaces on

which they paint. It is difficult to over-estimate the consequence of accurate knowledge on these points; but if we could place a Lawrence in juxtaposition with a Titian, we should immediately appreciate the immense importance of a right process of work, and the apparent inability of all modern painters to acquire the skill which the Venetians possessed, and which in their hands led to most harmonious and agreeable results.

Other drawbacks of a less appreciable kind are undoubtedly damaging to the art of portrait painting as at present practised in England. Among these may be mentioned the scale of prices and sizes. Certain conventional and often inconvenient sizes were settled by Lawrence, and his prices were fixed according to the size of the canvas, and without any reference to the merit of the work. This rule obtains to the present day, and the sooner it is abolished the better it will be for artists and sitters alike. If a portrait be a good portrait, it is not made one whit more valuable by being painted on a bishop's half-length instead of on an ordinary half-length canvas: it may be advisable to make the picture larger or smaller, but the question of a few inches on one side or the other should have nothing to do with price. In design or execution, a small whole-length is equal to the same picture set forth on a larger canvas, and there is only a small appreciable difference of labour; yet by the present system of prices adopted by portrait painters, there is a natural tendency to paint on large and inconvenient sized canvases, for the sole reason of claiming a higher price for the work. The old masters rarely had any canvas to let, and their portraits can generally be displayed in the rooms of an ordinary English mansion. No one would dream that they would be more valuable for being so large that they could only be properly hung up in a town-hall.

It is, however, more easy to point out deficiencies which are universally admitted, and to object to the criticism which the deficiencies call forth, than to indicate the direction from which we may derive hope of any great improvement in the school; but it is impossible to overlook the influence which, for good or evil, is now being exercised, and probably will be exercised through all future time, by the marvellous discovery of photography, and its application to the ends of painting. It is at least a question whether what is called pre-Raphaelitism in England is not due to this discovery, acting upon a few minds unconsciously impressed by the clear manifestations of important truths hitherto smothered under broad conventionalisms. The geology of landscape, for instance, was but little appreciated by painters, before they were taught by photography that the stratification of a rock cannot be expressed by a few vague and ignorant touches. No painter ever taught us so much about the Alps as the photographs of

Bissot or the small stereoscopic slides with which we are so familiar. Let us readily grant that photography is not a fine art itself, neither can it possibly take the place of any intellectual work; that it can exercise no power of selection, modify no expression, raise no emotion, evoke no sympathy; but although it can never raise us to the contemplation of any spiritual truth, it reproduces accurately the aspect of the material universe. Its effect upon the art of our generation has been great, not perhaps altogether good. So far, it has certainly given an undue impulse to the merely imitative faculty, while the noblest of human faculties, the imagination, has been in abeyance; but we cannot but think that its influence will tend in the long run to strengthen the latter, by endowing it with a more accurate and enlarged experience. We may at least be grateful that it has displaced a great deal of bad art. A photograph of the Coliseum or of Notre Dame is better worth having than the incorrect lithographs that used to stand for them; and the sun gives us a better idea of Vesuvius than the execrable *guache* drawings that were formerly exposed in the Neapolitan print-shops. And although we may regret the temporary eclipse, for such we trust it is, of miniature painting, we have little reason to deplore the annihilation of that cheap art of portraiture to which Mrs. Lirriper was sacrificed, and to the professors of which, as she says, "you paid your three guineas, and took your chance as to whether you came out yourself or somebody else."

But while the influence of photography may be clearly traced in the more careful study of form and detail which distinguishes our living subject painters from their immediate predecessors, our portrait painters have refused to profit by a discovery which might be to them an invaluable handmaid, while it never could become a successful rival.

Want of strong individuality is the characteristic of nearly all modern portraiture,—not only in the countenance but in the action and build of the figure. The old masters were all alive to the importance of making a portrait an absolute fact in the first place; and although Titian and Vandyke, each in his different way, by surpassing knowledge of treatment, ennobled the aspect of their sitters, they never sacrificed an iota of character. With modern portrait painters it is a common practice to sacrifice their strong faculties of observation to the prevailing taste of the day, or to the requirements of family affection and prejudice. Against this weakness photography bears witness in a hundred ways. Harsh, black, unpleasant, and ugly as you please, and utterly contemptible as a work of art, a photograph sets before us a true representation of the construction of the cranium, the exact set of the features, and the general build of the body, with


a marvellous accuracy that it is out of the power of any human hand to rival. No child will mistake it, the dullest clod will recognise it; yet it is but a dead image, lacking the spark of human intellect which gives life to the meanest work of the hand, and we have more sympathy with the work of a sign-painter than with it. But by the intelligent portrait painter, surely the representation which conveys the exact conformation of the skull, the air and custom, as it were, of the man in his bodily presence, rendered so faithfully by this wonderful agent, should be received thankfully and modestly; he should use it as Vandyke or Reynolds would gladly have used it, as a valuable aid, not as a base trammel. Only an accomplished painter can so use it; only he can translate its meaning. At present it is, for the most part, neglected by those who might well profit by its help, and debased by the modifications of sixth-rate miniature painters, so that many of our portrait painters are half afraid to make use of it, and altogether afraid to acknowledge its value.

That it must eventually be the means of raising the art of portraiture to a more subtle and higher rendering of truth, we firmly believe. As yet our contemporary portraiture shows very little evidence of this; but we may mention the admirable portrait-busts of Mr. Woolner in illustration of the effects produced by this wonderful discovery upon an active and sensitive mind. Mr. Woolner is probably wholly unconscious how many of the really valuable results of photography he has appropriated and embodied in his work. No portrait painter has yet seen or felt the true use of it, or we should have less reason to complain, year after year, of the portraits that are said to disfigure the walls of the Royal Academy. The infusion of that hard stern reality which we so greatly deprecate in a photograph is more than all else needed in modern portraiture, and though a second-rate painter may fear to become the slave of the process, and is ever ready to dread that his work may be superseded by its mechanical results, the truly accomplished artist, who has mastered the greater difficulties of his art, will recognise in photography the most valuable of those mechanical aids which from time to time have been placed at his disposal by the discoveries of science.

It is not however by the aid of photography, or by any special education, or by any acquired knowledge of technical processes, that any man can become a great portrait painter. A man of genius like Reynolds takes his position with the greatest certainty, though all our highly prized means and advantages have never been placed at his disposal. Such a man alone can make a right use of them, because he is so independent of them. Reynolds had no better teaching than that of a sixth-rate painter, and no greater opportunities of study and travel than such as are open now, at infinitely less trouble

and cost, to the great majority of students; yet he turned to wonderful account all his opportunities, while he did not scorn the meanest help: he derived the breadth and vigour of his style from the study of the Venetian and Flemish masters; but he never parodied their works: he made use of the mechanical assistance of his drapery-men, and gave life to their work by the faculty which enabled him to make it his own. His light was reflected by his immediate successors, and finally went out with Jackson, the last of our luminous flesh-painters. No painter since his day, not even Turner, whose highest ambition was to lie beside him in St. Paul's, has made so great a mark, or exercised so large an influence on the English school. The present school of portraiture needs above all things the direction and presence of a man of similar genius, if only to teach our painters how to throw aside the weakness which makes them the slaves of fashionable caprices, and to instruct them how to make use of the advantages, discoveries, and highly increased means of study, which of late years have been added to the general sum of their resources and experience.

LOWES DICKINSON.



THE EDUCATION OF WOMEN.

IF one were to pay heed to much of what has been said upon platforms, and written in pamphlets and newspapers, in the course of the last eight or ten years on the subject of the education of women, one might be led to think that it was a matter heretofore almost wholly neglected, and that the present generation was the first to discover that women require and deserve training suitable to the share that falls to them in carrying on the affairs of life. A very slight retrospect will show how far this is from being the case. We shall find, on the contrary, reason to believe, that from the very earliest times the bringing up of girls must have been a subject of anxious care, not only to the matrons, but to the men of every civilized nation. Thus, to go no farther than the Bible for examples, the pages of both Old and New Testaments exhibit many a bright portrait of a maiden armed with all the graces of her sex. If we turn to the other best known peoples of ancient days, we shall find equal reason to believe that they were not so indifferent to the education of their daughters as is sometimes rather too hastily assumed. The poets of Hellas would scarcely have ascribed their inspiration to the favour of virgins of Helicon, had they been accustomed to the society of women incapable of literary cultivation and refinement; nor, again, under that disadvantage could they have conceived the charming feminine characters with which their works abound. Nor would we readily believe that the advant-

ages of education were confined to a particular class of women, whose habits of life made them eager to adorn mind and body with every meretricious attraction. It is a point difficult to prove. Unhappily, it is too clear that the estimate of women at Athens was low, and the view taken of their duties as wives and mothers mean and degrading. And no doubt few would be found to rise above the low level assigned them, for women in all ages and countries adapt themselves very much to what men think of them. At the same time there could be no chance of our hearing of such exceptions as might occur, since Pericles must have expressed the general feeling of his countrymen when he said that nothing was more creditable to a woman than to be never heard of among men. But it does not follow from this that we have no data to go upon. Great men do not spring from the wombs of ignorant and foolish mothers. Just as the orator found the glorious deeds of her sons redound to the glory of Athens, so we may reasonably infer that Hellenic soldiers, statesmen, and poets owed much to those who bore them, and praise the mothers in the children. The same argument might be used of the matronage of Rome. But it is not our present business to argue the matter. We would merely indicate that there are grounds for thinking that more regard was paid, and with more success, to the education of women in past ages than is commonly supposed, and remind our readers that while they are sure to hear of all the evil that can be said against the sex, and find the names of the most profligate women recorded, history is likely to be silent concerning the great bulk of those virtuous and accomplished matrons who, content with bearing the conquerors of the world intellectual or world material, lived quiet and unknown under the shadow of their homes. We may pass to the more immediately interesting subject of the education of women in our own country.

The pretty story of King Alfred's childhood—his coveting an illuminated copy of a Saxon poem, and winning it of his mother by learning to read it—may be fairly taken as typical of the way of English mothers with their sons. There is perhaps no nation on the face of the earth where women have more uniformly claimed or better exercised their natural rights in the bringing up of their offspring. Few men have attained to greatness among us on whose character this tender nurture of early years has not left deep marks, few who have not openly and thankfully acknowledged the debt. But it may be again inferred that women who could so acquit themselves of their teaching duties could not have been rude or uneducated. And it must be said that the chroniclers of England have done them considerable justice. Our annals teem with the names of royal and noble dames renowned for every feminine accomplishment, as well as

those higher qualities of soul without which accomplishments are worth little—wisdom, tenderness, and purity. Even the rude Norman times abound with such names, and to cite examples would be merely to crowd our pages to no purpose. Should it be replied that these were after all merely exceptions, proving nothing of the average condition of the sex, we are not without the means of showing that the education of women was not neglected in the ranks of ordinary life. Take, for instance, the Paston Letters—a collection the authenticity of which it is a marvel indeed should ever have been questioned. To that invaluable repertory we find the ladies of the family contributing their full share. Indeed, it seems to have been the custom of the men of that house to have consulted them on all their most important affairs. They not only write to their mothers or wives concerning their domestic matters, but keep them well informed of the shifting politics of those troubled times. They appear seldom to have taken any step for the management or protection of their property, or even in their relations with the rival factions of the day, without asking their advice. The ladies, on their side, appear to have well earned the confidence reposed in them. Nothing can be more prudent and courageous, at the same time more tender and womanly, than the general tenor of their letters. It is truly surprising, in the midst of the terrible civil war which was then laying England waste, and in which their husbands, sons, or brothers took an active share, to see them so unruffled by terror or anxiety. Whatever they felt they kept to themselves. When occasion called them to act, they proved equal to the demand. Nor were they wanting in those lighter arts which make home cheerful in times of peace. Thus there is a pretty letter from a lady to a nobleman, in lines much above the common run of *l'arts de société*.* No maiden of modern days could write letters to her lover excelling in modesty, simplicity, and tenderness, those of sweet Margery Brews to John Paston, “her Valentine.”† And one might search all history in vain for a more perfect pattern of wife and mother than Margaret Paston, mother-in-law of Margery. In the very first letter of the collection we are told of her entertaining her future husband “with gentyl cher in gentyl wyse.” A year or two after her marriage she commends herself to him “with all her simple herte.” When he is sick, she would have him home “lever dan a newe goune, zow it wer of scarlette.” She is able and bold enough to make good her husband’s house in his absence against the wild retainers of the Duke of Suffolk. There is indeed something very touching in tracing, in the long series of her letters, this gentle creature’s career through wedlock into widowhood. To the last, for all her troubles and losses, she is the same bright Margaret, well worthy

* “Paston Letters,” vol. ii., p. 304.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 214-15.

of the husband who, after they had lived more than twenty years together, writes a merry letter in rhyme to his "own dear sovereign lady." From the same source we get some curious information as to how girls of good birth were brought up in those days. There is no hint of their ever being sent to a convent to be educated. The most common plan seems to have been to place them under the charge of some friend or relative, they in return, besides some payment for their board, making themselves useful in the house. Thus among the memoranda of Agnes Paston—who it may be inferred* was a sensible woman, since we find her elsewhere making a special request to her son's tutor "to belash him" unless he were more diligent—is one to this effect:—

"And sey Elyzabt' Paston that she must use hyrselfe to werke redyly as other Ientylwomen don', and su'what to helpe hyrselfe therw't. It'm to pay the Lady Pole xxvjs. viijd. for hyr bord."*

So, in another place, Sir John Heveningham desires Margaret Paston to take Anneys Loveday as a boarder.

Succeeding generations appear in this respect to have deserved equally well of their country. The era of the Tudors was fruitful of graceful and accomplished women. But with the Stuarts came evil times. That ill-omened race, conscious of their defective title to the crown, did all in their power to degrade and brutalize the people over whom they were placed. Accordingly they deliberately encouraged ignorance and vice in both sexes. The royal daughter of Henry VIII., under the like disadvantage, had comported herself in far different wise. She imperiously asserted her right, and if she did not succeed in silencing all question, at least made all men obey her, while they wondered at the vigour and wisdom of a woman. But there was no such nobleness to support the poor recreant who succeeded her. Under him chiefly came in that withering baseness of morals which poisoned a large part of English society for the ensuing hundred and fifty years, and of the effects of which we are not yet rid. Culminating under the second Charles, it was too slowly worked out. Indeed, in coarseness of thought and speech, the ladies of the earlier half of the last century were almost a match for the women of Charles's Court, although their lives were probably less actually profligate. But the records of the Courts of the four Georges are not pleasant, and it is poor honour to have shone in any one of them. George III. and his Queen stand out brightly in the unsavoury story, but few of their courtiers deserve to range with their master and mistress. Under these unfavourable circumstances, no wonder that women sank rapidly downwards in the scale of refinement. The tone of gallantry which

* "Paston Letters," vol. i., p. 143.

prevailed in the time of the Stuarts sprang from no true respect : it thinly covered a settled design to degrade women into mere instruments and bond-slaves of lust. If under Anne there was some attempt at improvement, it was too short and fleeting to produce much effect. The Queen's own weak character and gross personal habits did much to counteract the efforts made by such men as the writers in the *Spectator* to improve the minds of the women of their day. Some names remain, it is true, to attest the existence of clever and cultivated women among our great-grandmothers, but they fall sadly beneath the Jane Greys and Margaret Pastons of earlier days. Indeed, I know few things more sadly indicative of decay in manners than a comparison of the letters of the ladies of the Paston family with those of the famous Lady Mary Wortley Montagu. For grace, simplicity, and love—for the wisdom of—

“ Perfect women, nobly planned
To guide, to counsel, and command,”—

we find substituted the heartless gaiety and cold sparkle of the witty woman of the world, fettered to a husband to whom she had no love to give, and surrounded by a circle of people whose admiration she coveted, but for whom she had not a spark of true regard. You may see the character of the two eras in their dress. Look at the sober dame of the fifteenth century, as she lies by her husband's side with her comely wimple and decorous robe, falling evenly to her feet, and compare with her the belle of the eighteenth, all powder, patches, paint, and hoops. It is true, it became a fashion with women to be learned. But learning does not mean education in the true sense of the word, especially in the case of women, and it is very doubtful whether they were any the better for it. Johnson, true to the cause of letters, bestows his praise on the Mrs. Carters and Mrs. Montagus of his day, but it is pretty clear he does not much like them. Miss Burney and Miss Hannah More seem to have been the only literary women for whom he really cared. And if there were, as God forbid there should not have been, many excellent women in those days who yearned after better things, the terrible storm of the French Revolution left them no chance of effecting much good. We are only now getting far enough from that fearful time to estimate—whatever good may have since sprung from it—the stern check it imposed for many long years on the progress of learning and art. Scott excepted, even the poets who adorned that period were little known or appreciated till some years after the struggle was over. The number of students at the universities dwindled down; there were few or no great writers; all men's thoughts and energies were spent on the war. Prosperous for a few, the times for the bulk of the people were hard, and there was little money to spend on the teacher. If sons fared

badly in this respect, daughters, as is the way of the world, fared worse, and probably at no time in our history was the education of women generally at a lower point than in the time of George IV., whether as regent or king. Dancing, the merest smattering of drawing, French, and music, were all that was taught a girl. As for more solid accomplishments, they were, generally speaking, utterly neglected. An album fifty or sixty years old is of dreary things the dreariest. Trumpery verses, puny little copies of a drawing-master's stock-in-trade of flowers, fruit, and impossible cottages, make them up. Queen Adelaide, willing enough to set an example of better things, was too short a time in the position to do so, and suffered too much from broken health. A turn for the better was reserved for her successor.

The reign of our present Sovereign, in many respects felicitous, has been in none more so than the attention which has been paid to the condition of women in all ranks of society. Time indeed it was that something should be done. The misery and degradation of the lives of too many women was and is a stain upon the manhood of the country. With regard, however, to the matter with which we are at present concerned—their education—the favourable change of which we speak is due not merely to the fact of there being a woman on the throne, but very much to the personal character of the Queen and her Consort. Both began their career by taking a hearty interest in arts and letters: both were by temperament and education inclined to domestic life, adorned by becoming and refined pursuits; neither cared for the riotous pleasures or barbaric splendour of vulgar royalty. Above all, both were influenced by a genuine desire to improve the condition of the poor. The late Prince Consort will be always and deservedly remembered for his care for the poor. In all his efforts to help them he was seconded by the Queen, and the sight of the Royal pair busy in doing good unquestionably wrought an incalculable effect throughout the country, especially among women. It reminded them of the mighty share they hold in alleviating the sufferings and promoting the welfare of the world: it encouraged those who had hitherto worked or yearned to work in secret to come out into the light of day, and openly and publicly ask for help in every department in which it was needed. The stir and movement thus aroused had the best effect on their minds. They began to perceive in how many points their education had been defective—how formal, superficial, and showy were the accomplishments on which they had most prided themselves. For a woman who does not go beyond her own home and little circle of friends and acquaintance scarcely ever has an opportunity of taking true measure of herself. She never gets that rough contact with other

minds which soon teaches her brothers to find their level. People are—and quite rightly, for the drawing-room is not a fit arena for trials of that sort—too kind, too civil, too careful of her feelings to give her a chance of finding out what her education is really worth, how far it has succeeded in arming her with refinement, self-control, and aptitude for business. But as soon as societies began to be formed in which women took a leading part, and that in public, they quickly learnt that something more was needed than they had been accustomed to receive from their teachers. It is too true that there must be added to this the pressure of actual need. The order of Providence has been upset by emigration. Thousands of women who might have naturally looked to marriage for support in comfort and quiet, have been forced to earn their bread for themselves. Many have had the dreadful choice to make between want and evil courses. Men, it must be owned, have not done all their duty in the matter. It cannot be denied that, take society throughout, women have not been of late thought and spoken of with the respect due to them. There is too much ridicule, too much contemptuous talk. If, as is probable, there is less profligacy among the upper ranks of society than formerly, it has without doubt fearfully increased in the commercial and labouring classes. Therefore, when we read in the newspapers tales of brutality to women that seem to grow daily more terrible, we must regard it, as indeed crime is always to be regarded, as the outward sore which indicates the poison within, poison affecting the whole body politic. Nor have these signs of the times obtained from men the attention they deserve. There has been talk, but little has been done. Thus various circumstances have combined to urge those women, whom God has blessed with leisure and ability, to come forward and attempt to do something effectual for the benefit of their own sex. And the first and chiefest need they found was that they should be better taught. For this, then, there quickly arose a cry.

At first, it was not so much an articulate cry as a scream. In every great movement of humanity it will be found that the wiser part of mankind are not the first to come forward and declare themselves, especially where there is a grievance or a want. Not that they wait to see how the wind blows, but what they discuss in private, and are waiting prudently, may be over-prudently, for a fit occasion to bring before the world, some incautious or mischievous friend blazes abroad, and if it be a matter of general interest, forthwith there is a conflagration. Never was this more the case than in the present instance. It is now, we believe, some ten or twelve years since the public mind began to be aroused on various points regarding the state of women both in this country and the colonies. Great complaints were made of the incompetence of ladies of the present day to conduct their house-

holds. They did not know, it was said, how to cook a dinner, cut out a frock, or rule their maidens. Really at one time a wife must, we think, have been in a state of nervous excitement every time dinner was put on table, or a new set of pocket-handkerchiefs came home for her husband. Then their taste was laughed to scorn. Gaudy, ill-planned, yet not cheap furniture, crowded their drawing-rooms, while garments of preposterous shape and astounding colours disfigured their bodies. It must be owned there was some truth in these charges. In some degree, under the best circumstances, they will always be true. Few women, or men either, will ever be trained to thorough skill or taste in any science or accomplishment, and the general condition in matters like dress or furniture will depend on how far the leaders of fashion may be competent to their task. But the outcry raised was simply foolish, because it said that everything as it was was simply wrong. Then was brought forward the subject of the inequality of the sexes. Women were starving at home for want of husbands, while in the colonies men were pining and in rags for lack of wives. The panacea, at least as far as the old country was concerned, was to be what was called the emancipation of women. Hitherto it must be supposed women had been slaves. Most men will rather incline to the view of the little Sunday school boy, who, upon the teacher asking the class to prove from Scripture that men may not have more than one wife, called out, "I know, teacher—No man can serve two masters." However, emancipation it was to be. What was desired seemed to be that a husband and wife, living in one house, with every interest in the world in common, might have separate purses. Women did not appear to see that although this might mend one great and growing evil, it might end in bringing in another and far greater one. Unscrupulous men might altogether deny the duty of maintaining wives whom the law permitted to earn a living for themselves. The census of 1861, proving that women outnumbered men in England far more than had been supposed, fanned the flame higher and hotter. There was a perfect storm of meetings, speeches, pamphlets, magazines. In the midst of all this, the voice of sense and reason could be scarcely heard. But in the meantime the fruit of the work of wise and self-denying women, which had been quietly going forward all the time, began to show itself. It was seen that mothers' meetings, cottage flower shows, parish sewing societies, well-organized schemes of emigration, and, to turn to more sad and serious matters, refuges and penitentiaries, were beginning to produce a sensible improvement. More than this, the general tone of the sex grew better. Among women of rank and station there was less folly, less frivolity and bad taste. But the improvement was chiefly discernible in London, where lived the greater number of the more sensible women

who were trying to help their sisters. In the provinces, at any rate among the commercial classes, carelessness of the wants of their neighbours, or at the best misdirected energies, and in their own dress and houses a foolish love of finery and show, still reigned predominant. It was seen that the root of all this lay in ignorance. Thoughtful women perceived that no large and well-directed attempt could be made to avert the evils which are threatening the whole fabric of society through the great wrongs their sex are undeniably suffering in our day, until the general body were better taught, and so not only knew better what to ask for, but made their appeal in a more clear and united voice. They therefore left for a while their other pressing tasks to go on quietly under the hands of those to whom they were more especially committed, and of which we have the past three or four years heard comparatively little, in order to urge the public mind to consider the need of improving the education of women. Thus what was in the beginning a confused scream, became a clear and definite cry for help.

Before entering upon the detail of what they demanded, and what has been done to meet their demand, it will be well to examine what grounds of complaint existed, and what end it is desirable to have in view. It is impossible, we think, to deny that, some twenty years ago, girls were very badly taught. Whether they were sent to school or brought up by governesses at home, the result, as has been already pointed out, was very slight and meagre. Now we are not going to make an onslaught on either governesses or girls schools; yet we cannot help saying that, some years back, both were as bad as they could be. This was due by no means so much to their own fault as to the parents of their scholars. People engaging a governess asked and expected her to teach their daughters a whole round of accomplishments. Even well-educated persons, whose attention had been long turned to other pursuits, and who were busy with the cares of life, forgot how impossible it was for one person to teach more than one or two things well. Perhaps we must add that the forgetfulness was in some measure wilful, sparing the purse. So the poor governess had to teach subjects with which she was herself imperfectly acquainted, and could only just keep ahead of her pupils. Many a poor girl must have had trying work of it; pupils all day, indoors and out, never got rid of but in bed, and to have to give to the next lesson in *German* or *Italian* the precious hour or two of solitude before going to rest. How could the pupils get much real teaching from one so jaded and weary? How could we wonder if to be a governess was the last thing a well-bred and high-principled girl would take to, yet the ready resort of unscrupulous poverty? As for schools, things were, if possible, yet worse. Every girl was expected to be taught everything. Her own measure of taste and abilities was the last thing thought of by her

parents. Knowledge and skill could be put into her, they considered, like water into a glass or sugar into a basin, and they expected to pay for it at so much per pound. The poor schoolmistress was obliged to put everything she could think of into her prospectus, and find, somehow or other, an hour or two in the course of the week for every subject. They were taken in routine, no matter how inconsistent and repulsive. Here is an example. Two little girls of thirteen and eleven years old, at a first-rate London boarding-school, spent a Sunday with a married cousin. At breakfast on Monday morning she asked them what they would have to do when they got back. "Oh, the first lesson is in chronology." And the next? "Oh, the next is in conchology."* But the mistress was not to blame. If parents insisted on their daughters receiving a smattering of every branch of human knowledge, she must obey. It is easy to say, "Do what is right, and never mind consequences;" but when a lady has taken a large house and premises, and has rent and baker's bills before her eyes, it is not so easy to defy the world. Not easy, even where there is a fair standard to appeal to; least of all where there was none but the judgment, or misjudgment, of parents. Men who teach boys are in a far better position. They, if they have been at either Oxford or Cambridge, have their place in the honour classes to point to in testimony of their having bestowed attention on the tasks in which they are engaged. If not, they can still challenge the example set by the able scholars who are placed at the head of all the most important schools, and argue that they are not likely to be wrong in following in the steps of guides so competent to lead them. But a lady had no such support. She had absolutely nothing but the chance of parents forming a right estimate of her abilities—an estimate which must be formed chiefly from the reports of a child, certainly inexperienced and ignorant, perhaps vain, foolish, and malicious into the bargain—to distinguish her from the female charlatan in the next street, whom the possession of a few hundred pounds, and the desire of butter for her bread, had moved to put a plate with "Academy for Young Ladies" on her door, without knowledge, without accomplishments, without liberality, but with just sense enough to keep a good table for her pupils, and to see that her half-starved, worn-out assistants occupied them from hour to hour throughout the day with a pretence of instruction. This is no overcharged description of what many and many a girls school was and is throughout the country. It is the harder to combat, because every girls school is a private speculation, and that, too, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, a speculation not very flourishing. No woman takes to the business of teaching girls except under pressure of absolute necessity.

* Fact. It occurred at the writer's own table.

The most successful schoolmistresses do not realize more than a very modest competency to retire upon in old age; few get more than daily bread. Often there is an idle scamp of a husband in the background, who is not ashamed to be the parasite and cankerworm of his own wife. Every one knows how different it is with men. The profession of a schoolmaster, if sometimes irksome and laborious, is, and always has been in England, except by the man's own fault, dignified and honourable—often, indeed, in the case of clergy, leading to the very highest preferments in the Church. Many masters of ordinary private schools, after holding a position of great respectability among their neighbours, retire with good fortunes. This excellent state of things is secured, almost beyond fear of change, by the great position and growing influence of the two universities in the country, and their sending their most promising sons not merely to the old foundations of Henry VI. and Edward VI., and the great schools which have sprung from the generosity of private persons, but even to such as have no resources beyond the capital of an individual. Ladies have no such helps and encouragements; and perhaps the very first thing to be done in order to improve the education of girls is to add dignity to the calling of their teachers. Many accomplished and attractive women are at the head of girls' schools here and there throughout the country: such no doubt enjoy the respect and affection they deserve from their pupils and their friends. Many charming girls whose homes are poor, or who have been left in orphanhood, go out as governesses for the sake of food and shelter. These too are sometimes—often, let us hope—treated with parental care and kindness. But it is impossible to say that their calling is regarded by the public at large as more than tolerably respectable—certainly not dignified. Take the sure test of marriage. If a man—say a clergyman, barrister, or military or naval officer—marry a lady who has been engaged in teaching, it is at least a question among his friends whether he may not have made something of a *mésalliance*. Certainly he is not thought to have married well. It is probable that very few such marriages occur at all. Far different is it with the other sex. Tutors of colleges and schoolmasters have, if one may venture so to put it, the pick of the matrimonial market. Dine at a house in a provincial town where there is a grammar school, and ten to one but the master's wife is one of the prettiest, sprightliest, and most ladylike women in the room. Why there should be this difference is hard to see. If a woman is ever to earn her own bread at all, surely there is no way so honourable as bringing up children of her own sex to be good wives and mothers: for this, after all, rightly and generously understood, is the true end of the education of women. However, a change in the public estimate of this matter will not be wrought by argument or

even example, and we are certainly not prepared to recommend an ardent youth to go and marry a governess because she is a governess, in the hope of converting the little world of eligible suitors. It will only be brought about by the slow but sure exclusion of unworthy persons from the office of teacher. How this may be done is a question. We are in hopes that a process is already begun which may do something towards it. It is not impossible that time may produce something of a sisterhood to which none may be admitted who cannot produce satisfactory proofs of fitness, not merely in acquirements, but in character, temper, and manners. However, be the method what it may, once draw a clear line between fit and unfit women, let the business of teaching girls once become, in the true sense of the word, a *calling*, upon which those who have any worthy view of their duties will not enter until they have been declared by competent authority able and fit to be invited to it, and it will henceforth become honourable. There will then be no difficulty in finding candidates in every way worthy of an office so important and so truly noble.

Next, perhaps, in importance to raising the *status* of teachers comes a better adaptation of subjects to the tastes and capacities of different girls. Some things no doubt ought to be taught to every girl who is to receive the education of a lady—French, for example, and botany (we assume English and sewing), and perhaps chemistry enough for a little kitchen lore. But why, in the name of common sense, should Italian and German be forced on a girl who shows no ability whatever for acquiring languages, or drawing and music on one who has neither eyes nor ears? Each may be tried, and the rudiments, especially of drawing, to some extent mastered; but when proficiency is become hopeless, surely it is better to give them up. Probably nothing has contributed more to make men fight shy of drawing-rooms than the peril of being compelled to listen while a poor girl drums out her little exercise on the piano in unsteady time, with bungling fingers and dull touch. Drawing at any rate hurts nobody, and the commonest sketches of scenery are interesting to the sketcher and her friends. Still, pursued without prospect of success, it becomes a waste of time. What clever girls require most is to be encouraged to cultivate a decided taste for something, just as clever boys make their choice between classics and mathematics. Without indeed being clever, there are few girls worth having who would not be willing to take up something or other, and give their minds to it, if they were only shown the way. No doubt there are girls, no less than boys, incorrigibly idle or stupid, but they are probably fewer in proportion to the whole; and those who tend that way have rather a better chance. More choice is set before them at school; and a good many of the tasks to which they may turn themselves are hardly less

attractive than mere amusements. But it is seldom that a girl has the right motive for industry placed before her. All the exhortations she gets, whether from parents, friends, or teachers, commonly come to this, that she is to fit herself for display. The school exhibition at the end of the half-year, the mistress's party, the drawing-room at home, are represented to her as the arena of feminine strife, in which she is to distance her rivals, and her reward is to be a good marriage. The word *good*, it must be observed, is used in a sense as thoroughly commercial as on 'Change. The duty of cultivating the abilities God has given her, of fitting herself for the work of life, is rarely or never placed before her mind, unless she is lucky enough to hear now and then a sensible sermon at church. Is it Utopian to think that good motives will avail more than bad ones to make girls diligent? God forbid! the world is in a poor way indeed if it be so. But we do not believe it. We have ourselves been fortunate enough to know at least one girls school which has obtained remarkable success in every sense of the word, without any vicious incitements to get on being laid before the scholars. Besides, what is true of boys may, in this respect, be safely referred to as a guide to what we may look for in the case of girls. Few persons conversant with the subject will deny that considerable good has been effected by the higher tone taken with boys about their lessons. The effect is not always to be seen at the time, but comes out in after life. Now girls are not less ready than their brothers to hear the voice of the wise—do not in ripeness of years less require the consolation and encouragement of duty to support them under the trials of life. There is then no reason for substituting inferior motives for the truest and highest, in order to persuade girls to use their time well. Teach them to think of pleasing neither themselves nor others, but only God; teach them that their tastes and feelings, kept under due control, are the natural indications marked by His hand of what it will be of most account to turn their minds to; teach them that if, as becomes women, they long to charm all about them into respect and love, the surest way of doing so is the diligent and unconscious discharge of the duty of the hour. We do not believe that any one teaching in this spirit would find them unwilling or unapt scholars. It is in this spirit that we would be understood in saying that the true end of the education of women is making good wives and mothers. This is a very different thing from saying that marriage is the end of life to a woman. For the qualities, and especially the manners, that make a good wife and mother are essential to every woman, married or unmarried. Why is it that old maids are so often crabbed and useless creatures? Often, no doubt, disappointment has much to do with it; yet in most assuredly be found to have arisen from

in youth no less than in age. Every one must know old maids who are as useful in their generation and as much beloved by those about them as any married woman, and this by the exercise of precisely the same virtues as make a wife a blessing to her husband and children—prudence, kindness, and a sweet tongue. If the old Winchester motto, “Manners makyth man,” be true for boys, truer is it if possible that “Manners makyth women;” and she who, teaching girls, keeps this in view, will best succeed in bringing them up to be capable of making their homes cheerful, happy, and innocent, and to live to do God service.

It is full time, however, to turn to what has been actually done to meet the just and reasonable demands of the sex. The first decisive attempt to step out of the old routine was the establishment of ladies colleges. These were set on foot, we suppose, with the view of opening to girls an opportunity of carrying their education to a somewhat higher point—to stand, in short, to ordinary girls schools in something the same relation as the universities stand to grammar schools. Much good has undoubtedly been done by these institutions. Yet it may be questioned whether their system is such as one would desire to see generally, or even in any case, adopted elsewhere; for the lectures are chiefly conducted by men, an arrangement which surely nothing but the strongest necessity can recommend. There is something to our mind as unseemly and unnatural in girls being taught by men as in committing boys after infancy to the charge of women. It is incredible, impossible that it should in the long run work well. However, all honour is due to the original founders of the institutions which have been so largely useful in educating the young women of London, nor should we advert to that part of their system which seems unsuitable for general adoption, were it not a fact that this particular detail is just the one which is being widely employed. We have before us a prospectus of a large girls school in a provincial town, in which the names of no less than nine self-styled “professors” are paraded before parents, no one of whom can boast the smallest distinction in any particular. Now what possible advantage can this school offer to outweigh the great disadvantage of putting men to teach girls? Take every-day teaching for every-day girls, and the only thing they cannot be taught by their own sex as well as by men is perhaps drawing. Take languages: these are surely much better taught them by women than men. To employ a French *master* is especially absurd. A French woman is as a rule higher in the scale of humanity than a French man, possesses more diligence, firmness, and sense of duty than he. However, even if it were otherwise, and granting—what is not the case—that girls taught by men were clearly and widely better than their competitors in knowledge of their subjects, we question

whether the probable loss does not overbalance all possible or actual gain. Then further, unless there is some clear and unalloyed advantage to gain, it does seem hard, under the pressure there is now-a-days on too many women, and the great dearth they find of becoming occupations, to take away what may be fairly claimed as their own.

But leaving this question, and returning to the detail of what has been done: in the year 1863 application was made to the Oxford delegacy and the Cambridge syndicate for conducting the examination of students not members of the universities, to know whether girls could be admitted to the examinations, in places where local committees would undertake to provide properly for their reception. The answer was the only one that could be given, viz., that boys only were contemplated in the scheme, and that before it could be extended to girls, the matter must be brought formally and in a public manner before the universities. But the Cambridge examination for that year was approaching, and with the help of the London local committee for Cambridge, arrangements were made for conducting an examination of girls, at the expense and under the responsibility of a committee of ladies, simply as an experiment; and the syndicate were asked to allow the girls to use the examination papers prepared for the boys, and to submit them to the university examiners. The reply to this request was that "the syndicate have agreed to provide extra copies of the examination papers, and to direct their examiner in London to give these out to some responsible person appointed by your committee, on each occasion after he shall have given them out to the boys. The syndicate decline to *order* the examiners in the various subjects to look over the answers of the girls, but leave it to your committee to make what arrangements you please with the examiners." Of course no difficulty was raised in that quarter. Notice was given of the examination to schoolmistresses and others likely to send in girls. Although scarcely six weeks were left for preparation, eighty-three girls presented themselves. The result was completely successful. In all the subjects they took in they acquitted themselves quite as creditably as the boys, arithmetic alone excepted. That they should fail in arithmetic was not only to be expected, but inevitable. Besides the fact that arithmetic is more difficult to girls than boys, it is likely that their teachers, generally speaking, never dreamed of the precision and facility in working sums required to pass an examination in this subject with credit. Even with teachers of boys the same was in some degree the case at first. The proportion of boys rejected in arithmetic was much greater in 1858 than in 1863, and the improvement was very gradual from year to year. Our space does not permit us to make quotations from the very interesting report issued by the ladies committee on the occasion, and it is the

less needful as it still may easily be procured, and is worth perusal. Encouraged by this success, the committee proceeded to draw up a memorial to the universities, asking formally for the admission of girls to the examinations. It was signed by no less than a *thousand* teachers, besides many distinguished persons interested in the subject, and then sent to the vice-chancellors of either university. Of course there was great diversity of opinion. Outside the universities the proposal was met with a good deal of ridicule, of no account except that it was, in several cases, of a nature to be insulting to the feelings of women. Within Cambridge itself—and we believe the same to have been the case at Oxford—there was nothing of this kind. Indeed, the memorial was listened to in the fairest spirit on all hands. The opponents of the measure appear chiefly to have been influenced by two considerations; first, that it would injure the prosperity of the boys examinations, and secondly, that they could not be conducted in such a manner as to be profitable to the girls themselves. All expressed willingness to do whatever could be shown to be proper for the university to do with due consideration for all the interests involved. In short, the question was met in the spirit in which it might be expected to be met by educated men who knew what they owed to mothers, sisters, or wives. Its supporters, on the other hand, seemed to attribute much weight to the argument of the memorial, that women strongly felt the want of some outward standard by which to test the value of their work, and that, if the universities refused to help them in this particular, there appeared to be no body existing, or likely to be created, in the country to which they could apply. The truth of this allegation is apparent enough. There is probably nothing in which girls have been worse treated than their examinations at the end of the school year. They are in most cases a mere display, ending with a flourish of trumpets at the breaking-up party. There lies before us a report of the examination of a large girls school. It is one chorus of praises from end to end. One examiner finds that “though the inspection of instructional results only was our province, yet moral characteristics are constantly and clearly revealed in the course of intellectual operations.” He proceeds to “hazard the opinion” that in Miss X.’s establishment “headwork is not neglected, yet does not monopolize too exclusive an interest; or rather, perhaps, that it is so conducted as to promote the still higher objects of our being.” Then he finds the style of the girls English “clear, simple, vigorous, and expressive.” But he rises to his highest ecstasies at the *vivâ voce*:—

“Speaking generally, the intelligence, the readiness, the abundance of information, the simple, natural, and clear statement of what was known, and the not less straightforward admission of what was not known—the sustained interest throughout a long course of questioning—

tioning, made it altogether a pleasure to do what is often sufficiently irksome, to go on formulating a string of questions for hours together."

Happy examiner! and assuredly most wonderful pupils! We apprehend that the reports of the local examinations are not likely to approach such fine writing as this, or to bestow any such sounding praises. Nor do we believe that girls are so wanting in common sense as to wish it. Their feelings appear to be truly stated by Mr. Plumptre. Speaking of the error of the outside public in thinking the "predominant motive of girls in wishing for examinations to be that they may obtain some material benefit either as governesses or in some other position in which they want a testimonial to fall back upon," he proceeds:—

"My belief is that that motive forms a subordinate element in the desire of the girl to be examined. I have watched the progress of these things, and I find that those who most desire to do well are not those who are trying to gain certificates of competency for any professional purpose, but those who are looking forward to a life of private usefulness. They desire knowledge and self-knowledge for their own sakes. They wish their knowledge not to be hollow, superficial, or merely ornamental, but solid and substantial."

That these words express the true state of the case may be inferred not merely from observation of facts, but from the slightest knowledge of the feminine character. There is nothing a woman, at any rate a young woman, of more than the shallowest capacity detests more than a sham; and of all shams, the language of untrue compliment is most offensive to her, for the very reason that her nature teaches her to covet the approval and praise of men, and sharpens her to be keen in detecting the false ring of flattery. Another consideration that probably weighed much with the promoters of the scheme was a deep conviction that the university is fully as much interested in the proper education of the youth of the country in their own homes, and in their earliest years, as in the schools she examines. Therefore they maintain she is by no means stepping out of her proper province in anything she can do to cherish and promote the good nurture of future wives and mothers. The issue of the affair was, that while Oxford rejected the scheme altogether, Cambridge accepted it by way of trial for a period of three years. Various rules were laid down to insure the proper conduct of the examination at every place in which it might be held. It is to be entirely managed by ladies. No list of names is to be published; but every girl who passes with credit will receive a certificate signed by the Vice-Chancellor, and if she succeeds in distinguishing herself in any subject, it will be mentioned in that document. One examination has been already held. One hundred and thirty-one girls presented themselves at six places.—London


Brighton, Bristol, Cambridge, Manchester, and Sheffield. Nothing could be more satisfactory than the way in which the week of examination passed off. The reports of the local examiners were quite uniform on this point. The local ladies' committees had done their work exceedingly well. Every arrangement had been made for the comfort and privacy of the girls. They had themselves been quiet, punctual, and industrious, and had strictly attended to the regulations in every particular. Their papers were sent up in fully as good order as those of the boys. This of itself is a most important result, and will, it is hoped, convince many of those who doubted whether an examination of girls could be suitably conducted. We believe the same is found to be the case by the University of Edinburgh. There, too, girls as well as boys are admitted to the local examinations held by the university, and we believe with the same encouraging experience. It may be safely assumed, therefore, that there is nothing to apprehend on that score. At the same time, the unprecedented increase in the number of boys—nearly fifty per cent. on last year—altogether puts an end to the fears some entertained, that the admission of girls might make the examinations unpopular with them.

The general result of the examination was as follows: Out of eighty senior candidates, five were absent, twenty-eight failed, forty-seven passed, of whom eight obtained marks of special distinction. Of fifty-one juniors, nine failed, one was absent, forty-one passed, of whom six gained distinctions. We subjoin a few details that may interest the reader, referring him for fuller information to the elaborate report and tables published by Messrs. Rivington. We take those in which women are most concerned. In arithmetic, so disastrous in 1863, when out of forty senior candidates thirty-four failed in that subject, this year only one senior and two juniors were rejected. Only one senior and two juniors failed in geography; one junior and no senior in history. Indeed, the aggregate of failures on the whole very much surprised the examiners, each of whom, excepting those in religious knowledge, seemed to have few in his own department. It appears to have arisen chiefly from the girls not understanding clearly that, in order to pass on the whole, they must pass respectably in at least two or three sections. The average marks obtained were extremely creditable, and some girls got high numbers. Thus one got six-sevenths of the full amount in history, another four-fifths in geography. But they were most fortunate in Shakspeare's "Tempest." On this play, a paper was set well adapted to test the soundness of such knowledge as youths might be expected to possess not merely of that, but of other plays of Shakspeare, and of the English tongue. About thirty girls tried it; almost all with credit to themselves, some very successfully, and one succeeded in attaining a high

proportion of the full marks than any of her competitors of either sex—seventy-two per cent.

In religious knowledge the girls were not so successful as their work in 1863 led us to expect. Of the seniors twenty-five, of the juniors eight, failed in this section. Only one succeeded in distinguishing herself. The examiners reported that their knowledge of Scripture was, generally speaking, good, but that they appeared to have been very imperfectly instructed in the other subjects, particularly the Liturgy. Fourteen altogether took in Latin. The examiners speak of the remarkable accuracy of their work, and say that it will bear comparison with that of the boys. In French, as might be expected, the girls distinguished themselves. Their average performances were good; many obtained marks of special credit, and one got seven-eighths of the whole number, the highest point reached by any one. Thirty-four went in for drawing. Of one the examiner reports that "she excelled all other candidates in the colour sketch, which was admirable, as was also her model drawing." Several other girls also obtained marks of distinction. One regrets that so few girls attempted botany, and none with much success. It is to be hoped that more of them will turn their minds to this ladylike accomplishment, and will attend to the sensible remark of the examiner in the subject, that the students "appeared to derive their knowledge from manuals, and not the study of nature." Botany can only be learned in the fields. In music rather more than half the girls who went in did their work creditably, of whom five distinguished themselves. Here we will close the list. Enough has been said to convince the reader that girls are taught better than he perhaps thought, and that examinations of this sort, as is shown in the noteworthy instance of arithmetic, do at least bring out weak points in teaching, and in some cases lead the way to amendment. We will only add that it is heartily to be wished that the boys may in future imitate their sisters in one particular, their good English. Their answers were almost without exception straightforward and to the point, clearly stated, and without any attempts at fine writing: while at the same time, many of them gave sure promise of that pretty quickness of wit which is one of the brightest charms of a gentlewoman.

THOMAS MARKBY.



THEODORE PARKER AND AMERICAN UNITARIANISM.

The Collected Works of Theodore Parker. Edited by FRANCES POWER
COMBE. Twelve Volumes. London: Trübner, 1873-1875.

The Life and Correspondence of Theodore Parker. By JOHN WEISS.
Two Volumes. London: Longmans, 1863.

IT has been said that religious thought ebbs and flows between Pelagius and Augustine; and religious history confirms the truth of the saying: if one generation has magnified over-much the natural powers of man, the next too often denies his powers altogether, and makes him the slave of an arbitrary will; if one generation is eager to define every minute or transcendent point of doctrine, the next generally experiences the ebb-tide of feeling, repudiates the carefully drawn "Confessions" of their fathers, and exalts philanthropy and the pagan virtues. Thus the Holland of the precisians who drew up the canons of Dort became in a generation or two the refuge of oppressed thinkers from every nation in Europe; the land of Vitringa gave a home to Bayle; Calvin's own Geneva, in the middle of the eighteenth century, won the praise of liberality from Diderot and Voltaire;* and in the New England State of Massachusetts, the change from the vigorous Puritanism of the seventeenth to the free and easy worship of the nineteenth century has been at least as remarkable. It is of this that we have now to speak more particularly.

The New England colonies were founded, as is well known, by men flying from "king's and prelates' rage;" hence it is too hastily concluded that they sought in new lands nothing more than freedom

to worship God according to their conscience. It is no doubt true that they sought a refuge beyond the jurisdiction of Star-Chamber or High Commission—a place where their humble assemblies should be free from the intrusion of constable or apparitor; but to establish a polity where all men should enjoy the same freedom of worship which they desired for themselves, was altogether beyond their thoughts: they wished to worship God freely in a certain way, but it was very far from their intention to tolerate within their borders any other form of worship than that which the leading men in Massachusetts thought the best: let those who refused to conform to the one allowed form seek some other land; for them Massachusetts was no place. The early history of the colony is full of illustrations of this principle.

While the Pilgrim Fathers still inhabited mud hovels and log cabins on the shore of Massachusetts Bay, provision was made for the religious constitution of the colony. It was of the simplest kind; each community was at liberty to form itself into a church, without the interference of any other church, or indeed of any power from without; the members of each church chose its officers, and the ministers required no ordination but such as the community gave them; they used no liturgy, and the stern simplicity of the Calvinistic ritual was made more simple still in the American wilderness. All these congregations were cast on one model, and from this no deviation was expected. They had fled to the uttermost parts of the earth from cap and surplice, rochet and chimere; no rag of the accursed thing should henceforth be endured among them. They soon carried their principles into practice. Two of the most influential members of the Colonial Council gathered about them a little company, in which the "Common Prayer worship" was upheld; they were seized as criminals, and put on board a ship returning to England, the services which they had rendered the colony weighing little against the wrong which they had done in using the service of the hated Church of England. Brave Roger Williams, who maintained the daring proposition that it was not the duty of civil magistrates to prescribe particular forms of faith for the people, was cast out as an exile, and founded, in the year following his banishment (1636), a "shelter for persons distressed for conscience," at Providence in Rhode Island. The poor Quakers, who penetrated into Massachusetts some twenty years later, were sentenced to whipping, to boring through the tongue, even to death itself, as the penalty for their intrusion into the realms of Puritanism.*

Thus did the people of Massachusetts endeavour to maintain the principle which they had laid down, as early as 1631, as one of their

fundamental laws, "that no man shall be admitted to the freedom of this body politic, but such as are members of some of the churches within the limits of the same."* As the churches were all of one kind—the Independent or Congregational,—and as the magistrates insisted on the attendance of every man at public worship, religious liberty was reduced to a minimum. No doubt the form of service established left freer play for the individualities of the several ministers than a complete liturgy would have done; but as the civil magistrates took upon them to repress what they considered heresy, the limits within which thought was allowed to range were sufficiently narrow.

The effects of the principle, that none but members of the church could hold civil offices or vote at elections, were not long in becoming apparent. This provision was perhaps not more objectionable in theory than the Test Acts which were maintained until a comparatively recent period in England; but its working was different. The Test Acts applied only to a comparatively small number of office-bearers; admission to the Holy Communion was at least a simple act—only notorious offenders could be repelled; it was laid upon every man's conscience to judge whether he was fit to approach so sacred an ordinance. In Massachusetts, a very different state of things prevailed; a man was presumed to be bad until he proved himself to be good; an applicant for membership of a church must furnish evidence of his fitness—he must give in an "experience," an account of what has passed at the most momentous crisis of his life in the inmost recesses of his soul; he must be "propounded"—that is, his application must be announced from the pulpit, and his admission deferred until the members of the congregation should have acquainted themselves with his manner of life. Then, being found blameless, and not till then, he was admitted into communion with the church. The effect of this system was, that many men of great intelligence, of good character, and of unimpeached orthodoxy, were excluded from valuable civil privileges.†

It is not to be supposed that such a system as this could long be maintained in its integrity in a society rapidly growing in numbers, wealth, and intelligence; in fact, as early as the year 1662, symptoms of wavering manifested themselves. About that time it came to be allowed that children baptized in infancy should be reputed members of that church to which their parents belonged, though they must still furnish evidence of "regeneration" before they were admitted to the Lord's Table. In about forty years more, a still more important change was made; for it was admitted in many churches that, as it was impossible to decide with any degree of certainty whether a man

were "regenerated" or not, any applicant should be admitted against whom no scandal or heresy was proved. The congregations had to choose between becoming small and close sects and including a larger number in a looser bond; and they chose the latter alternative.*

During the first half of the eighteenth century, the general tendency of religious feeling in America was towards the same dull level of decorous morality which was prevalent at that period in Europe. Men went contentedly about their daily tasks, sat in churches, and heard sermons, without mooted the deep questions which had seemed so vital to their forefathers. The old views of the Pilgrim Fathers were little heard of, and an unavowed Pelagianism seems to have risen up in the New England churches, when they were roused from their torpor by the loud voices of Jonathan Edwards and George Whitfield. The influence of these remarkable men, in the middle of the last century, brought back many churches into the position which they had held a century earlier; the distinction between the regenerate and unregenerate was re-established in all its vigour, and all who did not pronounce a shibboleth satisfactory to the Calvinistic churches were once more declared to be heirs of perdition. The effect was no doubt to arouse thoughts of things Divine, to lead to greater holiness of life, in those who accepted this teaching; but on those churches which still stood without the magic circle the effect was very different. There, the proselytism of the new teachers, their eagerness to exclude from their communion all who had not passed through the prescribed stages of experience, seemed but passion and censoriousness; in flying from these faults they fell more and more into dull, self-contented apathy. The Puritans had at least maintained, under whatever errors of thought and expression, the need of God's grace for man's justification and sanctification: the newer school suffered men to forget that the Son and the Spirit had anything to do in the work of man's salvation. In fact, during the latter half of the eighteenth century, a large number of the New England churches were gliding, for the most part unconsciously, towards that flat, negative Unitarianism which was then prevalent in many parts of Europe. Thoughtful men here and there observed this progress, but it was naturally not obvious to those who were themselves moving in the same direction. In the early years of the nineteenth century, a few books appeared which unequivocally repudiated the doctrine of the Trinity; a few ministers were suspected of a like repudiation; it became increasingly difficult to enforce Calvinistic orthodoxy on candidates for the ministry; yet, so quiet and unperceived was the progress of change, that it was with genuine surprise that many worthy men learned from Belsham's "Memoirs of

Lindsey," published in London in 1812, that their ministers were accounted Unitarian.

Now was seen the weakness of the Congregational system. So long as all the members of a community were of one mind—so long as all were agreed that it was part of the duty of the civil power to exterminate heresy,—so long, and no longer, it was possible to maintain the same standard of orthodoxy in the nominally independent churches scattered throughout a state. When the pressure of a very vigorous public opinion and of the secular arm was once withdrawn, as in fact it was in the eighteenth century, each congregation took its own way in matters of doctrine and discipline; there was nothing to hinder the minister of one parish from preaching the stern doctrines of Edwards and Whitfield, and producing all the strange phenomena of a religious "revival," while his neighbour was expounding from the pulpit the principles of Seneca or Locke, and deprecating—often not without very good reason—above all things excitement and censoriousness. There was no way of compelling churches which had become Unitarian to part with their Unitarian pastors, nor could orthodox ministers or congregations be compelled to recognise a Unitarian as a Christian minister, or his church as a Christian church. The effect was, that though the "General Convention of Congregational Ministers" continued to meet, mainly on account of certain endowments, once a year, as if still forming one body, they were in fact divided into two hostile camps; an adherent of one party would not permit a minister who belonged to the other to occupy his pulpit on a Sunday. In Boston in particular, in 1812, all the Congregational churches, with only two or three exceptions, had become Unitarian;* and in various parts of New England were to be found probably nearly a hundred more, the greater number in the eastern part of Massachusetts. Wherever the majority of a parish became Unitarian, they obtained possession of the endowments of the church, which were in some cases considerable. Harvard College, too, founded—to their honour be it said—by the very first generation of Puritan settlers in Massachusetts, passed into the hands of the now dominant Unitarian party. Thus a mighty change had passed over the land of the Pilgrim Fathers. After the fitful fever of Puritan zeal and Calvinistic revival, religion slept the sleep of Pelagian dulness, if not of Epicurean indifference.

The phase of religion which constituted the prevalent Unitarianism in New England at the beginning of the present century is not easy to define. In the first place there was in it, running through all its divisions, the anti-Calvinistic feeling. Abhorrence of Calvinistic

* It ought to be stated that this proportion no longer holds; the Trinitarian Congregationalists are ————

doctrines with respect to the fallen condition of man and the nature of redemption ; disgust at the narrowness which claimed the title of "Christian" only for a few exclusive sects or coteries, and denied it to all the world besides ; shrinking from the vehement appeals to excited feeling, and the frequent denunciations of never-ending torment, which formed too large a part of the popular teaching in many congregations,—these were powerful incentives to the formation of a creed free from the peculiarities of Predestinarianism. This dislike of popular Calvinism colours the writings of American Unitarians of all shades of opinion ; indeed it would almost seem as if some of them had never heard of any form of Christianity preceding their own sect but Congregational Calvinism : the doctrines of a sect are to them the whole of popular Christianity. Then there came in aid of this powerful reaction the sensuous philosophy which was almost everywhere prevalent in the age immediately preceding the French Revolution ; the desire for clearness and definiteness even at the expense of depth and comprehensiveness ; the wish to base human society, whether civil or religious, upon certain great truths, acknowledged by man as man, and independent of sects and parties. The prevalence of thoughts of this kind in the minds of men aided the formation of a society in which, while the name of Christianity was retained, the peculiarities of Christianity were made as little prominent as possible. A religion which confined its creed to the acknowledgment of God as the creator of the world, and of the Lord Jesus Christ as a great teacher, who had inculcated a pure morality in a popular style, and thrown considerable light on the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, this was the kind of religion which was acceptable to men of the world, men of sense, men of enlightenment, in the latter years of the last century. This school did not reject miracles ; on the contrary, its tendency was decidedly towards that "evidential" method of which Paley's "Evidences" is the highest example : but the system which they held to be proved by miracles was little satisfying to the conscience, and had too often but little effect upon the life. Then, again, the ranks of Unitarianism were swelled by a considerable number of the class—never a small one—of church-goers who have no distinct religious convictions. To persons of this class a very slight change which *interferes* with their comfortable routine is intolerable ; the change of a custom or a vestment will drive them from the church where they have sat contentedly for half a lifetime ; but so long as they see the minister in the accustomed place and the accustomed dress going through the accustomed forms, a very great change in doctrine may pass them by unheeded. Many of this class in America worshipped in the same chapel before and after it became Unitarian, and hardly perceived the change.

But if the foregoing description is true of many men of two or three generations back, both in America and in England, it is by no means true of some who adorned the Unitarian community in the early years of the present century; it is by no means true of such men as the Wares, Orville Dewey, Tuckerman, Follen, and many others who might be mentioned; least of all is it true of William Ellery Channing, the Fénelon of American Unitarianism. In such men as these we see plainly the wider culture, the broader induction, the greater warmth and tenderness of feeling which, in America as in Europe, distinguish the race which succeeded the French Revolution from that which preceded it. Belsham and Priestley were heard of no more; Coleridge and Wordsworth attracted the attention of thinking men everywhere to their deep thoughts and lofty aspirations; men's minds came to be filled with questionings about God and his ways to man—about man, his nature and his destinies—such as would have seemed madness to their forefathers. By teachers such as these, the feelings and imagination were warmed and brightened, not merely the intellect gratified. In Channing more particularly, we hardly recognise one of the distinctive traits of the Unitarianism of the age of Priestley: where, in the older form of creed,—if we may call the opinions of the eighteenth century Unitarians a creed,—all had been clear, cold, systematic, even materialistic, in a word, “light without love,” we find in Channing and the best of his compeers, love, warmth, tenderness, earnest devotion, sympathetic eagerness to promote the welfare of the human brotherhood. While the tendency of the former age had been to set God at a distance from his works, to regard Him as a Being of infinite power and skill, who had made the world with so much ingenuity that, when once created, it required no more interference,—laws of nature, laws of matter, and the like, being enough for its regulation,—the newer generation looked upon God as everywhere active, alike in the material and the spiritual world, sustaining, guiding, teaching, drawing men to Himself. While the earlier school had carefully rejected everything that bore the shadow of mystery, priding itself on receiving only what was proved by the most irrefragable evidence and satisfied the clearest understanding, the later continually recurs to that which we have “the likest God within the soul,” to the truer and deeper knowledge of God which is gained by prayer and holy life. In time past mysticism, sentimentalism, transcendentalism had been the especial bugbears of enlightened Unitarians; mysticism, sentimentalism, and transcendentalism may almost be said to be the very watchwords of many who in more recent times have borne the name of Unitarian. One generation taught that every child came into the world with its moral and spiritual nature—if, indeed, it had a moral and spiritual nature—fresh and unim-

paired, untouched by any transmitted stain of sin ; that every feeling and faculty in man was alike to be developed and cultivated : the next saw that the "wild trick of his ancestors" did in fact descend to the child ; that children were in fact not all born virtuous, or capable of being made perfectly virtuous by judicious training ; that men were in fact conscious of a law in their members warring against the law of the mind, a law of sin and death as well as a law of life. These considerations led to the rejection of the old theory of the natural perfection of man. It was seen that sin was indeed something different from a bad habit, that it was something strangely inherent in the nature, the very *self* of the man ; to get quit of sin, he must get quit of *self*. The earlier school of Unitarians held that only repentance was necessary to obliterate sin ; a subsequent school, taking a wider and truer view of the facts of the world, could not but see that transgression of God's law was in fact punished, that no repentance would restore to the palsied drunkard his wasted health, or to the reckless spendthrift his squandered inheritance ; nay, that the father's repentance would not replace the child in the position from which the father's crime had degraded him ; and these thoughts made the great problem of sin and reconciliation far less simple and easy than it had been to the shallower observers of the earlier school : the mere recognition of the greatness of the problem led to the rejection of the shallow methods by which Priestley and his fellows had attempted to solve it. In fact, in reading Channing's writings, we are continually tempted to wonder what it is that separates him from us. Of the person of Jesus Christ he speaks—at least in his practical and devotional writings—in terms of reverence and love not distinguishable from those in which the Saviour is addressed by his earnest worshippers everywhere. Repeatedly he declares that Jesus is no mere man ; nay, he does not hesitate to speak of Him as the Redeemer.* We do not say that his views on the great subject of Atonement were such as would have been accepted by the Church either of ancient or modern times ; we rather wish to point out the great gulf there is between the hard Materialism of Priestley and the religious thoughtfulness of Channing.

The truth is, that the body which was still called by the name "Unitarian" was ceasing, in the third decade of this century, to be distinctively anti-Trinitarian ; many at that time would have joined with Channing in saying, "I am little of an Unitarian."† They had ceased to be distinguished by the maintenance of certain dogmas ; their characteristic was rather the absence of dogma ; "religious liberty," "free inquiry," "progress," had become the watchwords of the Unitarian party. This is especially true of Channing, a repre-

* Channing's "Life," by his Nephew, p. 308 (Ed. London, 1851). † *Ibid.*, p. 284.

sentative in this respect of the hereditary toleration of Rhode Island. Everywhere he shrinks from maintaining a doctrine, still more from enforcing it upon another. There is hardly a sermon in which he does not remind his hearers that he speaks with no authority, that they are as competent to decide on the truth of this or that proposition as he himself. He says, writing to Baron De Gerando,*—"What is here called Unitarianism—a very inadequate name—is characterized by nothing more than by the spirit of freedom and individuality. It has no established creed or symbol. Its friends think each for himself and differ much from each other, so that my book, after all, will give you my mind rather than the dogmas of a sect." Thus Unitarianism had become creedless; it was no longer distinguished by definite views; it was a name given to that body of Christians which subscribed to no creed or symbol.

Yet Unitarians of all shades of opinion, from Priestley to Channing, had agreed in assigning a high degree of authority to Scripture, and in accepting the Scriptural miracles as true and real. They had agreed in recognising, in some shape or other, the authority of Jesus Christ. Their views on this most momentous point of all theology varied indeed from the High Arianism which regarded Jesus as Divine, but not co-eternal or co-equal with the Father, to the humanitarian view, according to which the Saviour was mere man, though raised above other men; but all agreed that his words were to be received as of authority in the Church. Before Channing's death, these few remnants of fixed belief received a violent shock. As time went on, and the western shores of the Atlantic began to feel the wave of modern thought and modern criticism which had received its first impulse from the theological blasts of Germany, there arose men who were for shaking off all authority whatever in matters of religion; who were not content with a system which, while it stripped away many of its most characteristic mysteries from the Christian faith, still maintained the reality of revelation and prophecy and miracle; who found it, in a word, just as difficult to accept the faith of Channing as the faith of Athanasius. The leading spirit of this new school, a very small body at first, was a young Massachusetts minister, named Theodore Parker.

This remarkable man was born in 1810, near Lexington, in Massachusetts: his father was a farmer, a Unitarian, though descended from the old Puritan colonists of the district; and Theodore's early years were spent in the ordinary labours of the farm and the woodland. But a thirst for knowledge seems to have been inbred in him; from his boyhood he was an eager reader of every book that fell in his way. In order to have more time for study, he became an usher in a private school at Boston, paying out of his scanty stipend a labourer to per-

* "Life," p. 288.

form his own share of the work on his father's farm; so careful was he not to desert his duty in following his inclination. Afterwards he kept a private school in Watertown, all the time working with the fierce energy which was characteristic of him—an energy which wore him out before his time—to qualify himself to pass the examinations at Harvard University. When he finished his University course, at twenty-four, he could read ten languages; at his death he is said to have been more or less acquainted with twenty. Few histories of the pursuit of knowledge under difficulties are more striking than that of Theodore Parker.

In 1837 he was appointed minister of the Unitarian Church at West Roxbury, near Boston. Here, in a quiet village, among friendly people, with plenty of leisure for thought and study, he soon found himself drifting away from Unitarian orthodoxy. A great change had come over theological study since the days when Channing was a student; the Wolfenbüttel Fragments, the writings of Eichhorn, Paulus, De Wette (whose Introduction to the Old Testament Parker translated, with some additions), D. F. Strauss, and other leaders of the modern German school of Biblical criticism, found their way into America, where they were eagerly studied by the few who understood German, and were interested in the progress of theology: by none more eagerly than by Parker; and he at least was not a man to suppress the thought that was in him. He says of himself:—

“As fast as I found a new truth I preached it. At length, in 1841, I preached a discourse of the Transient and Permanent in Christianity. . . . A great outcry was raised against the sermon and its author. . . . Unbeliever, infidel, atheist, were the titles bestowed on me by my brothers in the Christian ministry. A venerable minister . . . called on the Attorney-General to prosecute, the Grand Jury to indict, and the Judge to sentence me to three years' confinement in the state prison for blasphemy.”*

The old spirit of Puritanism was not extinct even in the Unitarian body. No Unitarian bookseller would put his name to the printed sermon, which at last appeared under the auspices of the Swedenborgians: its author became a Pariah; many of his former friends refused to touch his hand or speak to him in the streets; and of the Unitarian ministers, only six would allow him to enter their pulpits: the cry was, “This young man must be silenced.” He was not silenced, however; a few men, who thought that the young minister had not been fairly treated, invited him to lecture in Boston. In consequence of that resolution, he delivered five lectures, which form the main part of the “Discourse of Matters Pertaining to Religion,” published in 1842. In 1843 he visited Europe, whence, after a year's travel, he returned to Boston, with his health, which had been greatly impaired by the over-

* “Experience as a Minister,” in Weiss, ii. 466.

work of years, much strengthened. On the 16th of February, 1845, he entered on the ministry of the Twenty-eighth Congregational Society of Boston, which he served with unwearied energy for fourteen years. In 1859, his excessive labours—he had given lectures in almost every town of the Union, in addition to his usual ministrations in Boston—brought on bleeding from the lungs; he visited the West Indies and Europe without receiving any permanent benefit: on the 10th of May, 1860, at Florence, he rested from his labours,—labours to which even those who think them ill-directed must award the praise of having been earnest and sincere.

He was not full fifty years old at the time of his death. In those fifty years he had drawn round him a body of men like-minded, and given a very powerful impulse to religious thought in America; and he had taken a principal share in organizing a strong anti-slavery party in Boston, to which the vigorous resistance which pro-slavery measures have always of late years met with in the North is in a great degree due; and in the midst of all his labours, ministerial and political, he had accumulated an extraordinary store of multifarious learning. But the name of Theodore Parker is best known in England in connection with a certain theological teaching called "Theism." Of this system we must attempt to give a short account; and a short account is less unjust to Mr. Parker than it would be to most other theological teachers, inasmuch as his principles are few and simple. His numerous works relating to theology are but variations—sometimes without much variety—on a few simple phrases. The leading thoughts to which he continually recurs are in the main such as these:—

If we look at man as he actually exists in the world, we find one vast institution of the highest consideration in human affairs; this is religion, coeval and coextensive with the human race. Whence comes it? The foolish answer to this question may be read in Lucretius and elsewhere, that *fear* made the gods; that hypocritical priests and knavish kings invented a religion to help them in governing the common herd of men. As well might it be said that the custom of eating was the cunning device of primeval butchers and bakers. The *wise* answer is, that religion comes from a principle deep-seated in our mystic frame, and belongs to the unchanging realities of life; that there is in us a spiritual nature, which must needs be satisfied with heavenly food even as our bodily wants with earthly food. We trace the working of this religious element both in the history of the world at large, and in the individual soul. And this religious consciousness must needs have some object; the sense of dependence implies something on which to rely. This object is God; the knowledge of God's existence is an intimation of reason; it depends not on *reasoning*, but on *reason*; it comes to man as naturally as the

consciousness of his own existence. But the *conception* which we can form of God must, from the nature of things, fall far short of the reality; the finite can form no adequate conception of the infinite; for all the conceptions of the human mind are limited by time and space, while the Deity knows not bounds; our human personality gives a false modification to all our conceptions of the infinite. Hence, while the *idea* of God is constant, the same everywhere and in all men, the popular *conception* of God is of the most various and evanescent character, and is not the same in any two ages or men. "Absolute religion" is always the same; men's thoughts about religion change from race to race, and from age to age; there is but one religion, though many theologies. The true outward form of religion, that which shows itself in act, is morality; but man has devised many forms out of his own restless ingenuity. Hence, as we have various forms of theology, so we have various forms of worship. The three great historical forms of religion are Fetichism, Polytheism, and Monotheism.

Monotheism, the highest form of religion, is the worship of one supreme God, the Father of all. It annihilates all distinction of tribes and nations; it tends to abolish war and slavery, for it makes all men brothers. It gives to all alike the guidance of the Holy Spirit of God. God is distinct from nature, the ground and cause of all things.

True spiritual religion teaches us that in God "we live and move and have our being." Inspiration then is no miracle, but a regular mode of God's action on conscious spirit, as gravitation is a mode of his action on unconscious matter. The Word is very nigh to every man, even in his heart, and by this Word he is to try all things submitted to him. Wisdom, righteousness, and love are the spirit of God in the soul of man; wherever these are, there is inspiration from God. Inspiration is the action of the Highest within the soul, the Divine Presence imparting light. And this inspiration is limited to no sect, age, or nation; it is wide as the world and common as God. We are not born in the dotage and decay of the world; the "most ancient heavens are fresh and strong" now as ever: everywhere God is present still, as every man knows who has truly prayed to Him; and as God is always the same, his modes of action are always the same; He does not break the laws which He has established in nature.

From man God requires pure spiritual worship; He requires us to keep the law He has written in our hearts; to be good, to do good; to love men, to love God. The temple of this religion is a pure heart, its sacrifice a Divine life. The end it proposes is, to re-unite the man with God, till he thinks God's thought, which is Truth; feels God's feeling, which is Love; wills God's will, which is eternal Right; thus

finding God in the sense wherein He is not far from every one of us; becoming one with Him, and so partaking the Divine Nature. Religion demands no particular actions, forms, or modes of thought. The man's ploughing is holy as his prayer; his daily bread as the smoke of his sacrifice; his work-day and his sabbath are alike God's days. He does not sacrifice reason to religion, nor religion to reason; brother and sister, they dwell together in love.

Now it is clear that this "absolute religion" (as Mr. Parker is fond of calling it) dispenses with revelation, except such as is made directly to the soul of each man, altogether. There is no space left for the authoritative proclamation of good tidings from God; for all the knowledge of God, all the inspiration, of which man is capable, he may attain by cultivating and developing the faculties which God has given him; "miraculous or other revelations" can no more render him "religious than fragments of sermons and leaves of the Bible can make a lamb religious when mixed and eaten with its daily food."* The only question that can arise about revelation is, whether it coincides or not with "absolute religion;" if it does, it is simply superfluous, if it does not, it is injurious. Hence we are not surprised when Mr. Parker comes to speak of Jesus Christ, of the Holy Scriptures, of the Catholic Church, to find him treating the whole subject as from a superior height. His views of the life of the Saviour are those of D. F. Strauss; he believes the Incarnate Son to have been simply a young Galilean teacher, about whose pure and holy life various supernatural legends have clustered in consequence of the eager wish of the disciples to exalt their Master. On points of Old Testament criticism he adopted the views of De Wette, capricious and improbable as they sometimes are, with little reserve or independence of judgment; his views on the New Testament are taken mostly from F. C. Baur. Christ founded no Church, nor were the sacraments intended to be perpetual. The Church which we find existing was formed by a gradual process, from natural causes, in the course of the first three or four centuries after Christ. In a word, neither the Lord Jesus, nor the Scriptures, nor the Church, have any authoritative teaching for man.

It is admitted, however, that the teaching of Jesus did in fact coincide to a great extent with "absolute religion." Although He taught that God is wroth with sin, that there is a "devil absolutely evil," and a Gehenna of fire for impurity—things which Mr. Parker cannot receive; although He "taught something which is ritual"—Baptism, and the Supper of the Lord; yet the teaching, "Love man as

* "Discourse of Matters Pertaining to Religion," p. 13 (Miss Cobbe's edit.). The sentence is a choice specimen of Mr. Parker's delicate taste and clear perception of analogy.

yourself, love God above all," was true and spiritual; it included, indeed, all practical holiness. When Jesus Christ sets forth the highest aim for man, "Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect;" when He declares the eternal blessedness of, such as do the will of God; when He says that the Spirit of God shall be in them, revealing truth,—He teaches pure or "absolute" religion.

Such are the leading features of Theodore Parker's teaching. To use the words of Miss Cobbe,*—

"This creed has few articles: an ever-present God, who is absolutely good; a moral law written in the consciousness of man; the immortality of the soul; the reality of spiritual prayer. This is the entire theology of Theodore Parker. It contains no doctrines of a Fall, an Incarnation, a Trinity, an Atonement, a devil, or a hell; no original sin, no imputed righteousness. Its morality is summed up in the two great commandments of the law, and its theory of reconciliation in the parable of the prodigal son. To this religion Parker gave the name of THEISM, a name antithetic to Atheism alone, and comprehensive of every worshipper of God; a name not understood, like the elder Deism, to signify the exclusion of Christianity, but the inclusion of it in one great absolute religion."

We have honestly endeavoured to state fairly the central truths of Mr. Parker's system; those who have read his works will know how much vehemence and exaggeration we have eliminated in making this analysis. We have given Mr. Parker's conclusions without his offensive expressions or his strange caricatures of the views of his opponents.

And when stated thus, without the corollaries which Mr. Parker's vehement and somewhat coarse nature added to them, there is little to which we can object; nay, does not every Christian heartily assent to every article of Mr. Parker's creed? Surely every Christian admits, as heartily as the "Theist," that there is one ever-present God absolutely good; that all men, even those to whom the Gospel of Christ has not come, have the "work of the law written in their hearts," conscience that beareth witness, and thoughts that accuse or excuse; that the man does not die when he quits his failing house of clay; that God does indeed hear and answer the earnest prayers of his children here on earth. All this was written in the Bible long before Mr. Parker undertook to enlighten the world. The second article of this brief creed has, we must admit, been too much obscured in modern theology, though not to the extent that Mr. Parker seems to suppose; but, on the whole, the creed of the "Theist" is included in the creed of Christian men throughout the world.

It is not in what he affirms, but in what he denies, that Mr. Parker offends. The great truths which have been held with one mind by the Church throughout the world—the great facts of Sin, Incarnation,

* Preface to "Collected Works," p. xxi.

Atonement, are treated by him with scorn and contempt. His ideal Christian "asks no pardon for his sins;"* this is the cardinal difference between Mr. Parker's system and the theology of the universal Church; nay, we might go further, and say that this is the difference between Mr. Parker's view and the almost universal belief of all mankind. Everywhere the cry goes up to Heaven, "How shall a man be just with God?" Everywhere prayer and oblation, lustral waters and slain victims, temples and altars and priests, bear witness to man's conviction of sin, his consciousness of the need of propitiation; no barbarism, no stoicism, has altogether silenced this voice; yet this "new school" has no Atonement, for it has no consciousness of sin. Mr. Parker lays it down in the strongest manner that the universal wants and cravings of mankind imply the existence of some object to satisfy those wants and cravings; and yet he believes that God, the loving Father, the absolutely good Being, has left these his children "crying in the night," with longings that can never be satisfied. And so with regard to the Incarnation: Mr. Parker sees clearly enough that the reverence, devotion, and love which man feels for God are not to be satisfied by a mere abstraction; that all mankind longs for a *Man* in whom God shall be revealed;† and yet he refuses to contemplate even the possibility of such a revelation; "God became man" is to him simply the statement of a manifest absurdity. He can recognise the "*Vox populi, vox Dei*," when it tells of the existence of God and of a moral law: when this same voice cries out in wailing tones that man is impure, unholy, alienated from God; that He needs an Atonement, a Mediator, an Incarnate Saviour, a "Son of man" who is also "Son of God," then it is but a deceiving voice; man must be told that he has no sin, and by consequence no need of a Redeemer. Sin and the need of reconciliation are the most patent facts in the world's history; and yet all that part of theology which relates to sin and reconciliation are in the "Theistic" system a perfect blank. The theological theory is simplified by the summary method of denying or ignoring the principal facts which theology is called upon to explain; a system founded on consciousness contains no explanation, nay, contains no recognition of that most glaring fact, the consciousness of sin. This defect alone would prevent Mr. Parker's system from becoming, as his admirers believe that it is destined to become, the theology of the future. Suppose even that every particle of miraculous evidence for Christianity were annihilated; let it be agreed that no miracle was ever wrought; strip the Bible and the Church of every semblance of authority; still we do not believe that bare "Theism" would ever be the creed of any large

* "Discourse," p. 317. Compare the highly characteristic and unpleasant passage in Weiss, i. 152.

† "Discourse," p. 107.

portion of mankind. Take away the sacrifice of Christ, and men will offer all manner of vain oblations, devise all manner of expiations, cut themselves with knives before Baal, or make their children pass through the fire to Moloch, rather than commit themselves to a system which does not recognise sin, does not acknowledge an Atonement. No doubt there will always be Stoics and Epicureans; endurance or indifference will always be the resource of some minds; some souls will ever build themselves costly pleasure-houses, "wherein at ease for aye to dwell;" but some time or other "the abysmal deeps of Personality plague them with sore despair." And when the agonizing cry is uttered,—

"What is it that will take away my sin,
And save me, lest I die?"

what answer has Theism to give? It is in vain to tell the man who utters such a cry, "You have no sin; the phantom which terrifies you is but the nightmare of a diseased imagination;" the man knows but too well that it is no phantom, but something which is very real and very terrible, something from which he needs a Deliverer who is more than man. If he knows not the true Deliverer he will certainly seek some other.

If Mr. Parker had possessed an inductive mind, his own principles would have brought him to very different conclusions; but his mind was not calm and philosophical, but passionate and rhetorical. Even in the "Discourse of Matters Pertaining to Religion," which has considerable pretensions to be considered a philosophical work, and which is very brief in proportion to the vast matters to be treated of, there are frequent repetitions, not a few contradictions, and many passages of vague declamation. The sermons are full of rhapsodies which, if sometimes eloquent, are more often turgid and over-ornate. In a word, his faults are the faults of an orator, and of an orator accustomed to speak from the pulpit or the platform to an audience sympathetic indeed, but not of good taste or delicate perception. Vehemence and exaggeration, which mark almost every page of Mr. Parker's writings, are excellent qualities to attract a crowd, but sorry aids towards the attainment of truth. To this oratorical habit of mind are to be traced Mr. Parker's most prominent defects. His irreverence was perhaps natural to him. He was not destitute of a kind of religiosity, but he had no respect for men's feelings towards their most cherished objects of regard. The spirit of the youth who spoke of "old Paul" and "the gentleman from Tarsus" in the debating society at Cambridge is too often visible in the man, and is aggravated by the constant habit of platform denunciation. Leaving for an instant out of consideration the Divine authority of the holy sacraments, we should have thought that their venerable antiquity, and the constant reverence paid to them

by thousands of the noblest intellects that the world has seen, would have shielded them from the attacks of a young New England minister; yet he speaks of them with the utmost contempt: of the Holy Communion in particular he uses expressions which we cannot repeat here.* And to the same coarseness of perception, which was a main cause of his irreverence, is due his want of true wit and humour. To say that there can be no devil, since no print of his hoofs is found in the old red sandstone; or that men are, after all, more well-disposed than the contrary, since even South Carolina senators are sober all the forenoon,—these sayings would seem humorous and sarcastic to some audiences, while to others they simply show that their author knew how to catch the mob, though he was probably destitute of all finer perception of the humorous. His reading, too, with some exceptions, seems to have been rather of that hasty and discursive kind which enables a man to catch here and there a thought or an image for future use, than the slow and careful study which really *nourishes* the reader's mind, and leaves it not only filled but strengthened. He studied the Fathers of the first five centuries before he was twenty-five. We think of Delarue's lifelong toil over Origen, and Jansen's over Augustine, and wonder what kind of "study" this was. In another line, he takes up Bopp's "Comparative Grammar;" finding this a book requiring thorough study, not admitting of "skimming," he "can't read the book,"† though his friends tell us that he had remarkable linguistic aptitude. And this habit of devouring, without digesting his reading by careful meditation, stunted his mental growth. We see his mind filled with larger and larger stores from year to year, but we do not see it acquire more cautious deliberation, more sagacious judgment; we do not see that the latest expression of his thought rises, in point of vigour and ability, above the level of the sermon by which he first became known, the "Discourse of the Transient and Permanent in Christianity." In tone, some of his later writings are more unpleasant than his earlier. By a vehement impulse, he took up certain opinions early in life, and these he continually illustrated anew from the fresh stores of his reading; but he never seems to have become capable of altering his standpoint so as to gain a fairer view of an opponent's position. A boy of quick and active intellect delights in his own "intuitions;" they seem to conduct him so lightly and easily to the highest knowledge that he cannot submit to the long toil, the patient induction, the suspension of judgment which the wise in all ages have found necessary for the attainment of truth. This characteristic of boyhood, with its good and its evil, Mr. Parker seems to have retained to the end of his days. His extensive reading was not the means of advancing, with strengthened faculties, to higher

* Weiss, i. 155.

† *Ibid.*, i. 111.


truth; it did but illustrate certain foregone conclusions. It is the want of growth and moral thoughtfulness which renders Theodore Parker's "Experience as a Minister"—an autobiographical document addressed, shortly before his death, to his congregation in Boston—so very inferior in interest to the "Phases of Faith" of Mr. F. W. Newman, or the "Apologia" of his highly-gifted brother; it has none of that unveiling of spiritual conflict, that tenderness of conscience, that painful struggle towards the quarter whence the light seems to proceed, which gives such a deep, almost tragic charm to those volumes. It has an interest of its own, as a record of opinions steadfastly held, of a work earnestly wrought out, in the midst of a storm of opposition which would have daunted most men; but this hardihood against opposition has far less of human interest than the subtlety and impressibility which characterize the Newmans. Mr. Parker's mind was not subtle or impressible; it had that firm and tenacious grasp of a few leading principles which is essential to the success of a popular orator, not the pliancy and readiness to change, as fresh evidence arises, which mark a really great and progressive thinker. If he had possessed more ready appreciation of an antagonist's position, more perception of the danger of extreme statement, he would have been a much better and greater man, but he would not have held the attention of listening crowds, week after week, in the Boston Music Hall. In short, Mr. Parker's character might not unfairly be summed up in the words which he himself applies to the "resolute Hierome,"—"Setting aside his extensive, perhaps immense reading, and faculty of sharp declamation, . . . nothing but moderate faculties remain. He was not a profound scholar in Hebrew, or even in Greek [or Latin]. He tasted of theology rather than exhausted it."

We do not think Mr. Parker a "latter Luther," who will shake the faith of the servants of Christ as the earlier Luther did that of the servants of the Papacy; his work was too hasty and ill-compacted to produce a permanent effect upon the world; but we are far from saying that his labours are lost; no labour is wholly lost which is done in sincerity and truth. And if there is much "wood, hay, stubble" in the edifice which Mr. Parker has built, yet when the fire shall have destroyed them there will remain, we doubt not, some grains of gold. It is no small thing to have recalled men's minds to the fact, too often forgotten, that God has witnesses for Himself even in the midst of heathens and idolaters. "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork," even to those who have not known the name of Christ; the voice of God speaks in men's hearts to many who know not his revelation of Himself in his Son Incarnate; nowhere has God "left

Himself without a witness," though in many a land men "glorify Him not as God, neither are thankful;"—to have recalled this truth in the midst of a generation prone to regard all mankind, outside of certain small sects, as almost beyond the pale of God's mercies, is no small service. And akin to this is Mr. Parker's firm assertion of the eternal and unchangeable nature of morality, which is, we think, the best feature of his teaching. The Evangelicals had, to a great extent, adopted the same theory of morals as the older Unitarians; virtue and vice were in their eyes matters of ordinance; a virtuous act was simply an act deserving reward in the other world; a vicious act, one deserving everlasting punishment; men spoke sometimes as if murder would have been no sin, had not the tables of Sinai proclaimed, "Thou shalt do no murder." The popular definition of virtue was that startling Paleyan sentence which makes virtue consist in doing good for the sake of everlasting happiness: to this morality of calculation, which does good hoping for *much* in return, Mr. Parker, like the nobler philosophers of all times, opposed a firm faith in the spirit which does good "hoping for nothing again." Right, he declares, is eternally right, wrong is eternally wrong; no circumstances, no ordinances can make right wrong, or wrong right; the principles of right and wrong are fixed and eternal as God Himself. This is, in fact, his religion. We fail to find any distinction between a religion which is defined to be "voluntary obedience to the law of God, inward and outward obedience to that law which He has written on our nature,"* and a pure morality. A pure and unselfish morality Mr. Parker certainly preached; the cause which Pecoek maintained against the Lollards, Hooker against the Puritans, and Cudworth against the Hobbists, he maintained against the New England Evangelicals and "Old School" Unitarians. This is no faint praise; and more than this we cannot give. Some portions of his work will probably endure; his writings we think will cease to attract notice when the generation to which they were first addressed shall have passed away.

S. CHEETHAM.

* "Discourse," p. 24.



CHURCH HYMN-BOOKS.

Hymns Ancient and Modern, &c., &c., with accompanying Tunes. Selected and Arranged by WM. HENRY MONK, Organist and Director of the Choir at King's College, London. London: Novello.

Psalms and Hymns for Public Worship, with appropriate Tunes. Revised and Edited by JAMES TURLE, Organist of Westminster Abbey. Second Edition. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge

The Church Psalter and Hymn-book. By the Rev. WM. MERCER, M.A. The Harmonies Revised by JOHN GOSS, Esq., Composer to Her Majesty's Chapels Royal, and Organist of St. Paul's Cathedral. London: Nisbet & Co.

The Congregational Hymn and Tune-book, &c. By the Rev. R. R. CHORP, B.A. Assisted by the Rev. J. B. Dykes, M.A., Mus. Doc.; W. T. Best, Esq., Organist of St. George's Hall, Liverpool; E. Cooper, Esq., Organist of Her Majesty's Chapels Royal; Rev. R. F. Smith, M.A., Southwell; E. J. Hopkins, Esq., Organist of the Temple Church, London; Dr. Monk, Organist of York Cathedral; J. Turler, Esq., Organist of Westminster Abbey; and others. London: William Mackenzie; Simpkin, Marshall, & Co.

• *A Selection of Psalms and Hymns, Arranged for the Public Services of the Church of England* By the Rev. CHARLES KEMBLE, M.A., Rector of Bath. With appropriate Tunes, Harmonized and Arranged by Dr. S. S. WESLEY. London: Batten, Clapham

Hymns for the Church of England, with Proper Tunes. Edited by CHARLES STEGGALL, Mus. Doc. Cantab., Professor of Harmony at the Royal Academy of Musick, and Organist to the Hon. Society of Lincoln's Inn. London: Longmans.

Psalms and Hymns adapted to the Services of the Church of England, with accompanying Tunes. Selected and Revised by JOHN FOSTER, Gentleman of H. M. Chapels Royal, &c. London: Rivingtons [Commonly called "Hall's, or "The Mitre" Hymn-book.]

The Salisbury Hymn-book. London: Simpkin, Marshall, & Co

A Book of Church Hymns. London: Bosworth.

THE copiousness of this list, which might have been augmented to almost any extent, may testify to the interest which is now taken in the department of our public worship represented by it. And we are happy to say that the contents of almost any one of these volumes might be used to show the immense improvement which has taken place within the last few years. The Church in England owes

a great debt of gratitude to those who, by compiling such books, have carried the best hymns in the language into hundreds of churches where they had no chance of admission before,—have chastened the melodies and purified the harmonies of our national tunes,—and have enriched both hymns and tunes by translations and importations from other Reformed Churches. We may well look with some satisfaction on the list, when we compare our present state as to hymnody with our condition some years ago.

While refraining from anything like an apportionment of the service done to the Church among the hymn-books mentioned above, we may venture to say that first among the first stands the credit due to the compilers of "*Hymns Ancient and Modern*." A very cursory survey of the pages of this hymn-book will suffice to show to which school of Church opinion it belongs. Remembering that, though the strength of a machine is that of its weakest part, the strength of opinion of the author of a book is that of its strongest expression, we are obliged to connect the editors of "*Hymns Ancient and Modern*" with the more advanced portion of those who hold High Church sentiments. This being so, the Church owes them all the more for having so readily and so thoroughly adopted her very best evangelical hymns, and having carried them into the lips and hearts of congregations to whom they could not otherwise have reached. It is a cheering sign of the soundness at heart of all good men among us, when the intrinsic merits of a hymn, united to the presence of earnest faith in our common Lord, and yearning love to Him, are found able to overbear all adventitious drawbacks to its adoption.

Having thus acknowledged our obligations, we proceed to say something on the way in which the various compilers seem to us to have performed their work. In order to this, we will first consider the general plan of each book, with reference to what a church hymn-book ought to be.

In the S. P. C. K., and in Mr. Hall's and Mr. Kemble's books, we have metrical versions of the Psalms prefixed to the collection of hymns. Let us say at once that we believe such an addition, for church use, to be needless. The Psalms are already in our Prayer-books, and are much better sung as they stand, than in any metrical version. There can be no reason at all, in churches where it may be impossible or inconvenient always to chant the whole Psalms for the day, why some should not be chanted and some read, or the whole sometimes read and sometimes chanted. But the poor travesties of the Psalms commonly used as metrical versions of them were better for the most part disused. Those few of these versions which have become well known, as, *e.g.*, "*All people that on earth do dwell*," "*Through all the changing scenes of life*," and a few more, might

well be incorporated among the hymns, as indeed has been done in "Hymns Ancient and Modern," and in Mr. Chope's and Bosworth's collections. UNITY is the very first essential of a church hymn-book.

The next essential is, arrangement according to the seasons of the church year. This is now very generally attended to; but it is not, it seems to us, carried so far as it ought to be. We cannot be said to have arrived at the most convenient form of a church hymn-book, until we find, ranged under each Sunday and holiday, enough hymns for the services of that day. The combination of prescription and selection is even more troublesome than selection altogether. Of course, the freedom of the clergyman as to selecting need not be fettered by such an arrangement as we propose: we might take, for particular occasions which may arise, or to suit the subjects of particular sermons, other hymns from any part of the book, or from among a store of general hymns which might be appended to it.

The arrangement, in this respect, of the church hymn-books before us, will be seen by the following table:—

	Number of Hymns for Festival and Penitential Seasons and Days, and for Special Occasions.	Number of General Hymns.
Mercer's Hymn-book	268. No allotment to the Sundays, except the principal festivals.	242.
S. P. C. K. ditto	199. Ditto.	101.
Hymns Ancient and Modern	206. Ditto.	67.
Chope's Hymn-book . .	198. Ditto.	102, called Hymns for Sundays after Trinity.
Kemble's ditto	500. Six hymns allotted to each Sunday, and one to each minor festival.	124.
Hall's ditto	320. Four hymns allotted to each Sunday and great festival, none for the minor festivals, except by use of an index.	—
The Salisbury ditto . .	127. No allotment, except to the principal festivals.	77, called Hymns for Sundays after Trinity.
Bosworth's ditto . . .	328. Three hymns allotted to each Sunday, more to the great festivals, one to each minor festival.	62.
Steggall's ditto	Allotment quite irregular:— <i>e. g.</i> , eleven for Advent, six for Christmas, ten for Lent, five for Sunday before Easter, fifteen for Easter, thirty for Sundays after Trinity: special occasions also irregular.	

Only one of these books (Hall's) is furnished with an index of subjects, so that the task of selecting a hymn to suit a sermon must be almost hopeless in some of them: *e. g.*, among the 101 general

hymns of the S. P. C. K. collection. It is true, a partial exception to this occurs in Mercer's book, where the general hymns are grouped according to subjects.

It will be evident from the table, that the most complete book, as well as that most convenient for use, is Kemble's, where ample provision is made for every Sunday in the year. And when we state, that the small edition of these 624 hymns (together with the 150 psalms), in good legible type, and bound in cloth, is to be had for ninepence, it would seem as if we need go no farther for a church hymn-book. Considering these advantages, and also that the hymns are for the most part chosen to suit the views of the large and influential Evangelical party, we are not surprised to see at the end a list of 634 churches, at home and in the colonies, where this book is in use. We shall return to it in treating the next branch of our subject.

In completeness of arrangement, the next on our list are, Mr. Hall's book, and the anonymous book published by Mr. Bosworth. Against the former of these we shall have serious objections to make by-and-bye. And other matters apart, it is one great objection to the latter, that three hymns for each Sunday can hardly satisfy the wants of parish churches; and thus the necessity of selection comes in, and mars the usefulness of the book.

It is plain that none of the other collections can be said to fulfil our condition. The worst arranged in this respect is that of the S. P. C. K. Between the others there is not much to choose, except that Mercer's grouping under subjects somewhat eases the difficulty of selection.

But we now come to a far more important matter; the way in which the allotment of hymns to different seasons and Sundays is made: involving of course the character, in each case, of the material used—the hymns themselves.

Speaking now not of those higher requisites, without which no hymn should be admitted into Christian worship, but of the setting of them in words and framing in verse, it seems to us that a hymn is a thing of itself, distinct from a lyrical poem, demanding other powers for its production, and dependent for its excellence on other qualities. Our English "*corpus hymnorum*" has suffered in no small degree from this having been forgotten. And the principal mischief of this kind has been done in, or near to, our own days. We have witnessed the introduction into the worship of the Church of many hymns which have great poetical beauty, but on that very account are almost unfitted for congregational use. It is hard to speak of, as offenders in this respect, men to whom we owe so much, as Bishop Heber and Dean Milman. Yet there can be little doubt that they first set the

example of introducing what may be called "high poetry" into English hymns. In their hands, the endeavour succeeded, mistaken as we believe it to have been: and many of their hymns must ever find a place in all English collections. Good as they are, and popular, it is a pity that they had not been better, by being more chastened in imagery and diction. Then their popularity would not have led, as it unquestionably has done, to many most unsuccessful imitations which unfortunately have now become as popular as their prototypes. We know we are on very delicate ground: we almost shrink from naming as among this last class, the favourite "Nearer, my God, to Thee," and the still more popular "Jerusalem the golden;" and having done so, we break off the list, for fear of seeming to be upholding a paradox from mere caprice.

Highly poetic diction and imagery are not and cannot be understood by the great mass of an English congregation. The charm of those few strains in "The Christian Year" which can be used as hymns is, their perfect simplicity in the midst of high but chastened poetry. And the reason why more of that delightful book cannot be so used is, that the poetical and rhetorical elements have prevailed, to the overpowering of the hymnic character.

One of the best books before us, the anonymous "Church Hymns" published by Mr. Bosworth, sets forth in its Preface a profession of having aimed at a higher standard of poetic excellence than other collections. We were agreeably disappointed to find the editor's real meaning to be, that he has endeavoured to choose none but really *good hymns*. His errors in the direction of his own principle have been but few. He has indeed admitted that "chrononhotonthologos" of hymns, the disagreeable so-called "alleluiatic sequence;,"* but he has not inserted the even more disagreeable, though also more poetical address to a star, "Brightest and best of the Sons of the Morning," which, absent from the pages of "Hymns Ancient and Modern," Hall's, Steggall's, and the Salisbury hymn-book, is yet found in Mercer, the S. P. C. K. book, Chope, and Kemble.

From over-poetical the transition is easy to sensational, or poetico-

* By-the-by, why do a certain school of English hymn-writers persist in dropping the *h* at the beginning and end of "Hallelujah"? The Greeks, taking the word from the Hebrew, omitted the *h* at the end, as possessing no means of representing it: and when the authors of the early Latin versions, ignorant as they were of Hebrew, took the *Αλληλουια* from Greek written without breathings, they naturally dropped also the *h* at the beginning, and represented the word by "Alleluia." But our translators, by thus giving it in the Book of Revelation, were acting against their plain instructions, to render every proper name uniformly; and now that the Hebrew is familiar to us, it is simply inexcusable so to write it, and a mere piece of affectation of Latin forms even where wrong. Be it remembered, likewise, that by thus writing it, the composition and rendering of the word are disguised, and, which is even of more importance, the Sacred Name altogether obliterated.

sensational hymns. And these are even more objectionable. We cannot forbear giving one specimen of the kind of hymns we mean :—

“ Fierce was the wild billow,
Dark was the night,
Oars laboured heavily,
Foam glimmered white :
Trembled the mariners,
Peril was nigh :
‘ Men,’ said the God of God,
‘ Peace ! It is I !’

“ Ridge of the mountain-wave,
Lower thy crest :
Wail of Euroclydon,
Be thou at rest :
Sorrow can never be,
Darkness must fly,
Where saith the Light of Light,
‘ Peace ! It is I !’

“ Jesu, Deliverer,
Come Thou to me :
Soothe Thou my voyaging
Over life’s sea :
Thou, when the storm of Death
Roars, sweeping by,
Whisper, O Truth of Truth,
‘ Peace ! It is I !’ ”

This, or anything approaching to this, ought rigorously to be excluded from all church hymn-books. It is not taken from any of the collections on our present list, nor, we are glad to say, have they been great offenders in this respect. The Salisbury hymn-book has, we think, most yielded to the temptation of inserting sensational hymns.

But if high poetry, or the imitation of it, be undesirable, still more so is mere jingle, without any poetry or feeling. And of this we fear the books on our present list are far more frequently guilty. Take this example from the Salisbury book,—

“ So shall He collect us, direct us, protect us,
From Egypt’s strand :
So shall He precede us, and feed us, and lead us
To Canaan’s land.

“ Toils and foes assailing, friends quailing, hearts failing,
Shall threat in vain :
If He be providing, presiding, and guiding
To Him again.

“ Christ, our Leader, Monarch, Pleader, Interceder,
Praise we and adore :
Exultation, veneration, gratulation,
Bringing evermore.”

(Or again, the following from the same book, for Trinity Sunday:—

“Trinity, Unity, Deity
Eternal :
Majesty, Potency, Brilliancy
Supernal :
First and Last, End and Cause,
King of kings, Law of laws,
Judge of all,
Round whose throne angels fall :
Thee they laud, Thee adore,
Thee they chant evermore.”

It really pains us to quote such doggrel in combination with the highest and most sacred of doctrines. Mr. Kemble's book errs less in the insertion of worthless hymns than might be expected from its more miscellaneous character. We had noticed a few as unworthy of the place they hold: but after our last specimens, we shall forbear citing them, as their delinquencies would be altogether eclipsed.

Offences against taste, which also are offences against reverence, are of frequent occurrence in the body of English hymns. Many of these derive their origin from a time not so discriminating in the use of words and phrases as our own; and some of the best of them were composed by men who cared more for the life and unction of their expressions, than for that decorous and unimpassioned equilibrium which we, in our day, are not allowed to overstep. Sometimes again, descriptions and similitudes, familiar enough when the hymns of the ancient Church were used, have been retained in translation, or imitated, and even exceeded, in their objectionable points. Witness these two stanzas in the Salisbury hymn for St. Stephen's day:—

“Like a gem, each rugged stone
Sparkling with his life-blood, shone :
Stars would seem less bright and keen
Studded round his head serene.

“From his forehead's gushing streams
Dart a thousand blending beams,
Till his visage beams in grace
Of glory, like an angel's face.”*

We may mention that the hymn, “Lo He comes with clouds descending,” as given in “Hymns Ancient and Modern,” Chope, and the Salisbury book, contains one stanza—the third—which ought never to have been printed in a modern church hymn-book.

To this class—offences against taste and reverence—we must also refer the now very frequent sensuous representations of our blessed Lord's Passion, and of our participation in its benefits. These, as our readers know, abound in the hymns and books of the Romish Church.

* The composer of this hymn must have forgotten that it was before the Council, and not during the martyrdom, that St. Stephen's face was as the face of an angel.

And we are sorry to say, they also abound in the pages of "Hymns Ancient and Modern," and in Choep's book, which is, in so many particulars, a copy of "Hymns Ancient and Modern." We forbear to give examples, but will refer the reader to such hymns as 91 in "Hymns Ancient and Modern:" also 93 and 94; and 93 in Choep.

It seems to us a mistake to insist on hymns intended for public worship being expressed in the plural number. Undoubtedly there is at first sight a propriety in a multitude thus speaking. But when we reflect that that multitude is no ordinary assembly, but the Church of those who are one in Christ, the case is somewhat altered, and the *primâ facie* view becomes modified. The singular has no longer a disjunctive but an uniting effect: whereas the plural, in all cases expressing individual feeling, gives rather the separate units than the amalgamated whole. We doubt whether it will not be found that the very best experimental and spiritual hymns of all ages of the Church have been in the singular, from the fifty-first and the twenty-third Psalms downwards. Certainly this is true of our own English hymns. The two which stand out, as prominent in depth of holy feeling, as in simplicity of expression, "Rock of Ages, cleft for me," and "Jesu, lover of my soul," though throughout in the singular, have, we will venture to say, carried the united praises of the great congregation as often as any in the language.* The same is true of Bishop Ken's Morning and Evening and Midnight Hymns, and of Keble's hardly less beautiful Evening Hymn, and of hundreds of others which have become household words in the Church of England, and will continue so as long as she shall endure. Mistakes, some of them of a curious kind, have been made in the books before us, in altering the diction of hymns from the singular to the plural. In the S.P.C.K. collection, hymn 172, Bishop Ken's words are altered to, "We wake, we wake, ye heavenly choir."† The impression given by this, if sung after sermon, might be a little awkward.

* With regard to the latter of these hymns, we are truly concerned to find ourselves so completely at issue with the excellent Archdeacon Wordsworth. He speaks in the Preface to his "Holy Year," of its two first lines in terms which we maintain they are the furthest possible from deserving. We doubt whether any one, who has used and felt the hymn, would ever, on account of a hardly ambiguous word in its first line, attribute to it an "amatory" character. Every word of every line protests against such an interpretation. The whole spirit of the hymn is that of one defenceless and in peril, flying to Christ for shelter. "Lover of my soul" has a totally different meaning from that which the Archdeacon assigns to it: "Let me to thy bosom fly" is addressed to Him who carries the weak and defenceless of the flock in His bosom. The tone of this magnificent hymn is that of the deepest reverence; and it is passing strange how one of Dr. Wordsworth's penetration should have so totally missed the point of it.

† It may be noted that the original appears to have been: "Awake, awake, ye heavenly choir:" then it became, possibly under the Bishop's own hand (for we find both forms): "I wake, I wake," and so in the pluralizing of the Tract Committee of the S.P.C.K., "We wake, we wake."

Before we pass from this part of our subject, something must be said of what seems to us the inexcusable practice of the wholesale alteration of hymns. Of course something must be allowed for the great difficulty, in this respect, which besets the editors of hymn-books. It is not always possible to adopt entire what might by the change of a few words be, or appear, an appropriate hymn. We will take as a crucial instance the grand hymn of Doddridge's, "Ye servants of the Lord, Each in his office wait." Doddridge wrote the last stanza of that hymn,—

"Christ shall the table spread
With His own royal hand,
And raise that favourite servant's head
Amidst the angelic band."

Here, one word, "favourite," is the dead fly in the ointment. How came he to write it, with "Well done, good and faithful servant," before him? To substitute "faithful" for "favourite" is really, in a case of this kind, more a matter of duty than of choice. And doubtless the same may occur sometimes with more than single words; where the hymn writer has missed some expression or application lying close to his subject, and filled the place with what may seem irrelevant matter. But in all such cases we ought to be especially careful. Any one can mar a hymn, which not one in ten thousand could have made. Examples continually occur in almost all our hymn-books, where the editors have entirely missed the sense of the words which they thus bunglingly alter. Our translators of the Bible are said to have received an application suggesting a change in a word, and stating five reasons for its adoption. The reply was a thankful acknowledgment, stating that the translators had fifteen reasons against it. And so, if the hymn writer were consulted, would it often turn out to be with proposed alterations of his work. Indeed he of all men is much to be pitied in this matter. He, poor man, in his bookseller's shop, turns over on the counter some hymn-book of great pretension and highly accredited, perhaps with its circulation of millions. A hymn of his own flatters his eye; and liable as he is to human weakness, a certain pleasurable sensation comes over him: doomed, alas, to give way to how bitter disappointment, when he sees that the very keystone of his thoughts has been taken out, and the place supplied by some trumpery stop-gap, whose greatest merit would be to have no meaning at all, seeing that whatever it has, mars and vulgarizes the whole.

Of the books before us which adopt this practice, it is hard to say which is the worst. As far as we have examined, Bosworth and Mercer are comparatively free from it. The editors of "Hymns

Ancient and Modern" have indulged in it far too often: indeed some of its worst examples are to be found in their pages. Nothing can excuse it when dealing with the hymns of living writers. The author may be always consulted as to any desired change, and if his consent be withheld, the hymn ought not to be used. We are sorry to say that such has not been the practice of the editors of "Hymns Ancient and Modern." Having taken hymns originally without any application to the author, and having changed the wording so as to make him responsible in the eyes of the public for sentiments very different from those of his own composition, they have, when applied to, declined to correct the fault, alleging as an excuse their extensive circulation. That is, they refused reparation on account of the magnitude of the injury inflicted. The conduct of the Tract Committee of the Christian Knowledge Society forms a favourable contrast. In one of the cases referred to, they had copied the "amended" hymn from "Hymns Ancient and Modern," trusting to the high character and good faith of that collection. But, on being made aware of their error, they at once cancelled the leaf, and inserted the hymn in its genuine state.

Of the other books before us, Mr. Hall's, or the "Mitre" hymn-book, so much used in London churches, is very full of unlicensed and mostly unintelligent alterations. Sometimes even whole stanzas of miserable wish-wash are inserted in the middle of well-known hymns; and far more often, the words and sentiments are robbed of their unction and point to suit the required mediocrity of the school to which the book belongs.

But we pass from a time when such things were not well understood, and therefore perhaps more excusable, to one of the most recent of our collections; that for the music of which (no name of any one is given as editor of the hymns) Dr. Steggall is responsible. It were to be hoped that, in 1865, we did understand somewhat more about the proprieties of editing hymns than some twenty years ago. But in this book we find the "*cacoethes mutandi*" still raging at its full. Our readers all know the common Advent hymn, beginning,—

"Hark! the glad sound! the Saviour comes,
The Saviour promised long:
Let every heart prepare a throne,
And every voice a song."

But what must be the feelings of any among them, who have always thus known it, to see it disguised as follows:—

"Hark! joyful sound! the Saviour comes,
The Saviour promised long:
Let every heart be melody,
 since he comes."

Now every change here is, as usual, for the worse. "Joyful," besides being altogether without justifying reason, introduces another *jingle*, of which our English hymns are always too full, in the harsh sound of the "j." "Let every heart be melody," is absolute and hopeless nonsense. We may "make melody in our hearts," as we may make hymns in our houses; but the heart is not melody, any more than the house is a hymn. And "Let every voice be song" is almost equal nonsense. The voice is the instrument and vehicle of song, but is not itself song, any more than a pianoforte *is* music. Then again: in the last verse of the same well-known hymn, the original ventures on two lines expressing something like feeling, in something like poetic diction. *Ergo*, they must be sacrificed. The stanza stood thus:—

"Our glad Hosannas, Prince of Peace,
Thine advent shall proclaim:
And heaven's eternal arches ring
With Thy beloved Name."

To what does the reader suppose the two last lines have dwindled down?—

"And every knee in worship bow
To Thy most holy Name."

Of course; but what do these words express of joy in the great day of joy? What do they express at all which is not done now by the waiting Church? The original words, not perhaps faultless, had yet this to recommend them: they set in contrast the perishable arches of the material church, with the starry vaults of the heavenly Jerusalem; our feeble hosannas here, with the great shout of the multitude whom no man may number; they brought before us that ringing of the streets of Jerusalem on earth with the hosannas of the palm-bearing crowd, and the great day which that lowly Advent prefigured. Where is all this, to the choirs who sing the "amended" version? Gone: hopelessly gone; and in its place a weak miserable commonplace, unworthy of a schoolboy's exercise. And such, we assure our readers, is but a specimen of this, in the matter of words of hymns, certainly the least satisfactory of the books at the head of our article. We cannot forbear giving a few more specimens of changes from this book (which, by the way, was praised in some "opinions of the press" for the judiciousness of its alterations):—

ORIGINAL.

"Till then I would Thy love proclaim,
With every fleeting breath."
"How sweet the name of Jesus sounds,
In a believer's ear!"
"Forbid it, Lord, that I should boast,
Save in the death of Christ my God:
All the vain things that charm me most,

TRAVESTIE.

"Still let its power our heart inflame,
Fanned by the Spirit's breath (!)."
"In faith's attentive ear!"
"O may I know no other boast,
Than Christ and His atoning blood:
The vain delights that charm me most,

Surely the force of absurdity can hardly go farther than this, "plunging delights in a saving flood"!

ORIGINAL.

"When I soar thro' tracts unknown,
See Thee on Thy judgment Throne."

TRAVESTIE.

"When I hear the midnight cry,
Telling that the Judge is nigh."

We thought it was the *Bridegroom* whom the midnight cry announced. Surely we have a right to demand that Scripture symbolism should be kept inviolate.

ORIGINAL.

"Thou, whose Almighty word
Chaos and darkness heard,
And took their flight."

TRAVESTIE.

"God, whose Almighty word,
In the beginning heard,
Put gloom to flight (!)"

Here, besides the miserable lines in lieu of very fine ones, is a positive historical (and geological?) error. It was not *in the beginning* that God said "Let there be light;" but having made the heavens and earth in the beginning, at a certain time, when darkness was upon the face of the deep, He uttered these words.

ORIGINAL.

"Judge not the Lord by feeble sense,
But trust Him for His grace:
Behind a frowning Providence
He hides a smiling face."

TRAVESTIE.

"Judge not the Lord: let feeble sight
To loving Faith give way;
The brighter for the moonless night
Will shine the perfect day."

Poor Cowper! was ever such stuff? Notice, that the contrasts are, "*feeble*" and "*loving*," "*moonless*" and "*perfect*." But that is not all:

ORIGINAL.

"His purposes will ripen fast,
Unfolding every hour:
The bud may have a bitter taste,
But sweet will be the flower."

TRAVESTIE.

"His purpose He in time will show,
Unfolding it each hour;
The bud in form unloved may grow,
Yet lovely be the flower."

We really expected, after such specimens, to have found "All people that on earth reside" substituted for the first line of the Old Hundredth Psalm. We venture to express a wish that "Hymns for the Church of England, with Proper Tunes," may be used when all other collections are forgotten, but—not till then.

There are two or three minor matters, regarding usage in hymn-singing, in the Church of England, which it is perhaps now the proper place to discuss. One of these is, the attaching a doxology to every hymn. Certainly this would seem to be justified, if not in some measure prescribed, by the injunction in the Prayer-book to close each portion of the Psalms with ascription of praise to the Blessed Trinity. But perhaps on consideration this may appear not to be quite a sound conclusion. The Psalms, being songs of the Old Testament Church, might require, for purposes of Christian praise, this continual remembrance of the revealed covenant God of the New Testament. And doubtless, analogy would suggest to the Church

similarly to conclude many, if not most, of her own hymns. But we very much question whether the practice, almost invariable in some of these books, of ending with a doxology, does not tend to obscure the sense and diminish the effect in some cases, especially when, as in many examples which we could cite, a stanza of the original hymn, which was necessary to the sense, has been omitted to make room for the doxology. There are many cases where it is most appropriate. No one, for instance, ever found fault with it in Bishop Ken's Morning and Evening Hymns, nor, we may add, in any hymns of general praise; nor in any where the stanzas are dis-united, being separate expressions of a general spirit pervading the whole. But where the hymn is a continuous setting forth of one sentiment, descriptive, supplicatory, or didactic, it seems to us that the doxology is far better dispensed with.

Again, there has of late prevailed a custom, originating in "high" places, but having now passed almost through the hymnody of the Church of England, of adding an "Amen" at the end of every hymn. It may be difficult to stem so wide and full a stream; but we have no hesitation in saying, that we think the practice generally objectionable. Musically, it cannot for a moment be defended. The rhythm of the hymn concludes with the tune; the two notes expressing the "Amen" are insulated from it, and come painfully on the ear, which is already satisfied with the completed time of the tune itself. Nor can the usage be justified by the continually recurring "Amen" after the recitation of the prayers on the monotone. That recitation is unbarred, and has no reference to time. Nor, again, has this "Amen" at the end of hymns any analogy with that which is included in the barred setting of the doxologies at the end of our harmonized "services." It is altogether an excrescence, and in our opinion, offensive to the ear. And what is even worse, it is, except when the hymn concludes with the doxology, or with a distinct ascription of praise, or a direct address in prayer, out of place, and impairing to the sense. Take an example, occurring in hymn 148 of Steggall's book:—

"O happy place!
When shall I be,
My God, with Thee,
To see Thy face? Amen."

Or in hymn 126 of the same:—

"O happy band of pilgrims,
Look upward to the skies:
Where such a light affliction,
Shall win you such a prize. Amen."

There is yet one other point, and that has reference to the arrangement for the year of the Church. For every Sunday, there should be

at least four hymns. Of these four hymns, the first will in all probability be that sung between the Morning Prayer and the Communion Service. At this place was anciently sung the Introit—the hymn coinciding with the entrance of the minister into the eucharistic portion of the service: his going, as we should phrase it, up to the Communion Table. In King Edward the Sixth's first Prayer-book, certain portions of the Psalms were appointed to be sung in this place as Introits on the Sundays in the year. In our present Prayer-book these do not appear: and, considering that the whole Psalter is sung through once a month, and thus the Introits would often repeat portions already used, it would not be advisable, if indeed it were lawful, to bring them back into use. But we may venture to say, that the hymn used in this place ought to be of the nature of an Introit for the particular Sunday: ought to reflect the subject then before the Church, and to have reference, either to the Lessons lately read, or to the Epistle or Gospel which is about to follow. That *no* regard has been paid to this in the books before us, would be too much to say because in arranging the hymns according to the Christian services, the end has generally, during the period of fast and festival, been more or less subserved. But in the less plainly marked portion of the year, in the Sundays after Epiphany, Easter, and Trinity, we have very little if any recognition of such a principle. This is a matter which ought to be specially kept in mind in drawing up Church hymn-books; and with regard to which certainly we have not yet seen the book which the Church wants. There can be no reason why a set of Introit-hymns should not head the four selected for each Sunday, which Introits might gain general acceptance, and even supersede in our cathedral and choral service the wholly inappropriate and tautological Sanctus, which has now usurped a place not its own, and appears like a shabby apology for not proceeding to its use in the place where the Church has appointed it.

As to the other three hymns for each Sunday and chief Festival, a similar principle should, it seems to us, generally govern their selection. That is, they should, although not so directly aimed at the peculiar subject of the day (except indeed on the highest Festivals), still derive their interest and hold on the congregation from some salient point in its services. That this may have been carried too far, we are quite ready to admit. We can hardly think that the elaborately gathered and remote analogies which are expressed in some of the hymns in Archdeacon Wordsworth's "Holy Year" can be edifying to worshippers in our English churches. Take for instance the hymn at the termination of the Epiphany season, where all the manifestations of the Son of God celebrated during that season are summed up. As a lesson to a school class, the enumeration might be valuable and the

hymn might serve as a *memoria technica* for the remembrance of the course of services; but we would ask with much deference, whether the grasping of some one marked fact or saying in the services of the particular Sunday, might not have suggested a fitter hymn for the great congregation? The services of any Sunday in the year will be found to furnish some such facts and sayings, of which advantage might be taken. The Church needs, it is true, many new hymns; and we cannot but think that, if the editors of hymn-books had made this generally known, our stock would have been by this time vastly improved. It is hardly to our credit, that the very best writers of English hymns, properly so called, have not been of our communion. Watts, Doddridge, and C. Wesley have never yet been surpassed; though Toplady, Lyte, and Miss Charlotte Elliott certainly approach them nearly. The Presbyterians of Scotland, though no book can be more meagre and dreary than that which the Established Church has put forth for the use of her members, boast of one of the best of modern hymn-writers, Horatius Bonar.

We have gained much by the practice of translating the hymns of the ancient Church; and among those who have contributed the most to this gain, is Dr. Mason Neale. But while we gladly acknowledge this, there can be no question that there is something to be set on the other side. The spirit introduced into our hymnology by translations is often un-English, and the diction and versification of the hymns stiff and crabbed. And some ideas, which gave no offence in their original Latin, become unwelcome and even shocking in an English dress. We hear "*Sanguis Christi, inebria me,*" without a painful feeling: but its equivalent in English would distress any reverent mind.


An English hymn should be plain in diction, chastened in imagery, fervent in sentiment, humble in its approach to God. Its lines should be cunningly wrought, so that they may easily find their way to the ear of the simplest, and stay unbidden in his memory. It should be metrically faultless; so departing at times from perfect uniformity, as to render reason for the departure, and give a charm to its usual strictness. They have done our hymns an ill service, who have gone about to alter trochaic feet into iambic, because the metre was iambic.

The making of hymns requires more of the fancy than of the imagination: but the fancy must keep her bounds, and speak not above a whisper. A hymn, as it must not be "fanciful," so neither must it be sublime: as it must not be without thought, so neither must it require and challenge thought. The soul of the worshipper is greater than the hymn which he sings: the hymn must not set itself up above him. Hymns are founded on the divine Word and the divine Life. Both should be approached reverently. God's word in the Scripture,

God's work in the soul, are not to be caricatured by big and airy sounds. We may take the text which has struck us, and mould it into a hymn, but we must use it fairly: not distort it, not set it to work in regions where it finds no reference. We may choose the aspect of faith or hope or love which seems best to us, but we must sit at the feet of the Great Inward Teacher, and be not false to our own experience; we must not exaggerate; we must curb the licence of metre and antithesis. He who is to lead the praises of the Church, must speak the mind of the Church.

There are few hymns indeed which come up to the highest standard. A very good test of approach to it, is being everywhere known. For it is the very object of a hymn to get carried into the mind of the Church, and to serve as the acknowledged vehicle of heavenward thoughts and strains. And this will ordinarily be done, not by hymns imported through translation from other churches, but by those which are of native growth: not by the elaborate and artificial, but by the simple and natural: not by those which are made out with stop-gaps, and patches of commonplace, but by those where every word is in its place, and cannot be disarranged without loss to the whole.

We have said nothing in the present article of the tunes which accompany these collections of hymns. Most of them have been arranged by musicians of eminence, and challenge, at all events, strict musical criticism. This the tunes in "Hymns Ancient and Modern" have met with at the hands of a musical correspondent of the *Record*, and apparently have not come very well out of the process. We hope that the whole subject may, at a future time, be treated in this journal.



THE FREEST CHURCH IN CHRISTENDOM.

(BY A CLERGYMAN OF THAT CHURCH.)

WHEN a Dutch deputy, at the anniversary meeting last year of one of the English religious societies, asked how it was that his second speech about Holland and its Church was heard with greater manifestations of sympathy than his first, he received the answer, "Because the first time you assumed that we were acquainted with the state of things in your country, whereas, to tell the truth, we knew next to nothing about them."

The writer has often experienced the same thing when conversing about his native land with friends from Great Britain. Though we are next-door neighbours, trace our origin in great part to the same Saxon root, profess the same religion, and cultivate the same tastes, yet, owing chiefly to the smallness of our country and the limited circle within which our language is spoken or read, our present history and condition I believe are as little known in England as are the history and condition of Lapland. Consequently, it is only to be expected that Englishmen, when their attention is now and then drawn to this *terra ignota*, should often pass condemnatory verdicts upon us where we ought to be praised, or encomiums where we have deserved rebuke. And so I did not marvel when a friend in England wrote me, that in the *Westminster Review* for July, 1865 (p. 225), a sentence occurs like this :—"A conclusion which shows the Church of the Netherlands to be the most free of any of the regularly constituted

churches of Christendom." Such an assertion could have been written only by one unacquainted with the history of our Church during the last fifty years, unless indeed party spirit had so blinded his mind as to render him unable to distinguish between anarchy and liberty.

I gladly comply with the honouring request of the Editor of this Review to write an article which in some measure may enable the British public to judge for themselves in how far the above-quoted sentence from the *Westminster Review* is correct. It is evident that the limits of an article like this cannot admit of an elaborate and detailed account of the events which have combined to bring our Church to its present state; but the main drift of these events was so conspicuous, that even a superficial glance at them will suffice to show what must be their results upon the Church which they directly influenced. To guard myself against partiality, I will, as much as in my power, abstain from indulging in my own reflections, and simply recite the facts as they may be proved from authentic records and historical documents, which I shall quote where it may be required.

And first let me give a few statistics. The population of the Kingdom of the Netherlands amounted, according to the census of 1859, to 3,309,128 persons. Of these 2,007,026 were Protestants, 1,234,486 Roman Catholics, 63,790 Israelites, 3,826 unknown, including a few Greeks and Armenians.

Of the two million and seven thousand Protestants, by far the greater majority—viz., 1,828,365—belong to the Reformed Calvinistic Church, the official name of which is "The Netherlands Reformed Church." Connected with it are the French or Walloon Church, with 9,803 members; the English Presbyterians, with 374; and the Scotch Presbyterians, with 97.

The other Protestant bodies which exist under the shade of this "great church" number, comparatively speaking, but few members. There are the Christian Separatist Reformed (who seceded from the Netherlands Reformed Church in 1832), numbering 65,728; the Lutherans, 64,539; the Mennonites (who hold adult baptism, but with sprinkling), 42,162; the Arminians, or Remonstrants, 5,326; the English Episcopalians, 575; the Moravians, 331: total, 178,661.

It appears from these statistics that the number of all the Protestant dissenters together is less than 0.110 of the members of the Netherlands Reformed Church, and that the latter comprises more than one-half of the whole population of the kingdom. On account of this numerical majority, as well as of its history since the time of the Reformation, this Church may rightly be called the Dutch National Church. It is, with the exception of those in the Roman Catholic provinces bordering upon Belgium, in possession of all the cathedrals

and parochial churches which the Roman Catholic Church possessed before the Reformation. It is a thoroughly presbyterian body, and was for two centuries—up till 1795—the Established Church of the Dutch Republic. It was that Dutch Church which, as it had triumphantly overcome its bloody struggle of eighty years with Rome and priest-ridden Spain, faithfully and liberally offered support, shelter, and protection to all from other countries who sought refuge in the Netherlands against the persecutions of the same enemy. England and Scotland remember this, as well as the Protestants of France.

In those days—that is, before 1795—this Reformed Church was not merely the *privileged*, but exclusively *the* Church of the country. It is true, other denominations, as for instance the Romanists, Lutherans, Mennonites, and Arminians, were tolerated, and, together with the Jews, enjoyed more liberty in our country than was usually allowed to them in other countries. But still, so close was the union between Church and State, that only the Reformed Church was in possession of *all* civil rights, the members of the other denominations being excluded from the civil offices in the State.

This state of things was put an end to by the influence of the French Revolution. The separation of the Church from the State was publicly proclaimed on the 18th of August, 1796. The ecclesiastical possessions, from which the salaries of the Reformed clergy, &c., had been paid, were secularized, and became national property. A time of great confusion and humiliation, alike in Church and in State, now ensued. In 1806, Napoleon sent us his brother to reign over us as king. In 1810 he incorporated our country as a province into his own empire. In 1813 we were delivered from the French yoke. Its re-imposition was for ever prevented by the victory at Waterloo.

The last Stadtholder of our Republic, William the Fifth of Orange, had in 1795 fled to England, where he died. The people, rejoicing at their liberation from the French tyranny, and remembering how much they were indebted for their national existence to the Orange family, enthusiastically and unanimously proclaimed the late Stadtholder's son as their king. He ascended the throne in 1814, under the title of William I. The bitter experiences of the past had decisively put a stop to the former political discord, and the animosities of party spirit. William was gifted with extraordinary administrative skill. He at once directed his attention to the Reformed Church, which, though nominally separated from the State, was yet in fact the church of the people. It lacked a central board of administration, and this the King set about supplying. On the 7th of January, 1816, the King, after having taken advice from a "consulting commission," which partly consisted of politicians, partly of ecclesiastics, granted the introduction of a set of rules, called

“General Regulations for the Administration of the Reformed Church in the Kingdom of the Netherlands.”

This was by some, perhaps by many, looked upon as an encroachment upon the liberty and rights of the Church by the secular power. Two presbyteries, that of Amsterdam and of Woerden, had even the boldness to send in their humble but serious objections. They, however, were sent about their business in a rather haughty tone, by the Minister for Public Worship. They were left alone by the other presbyteries, as their noble opposition met with no encouragement from the great bulk of the church members. It was unhappily the most unseasonable time possible for such movements. The princely scion of the much-loved house of Orange had just recently been hailed as an angel of redemption, and enthusiastically raised to the throne. He was looked upon by every one as the man with whom an era of new life and unknown prosperity was to dawn upon the kingdom. His eldest son had shed his blood on the battlefield of Waterloo. He had himself suffered an exile of eighteen years for the sake of the national cause. From such a man nothing but good could be expected. He had come to restore order and prosperity to the long-vexed country. To try to thwart his movements at such a time as this was regarded as madness. Any attempt to limit his power had all the appearance of rebelliousness. The people were under the charm of an hallucination. Their sudden delivery from so much misery and such deep humiliation had blinded them to the real bearings of some of the changes he speedily inaugurated.

The regulations which the King imposed upon the Church were deemed to contain much good, if viewed from a merely administrative standpoint. They emphatically prescribed the maintenance and vindication of the Church creed. And the creed was still embodied in the old formulas of concordance of the Church, viz., the “Dutch Confession of Faith,” composed by Guido de Brès, the martyr of Valenciennes; the “Heidelberg Catechism,” and the “Doctrinal Rules (*Leerregelen*) of the Synod of Dordt,” concerning the doctrine of predestination. These regulations, it was thought, fully inculcated faith in the doctrines contained in those writings, and could do no harm to the Church at any rate.

A closer inspection, however, ought to have undeceived the panegyrists. The regulations were to a considerable extent a Cæsaro-papistic creation. According to them the Church was henceforth to be ruled by what was called a general synod, which consisted of the deputies of the provincial synods, one from each. In this general synod the Minister for Public Worship and his secretary had seats. The theological faculties of the three universities of the State (Leiden, Utrecht, and Groningen) also sent each a deputy, but these were only

invested with "pre-advising votes." The members of the first general synod, its president, vice-president, and permanent secretary, were called and appointed by the King himself. In the ensuing years each provincial synod sent a deputy who was a clergyman. Only one elder or ex-elder (*oud-ouderling*), chosen by the provincial synods in rotation, was added to this politico-clerical assembly!

The provincial synods were composed in the same way. Each of the forty-three presbyteries (Dutch, *klassen*) had to return one member. These members were the first time called and appointed by the King himself; but afterwards he chose them from triasses which were formed by the united votes of the provincial synods and the presbyteries. He also reserved to himself the right of appointing the presidents and secretaries. To each of these assemblies, again, only one elder was added, who was chosen by the respective presbyteries consecutively. All important questions concerning church discipline belonged to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of these synods.

The classes or presbyteries, of which all the clergymen were members, were placed under the same sort of royal tutelage. That member of the presbytery, who was its representative at the provincial synod, was also its moderator. The secretary or scribe was the first time called by the King himself; but afterwards he chose him from a trias. Three or four of the clergymen were commissioned to join those two to form a moderamen, to which one elder was added. These presbyteries met only once a year (on the last Wednesday in June), and had no other business but to vote for the formation of the trias from which the King was to select the secretary; for the appointment of the commissioned members to the moderamen; and to examine and certify the accounts of the Widows' Fund and other funds.

Finally, the French or Walloon Church was connected with the Netherlands Reformed Church, by having the right of sending a deputy to the general synod. This deputy, again, was chosen by the King himself from a number of six clergymen. The English Presbyterian and the Scotch Churches were incorporated with the Netherlands Reformed Church.

The quiet, submissive spirit with which the Church accepted these regulations, by which the King virtually obtained the power of a *summus episcopus*, would be quite inexplicable but for the circumstances already referred to. Moreover, since the greater part of the ecclesiastical possessions were transferred to the State, the clergy had become accustomed to receive their salaries from the State exchequer, so that they were not only attached to the King by spiritual, but also by financial ties. Nor did His Majesty neglect to strengthen that feeling by pretty liberal grants from the exchequer for defraying the expenses of all the above-mentioned ecclesiastical boards.

It is obvious that this organization of the Church was at variance with the vital principles of the Reformed Presbyterian Church polity. Not one of all the above-mentioned assemblies or meetings was held in public. The doors were always closed, and the Church was entirely excluded from witnessing the discussions and debates which often took place regarding its most important interests. As only one elder had session in each board, and all the other members were either clergymen or professors of universities, the Church Government was reduced to a *scientific hierarchy*, nay, an *oligarchy*, under the patronage of the King. The King, it is true, was, like his ancestors, a professor of the Reformed Calvinistic creed, but not bound to be so by any article of the charter. His being a member of the Church in which he assigned to himself such a prominent place was thus only accidental. Nor did he, in the last years of his life, give very striking proofs of his devotedness to the Protestant creed. He abdicated in 1840, and married the Roman Catholic Belgian Countess Henriette d'Oultremont.

Another most important resolution of the King, which could not fail to have a decisive bearing upon the spiritual life and character of the Church, regarded the training and ordination of its clergy. By a Royal Resolution of August 2, 1815, art. 116, it was enacted that the Netherlands Reformed Church should call no other ministers but such as had received their training at one of the three universities. The universities, however, being State institutions, a law was passed at the same time, by which the professors of divinity at those universities were declared to be State officers, and consequently to be chosen, appointed, and salaried by the Government. A few months later, on June 30, 1816, a set of "Rules for Examination and Admission into the Ministerial Office in the Reformed Church" was issued, in which it was enacted, that the aspirants, who were to be examined and ordained by the provincial boards, must have the degree both of candidate of philology and candidate of theology,* at one of the three universities; that they must produce a certificate of good moral conduct, and have been members of the Church for at least two years. Having fulfilled all these conditions, the person examined had to subscribe the following "declaration and promise:"—

"I, A. B., appointed, &c. . . . hereby do sincerely declare, that both through my teaching and conduct I shall carefully promote the interests of Christendom in general, as well as of the Netherlands Reformed Church in particular; that I *de bonâ fide* accept and cordially believe the doctrine which, according to God's word, is contained in the accepted formulas of concordance of the Netherlands Reformed Church; that I shall teach and vindicate it diligently, and that I shall, with all my energy, apply myself to

* The degree of candidate at the Dutch universities is that which, in all the faculties, precedes the doctor's degree.

the furtherance of religious knowledge, Christian morals, order, and concord. I also pledge myself, through this my signature, to maintain all the above-written, and to submit to the judgments of the competent ecclesiastical boards, in case I should be found to have acted at variance with any portion of this declaration and promise."

This formula of subscription (especially since 1832, when the increasing deviations from the Church creed elicited public protest) has given rise to much controversy as to its real purport and meaning. The honesty of its composers was even questioned by many. Nor could it be denied that the sentence—"that I accept and believe the doctrine which, according to God's word, is contained in the formulas of concordance"—was rather ambiguous. Was the "which" in this sentence to be taken as a *relativum explicativum* or as a *relativum partitivum*? In the former case, it meant that the whole doctrine contained in the formulas was according to God's word. In the latter, that only a portion of that doctrine was acknowledged as being according to God's word, and it was left to the subscriber to reject such portions as he disbelieved. Experience soon showed that most subscribers took it in the latter sense.* From a memorial which, in 1842 (*i. e.*, twenty-six years after the issue of this formula of subscription), was addressed to the general synod by seven influential orthodox gentlemen at the Hague, it appears that the writings of the professors of divinity in the University of Groningen, and of many clergymen trained in their school, proclaimed a system of theology which, in the openest and most straightforward way, rejected and sometimes even ridiculed many of the fundamental doctrines of the Church creed.

I have given this detailed description of the way in which, under King William I., our Church was organized, to show how it came about that a door was opened through which, under appearance of strict adherence to the creed of the Church, such a disorderly spirit was gradually introduced, as at length actually reduced the formulas of concordance to nonentities, and brought about that state of perfect confusion at present threatening to break up the Church. The code of regulations which that King issued, on the 7th of January 1816, continued in vigour till March 23, 1852, which was the fourth

* It was the well-known question about the *quia* and *quatenus*, which was also much discussed in Germany and Denmark. I am of opinion that with regard to the written creed of a church both a *quia* and a *quatenus* should be admitted; viz., *quia*, with reference to all essential points, as being clear enough to be understood by an enlightened conscience; *quatenus*, with reference to non-essentials, as, *e. g.*, the right of the Government to expel heretics, &c. In this I agree with Dr. Merle d'Aubigné, Dr. Martensen of Copenhagen, Dr. Da Costa, Mr. Heldring, Dr. Nitzsch, and Dr. Ebrard. Dr. D'Aubigné has published a new confession of faith, into which he has received all the doctrines of the Calvinistic creed. Still he lays a prominent stress upon two points, viz., the love of God and the moral responsibility of man.

year of the reign of his grandson, William III., our present King. Shortly before the accession of that prince to the throne, the revolutionary movements of 1848 had had the effect of considerably changing our political conditions. Our charter was altered, the power of the Crown considerably curtailed, and the people allowed to exercise greater influence on the management of our public affairs than before. In fact, while retaining the name and the appearance of a monarchy, we were virtually transformed into a disguised republic. The sentence, *ecclesia sequitur curiam*, was, to a certain extent, applied to our Church. Perfect separation between Church and State was written on the banner now displayed; and partially, or at least in appearance, the Church was freed from the government of the State. More rights were also allowed to the Church members. In this spirit a new code of "General Regulations for the Reformed Church in the Kingdom of the Netherlands" was drawn up by the general synod on the 9th of September, 1851, which, on the 23rd of March, 1852, was sanctioned by the King. This is the code under which the affairs of our Church have been ruled up to the present time.

It is moulded on the basis of the former code, though with considerable modifications. The interests of the collective congregations in the respective divisions of the Church are now committed to the care of the presbyterial and provincial boards. The presbyterial boards are elected by the presbyterial assemblies, which are composed of all the non-retired clergymen and as many non-retired elders as the consistories* of the special churches may send, provided their numbers do not surpass that of the clergymen. These assemblies, with perfect liberty of election, appoint the members of the presbyterial board. They also elect the members of the provincial board, each presbyterial assembly appointing one clergyman. To every two clergymen an elder is added, who is chosen from either of the two presbyterial assemblies by rotation. The provincial boards elect, from their own midst, their presidents, vice-presidents, and secretaries. Each provincial board returns, every year, a clergyman as a member to the general synod. In the general synod—which, consequently, is composed of the deputies of the provincial boards—three elders, chosen by the provincial boards in rotation, have session. The theological faculties of the three universities also send their deputies, which, however (as was the case under the former code), have only a consulting or pre-advancing vote. Finally, the committee of the Walloon Church returns a member, who is a clergyman. The general synod chooses its own president and scribe, whose office is permanent. It is the highest legislative, juridical, and administrative court in the Church. Its

* Consistory is the name for the college of the minister, elders, and deacons of a special church.

power, however, is restricted by certain guarantees. It meets every July, at the Hague. In the interval between its meetings the interests of the Church are taken care of by a committee, chosen from itself, which is called "The General Synodical Committee."

It is clear that this code grants greater independence and freedom from Government influence to our ecclesiastical boards than did the former. It is true that eleven reservations are appended, which considerably limit that independence; but the King has ceased to exercise any power of appointment, and a greater number of elders have session in our ecclesiastical boards. Certainly this is something. But still, the appearance of liberty is greater than the reality. Our ecclesiastical boards—owing to the fact that one very important article of the code has been constantly kept in abeyance—do not originate in the bosom of our Church, nor do they represent it as they ought.

This important article, which some look upon as being a sort of Pandora's box, while others expect it to prove the Palladium of the liberty and prosperity of the Church, is the 23rd article of the new code. It regards the election of the consistories (*i. e.*, of the colleges of the ministers, elders, and deacons of the special churches) and the calling of the ministers. That this is a point upon which the whole question as to the liberty of the Church hinges is obvious. We have seen that under the old code the general synod was elected from the provincial boards, that the provincial boards were chosen from the presbyteries, and that the presbyteries consisted of the ministers and a number of elders. Now who called and appointed the ministers? The answer is, the consistories. The members of a church had no vote in the call of their pastor; he was called by the college of elders and deacons. And who elected the elders and deacons? The answer is, they filled up the vacant places by choosing whom they liked. The consistories were self-electing bodies. So the members of the Church were excluded from any right of voting whatsoever.

Thus it was under the old code. It was expected that the new code was to alter this state of things altogether. Its 23rd article seemed to justify that expectation. It reads as follows:—

"The right of electing the elders and deacons, and of calling the ministers, rests with the Church.*

"The Church (*Gemeente*) shall, except in the acquired rights of others, either exercise that right herself or through the medium of those whom she will specially authorize for that purpose, according to conditions fixed in special regulations, to be drawn up hereafter, for the election of the consistories and ministers.

* *I. e.*, with the members of each special or local church. The Dutch has one word (*kerk*) for denoting the collective body of all the local churches taken together, and another (*gemeente*) for denoting the assembly of the members who constitute a local church. In the 23rd article the latter word is used.

“Until these special regulations shall have been made, the now extant conditions shall continue in vigour and application.”

This was everything the members of the Church could have desired, provided only those “special regulations, to be drawn up hereafter,” contained no new restrictions upon the free action of the Church. So the day was eagerly looked for on which those regulations were to be published. But, alas! that day has not yet come. Fourteen years have elapsed since the new code was enacted, but we are not yet one step nearer to the publication of the promised document. We are still in the same condition as we were in under the old code. The members of the Church have no vote whatever. Everything is in the hands of the consistories.

Here lies the root of all the mischief, for it is a fact that in all or nearly all the churches of our great towns, and in very many country churches, the consistories hold opinions which are at variance with the Confession of the Church, and consequently, they carefully exclude the orthodox from their membership. The result is, that our higher and lower ecclesiastical boards are filled with men who either evince an over-moderate or a negative spirit; men, in fact, who do not represent the collective members of the Church, and have neither their sympathy nor their confidence. Our ecclesiastical boards represent only one party in the Church—that, namely, which is either indifferent or opposed to the chief doctrines of the creed; and, having all the reins in their hands, they keep the other party perfectly powerless. It is in vain to bring complaints about false teachers, or about excessive and highly offensive deviations from the doctrines of the Church, which it is their duty to maintain, before their courts. They either answer their memorialists in an evasive way, or haughtily send them about their business, as they did year after year some time ago, or as was the case so late as last year. The synod comes forward with the humble and public confession that it is not in its power to maintain the creed of the Church.

Nothing perhaps could better enable my readers to learn the present condition of our Church than a view of the last-mentioned answer of the general synod. This answer bears date of the 29th July, 1865, and is entitled, “Report concerning the Liberty of Teaching in the Netherlands Reformed Church.” It was drawn up by a committee of the synod, composed of Dr. Kuenen, Professor of the University at Leiden; Dr. Hofstede de Groot, Professor of the University of Groningen; Dr. Tichler, Mr. Gerlach, and Mr. Oort, ministers of the churches at Leiden, Middelburg, and the Hague. The synod unanimously agreed to this report, and accordingly published it as its answer to the objections and complaints of a number of memorialists.

These memorialists were,—

1st. The presbyteries of Kampen, Deventer, Gouda, and Utrecht, and the provincial board of Overijssel, objecting to the expression, “the existing liberty of teaching” (occurring in an answer of the synod of the preceding year), as if that liberty, because existing, had also a *right* of existing.

2ndly. Seventy-six members of the Church of Nymegen, bringing a charge against two of its ministers of antichristian preaching, and requesting redress.

3rdly. Mr. Fransen van de Putte, member of the provincial board of Zeeland, objecting to the fact that in October, 1864, four candidates were admitted to the ministerial office by the said board, and had signed the formula of subscription, notwithstanding that they denied the resurrection and the mediatorship of Christ: reason why the memorialist requested that the formula of subscription should be altered, or not laid for signature before the candidates at all.

4thly. Dr. Huydecoper, minister of the Church at the Hague (who has since died: a man who stood in high respect with all classes of society), objecting to the “diplomatic forms and answers” of the synod, and desiring a “manly, honest, and frank answer” to the question,—

“Whether in our Church coexistence is permitted of the acknowledgment of a direct Divine revelation, with the denial of the same;—of the representation that sin is an evil by which we become guilty, with the representation that it is a stepping-stone towards virtue, so that our guilt disappears;—of faith in the resurrection of Christ, with attacks against that faith;—of the preaching of Christ as the Son of God, and the belief in the supernatural as seen in Him, with the assertion that He is a common man, though the most excellent of men?” The memorialist closes with the request “that the synod be pleased henceforth to look upon itself as a merely administrative body, abstaining from meddling any longer with the doctrine which the Church professed in former times, and consequently cancelling everything in the regulations which bears upon the maintenance of the creed.”

The answer of the synod, as embodied in the above-mentioned report of its committee, came to this:—

1st. That no further notice shall be taken of the observations concerning the expression “the existing liberty of teaching.”

2ndly. That the request of Messrs. Fransen van de Putte and Huydecoper, to cancel everything in the regulations, &c., shall not be complied with.

3rdly. That the synod shall continue promoting the legal liberty of the members of the Church in so far as compatible with the order in the Church; proof of which intention might be found in the fact that already alterations are made in the regulations concerning baptism

and confirmation, and that measures are being taken for carrying the 23rd article into practice.

In its annotation to section 2 the Committee says:—

“We say, with Dr. Huydecoper, that we cannot imagine a church without a doctrine. We say that the synod may not be an inactive witness, much less an accomplice, where our Church is in danger of losing her character, and of becoming perhaps Roman Catholic, Mohammedan, or Buddhistic. It is our firm conviction that such a thing as boundless liberty of teaching may not be legalized; that he who does not believe in *God* cannot be a teacher of religion; that he who does not believe in *Jesus Christ* cannot be a Christian teacher; that he who does not hold fast the *Gospel of God's grace in Christ* cannot rightly belong to the clergy of an evangelical or reformed Church; and that he who does not hold fast the *liberty of searching* cannot square with the teachers of a Protestant church. While thus we recognise these four requisites as indispensable in the teachers of our Church,—the keeping hold of God, of Christ, of the Gospel, and of liberty,—we at the same time declare our conviction that all ecclesiastical boards, and above all the synod, ought at least to watch over the preservation of these requisites, and to maintain the doctrine of our Church in so far as is expressed in the 11th article of the general code of regulations.”

The Committee then enumerates the difficulties which are connected with each of the proposed measures of redress, whereupon it proceeds in these words:—

“We have arrived at the conclusion at which the memorialists should have arrived even sooner than we, that *we cannot* purify the condition of the Church, neither can we maintain its doctrine, at least (*inmers*) not by pursuing the course in which it is attempted to lead us. This is beyond the power of the synod, nay, beyond any human power. Such is the condition of school teaching, of society at large, and of the Church in particular, and it cannot be helped. Even when deeming that condition altogether objectionable, it is plainly impossible quickly and thoroughly to improve it by such and such a measure. What, then, is left to be done by us in our capacity as members of the synod, as rulers of the Church, as Christians? The answer of your committee to this question is not dubious: *we must submit*. The present condition of the Church is too mighty for us. The Christian Church here below is not perfect, and is usually in suffering and pain. We cannot be purified to enter the kingdom of heaven except in and through many tribulations.”

The Committee closes with the following observations:—

“It is clear that the true source of the—in many respects—distressing and confused condition of our Church lies in a scientific strife. The amazing progress of the natural sciences, and the rich discoveries of history, have given rise to a contemplation of the universe which is at variance with the hitherto accepted theology. If that contemplation of the world is wholly in the right, the theology which has been prevalent hitherto will fall altogether. If it is altogether in the wrong, theology will overthrow it. If truth and right side only in part with it, it will conquer as far as that part is concerned, and theology will by the strife change much, but also become purified and sanctified, and after some time blossom more brightly than

before. But whatever may be the result, that result will only be possible through the free development of science. If science has inflicted wounds upon the Church, those wounds, if curable, can only be healed by science itself. Dogmatisms, condemnations, and suspicions, are of no use here. On the contrary, they make the matter worse.

"In former centuries it was believed—though, as has been shown by experience, unjustly—that the Reformed Church had the power of preserving a certain strictly defined and fenced-in doctrine through *church authority*. This belief cannot be maintained any longer. The liberty of science, the public discussion about all the questions concerning philosophy and theology, render that authority powerless in the present.

"If, consequently, anything is to be done for the preservation of the Reformed Church and its doctrine, that order may rise out of the confusion, it can, in our opinion, only be done through the above-mentioned means, and particularly through the last-mentioned—science. We do not say, through scholarship, but through science; through one's own independent, thorough, unprejudiced, and coherent insight, based upon inquiry and meditation, which insight is obtainable also by those who continue strangers to scholarship, though they may not be able to do without the guidance of the scholars."

Perhaps there is not another instance to be met with in ecclesiastical history of a document issuing from the highest court of a church, in which that court so unhesitatingly confesses its impotence to do its duty, or in which so many contradictory assertions are put together within such narrow compass, and in which the Holy Spirit, given to the Church to guide it into all truth, is so unmistakably though tacitly set aside. The *Tijds*, which is the chief organ of the Roman Catholic party in our country, has, in three cutting articles (in October, 1865), pointed out the *inconsistency*, the *powerlessness*, and the *unholiness* of this official document; and there is, in my opinion, nothing but truth in the assertion of that periodical, that—

"The synod, while pretending to be willing to maintain the Confession of the Reformed Church, has, of its own accord, without having any competency whatever, accepted and prescribed a quite new confession, which is no confession at all, since it defines nothing, and, if thrown into the midst of the contest of opinions which goes from pole to pole, proves only a deceitful play of words."

This evidently refers to the new formula of subscription for the candidates, which the synod published on November 27, 1854, and runs as follows:—

"I, the undersigned, A. B., appointed, &c. . . . hereby sincerely declare, that, according to the fundamental principle of the Christian Church in general, and of the Reformed Church in particular, I do with all my heart accept and sincerely believe the Holy Word of God contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament; that I am disposed and willing faithfully to maintain the spirit and essence (*hoofdzaken*) of the doctrine which is contained in the received formulas of concordance of the Netherlands Reformed Church; that, according to the gifts given unto me, I will

earnestly and cordially preach to the Church all the counsel of God, especially His grace in Jesus Christ as the only ground of salvation ; that I will apply myself with all zeal to the furtherance of religious knowledge, and of Christian faith and life ; and that I will advocate and promote order and unity : that, consequently, looking up to the help which is from above, I will carefully take to heart the interests of God's kingdom, and of the Netherlands Reformed Church in particular, and, as much as is in my power, contribute to the furtherance thereof. I also pledge myself by this my signature to maintain all the above-written, &c."

Certainly this formula sounds grave enough ; but practice has proved that it opens a door for various interpretations, even the most injurious to the Church. The writer has, with his own ears, heard members of high ecclesiastical boards declare "that it cannot any more be made out what the doctrine of the Reformed Church is." According to the opinion of Mr. Chantepie de la Saussaye,* minister of the Church at Rotterdam, we have at present the most miserable church government of all the Christian churches in the world. According to the opinion of Mr. Van Koetsveld,† of the Hague, all our ecclesiastical laws and regulations are like a wax nose. Horace said, "Quid leges, sine moribus, vanæ proficiunt ?"

No wonder that, under these circumstances, the deviation from the doctrine of our Church, in our public preaching, increases in an alarming way. Thousands of the most seriously minded people run for refuge to secession or to private conventicles, which are very much like Protestant convents. Others sink back into dull despondency. The Church of Rome lifts up its head as it has never done since the days of the Reformation, and it exults triumphantly in the approaching fall of our Church.

Let us now inquire into the source of the evil. The professors of divinity at our three universities, whose colleges our future clergymen are, by the law, obliged to attend, are not under the control of the Church, but they are officers of the State. The 128th Article of the Royal Resolution on Academical Instruction is as follows :—"All the professors, those at the University of Leiden as well as those of Utrecht and Groningen, are officers of the State (*Landsbeambten*);" consequently, they are not elected by the synod, but by the King, out of a couple presented to him by the curators of the university. The King, however, leaves the whole matter in the hands of the Minister for Inner Affairs. For several years past this high office was occu-

* Mr. C. de la S. was formerly Walloon clergyman at Leiden, and editor of a now extinct theological periodical entitled *Ernst en Vrede* (Earnestness and Peace), which was the organ of the Ethic-Irenic party. He is also the author of a Commentary upon the Epistle to the Hebrews, and many other popular works.

† Mr. V. K. is a clergyman who tries to keep the middle path between orthodoxy and rationalism. He is the author of many popular works, mostly of a practical tendency. He is also the founder of a school for idiots at the Hague, which is admirably conducted.

pied by the very talented and skilful statesman Dr. Thorbecke, who only very recently (Feb., 1866) resigned. Now Dr. Thorbecke, who is the son of a Hanoverian, and of the Lutheran confession, is with all the energy of his character devoted to the principles of the so-called modern theology, which finds its representatives in Strauss, Renan, and Reville. This man, during a considerable period of time, was virtually in exclusive possession of the power of calling and appointing those who have to instruct and train the students for the holy ministry of our Church. It may easily be imagined what class of theologians enjoyed his preference. He has been known to decline to choose either of the two candidates presented by the curators, because both were too orthodox for his taste, and to ask for a fresh couple. Well may we inquire, what, under such circumstances, becomes of the highly praised freedom of our Church?

But the confusion in our Church began long before Thorbecke became our premier. The University of Groningen took the lead so early as the year 1836. Some of its professors and pupils who were chiefly educated under the influence of the eminent Platonic philosopher, Professor Van Heusden, at Utrecht, began to advocate a new conception of the doctrines of the Gospel, and to popularize it in a much-read monthly journal called *Truth in Love*. Their theology was marked by warmth, fervour, and liveliness of feeling, which contrasted favourably with the dulness which characterized many of the orthodox preachers of those days. This "Groningen school,"—for this was the name it went by,—though opposed by many, met with the enthusiastic sympathy of a considerable number. It commended itself to the popular feeling by its practical tendency. It promoted all kinds of philanthropic schemes, and strongly advocated missions to the heathen. But it was not based upon the doctrine of the Church. It was a mixture of Platonism and Schleiermacherism. It first privately and afterwards publicly denied the Trinity, the Divinity of Christ, and His Atonement. On the other hand, it prominently placed the humanity of Jesus in the foreground. Strange to say, it acknowledged all the events of his life, which the Gospels record, as historically true. It believed in the miracles of Christ, and in his corporeal resurrection. Evidently enough, it was a transition theology, moving towards a system less ambiguous and at the same time less scriptural. Its blossoming time was the decade between 1840-50, after which it ceased to make progress: a new school was rising, which put it in the shade.

This new school was that of Leiden. The chief professor of divinity at that university, Dr. Scholten, a man of high intellect and great sagacity, wrote a work in two volumes, about the year 1850,

entitled "The Doctrine of the Reformed Church viewed in its Fundamental Principles."* This book had a large sale. It went through three editions within a few years. Its influence upon the minds of the students and the young clergymen of the Church was very marked. It completely upset the whole system of the Groningen school, the ambiguity of whose semi-rational, semi-scriptural standpoint, and the untenableness of whose Arianism, it clearly exposed. The author professed to be a thorough Calvinist. Indeed, he energetically took up one side of Calvinism, especially the doctrine of predestination, which however he interpreted and worked out in such a peculiar way that he arrived at a system of absolute *determinism*, which entirely takes away man's free will, and with it his responsibility, his power of prayer, &c. With this more philosophical than theological system a great many opinions were connected which savoured of anything but Calvinism. A sharp distinction was made between *God's Word* and *Scripture*. Several portions of the latter were rejected, some of which, however, were afterwards readmitted. The Gospel narrative of the Lord's miraculous birth, for instance, was repudiated. The Divinity of Christ is not an indispensable ingredient in Dr. Scholten's system. Still he held for some length of time to the doctrine of the Lord's corporeal resurrection; but it is doubtful whether he does so now. In a recently published work he has impugned the genuineness of the Gospel of St. John. If I am right, Dr. Scholten sees in Scripture nothing more than the literature of the Hebrew nation, and of the first Christians. His younger colleagues, Professor Kuenen and Professor Rauwenhof, are of the same spirit, and go even much farther than he does. His colleague, Professor Prins, who is of his own age, keeps in the twilight between orthodoxy and neology, and is too weak to stem the flooded current of these powerful streams.

But influential as the Leiden school was, and to a certain extent still is, it is being outstripped by the Empiric school, which sprang up some ten years ago, and goes now by the name of the *Modern Theology*. Its chief leader is the very talented Dr. Opzoomer, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Utrecht. His party might be called the Utrecht school but for the fact that the three professors of divinity at that university, Dr. Ter Haar, Dr. Doedes, and Dr. Van Oosterzee, are opposed to his system. The teaching of these divines being in accordance with the fundamental doctrines of the Church creed, the orthodox party look upon Utrecht as *their* university. Unfortunately, however, the law makes it obligatory on

* "De Leer der Hervormde Kerk in hare grondbeginselen." Dr. Chantepie de la Saussaye gave a thorough but unfavourable criticism of it in his above-mentioned periodical.

the young men to attend the lectures of the professor of moral philosophy during the first two years of their university curriculum, before they can be admitted to the study of theology; so that the theological professors receive their pupils as it were from the hands of Professor Opzoomer. It is not needful to characterize Dr. Opzoomer's system. It is only necessary to say that in one of his books he has declared that "the Gospel is a wasp's nest full of fables." The supernatural has, in his opinion, no existence, or, if it has, it has yet to be shown as it has never hitherto been. Such things as miracles are, of course, altogether out of the question. Dr. Opzoomer has not yet gone so far as positively to say that there is no personal God, but it is impossible to see how such a Being could have a place in his system, which resolves itself into flat Pantheism. The fact that such a teacher occupies, as it were, the entrance and ground-floor of the university (Dr. Da Costa used to call it the Dardanelles), must be all the more injurious to the Church, since he is gifted with an extraordinary talent for putting his thoughts in attractive forms before the minds of his hearers. To inexperienced young men his eloquence is all but irresistible. Many orthodox families, alas! have experienced the sad consequences of his fascinating power over their sons, whom they hoped one day to hear preach the Gospel. I will only point to one of those unhappy cases, which has, more than that of any other, attracted public attention, owing to the highly respectable character and eminent talents of the young man concerned. I refer to the well-known and renowned Dr. Pierson, late minister of the Walloon Church of Rotterdam, and colleague of his friend, Dr. Reville. His parents were members of the most respectable merchant class of Amsterdam, and ranked foremost among the leading orthodox families of our metropolis. Great expectations were entertained for the good of the Church when this noble and well-educated young man, some twelve years ago, went to the University of Utrecht. He commenced his theological career by attending Dr. Opzoomer, and he has recently closed it by renouncing Christianity altogether. He has resigned his charge as a minister of the Church, and removed to Heidelberg. In a recently published pamphlet, entitled "Dr. Pierson to his Last Church," he has given an account of this step, and declared that as an honest man he could no longer continue a member, far less a pastor of a Christian church, since humanity is, in his opinion, a much higher realization of unity than any association based upon the principles of Christianity. In former writings he professed his profound admiration for Jesus as a teacher of religion, nor would he refuse to be numbered among his followers, inasmuch as he sympathized with many of his moral precepts, and with his chief opinions about Providence, &c. But then he would (were it not for the unfavourable

vourable signification which the term unfortunately has obtained) like better to be called "a Jesuit" than "a Christian," since, in his opinion, the Christ-idea was a chimera of the ancient Jewish Christians, which in a fanatic way they somehow connected with the innocent person of the Rabbi of Nazareth. No doubt, from a moral point of view, Dr. Pierson's resignation may be regarded as a high proof of his integrity of character. Nor does he stand alone in this respect. Mr. Busken Huët, minister of the Walloon Church at Haarlem (now one of the regular contributors to the *Haarlem Courant*), had previously resigned his charge, and for the same reason. Their example was followed by Mr. De Veer, of Delft (now director of a high-class popular school in that town), and it is still being followed by others. One can scarcely tell, or even imagine, to what an extent the band of our clergymen would be thinned, especially of the younger portion, if all those who either publicly or covertly adhere to this theology were to resign their places. It is a sad truth that many of the most talented and gifted men in our Church are now in the service of that spirit which "permanently denies." Our Netherlands Reformed Church, under the power of "modern" politicians and "modern" scholars, is being inwardly torn to pieces. Thousands who devotedly love her, and refuse to secede from her, yet leave their children unbaptized, and have for many years been without partaking of the sacrament of the Supper. Others have fallen back into obscure sects, while many others have emigrated to America.

My view of the present condition of our Church would be very deficient did it not deal with what has been done on the part of the true friends of the Creed to oppose those pernicious influences. From the commencement of the rationalistic movement a loud and powerful protest has been raised, which, in many cases, has issued in actual secession. And this protest still continues.

The man who may be said to have given the first impulse towards opposition was Dr. William Bilderdijk (born 1756, died 1831). He was a man of extraordinary genius and learning, who, had it not been his lot to write in a language spoken only by three millions of people, would have earned a European fame, and been ranked with such geniuses as Dante, Milton, and Goethe. He was undoubtedly our greatest poet. His poetical works alone, which were recently reprinted, fill fourteen volumes, and comprise every kind of poetry, from the epic to the ballad and the epigram. As a linguist he far surpassed his contemporaries; his acquaintance with jurisprudence was deep and extensive; and in knowledge of history he had not his equal in Holland. His history of our country fills twelve volumes. In medicine he had vast skill; and he could also draw and etch successfully. He was a genuine Christian, cordially believing the

truths of the Bible, and firmly attached to the doctrine of the Church of which he was a member. As the strongly marked political party spirit of the days in which he flourished prevented him from obtaining a professorial chair at any of our universities, he opened his house at Leiden for the reception of such young men as were desirous of profiting by the riches of his learning and genius. Among these were the manly and talented Dr. Isaac da Costa (died in 1859), and Dr. Abraham Capadose (still alive), who, having been received as members into our Church in 1822, set about opposing the sceptical spirit of the age with all the fervour of their fresh and enthusiastic convictions. More or less connected with this "Bilderdijk school" was also Dr. G. Groen van Prinsterer, one of our ablest and most learned politicians. He was and still is a counsellor of State, and is the author of some excellent works on the history of our country. For upwards of twenty-five years, while a Member of Parliament, he defended the Church and the rights of the orthodox party, with unflinching zeal and courage, against the attacks and cunning devices of the innovators. He is still the head and ornament of the so-called anti-revolutionary party in our country. These eminent men were gradually joined by a few noblemen and clergymen, most of whom were influenced by the religious movement which originated in Geneva, and has spread through the Reformed Churches of Switzerland, France, and Holland.

The irregularities in the Church, and the deviations from its doctrine, though of course not then so gross as in the present day, were conspicuous enough to alarm the seriously minded all through the country. Their eyes were now opened to the great imprudence they had committed in allowing the synod of 1816 to exist, and to do its work wholly unopposed against. The synod, having now an autocratic power, and being rendered independent by the King's authority, did nothing to lessen the existing grievances. At length, about 1832, thousands seceded from what they called "the Church connection of 1816," and established a Separatist Church, under the leadership of a few clergymen. But William I. was not the man to allow his pet scheme to be opposed without serious consequences. Dragoons were marched through the country to disperse the religious meetings. This was done under cover of an article in the Code Napoléon, which is still the penal code of our country, and forbids assemblies of more than twenty persons, unless authorized by the Government.* People were heavily fined, and ministers were imprisoned. It was a cruel time of persecution. Hundreds of families

* This article was, in the year 1848, cancelled by the enactment of a special law "On the Right of Assembling," by which no authority is required from the Government for the meeting of any number of people.

escaped to America. In vain did Dr. Groen van Prinsterer show in a masterly pamphlet* that these measures were a political blunder, as well as a gross injustice. But not until William II. succeeded his father on the throne in 1840, did the Separatists obtain their desired liberty. Their number increases gradually. In 1859 it amounted to 65,000. They have about 150 churches. Their organization being based upon the creed and church regulations of Dordt, they look upon themselves as the original Netherlands Reformed Church. The official title of their church however is, *Christelijk Afgescheidene Gereformeerde Kerk* (Christian Separate Reformed Church).

This secession movement was not shared by the aristocratic orthodox party in the Church, nor by the clergy. Dr. Groen van Prinsterer and his friends were of opinion that much more could be done for the cure of the sick Church by remaining in it than by seceding. So public protest within the limit of the church laws was entered on. The "Groningen school" doctrines, which began to gain ground more and more, induced seven highly distinguished and influential gentlemen at the Hague to publish an eloquent and powerful address to the synod in 1842. These seven men were the Count D. van Hogendorp, the Hon. B. H. W. Gevers, Dr. A. Capadose, Dr. G. Groen van Prinsterer (probably the composer of the address), the Hon. P. J. Elout, the Hon. J. A. Singendonck, and Mr. C. W. van der Kemp. The title of this memorial was, "Address to the General Synod of the Netherlands Reformed Church on the formulas of concordance, the academical training of the ministers, the school teaching, and the church government."† After having clearly proved the grossness of the deviations of the Groningen school from the church doctrine, by ample quotations from its periodical, *Truth in Love*, and having shown the injuriousness of the present organization of our church government, the memorialists close by saying:—

"So we demand (*verlangen*) of your assembly,—

"1. Vindication of the chief truths of the Gospel, and, as a means to that end, vindication of the formulas of concordance in everything concerning the true nature and essence (*het wezen en de hoofdzak*) of the reformed doctrine, according to the spirit of the composers of those formulas, and of the Netherlands Reformed Church.

"2. Public disapproval of what in the preaching or school teaching is contradictory to the above-mentioned truths, and especially a declaration that the doctrine which, taught by three professors of divinity in the

* "De maatregelen tegen de Afgescheidenen aan het Staatsregt getoetst." The third edition was printed as early as 1837.

† In Dutch,—*"Adres aan de Algemeene Synode der Nederlandsche Hervormde Kerk over de formulieren, de akademische opleiding der predikanten, en het onderwijs."* It contains fifty-one octavo pages in print.

periodical, *Truth in Love*, militates against the Confession of the Reformed Church, and against the saving doctrine of the Holy Scripture.

"3. Protest against the existing regulations on the school teaching, as incapable of being harmonized with a Christian education in accordance with the doctrine of the Netherlands Reformed Church.

"4. Provisional (*aanvankelijke*) revision of the church regulations for the maintenance of Christian church discipline in doctrine and conduct, and preparation for the establishing of a synod to represent the Church by (a) allowing a larger sphere of operation and influence to the presbyterial assemblies; (b) by increasing the number of the members of the synod who, if not provided with credentials, at least ought to be made responsible in virtue of their obligation to maintain the reformed doctrine; (c) by increasing the number of the members of the provincial synods, to whom the examination of the future ministers is entrusted; (d) by restoring the government of each special church in its rights—by restoring, especially, the important office of the elders, according to God's word, so that also a greater number of them be sent to the various ecclesiastical courts."

The same gentlemen, in January, 1843, addressed an appeal to the Church, in which they ably defended the motives that had influenced them. This pamphlet, entitled, "To the Reformed Church in the Netherlands,"* contains 164 octavo pages.

These two addresses produced a deep impression upon the minds of the people, but had no effect with the synod. Its reply to the first left matters unaltered. Meanwhile societies were formed at various places throughout the country, "for maintaining and defending the doctrine and the rights of the Netherlands Reformed Church." One of these societies, that at Amsterdam, joined by those of Rotterdam and the Hague, addressed, in January, 1854, a memorial to the King, "concerning the relation of the Netherlands Reformed Church to the theological faculties at the universities." Now that every attempt with the synod had proved fruitless, it was hoped that something might be effected by moving the King,—1st, exclusively to provide the universities with "men who have given evidence that, in addition to the other requisites, they are sincerely and without doubt well affected to the Confession;" and, 2ndly, to cancel the 116th article of the Royal Resolution of 1815, by which "it is made obligatory to the Netherlands Reformed Church to call no other ministers than such as are taught and trained at the universities." The memorialists, in their very cutting and masterly address, pointed out that the Romanists, Lutherans, Mennonites, Arminians, and Jews, though State-paid as well as the Reformed Church, were yet at liberty to elect their ministers from their own seminaries, whereas the chief church in the country was compelled to see its youth taught by men not under its own

* The title is not, "To the Reformed *Kerk*," but "To the Reformed *Gemeente*,"—the latter expression, I may repeat, denoting the whole of the *members* of the Church in their purely Christian, not in their ecclesiastical character, as a body in the State. This second document is undoubtedly a still stronger protest against the synod than the first.

control. All in vain. The royal answer, if answer it could be called, gave no hope of redress; and up to the present moment matters continue the same as they were.

A series of addresses, which from year to year have been sent up to the synod, have met with the same result, till at length that court, as has been stated already, frankly declared in 1865 that it was beyond its power to repair the confused state of things.


Contemporary with these public operations were private meetings of various smaller or larger societies of friends of the Church Confession (with whom many orthodox dissenters greatly sympathized), for the purpose of strengthening each other in their faith, and of praying together for the restoration of the Church to its original purity. Such were the meetings of the "Christian friends" who used to assemble at Amsterdam from 1845 to 1854; and the meetings of the society of clergymen called "Earnestness and Peace," which ceased to exist in 1858. Such organizations are still scattered through the country, and their effect is important and powerful in certain respects.

A society, the operations of which fall more specially under our observation than those above mentioned, was formed two years ago (1864) at Utrecht. It is called "The Confessional Society of Ministers and Members of the Netherlands Reformed Church." It is composed of from seventy to eighty clergymen,* and about as many elders of various churches, united on the basis of the Church Confession. It occupies a much more conspicuous standing-ground than has hitherto been occupied by any section of the orthodox clergy. In the fifth article of its statutes it refuses to carry its submission to the church regulations so far as to give up its convictions, and affirms that it does not feel at liberty, from respect for those regulations, to acknowledge as ministers of God those who reject the apostolic testimony about Christ. In the sixth article it promises assistance to every church which in a pure spirit resists the prevailing infidelity, by providing it with the administration of Baptism and the Lord's Supper. In its seventh article it declares that it does not feel justified in carrying its respect for the order in the Church, or for official authority, so far as to abstain from preaching the Gospel to churches whose pulpits are occupied by such as attack the Gospel. This means that the clerical members of this society will no longer hesitate to preach and administer the sacraments in private houses or other places, in those parishes where the clergy are rationalistic. Nor is there any power to prevent them carrying into practice this latter article, for the regulations of the Church contain no article which forbids it. The society being yet in its infancy, little has been done in a practical way, but a committee is preparing schemes which are

* The number of clergymen in the Reformed Church amounts to from 1,500 to 1,550.

to be laid before the next spring meeting. Among these schemes are such as the training and sending out of evangelists and itinerant ministers; the training and supporting of pious and able young men who are preparing for the holy ministry; the appointing of private teachers in the university towns, thus to enable the students to obtain an antidote to the poisonous teachings of the infidel professors.

What the result of these movements may be, time will reveal. Meanwhile this much is certain, that the confusion has reached a crisis. The *Westminster Review*, while praising our Church as the freest Church in Christendom, at the same time passes an almost boundless encomium upon Dr. Zaalberg, one of the clergymen of our Church at the Hague. He is described as denying "the visible ascension, the corporeal resurrection, the miraculous conception of Jesus," &c. A "translation of Dr. Zaalberg's Sermons into English" is also highly recommended, as being sure to render the "greatest service possible to young ministers of religion and inquiring students of theology" (*Westminster Review*, July, 1865, p. 226). But what will the *Westminster Review* say about the highly praised liberty of our Church when it learns that its much admired friend, after having told his flock in the morning that the Resurrection is a fable, is yet *compelled* to suffer his colleague (say Mr. Gunning) to tell that same flock in the evening that, but for believing in the so-called fable, they will be lost for ever? Or what will the *Westminster Review* say when it is told that Dr. Zaalberg, after having given the children, at the catechising, to understand that a man who believes in miracles must be a fool, a fanatic, or a blockhead, is yet *compelled* to permit such supposed fool, fanatic, or blockhead to tell the children that miracles are works of God? Surely that is a strange kind of liberty which permits a man to uproot the seed which his fellow-labourer so zealously sowed a few hours before! What, under such circumstances, must become of the respect of the people for their rulers,—what of confidence, what of edification, what of peace, what of love? Nay, what must become of the religion, of the morality, of the Christian character of a nation which is compelled to see things most holy and precious thus publicly and scornfully dragged through the mire, and that, too, in the very buildings which were destined for the reverential proclamation of those holy things, and by the very preachers who were appointed to place them, in all their preciousness, before the minds of their hearers?



THE MODERN THEORIES CONCERNING THE LIFE OF JESUS

CONSIDERED AS THE CRISIS OF THE GERMAN CRITICAL SYSTEM.

STRAUSS'S "Life of Jesus," first published in 1835 and 1836, was answered in so many excellent works by Ullmann, Hase, Hoffmann, Tholuck, Neander, Lange, Riggensbach, Baumgarten, and other German theologians, that the victory of the Christian cause might have been considered decisive. Hundreds, nay, thousands of pulpits in Germany resounded with the preaching of God's word in renovated power. German theology, so long devoted to a partial, contemplative tendency, now took an interest in home and foreign missions, became zealous to relieve the spiritual wants of the neglected people; in a word, it assumed an ethical character. It was, it is true, unable to solve all the difficulties which may be found in the Gospel histories, or to reconcile all apparent discrepancies. Yet the return to the principles of the Reformation—especially to Luther himself—initiated by Schleiermacher, and since becoming more and more conspicuous, had afforded it a vantage-ground, which no longer rendered the theory of the inspiration of Holy Scripture, as taught in the Alexandrian and Scholastic schools, an indispensable foundation of Christian truth. From this ground it could proceed to treat of the Gospel histories, not in a dogmatic, but in a really historical manner,—not only without injury to the fulness of the Christian faith, but greatly to its advantage. By adhering to those principles, it no longer needed the ingenuity of the old harmonizers. Notwithstanding the problems

which were as yet unsolved, it might rest satisfied, seeing that he who really knows what he possesses in the Christian faith, likewise knows with what he can dispense in holding it, because he can distinguish between that which is necessary for the Christian life and that which is not. This renovated theology was, however, in many respects still deficient in distinctness with respect to doctrines and notions (*e.g.*, those concerning God, the Holy Trinity, the person of Christ, inspiration); yet it was in the right way towards it, by meditation on the Holy Scriptures (as is proved by a number of excellent commentaries), and by the study of the historical work of the Church in the formation of her doctrines. But Rationalism did not immediately recede from the positions which it had occupied formerly in Germany—quite the contrary: whereas formerly the adherents of the more recent philosophical systems had looked down with contempt on their predecessors—*e.g.*, the Hegelians on the followers of Kant, the æsthetic rationalists on the disciples of Wolf's popular philosophy,—now, individuals of the most different negative tendencies united together into a society of *Licht freunde* (friends of light), for the purpose of resisting the increasing power of the affirmative or positive tendency, which was already making itself felt within the Church, and, according to their view, to guard the interests of Protestant liberty. Their coalition, again, caused an influential party of the so-called *positive* theologians to advise, and even to urge, certain measures of resistance against them, which manifested more confidence in the power of the State, and in the legal applications of confessions of faith, and consequently in deprivations and intimidation, than in the spread of faithful persuasion, and accordingly made it their task to put down their opponents in this their own way.

This difference concerning the proper method of maintaining and spreading the faith of the Church, produced a division also between those who had hitherto contended against Rationalism as a united body. It was both natural and necessary—and also in conformity with Schleiermacher's fundamental tendency—that reanimated personal Christian piety should once more seek ecclesiastical forms; and the general synod of Prussia of the year 1846, called together by the enlightened minister Eichhorn, endeavoured to find the proper medium, by taking into consideration both the rights of Protestant liberty, and also the duties which result from the necessary conditions of Church communion, and from the unchangeable principles of the Reformation to maintain the Church in a course of tranquil, internal, constant development, and of *moral* conquests over her adversaries, without exposing her to the wild floods of caprice leading to anarchy. In this spirit, and with these views, the synod drew up the celebrated "formulary of ordination,"* and connected with

this the "doctrinal ordinance,"* both of which were acceded to by its members—with the exception of an insignificant minority—after long and searching discussions. But the King, Frederick William IV., withheld his sanction from these resolutions, by which alone the Church could apparently have been delivered from anarchy, and from swaying backwards and forwards into opposite extremes, and be maintained in the healthy, orderly course of internal development, without violence, and without relapsing into a false legalism. It appears that he was intimidated by the above-mentioned party, consisting of legal theologians and theological jurists, who expected safety and the restoration of order from the restoration of the legal application of the already established confessions of faith: they considered a determination of the Church that—and to what extent—an affirmative position was required on the part of the clergy to the *substance* of the confessions, to be insufficient, and rather claimed an obligatory power for those confessions in their totality; while, however, they certainly held out a prospect of indulgent treatment in any cases which might actually occur.

But a very unwelcome impediment to the realization of this project was found in the *union* † which had been carried out in many parts of Germany (in Prussia in 1817). The adherents to this project had formerly acceded to the union, and it was likewise manifest that the agreement existing between the Calvinist and Lutheran confessions of faith was sufficiently obvious, not only to professed theologians, but even to simple Protestant minds, to prevent all unevangelical deviations by adhering to the main purport of the creeds of the two churches. But those who looked upon the creeds as a code of laws, now saw in the union itself a fatal danger to the authority of the creeds in general and in their full extent, because by the union a portion of the creeds, separated from the rest, had lost its obligatory force within the National Church, and yet had never been defined by any law;—namely, that portion in which the creeds of the two churches contradicted each other. They dreaded the peril to which the whole would be exposed as a consequence of infringing on the authority of a part. Thus from a dread of the distinction between essential and non-essential doctrines—which, however, is one of the principles of the Reformation—they became the enemies of the union which formerly they had defended, and endeavoured to dissolve it. To justify this conduct, they alleged the necessity of an "ecclesiastical" Christianity in contradistinction to a merely "personal" one, and that such a Christianity must necessarily be connected with the formularies of the Lutheran and Calvinist ecclesiastical systems, historically

* "Lehrordnung."

† Namely, between the Lutheran and Calvinist bodies.—*Translator's Note.*

handed down from the times of our ancestors. In pursuance of this, they endeavoured to reintroduce ancient forms and usages of the Church into almost all the countries of Germany—especially into those of the north; and while doing so, they used so little caution, that they did not even fear to trespass upon the grounds of Romanism, taking “the Church” instead of “saving faith” * as their foundation,—directly against the Augsburg Confession; nay, substituting the sacraments for justification by faith, and attributing to the clergy a sacerdotal character in the power of the keys, confession, absolution, church government; in short, they sought to transform the laudable design of an internal and external reform of the Church into a restoration of the deplorable condition of the seventeenth century; nay, partly into a retraction of the Reformation itself. This phase of the development of the Protestant Church in Germany, therefore, forms a point of contact with the rise of English Puseyism some twenty-five years subsequently.

On the rise and progress of this movement in Germany, the proceedings of the so-called “Critical school” had, however, no slight influence. The principal seat of this school was the University of Tübingen, where Strauss, in 1835, opposed his mythical theory, both to the author of the “Wolfenbüttel Fragments,” who viewed Christ and his apostles merely as deceivers, and to that *natural* explanation of miracles promulgated by Eichhorn, and especially by Paulus at Heidelberg: the former theory he treated as coarse, and incapable of comprehending the characteristics of the religious mind; the latter as unnatural and insipid; and accordingly he rejected both. As for Strauss himself, opposed as were his doctrinal views to the supernatural, he sought what he considered a more natural and at the same time a less offensive explanation of the miraculous features to be found in the records of the life of Jesus, by assuming that the religious mind of the primitive Church had unintentionally and undesignedly glorified Christ, and that those records of miraculous actions and events were thus productions of undesigned inventive tradition, which, like floral ornaments, became intertwined round the image of Jesus, in process of time applying to Him the prevalent Messianic idea, and using the biblical representations of Moses, Elijah, &c., as a storehouse, from which the various miraculous traits were derived and transferred to Christ. But then, as he likewise considered that the apostles honestly believed the message which they proclaimed, and for which they suffered,—and as they must have known, in their character of eye-witnesses, that those impossible acts did not really take place, he was reduced to the necessity of assuming *à priori*, and without assigning any reasons, that our Gospels cannot be ascribed to

* “Fides salvifica.” (“Augustana,” vii., viii.)

eye-witnesses, but must have a much later origin. According to him, they can only belong to a time sufficiently remote to make it possible that myths could have been formed, independently of apostolical influence.

Certainly this mythical hypothesis left very much unexplained; it did not give any satisfactory answer to the question why it was that this numerous collection of traditions, or the transfer of Messianic attributes, was conferred on the person of Jesus; it left in obscurity—and that perhaps intentionally—*what* Jesus actually was; and while putting in motion the imaginative faculty of the primitive Church, it attempted no account of the origin of this Church: lastly, it left the essential character of the Church—the consciousness of man reconciled with God—unexplained.

But nevertheless, this work of Strauss produced an extensive and startling impression, most of all on those who had been hitherto accustomed to view the cause of the Christian religion as wholly and exclusively founded on the formal principle of the Reformation, viz., the inspiration and divine authority of the Scriptures. The many unsolved difficulties, the restlessness of critical investigations, and the uncertainty of their results, now excited doubts in some of them, whether that formal principle of the Reformation, by itself alone, was capable of supporting the entire edifice of Christianity, as the adherents of biblical supernaturalism in Germany and Great Britain had so long supposed, inasmuch as, from the standpoint of this supernaturalism, faith must be kept in suspense so long as there is any uncertainty in the proof of the inspiration of the canon of Scripture, a proof which apparently can never be satisfactorily established as long as biblical criticism has the right of investigation.

Now those who had overstepped the limits of this biblical supernaturalism in order to take their stand—not partly, but wholly—on the foundation of the Reformation, and of the word of God, were enabled to pass uninjured through this crisis. They acknowledged not only an objective external testimony of the Holy Scriptures, but an internal witness of the Holy Ghost; that is, the power of the saving word of God in the Scriptures, or Christian truth attesting itself by means of its own force on the soul of the believer, and revealing its internal evidence to him. They therefore needed not to put their faith in abeyance until the investigations of criticism should be completed, but, being convinced in their minds of the everlasting internal truth of the Gospel, and of the salvation which it declares, they could contemplate those critical investigations with confidence and tranquillity. Nay, they might even co-operate in the work, particularly as they were confident that it would be impossible for criticism to affect the canon in general injuriously, not merely because they

believed that God, who is the author of the Christian religion, has also provided whatever is requisite to propagate it in its purity, but also because historical criticism itself, according to its own nature, is bound by certain laws, through the infringement of which it must become baseless conjecture, and therefore insignificant and harmless. But among these laws there is especially this one, that an historical allegation concerning the age and authorship of a work must be met with *historical* arguments, that is, by means of historical sources, so that even the most incisive criticism of the New Testament can never reject all the historical sources of primitive Christianity, but would lose its base of operation if it did not hold fast part of them, were it only for the purpose of proving their incompatibility with the claims of credibility set up for the others. But the numerous adherents of what is called in Germany *biblical supernaturalism*, which we mentioned just now, who had in the meantime entered into the *ecclesiastical phase*, as it was denominated, in that uncertainty of the strength and sufficiency of the formal principle, or authority of the Scriptures alone, which had taken possession of them, sought for help in a course different from the legitimate Protestant one, namely, that which sought the renewal of a conscious union of that *formal* with the *essential* principle, and which, in the Divine confidence of faith by the Holy Spirit, would have remedied the deficiency which must be ever inherent in *historical* certainty, forasmuch as historical proofs can never amount to more than great probability. It was in the authority of the Church, establishing the canon, forming and expounding doctrines, that they sought compensation for deficiency in the authority of the written word.

Thus Strauss and the partisans of the negative critical school did not indeed, as they supposed, uproot the foundation of Christianity, but impelled many forcibly towards the Roman Catholic Church—towards her principles of ecclesiastical authority and of tradition, and thus also influenced the modern Protestant Church in Germany in this direction. As not a few distinguished theologians and Churchmen yielded to this impulse, and even began to apply it practically in the Church, that tendency which we have already described, and characterized as analogous to English Puseyism, obtained new and increased force; on the other hand, the regular development of the original principle of the Reformation, appropriated to themselves by the other party in its vivifying influence, was painfully impeded.

After the failure of the attempts at political reform in 1848, which constituted the legitimate element of the unfortunate revolution in Prussia at that time, and caused its extension, there arose a period of mental weariness, of general reaction against innovation, and of restoration of everything ancient. This tendency appeared to pre-

vail more and more; the dissolution of the Union seemed imminent; in some localities, the freedom of university instruction was attacked, where yet it had been moderate and kept within due limits, as in Göttingen and Rostock; and finally, in the domain of the Church's practical life—in public worship, confession, the administration of the Lord's Supper, liturgy, hymnology, and catechism,—no safety was seen but in the reintroduction of antique forms. But by interfering with forms of worship, the followers of this party came into conflict with the Protestant spirit of the people; for, after all, in their zeal for restoration, *they* likewise, in their own way, severed the historical thread, a proceeding which also appeared revolutionary. But the sacerdotal assumptions, which formed part and parcel of their theories, gave most offence to the people. The Protestant laity long kept silence, in the presence of these proceedings on the part of their clerical leaders; they looked on, generally with murmurs, often with indignation. But when those archaic, nay, Romanizing principles were to be practically applied, by which the laity would have been directly affected, great commotions arose among the people; they utterly rejected such tendencies, and resisted all attempts; and more than one ecclesiastical body met with bitter disappointment with respect to this object, which however might have been of some service in reminding the clergy of the source and substance of the Protestant Church's true strength.

Accordingly, nothing durable resulted from those attempts at restoration; they remained as old pieces of cloth on a new garment. Their impotency was soon felt. Unfortunately also, amid many outbreaks of unbelief, and as early as 1858, the culminating point of this period of restoration was overpassed.

But it has left behind it, even until now, some sad consequences. On the one hand, numerous theologians and other members of the German clergy, among whom are many zealous, gifted men, having been disappointed by the want of success in their attempts at restoration, which they considered to be for the welfare of the Church, are now in a state of irritation against public opinion, without the joy of hope and the inspiring courage to take up the problems and peculiar requirements of the people; and not only are they at variance with public opinion, but their own minds are affected with uncertainty, for which their only remedy is the expectation of the approaching end of the world, in accordance with certain *eschatological* theories of their own. It is certainly lamentable to be obliged to acknowledge that to be absolutely impossible and impracticable which is at the same time considered absolutely necessary for the welfare of mankind. But instead of merely accusing the world, whose sin is supposed to be the cause of this impossibility, and instead of withdrawing the

hand despairingly from the plough, it is surely more appropriate to the humble Christian mind to exercise self-examination, and to scrutinize those theories themselves which are thus considered absolutely necessary for the welfare of mankind. It has gone so far that, among many classes of the people, Christianity has become unpopular, and an interruption has taken place in the process of winning back the hearts of the nation for their evangelical Church, even among thousands who had appeared ripe for entering into lively communion with it.

Several recent manifestations owe their origin to these discordant circumstances: in the domain of the Church, the existence of the *Protestant Union*; in that of theology, the more modern movement concerning *the person of Christ*, or, more correctly, the "Life of Jesus," as represented by Renan, Strauss, Schenkel, since the year 1860. The adherents of the Protestant Union seemed at first inclined to agitate in favour of a constitution for the Church on the broadest basis, and to reconcile the people, particularly the educated class, to the Church, by advocating an ecclesiastical organization, which would have run into the opposite extreme to those attempts at sacerdotal restoration, by establishing a *democratic* Church government. But they seem to have already adopted more moderate views; their present design is only to protect Protestant liberty of teaching, so as to prepare the way for the principle of "conciliating the Christian faith with the educated world."

Of greater importance, however, is the second movement, which is affecting the religion of the people more sensibly. For all these new lucubrations concerning the life of Jesus have this in common, that they appeal to the people in diction and in a style different from the first appearance of Strauss in 1835, who gave his "Life of Jesus" a learned, theological character. Accordingly, it was quite suitable that the first replies to them should likewise adopt a popular style, and unveil—somewhat after the manner of Richard Bentley—the pantheistic or deistical foundations of these writings, and reveal their destructive, degrading consequences in depriving man of his chief strength for moral life, and of his consolation in death. In this manner Held in Breslau, Luthardt in Leipzig, Versmann in Holstein, Weydmann in Meiningen, Professor Schaff in Mercersburg, and others, have endeavoured to serve the people by popular lectures and tracts. But these efforts cannot be considered as sufficiently exhaustive of the task to be accomplished. The experience acquired by events since 1835 having proved that, however it might conduce to ease and comfort to avoid the problems raised by Strauss's "Life of Jesus" and the criticisms of Baur, this course was an inoperative one; and that, instead of meeting them with theological labours, to interpose in idle

security the authority of the Church is, on the part of Protestant divines, merely "leaning on the staff of a broken reed, whereon if a man lean it will go into his hand and pierce it." The present condition of affairs requires *that the warfare formerly begun, but never brought to a satisfactory conclusion, should be now carried on in good earnest and with full vigour, without the aid of external means or palliatives*, so as to re-establish in the German nation confidence in the credibility of their sacred Scriptures, and thus also to win back the people really for their Church and their religion by legitimate means.

This work is already in course of execution, and it is a remarkable fact that it was the course which the *negative* criticism has adopted since 1835, that had to point out the suitable way to a successful solution of the problem.

For the ten years following the first appearance of Strauss's "Life of Jesus" had been particularly fruitful in producing critical works on the New Testament Scriptures by Baur and his school, Zeller, Schweigler, R. Köstlin, Hilgenfeld, Volkmar, &c. Baur's "Kritik des Neuen Testaments" seemed at first sight simply to corroborate Strauss's *mythicism*, and to be in alliance with it; for if Strauss did not wish to cast a moral stain of dishonesty and deception on the historians of the New Testament, or even on Christ himself, he surely needed—as was observed above—a considerable period of time to have intervened between that in which the apostles acted, and that of the composition of our Gospel histories, in order that there might be sufficient time for the development of myths in the Church. This *à priori* requirement of his critical theory in the "Life of Jesus" must have been singularly favoured by Baur's opinion that the four Gospels were only written after the second destruction of Jerusalem under Hadrian in 135, and that the date of all the books of the New Testament, with the exception of four Pauline epistles and the Apocalypse, must be referred to the end of the first century, or even to a more recent period. But this support was, however, only one side of the question; it had also its reverse, which was soon to be manifested.

For Baur's inquiries, on the other side, prepared a new phase in the critique of the "Life of Jesus," which must be of advantage to the cause of Christianity, in so far as the decision is thereby simplified, and the whole subject must be reduced to a distinct alternative.

Baur, the ecclesiastical historian, did not, like Strauss, content himself with treating primitive Christianity on a mythical system, which, if the original sources are not considered worthy of credibility, can claim no greater value than that of a possible hypothesis, to which, again, other hypotheses might be opposed with equal justice or

injustice, and which, without historical sources, should likewise be confined within the regions of possibilities. Baur actually advances at least *one step on historical ground*, and even this one step must have had important consequences. This is, however, scarcely with reference to the person of Jesus. Like Strauss, he keeps His personality in the shade; and in his appreciation of the Sermon on the Mount he has nothing to say about Jesus, but that, in opposition to the righteousness of works of the Pharisees, He insisted on the disposition of the heart and on pure love; that in so doing He invited to the kingdom of God, which He then also opened. But he reproaches Strauss with having produced a *critique* of the *Gospel history* without a *critique* of the *Gospels*. He says that his tactics consisted in confuting the first three Gospels by that of John, and then the latter by the former, so as in short to produce confusion, and that we can no longer tell to what portion of the Gospel history we are to adhere. He also draws attention to the *historical fact*, that whatever may have been the circumstances of the life of Jesus, this *peculiar New Testament literature*, once for all, exists, and must be explained *historically*. Now in undertaking to give this explanation, Baur had to renounce the idea of evolving an *à priori* system out of his own mind, but undertook to incorporate the existing fact—these New Testament works—by means of historical data, with his own representation of most ancient Church history, and to introduce them progressively into it. In short, the explanation of the existence of those Scriptures imposed on him the necessity of attempting a delineation of that condition of life and world of ideas adapted to produce those Scriptures as their natural results. He was compelled, in opposition to the usual ecclesiastical account of the origin of those Scriptures, and of the state of the primitive Church, to attempt an historical delineation of a different kind, so as to account in a natural manner for the faith of the Church, together with her central point of the exalted, Divine appearance of Jesus; for he quite agreed with Strauss in his philosophical or rather *pantheistic* presuppositions, *e.g.*, that miracles are impossible. But by such a connected attempt to set up a new counterpart to ecclesiastical tradition as the true history of the occurrences, a trial would also be made whether such an attempt was feasible, or whether it would suffer shipwreck against its own self-contradictions and the realities of history.

The principal point in this attempt of Baur's is the following:—All the original apostles were *Judaists*, as is proved, among others, by the Apocalypse, written by the apostle John. At first they would not admit Gentiles at all, and afterwards only on condition of receiving circumcision, and they never proceeded beyond Jewish *particularism*. The apostle Paul first broke through the Judaizing standpoint, and

acquired importance by the multitude of Gentiles whom he converted. The consequence was a wide difference between him and the original apostles, and this contest and opposition have long pervaded the ancient Church. But, on the other hand, there also existed an active endeavour to re-establish unity in the primitive Church, which was facilitated partly by the increased hostility of the Jewish people, partly by their tragical destiny, which deprived the Judaizing Christians, or "Petrini," of their support. Those endeavours for union between the adherents of Peter and those of Paul went on until about the year 170, and their history had its different periods; the results of those endeavours of conciliation are contained in the Epistle to the Hebrews and the lesser Pauline ones, on the one side; in James, the Epistles of Peter, and the first three Gospels, on the other: further, in the pastoral epistles, and in the doctrinal views of John. The Gospel of the latter was the last of those writings which, under an apostolical name, sought to heal the old breach between the parties of Peter and of Paul; and the result of these proceedings was the formation of the ancient Catholic Church.

We will not stay to investigate this hypothesis, maintained and defended by him with acuteness and erudition. These two points may suffice: first, it does not show clearly, as he had led us to expect, in what respect a union between the Pauline and Judaizing spirit is to be found in John's writings, especially as, according to Baur himself, the fourth Gospel is said to be of a purely *spiritual* character. Secondly, if Paul, as early as the year 50, undeniably held the more exalted view of the Divinity of Christ, we cannot conceive why this view, identical with John's in its essence, should not have been shared by the latter apostle at an earlier period also, without interrupting the continuation of the ecclesiastical development. But when Baur imagines that a truthful immediate disciple of Christ, such as the apostles must be considered, could not have drawn such an exalted image of the person of Jesus, because it would be an historical impossibility, a miracle itself, but that Paul alone could have produced such an exalted image without being untruthful, because it originated in him by means of a merely subjective vision or ecstacy, he did not bear in mind with what zeal Paul insists on *his* Gospel (Gal. i. 8), in which Christ appears as the central point, and that it could not be asserted without accusing the Apostle of great insincerity, that he who gave the right hand of fellowship to the other apostles, declaring the identity of their Gospel with his (Gal. i. 23; ii. 1, *et seq.*), should have been induced to acknowledge a Judaizing Gospel, which he declares not to be such to him, and to be in friendly communion with those supposed Judaizing apostles. The gross hypocrisy which this conduct would imply, considering as he did the Judaizing

error as subversive of the Gospel, and deserving an anathema, would be more gross than that which he himself reproved in the conduct of Peter at Antioch. It would, moreover, be inconsistent with the image of the great character of the Apostle, as Baur himself cannot avoid representing it, not to mention that the same passage (Gal. ii. 11, *et seq.*) expresses in the clearest manner the Apostle's conviction that Peter was not a Judaizer, but that he acted inconsistently with his own principles on that occasion, giving way to others; and certainly the apostle Paul, who was acquainted with Peter, is entitled to be considered of more authority as to his religious principles than a modern German critic.

If we now sum up what has been said of Baur's general proceedings, so far as they differ from those of Strauss, we may briefly state the matter thus:—*Baur has substituted for the myth, or undefined inventive tradition of Strauss, the notion of conscious design and of planning intention.* In so doing, his object was to exonerate the apostles from the reproach of planning untruthfulness and of the fabrication of history, and to impute it to later generations. But in his decided assertion of the impossibility of miracles, and of the supernatural appearance of Christ, as well as in his general mode of argument, the following thesis is already involved:—That if, after all, the authorship of the New Testament Scriptures should have to be with certainty referred to the apostles, or to those influenced by them, no choice would be left, but *either* to attribute an intentional, planning untruthfulness to the authors, who must have known better,—therefore that Christianity, as it is, and has conquered the world, is based on the deception and insincerity of the apostles,—*or*, on the other hand, as we cannot deny, and as Baur himself acknowledges, that they really believed what they taught and died for, and should be regarded as having been deceived; in which case, the attack of the critical theory must end in an attack on Him who had deceived them—on the Person of Christ himself.

This is the crisis of which we spoke above, and through which the course of negative criticism must come to its final result—to a decision simplified and facilitated to the moral sense. And accordingly this is witnessed in the recent works on the life of Jesus by Renan and by Strauss.

Recognising, with just historical tact, the sophistry of that system of criticism, and the impossibility of bringing down the New Testament Scriptures to such a recent time,—referring the Gospels to about the same period as ecclesiastical tradition does, even seeing in them authentic relations by the apostles—Renan fixes the time of those relations so near to the real events that he can only carry out his denial of the miracles by asserting that Christ and his apostles had

combined in producing a delusive appearance of miraculous actions. Further, with that intelligent perspicacity proper to his nation, he recognised that the origin of Christianity must be Jesus Christ himself, not the congregation, not the apostles Paul or John; that, in order to become the founder of the Christian Church, He could not have been a mere moral teacher, but that his personal, overpowering spiritual presence, and his life, were requisite to produce the impression which is reflected in the Church; and he also acknowledges that Jesus did really, on certain occasions, lay claim to Divinity, although Renan, from his point of view, only regards this as the effect of enthusiasm and self-exaltation.

But Strauss likewise—in his new work on the life of Jesus, written for the German people—is urged forward to the same crisis and the same ominous alternative. Now since, as the successor of Baur, he has entered on the steep downward path of the assumption of a designing tendency with respect to the scriptures of the New Testament, he especially wreaks his hatred on the fourth Gospel. He does still indeed try to keep a place for myths beside what he considers as inventions, but this is only for the purpose of escaping from the consequences of his former standpoint into a kind of *eclecticism*. The most important point however, is this: after he had been compelled, by the course of the critical investigations of the New Testament literature, and by Baur's pointing out the *lacuna* existing in his former work, and the enigmatical doubt which he occasioned by his silence concerning the historical personality of Jesus, to tread on historical ground, at least partially, and to acknowledge some historical documents,—he was driven to an assumption which he had not expressed—or perhaps not even thought of—when he held his purely mythical views. This assumption, adopted for the purpose of avoiding the acknowledgment of the true majesty of Christ's Person as set forth in the Gospels, declares that the probable cause of the exalted but impossible representations of his Person, such as they are recorded in the Gospels, and are the main topic of the Christian religion, must be referred to Christ himself.


For the discourses of Jesus concerning the consummation of all things occupy such an important place in the primitive Church, with the apostles also, and are so intimately intertwined with its essence, not only among the Judaizing party, but also among the Pauline one, that, as Strauss confesses, we cannot avoid referring the *eschatology* of the New Testament—at least its characteristic traits—to declarations made by Jesus himself. Strauss professes as yet too much historical tact to agree with Baur, who indeed, being likewise inclined to confess the genuineness of the principal elements of those discourses of Jesus, would understand them in a purely figurative sense. Now in those discourses there is one constant thought, namely that He should. in

person, take part in the universal judgment and the consummation of all things. Connected with his Person is that marvellous change—the bringing in of the solemn state of retribution; according to his declarations, He is to awaken the dead, surrounded by his angels, and to hold the judgment. On this Strauss cannot refrain from saying, “To expect such things respecting Himself is not merely enthusiasm, but if Jesus uttered such sayings, there is contained in them an unwarrantable self-exaltation in raising Himself above all mankind by representing Himself as their Judge, forgetting that He himself had declined the epithet of ‘good,’ as applicable to God alone.” Strauss still has a scruple to utter before the German people the final conclusion which would result from this proposition; but it is manifest that, like Renan, by rejecting *à priori* the supernatural in the person of Jesus as an impossibility, he falls into a moral monstrosity and real impossibility. According to Strauss, “The same Jesus has developed purely and fully all that relates to love to God and to our neighbour;” yet at the very same time He is said to do homage not only to enthusiasm verging on insanity, but to intolerable pride. He is said to have towered morally and religiously over his contemporaries, and yet at once, although a sinner, He considered himself without sin, and the future judge of the world. He is said to have occupied an inferior position—far beneath ordinary men—notwithstanding his otherwise moral excellency, by his self-exaltation, which showed Him to be deficient in modesty, humility, and knowledge of self. To every thinking man, who knows that self-knowledge and humility form the basis of every strong moral and religious life, nay, that humility and the consciousness of sin, where sin exists, become more vivid in proportion to moral growth,—all this, considered in a moral point of view, is simply a logical contradiction; the union of Strauss’s predicates in the one personality of Jesus would indeed be a miracle, but a false one, and hence impossible,—greater and more unnatural than all the miracles in the New Testament, in none of which Strauss could point out such a barefaced logical contradiction as in this one of his own devising.

If it has but once become generally obvious that Christ must be considered as an historical person, and the founder of the Christian Church; that we must recur to his own declarations concerning Himself with respect to at least some of the highest predicates of Jesus—that, for instance, it is included in those declarations that He was not a sinner, that He had no need of redemption for Himself, but that He had come to redeem mankind,—we are once more, by the process of criticism, brought into the presence of Jesus himself, and the question, “What think ye of Christ?” is reduced to the simple alternative, Is Jesus what He professes Himself to be—the Sinless One, in whom dwells the office and the power of redemption; or is He, as He can-

not be, that monstrous compound being, composed of unbounded self-exaltation and the purest love to God and man—a liar and a sacrilegious criminal, who took on himself to build up a kingdom of God, after having overturned the foundations of the kingdom of God within himself? The decision may be confidently left to the moral feeling of each individual, and Strauss himself has rather adopted that moral impossibility which we designated a logical contradiction, than allowed himself to embrace the other view. But we must add two more points: first, if it must be granted that Jesus himself has made such a distinction between Himself and collective mankind, that He presents Himself to them as the Redeemer and the Judge of the world, can it be considered as anything but an unwarrantable proceeding that Strauss still omits from his acknowledgment, as far as it goes, the fact that Jesus also professed Himself to be the Son of God, not merely in a theocratical, but in the ontological or natural, and metaphysical sense? Surely Strauss himself sees that by attributing to Himself sinless holiness, the raising of the dead, the judgment of the world, He likewise, most probably, claimed divine attributes. What can it be that yet restrains him from granting—especially as he has his own explanation of enthusiasm and self-exaltation at hand—that Jesus likewise assumed to Himself to be in substance that in which those exalted attributes inhere, and without which they cannot be imagined to exist, namely, a higher divine nature in comparison with all previous and contemporary men? The French critic has here too gone beyond the German one; he sees with reason no ground why Jesus should not have ascribed Divinity to Himself, when once his enthusiasm and self-exaltation had overstepped the bounds of humanity.

Lastly, we wish to observe, that if Jesus was such an insincere, morally and religiously degraded character as He appears in Renan, and must needs appear in Strauss if his principles are logically carried out, and if, therefore, the Christian religion at its origin, *i. e.*, in Christ, was founded on deception and criminal pride,—in that case, the whole mythical hypothesis, according to which undesigned creative tradition cumulated those lofty attributes on Christ, loses its support, its value, and its interest. If Jesus himself has declared concerning Himself the very highest that it could have invented, it is an idle and almost totally insignificant inquiry, whether the Church has invented single lesser traits to adorn his image; nay, it is perfectly indifferent whether this happened intentionally or unintentionally. Thus the mythical theory, at the first step which it had to take upon the ground of actual history, began to destroy its own foundation, and to pass judgment on itself: although no Penelope, it has set about undoing the mythical web which it had woven.



NOTES FROM IRELAND.

The Church.

THE Established Church in Ireland is at present, upon grounds known to all, a special object of hostile attack, both political and religious. Corresponding to this hostility must be the solicitude entertained in respect to it by all who benefit by its operations, or can comprehend how deeply and how widely, whatever be its defects, a national institution so old and so extensive must have penetrated and pervaded Irish society. Nor can the English Churchman regard without a peculiar concern the fate of what is declared by legislative authority to be not only a national establishment like his own Church,—for this may be predicated of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland,—but a part, identical in doctrine and discipline, of the United Church of England and Ireland. The subject, therefore, of its present character and movements is one of general interest. In this department of our review no pretension will be made to perform the functions either of advocate or judge in relation to a controversy of such importance. Our main object will be to chronicle from time to time all noteworthy incidents bearing upon the interests of the institution; but while fulfilling this unambitious task, we shall

feel at liberty to characterize the acts and opinions we record, and to throw out suggestions as to the results likely to ensue from deeds done or schemes proposed.

Its present position has naturally called forth the efforts of defenders to meet the charges of opponents. It may be convenient to our readers if we summarize some of these defensive statements. The sources from which we draw are mainly the Archbishop of Armagh's charge delivered in 1864, the Rev. W. C. Plunket's pamphlet, the ably condensed collection of facts published by the Rev. Alfred T. Lee, and two lectures committed to the press by Mr. Whiteside.* In answer to the statement that the Church has been stationary or declining, we are furnished with the following statistical list, from which we must infer a very large increase in

* "Charge to the Clergy, 1864. By Marcus Gervais, Archbishop of Armagh." Second Edition. (Hodges & Smith.)

"The Church and the Census in Ireland. By the Rev. W. C. Plunket." (Hodges & Smith.)

"Facts respecting the Present State of the Church in Ireland. By the Rev. Alfred T. Lee." Fourth Edition. (Rivingtons.)

"The Church in Ireland. By the Right Hon. James Whiteside." (Rivingtons.)

its members during a period of less than three half-centuries :—

In 1730 there were	800 clergy.
1863 " "	2,281 "
1730 " "	400 churches.
1863 " "	1,633 "

Mr. Whiteside states that of the 1,633 churches now in Ireland there have been nearly 1,000 built since the Union in 1800, and that since 1848 nearly 300 have been enlarged. A still more important return quoted by him is that of *voluntary subscriptions* paid in the last ten years to the treasurer of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners of Ireland: their sum is £101,125 4s. 1d. We need not say that this sum does not include the munificent expenditure by Mr. Guinness upon the restoration of St. Patrick's Cathedral, an expenditure which exceeds it in amount; but it is doubtless exclusive also of other instances of voluntary expenditure. Being of opinion that the laity of Ireland have in past generations been discreditably parsimonious in their contributions towards all Church purposes, we hail with the greater pleasure the proof thus afforded of their awakening to a truer sense of their obligations. We have here to mention also the society formed to endow churches in West Connaught: whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the operations of the Irish Church Missions (and into that controversy we prefer not to enter^c), this endowment society bears testimony to the reality of conquests made, and adopts a right method of securing their permanence. These are all indications of activity and progress. On the other hand, we learn from Census returns that between 1834 and 1861, by a decline from 853,160 to 738,756, a decrease of 114,404 took place in the combined numbers of the Established Church and the Methodists, or a decrease of 13·4 per cent.;† but that this is mainly attributable to the effects of the famine and emigration is sufficiently indicated

* A remarkable pamphlet has just appeared, in the form of "A Letter to His Grace the Archbishop of Dublin, on Protestantism," by an Irish Peer. (Hodges and Smith.) It treats of the subject in rather a new aspect, and one worthy of consideration.

† The Census of 1834 reckoned together Churchmen and Methodists. In 1861 the former were 693,357, the latter 45,399. Mr. Plunket, supposing both to have decreased

by the fact of the similar decrease, but at a greater rate per cent., of the members of all other denominations, so that the absolute decrease in the members of the Established Church is a relative increase.* The Census of 1861 has supplied another argument, which has been much used against the Establishment, by its statement that there are 199 parishes in Ireland without any members of the Church. This ill-looking statement, however, is deprived of force by a reference to the distinction between the *civil parish*, on which the Census return is founded, and that which constitutes an ecclesiastical *benefice*. A benefice often includes many civil parishes, there being in fact 2,428 civil parishes in Ireland, and only 1,510 benefices, or 918 more civil parishes than benefices. It would appear that under arrangements now in operation there will remain but one benefice without inhabitant members of the Church, and this exceptional benefice has a church on the border of an adjoining parish, in which Divine Service is performed for the benefit of an attending congregation. But if the defenders of the Establishment are successful in meeting this charge, and in exposing the mistake upon which it is founded, we must admit that their mode of exhibiting the Church population by a statement of averages is one which conceals rather than represents the facts

in an equal ratio, calculates that, in 1834, Churchmen were 800,730, Methodists 52,430, reducing thus the decrease of the former to a rate of about 13 per cent.

* The corrected return is as follows :—

	1834	1861	Decrease.
Roman Catholics.....	6,436,060	4,505,265	80·4 p. cent.
Presbyterians.....	643,058	523,291	18·6 "
Other Protestant			
Dissenters.....	21,882	16,960	22·4 "

In the numbers we have given we have adopted the corrections of the Census established in the Primate's charge. We may here add, in correction of Mr. Trollope, that the true proportion of the Roman Catholics to the Church of England population in Ireland is a little less than 6½ to 1; he calls it first 9, and then 10 to 1. The proportion of Roman Catholics to all Protestants is a little more than 3½ to 1. Looking at the operation and tendency of present events, there is, we think, every reason to believe that the Protestant rather than the Roman Catholic element is that which is likely to advance, both in numbers and influence,—a consideration not to be lost sight of by legislators.

of the case. Our readers may be aware what may be accomplished in this way by averages, those most delusive of all numerical processes; but they will certainly consider that a very special feat of the kind has been performed in the subject before us, if they will compare a table given in Mr. Whiteside's lecture, p. 157, assigning 376 as the average number of the Church population in the rural benefices of Ireland,* with the catalogue at the end of Mr. Brady's pamphlet, exhibiting a return of the same for each benefice in the diocese of Meath.† We think it no unfriendly act to direct attention to this weak point, because, as all admit that internal improvements are called for, it is desirable that real defects should be looked in the face, and remedies sought for them. With this set of Church statistics in view, we are led to suggest that many advantages would attend upon carrying much further than has been done the system of uniting rural parishes in which the population is small. Active incumbents would be thus given work commensurate with their power, and active stipendiary curates would receive a much more effective training than at present in the duties of their profession, together with better pay in remuneration for their services. In this way, the whole rural clergy, reduced in number, would rise in energy, influence, and even social position. We shall not attempt to reproduce arguments founded on the Establishment's assumed right to perpetual possession of its temporalities, on its historical continuity, on the Union compact, &c., being persuaded that its defensive strength resides not in any such rights or attributes, but in proofs of activity and progress, such as those we have noted above; and still more in the general character of its clergy, and the salutary teaching, in religion and loyalty, which they diffuse. Facts such as these prove its present value, and that it is, as now constituted, a living, growing, acting member of the body politic, performing important functions, and one which could not be amputated or withdrawn from any sphere of action without leaving a bleeding wound, and causing a loss to the whole community of

health and strength. The Irish Church has had the advantage of respected and skilful advocates in the authors of the publications we have first cited, and in the eminent men who, as its representatives, have pleaded its cause at the recent Church congresses,—Mr. Plunket, the Deans of Cork, Cashel, and Emly, Dr. Butcher, Mr. Napier, and Dr. Salmon;‡ but service of a kind still more valuable has been recently rendered to it by the newly-acquired chief pastor, who, during the last autumn, has been animating the clergy of his extensive province to the careful performance, in a spirit of pious zeal and considerate charity, of their sacred duties. From what has transpired of Fenian designs, the Archbishop of Dublin, in his charge, infers confirmation of the view that no strong feeling against the clergy of the Established Church exists among the peasantry of the country. On the other hand, it is to be noted that the National Association takes credit for having sent up to Parliament last session 353 petitions, with 153,873 signatures, in favour of its disendowment; but this association has received little support from the Roman Catholic laity, and is worked mainly by the hierarchy and a section of the priesthood; and all who know how signatures are obtained at chapel by the priests, will not be disposed to consider them as indicating with any certainty the personal feelings and opinions of their flocks. There are, at the same time, many proofs that Roman Catholic laymen of condition believe a provision by the State for their clergy to be the measure which is most called for in the present juncture of Irish affairs. The proposal is one which forces itself upon the serious consideration of all. Looked at from the statesman's point of view, it has very strong recommendations. It is founded on apparent justice, and it would tend to secure the loyalty of an order of society who possess over the masses of the Irish people the greatest amount of influence; while the competing plan of disendowing the Established Church would inevitably weaken the English connection. Any religious objection to it on the part of the State has been invalidated by precedents already

* We see Mr. Plunket gives the authority of Sir Hugh Cairns for this number.

† "Remarks on the Irish Church Temporalities. By W. Maziere Brady, D.D. Dublin: Wm. M'Gee. 1865."

‡ We desire particularly to call attention to the eloquent and admirably condensed argument of the Dean of Emly, as fully reported in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Gazette* of October, 1865.

created in the payment of Roman Catholic chaplains for various departments of the public service, and indeed can only be consistently maintained in argument by those who hold that this form of Christianity is valueless to its attached and faithful adherents for either moral or spiritual benefit. Notwithstanding the recent general discouragement of the Fenian conspiracy by the Roman Catholic priesthood, which it would be unjust not to acknowledge, it is notorious that they have not been hitherto, as a body, active promoters of loyalty to British authority. It is no imputation on them to believe that their own feelings would be different, and their influence in behalf of loyalty more cordially exerted, if they were recognised by the State as rendering to their co-religionists services which, on the whole, were beneficial to the community, and deserving of substantial reward; it would be a concurrent advantage that their flocks, generally very poor, would experience relief in the diminution of their payments to their clergy, and would be gratified by a permanent endowment being provided for their spiritual benefit, while from both would be removed the grievance of the contrast which now exists in this respect between themselves and the Protestant Churchmen of Ireland. We are not unmindful of the serious objection which the foreign headship of the Roman Catholic Church raises to any State connection with it; we are aware that even in Ireland there are difficulties in the way of such a measure, and that in England strong prejudices and powerful political tendencies would impede its enactment; but we have reason to believe that these difficulties are already felt to be comparatively less than they were only a short time ago—that opinion among the most thoughtful Protestants has undergone of late a very sensible modification. The wise statesman, and, we will add, the good Christian, is bound to consider the special circumstances of each political problem,—and that of the present state and needs of Ireland is one of great difficulty and great urgency.

Another token of energy given by the Church of Ireland is the demand which has arisen in various quarters for the revival of the Irish Convocation. Such a measure has been advocated in his recent charge by the Irish Primate, and claimed in Parliament by Archbishop

Trench. Doubtless the demand is natural, and to be justified by many reasons; yet we may be excused for repeating what has been urged by others, that to have been revived, as was proposed last session, for the transaction of a nugatory form, would have conferred no dignity on its resuscitation, and for suggesting that at the present juncture, when it is thought politic to insist on the unity of the Church in Ireland with that in England, it may be more prudent not to rouse into activity a debating body, the proceedings of which might probably draw attention rather to the diversities which subsist between the two parts of the Church than to the bonds which unite them. The time will come, we trust, when a remodelled Convocation of the whole Church in these kingdoms will include, to the benefit of all concerned, our Irish brethren. Meantime, we observe with interest that a Diocesan Conference has been for a year or two meeting in the autumn, under the presidency of the Bishop of Down, and that papers of a high order, on important subjects, have been read and discussed by men of real ability and learning, such as Dr. Reichel, Mr. Byrne, Mr. McKay, Mr. Murphy, and Dean Atkins. By the first named of these gentlemen, the subject of the Divinity course in Trinity College, Dublin, has been brought into a discussion, which has been carried on with much animation in newspapers, as well as in the Down Conference. He proposes alterations which seem worthy of being favourably considered; at the same time, admission should be freely made that very efficient teaching, within a certain range, has been given in the Dublin School. It is satisfactory to observe that on all sides it is agreed that students for the ministry should be prepared by thorough instruction to meet the religious questions and difficulties of the times, and thus to guide and support the faith of their flocks.

We have to record the endowment of missionary scholarships for the education of Irish students in the College of St. Augustine, Canterbury, and we learn with equal pleasure that the Archbishop of Dublin, by whom this plan was originated, is engaged in promoting the institution of a Ladies' College, with a residence attached, and in forming a scheme for establishing a corps, extremely needed, of trained nurses.

Education.

In the able charge to which we have already referred, Archbishop Trench discusses the present state of the National Education question. Candidly avowing that he would have counted it no sin to have conformed to the Government scheme, he states his view that it has failed to secure united education, and that it is now desirable to adopt a compromise, whereby exclusively denominational schools should be assisted, where the population admits of separate schools, and that, where it does not, the present system should remain in force. We admire the spirit in which this compromise has been proposed, but we cannot but recognise, among other disadvantages attending it, that in large populations it would throw away the existing salutary restrictions upon the subject-matter of education which are of value to the State, and that in places of small population it would remain open to all the objections which have been so persistently urged by the clergy of both churches, while at the same time creating among such opponents the new grievance that those objections have been yielded to in other parts of the country, perhaps in the adjoining parish. And here it is worth while to notice that some words of that able and wise governor, Lord Wodehouse, have had wider conclusions drawn from them than he probably would sanction. In a speech referring to the proposed Roman Catholic College in connection with the Queen's University, after declaring his unshaken attachment to united education, especially in Ireland, he added, "Yet I think the genius of our institutions and the principle of our government require that we should not refuse the advantage of *academical degrees* to those who, from conscientious convictions, decline to accept the system of united education." This sentence of Lord Wodehouse is referred to by the *Times* as laying down for the regulation of public institutions the general principle, that "respect must be paid to really conscientious objections, although we may be unable to agree with them, and although they do not assume the form of specific religious belief." Surely, in such extension of the principle, the limiting clause ought to be added,—“when such respect to scruples, judged unreasonable, does not interfere with greater good.” It is this limitation

of the principle which seems to us to justify, in the matter of primary education, the requirement of a “conscience” clause in England, and to call for that protection of the interests of a minority which is secured by the present system in Ireland. It is much to be regretted that any deviation from this protective rule has ever been indulged in. We give in a note some important returns from the Report for 1864 of the Commissioners of National Education, from the Church Education Society, and from the Queen's University.* With regard

* *Extracts from the Thirty-first Report of the Commissioners of National Education:—*

“On the 31st of December, 1863, we had 6,163 schools in operation, which had on their rolls, for the year then ended, 840,569 children; with an average daily attendance, for the same period, of 296,986 children, and an average number of children on the rolls for the year of 544,492. At the close of the year 1864, the number of schools in operation was 6,263. The average daily attendance of children for the year was 315,108; the average number of children on the rolls was 575,486; while the total number of distinct children at any time on the rolls for the year was 870,401.

“As compared with the year 1863, there is an increase of 100 in the number of schools in operation for the year 1864, while in the daily average attendance the increase amounts to 18,122; in the average number on the rolls the increase amounts to 30,994, and in the total number of pupils enrolled during the year the increase amounts to 29,832.”

Estimated numbers, for the year 1864, of pupils, according to religious denomination:—

“Established Church . . .	56,961	} Total,	870,401
Roman Catholics . . .	710,270		
Presbyterians	97,053		
Other persuasions . . .	6,117		

i. e., Protestants of all denominations, 160,131, or 18·40 per cent.; and Roman Catholics, 710,270, or 81·60 per cent.

“The following table shows the percentage of schools from which returns have been received, exhibiting a mixed attendance of Protestant and Roman Catholic pupils, for the years 1861, 1863, and 1864:—

	1861.	1863.	1864.
Ulster . . .	81·1	81·6	80·9
Munster . . .	30·5	32·8	32·0
Leinster . . .	39·7	40·8	40·4
Connaught . .	45·1	45·1	45·0
Total . . .	53·6	54·6	54·1”

The following is a very important paragraph of the Report:—

“It appears that the total number of

to the innovation said to be contemplated of incorporating an exclusively Roman Catholic College with the Queen's University, the graduates of this University have printed a "Statement," setting forth with great clearness and strength the objections to which it is liable.* It would inflict a wound, which might prove fatal, upon the system of mixed superior education in Ireland, and (as appears by a remarkable pamphlet privately circulated by Sir Dominic Corrigan) is unwelcome to the Roman Catholic gentry of the country, who value for their sons the opportunities now afforded of association in youth with their coevals of other denominations. For those who prefer an exclusive Roman Catholic education, or degrees obtained without previous collegiate lectures and discipline, there exists the resource of the London University, which applies examination tests only, and examines for degrees in Ireland. Altogether it is plain that the present systems of primary and superior education in Ireland are so valuable, both in their results and ten-

dencies, as to crave wary handling on the part of Government and legislators. They are doubtless imperfect in operation, and applause may be gained from opposite extremes of the religious world by their destruction; but precious results and influences may thus be irretrievably lost, and evils incurred far transcending any present inconveniences.

Theological Literature.

The Donnellan bequest to the Dublin University, which produced, in the early part of this century, the lectures of Archbishop Magee on the Atonement and of Dean Graves on the Pentateuch, and more recently Archdeacon Lee's work on Inspiration, and those of Dean MacDonnell on the Atonement and Dean Atkins on the Pastoral Office, has, in the year 1864-65, given occasion to the delivery and publication of a set of sermons by Dr. Ryder, on "The Scriptural Doctrine of Acceptance with God considered in reference to the Neologian Hermeneutics." The object of these discourses is to establish, upon the foundation of the identity of Divine and human morality, a view of the terms of acceptance with God, free from the moral objections to which the views of Pantheists and Calvinists are obnoxious. They are marked by width of thought and competent learning, but the diction is too abstruse even for the pulpit of a college chapel, and the development of the argument has suffered from the limits to which it has been obliged to conform. The philosophical theologian will, however, be rewarded by much sound and honest thought for a persevering study of these sermons and the appended notes. The charge brought against them by the reviewer in the *Athenæum* (in a spirit hostile not to the author, but to the Church Article,) of heresy, as contravening the Eighteenth Article, because allowing the possibility of the salvation of individual heathens, must have been smiled at by any novice in Church of England divinity who had learned the distinction that a heathen, while not owing his salvation to "the law or sect which he professeth," might yet be saved, though unacquainted with the Divine process, through virtue of the mediation of the Son of God. The Donnellan Lectures now in course of delivery by the able and eloquent Dean of Cork, Dr. Magee, are upon "The Relation of Conscience to Religion."

children on the rolls of our model schools for the last quarter of the year 1864 was 11,270; of which 2,959 were of the Established Church, 4,597 Roman Catholics, 2,985 Presbyterians, and 729 belonging to other persuasions."

Extract from Report of Church Education Society for 1864:—

"Established Church pupils . . . 47,092
Dissenters 12,646
Roman Catholics 9,300"

It is admitted in the Report that both Dissenters and Roman Catholics are diminishing in number.

Extract from Statement respecting the Queen's University:—

"Number of students attending the three Queen's Colleges:—

In 1857-58 445
1864-65 835

"The numbers of the several persuasions attending the Colleges in the last three years were as follows:—

	Established Church.	Roman Catholic.	Presby- terian.	Other Per- suasions.
1862-63 .	212	214	277	84
1863-64 .	210	237	260	103
1864-65 .	221	229	273	112"

See these numbers accounted for in p. 21 of the "Statement."

* A full discussion of the whole subject is contained in a masterly pamphlet by that distinguished political writer, J. E. Cairnes, Esq., on "University Education in Ireland," reprinted from the *Theological Review*, and published by Macmillan & Co.

We may safely count upon their bringing into the light of clearly reasoned argument the difficulties of this fundamental and most interesting subject. If we cannot say that the mantle of Archer Butler, who blended so remarkably the poet, the philosopher, and the preacher, has fallen upon any successor, we may assign to several members of his college, who have followed him in the last-named function, merits of a high class. The sermons of the lamented Dr. MacNeece, of Dr. Salmon, and of Professor Jellet, all bear out this statement. They all deal with topics, theoretic and practical, of the highest religious importance, suggested by the questions of the day. In Dr. MacNeece's we enjoy candid and cogent reasoning, combined with warm spiritual feeling; in Dr. Salmon's, wise, well-balanced views, urged with closeness of logic and temperate language; in Mr. Jellet's, discussions of moral difficulties in Scripture, carried on by a mind of singular analytic power, and glowing with a noble passion for truth.* The separate publication of two sermons by Dr. Salmon, on the painful subject of Eternal Punishment, drew forth from another Fellow of Trinity College, Mr. Barlow, an essay in opposition to the received doctrine, vigorously but not temperately written; the sympathy which he excites by his generous feeling for ethical rectitude being checked by a treatment of his opponents which is certainly not generous. The view he advocates is that in the case of the worst sinners annihilation follows upon punishment. To this essay Dr. Sidney Smith has published a reply, confined to the ground of Scripture, carefully and well put together. One paragraph we cannot but regret, in which he appears to countenance the notion that the morality of Deity may be different from that of man. Mr. Sherlock, a junior member of the college, answers Mr. Barlow at

* "Sermons preached in the Chapel of Trinity College, Dublin, by the late Thomas MacNeece, D.D." (Hodges and Smith.)

"Sermons preached in the Chapel of Trinity College, Dublin, by George Salmon, D.D." (Hodges and Smith.)

"Shall not the Judge of all the Earth do Right?" Three Sermons preached in the Chapel of Trinity College, Dublin, by John H. Jellet, A.M." (Hodges and Smith.)

"The Suffering of the Righteous. Two Sermons preached before the University of Dublin, by John H. Jellet, A.M." (Hodges and Smith.)

greater length, and with a wider range of arguments. If his work has some of the faults of a young controversialist, it shows at the same time extensive reading, careful thought, and a kindly spirit. A second edition of Dr. Salmon's two sermons also contains replies to some of Mr. Barlow's arguments. To all these answers Mr. Barlow has recently published a rejoinder.^o Dr. Butler has edited a volume of Sermons by the late Rev. Alexander Pollock, which bear testimony to his ability and piety. In Ecclesiastical Antiquity, we note Dr. Todd's "St. Patrick, Apostle of Ireland: a Memoir of his Life and Mission," a careful and valuable work; and, edited by the same author, "The Waldensian Manuscripts preserved in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin; with an Appendix, containing a Correspondence on the Poems of the Poor of Lyons, the Antiquities and Genuineness of the Waldensian Literature, and the supposed Loss of the Morland MSS. at Cambridge:"—in Ecclesiastical Law, Mr. C. Todd's "Observations on the Judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in the case of Bishop Colenso *v.* the Bishop of Capetown."

Natural Science.

A most interesting lecture upon "The Climate of Ireland, and the Currents of the Atlantic," (Hodges) has been published by that eminent natural philosopher, Dr. Lloyd, the Vice Provost of Trinity College, Dublin. It deals with the distribution of temperature as affecting the growth of plants and the health of man. Some of the facts mentioned are of much practical value: for instance, with regard to the limits of the cultivation of wheat, the result is stated that—

* "The Eternity of Future Punishment," and "The Place which this Doctrine ought to hold in Christian Preaching." Two Sermons by George Salmon, D.D." (Hodges and Smith.)

"Eternal Punishment and Eternal Death: an Essay. By James W. Barlow, M.A." (Longman.)

"The Doctrine of Eternal Punishment examined chiefly in relation to the Testimony of Scripture. By George Sidney Smith, D.D." (George Herbert.)

"An Essay on Future Punishment. By W. Sherlock, B.A." (Longman.)

"Remarks on some Recent Publications concerning Future Punishment. By James W. Barlow, M.A., F.T.C.D." (McGee.)

"The lowest summer temperature at which wheat can be successfully cultivated in England is only 2° below the mean; and as the mean summer temperature of England is 60°, it follows that the minimum for wheat is 58°, or, with advantages of soil and other circumstances, 57°. In Ireland the mean temperature of the three summer months is 58°; and accordingly, for places about the centre of Ireland, a deficiency of a *single degree* of summer temperature brings us to the very limit of wheat cultivation, while a greater deficiency is *fatal* to the crop."

The conclusion drawn is, that it is contrary to the rules of all sound experience to attempt the culture of this cereal in Ireland, except in the most favoured localities. On the other hand, the absolute minimum of mortality as dependent on climate, is calculated to be at the western extremity of the yearly isothermal of 50°—*i. e.*, in Ireland,—a conclusion borne out by the facts. The average mortality of Ireland, so far as it can be determined by the imperfect method of a decennial census, is 21 per 1000, that of England being 22. Many other interesting facts are to be found in this lecture.

General Literature.

The publication of the first volume of the Brehon Laws, by the Commission appointed for the purpose, is worthy of record. These ancient laws of Ireland appear to have been in force more or less extensively from the early part of the fifth century down to the time of the Stuarts. They are exceedingly interesting for the light they throw on the antiquities of the Celtic race at large, and especially on the notions with regard to property and civil duties from which they drew their origin—notions which they tended to consolidate, and which exert, even at the present day, an influence upon the peasantry of the country counteractive to English law and English customs. Most minute are the details to which these laws condescend; and the varieties which they establish in obligations and penalties, according to the different classes and individuals to whom they apply, are very numerous. Of these classes we may mention bards as one which possessed distinct rights, and judges as persons held in the highest honour, and correspondingly privileged. All members of a sept were considered to be entitled to support from the land over which a chief had predominant rule, and were bound

to render him service both in peace and war, while he was under obligation to them in the way of enabling them to stock their farms. It is to be noted that amidst many regulations that, judged by modern ideas, seem trivial and even absurd, there are not a few which are marked by true humanity and a delicate consideration for the feelings of all, even the very poorest. A careful and detailed review of this volume, contributed to the *Revue des deux Mondes* for November last, by M. de Lasteyrie, points to these provisions as affording lessons worthy of general regard at the present day, and as indicating that with a people so sympathetic as the Irish, and who feel personal ties so deeply, the adoption of a mode of treatment which appealed to this part of their character might conduce to far happier effects than have been attained by consigning them to the mere operation of the laws of political economy, on which now too exclusive a reliance seems to be placed. It is, we believe, quite a mistake to suppose that the Fenian movement is simply a Jacobinical one, hostile to property, and having only pillage in view. We regret to say it is too widely sympathized with by the shop-keeping and lower middle classes throughout the country, particularly in the towns, to allow of this theory being correct. A little green volume published in the course of last year, and entitled "Street Ballads, Popular Poetry, and Household Songs of Ireland" (McGlashan and Gill), contains abundant proof that a mistaken spirit of patriotism pervades the population, and gives the support of excited feeling to the present blind and insane disturbance. Charles Kickham (Phœbus! what a name!), one of the three executive officers of the Fenian Brotherhood—the deaf man whom it gave Judge Keogh such pain to sentence to ten years' penal servitude—will be found in the list of contributors to this volume, with four poems attached to his name. One of these, "The Shan Van Vocht," is thoroughly rebellious, filled with anticipation of a friendly invasion from America:—

"There are ships upon the sea,
Says the Shan Van Vocht;
There are good ships on the sea,
Says the Shan Van Vocht;
Oh, they're sailing o'er the sea,
From a land where all are free,
With a freight that's dear to me,
Says the Shan Van Vocht.

"They are coming from the West,
Says the Shan Van Vocht;
And the flag we love the best,
Says the Shan Van Vocht,
Waves proudly in the blast,
And they've nailed it to the mast :
Long threatening comes at last,
Says the Shan Van Vocht.

"'Twas well O'Connell said,
Says the Shan Van Vocht,
'My land, when I am dead,'
Says the Shan Van Vocht,
'A race will tread your plains,
With hot blood in their veins,
Who will burst your galling chains,'
Says the Shan Van Vocht.

"For these words we love his name,
Says the Shan Van Vocht,
And Ireland guards his fame,
Says the Shan Van Vocht;
And how her poor heart fell
The day she heard his knell !
For she knew he loved her well,
Says the Shan Van Vocht.

"But the good old cause was banned,
Says the Shan Van Vocht,
By sleek slave and traitor bland,
Says the Shan Van Vocht.
Ah ! then strayed to foreign strand
Truth and Valour from our land,
The stout heart and ready hand,
Says the Shan Van Vocht.

"But with courage undismayed,
Says the Shan Van Vocht,
These exiles watched and prayed,
Says the Shan Van Vocht;
For though trampled to the dust,
Their cause they knew was just,
And in God they put their trust,
Says the Shan Van Vocht.

"And now, if ye be men,
Says the Shan Van Vocht,
We'll have them back again,
Says the Shan Van Vocht,
With pike and guns galore;
And when they touch her shore,
Ireland's free for evermore,
Says the Shan Van Vocht."

Another poem, "The Irish Peasant Girl," manifests a tenderness of feeling, and a sense of beauty, which make us grieve over the fate which his delusions have brought upon the author :—

"She lived beside the Anner,
At the foot of Sliev-na-mon,
A gentle peasant girl,
With mild eyes like the dawn :
Her lips were dewy rosebuds;
Her teeth of pearls rare;
And a snow-drift 'neath a beechen bough,
Her neck and nut-brown hair.

"How pleasant 'twas to meet her
On Sunday, when the bell
Was filling with its mellow tones
Lone wood and grassy dell !
And when at eve young maidens
Strayed the river-bank along,
The widow's brown-haired daughter
Was loveliest of the throng.

"O brave, brave Irish girls—
We well may call you brave !—
Sure the least of all your perils
Is the stormy ocean wave,
When you leave our quiet valleys,
And cross the Atlantic's foam,
To hoard your hard-won earnings
For the helpless ones at home.

"Write word to my own dear Mother—
Say, we'll meet with God above;
And tell my little brothers
I send them all my love;
May the angels ever guard them,
Is their dying sister's prayer'—
And folded in the letter
Was a braid of nut-brown hair.

"Ah, cold, and well-nigh callous,
This weary heart has grown,
For thy helpless fate, dear Ireland,
And for sorrows of my own;
Yet a tear my eye will moisten,
When by Anner side I stray,
For the lily of the mountain-foot
That withered far away."

The collection contains many pieces of much poetic merit and interest: all are more or less tinged with the same spirit, regretful or aspiring, always discontented.

To turn to poetry of a different kind: a volume of the compositions of a lamented young man, Mr. Edmund J. Armstrong (Moxon), has been recently given to the world by a friend who, in an interesting preface, sketches his brilliant college career, and the struggles of his spirit through scepticism to a confirmed Christian faith. His poems have many of the faults of youth—these we need not particularize; but they are full of evidences of elevated thought and keen sensibility, and moreover, exhibit a faculty of refined and forcible expression, and a feeling for poetic harmony, that breathe a prophecy (not here to be fulfilled) of maturer excellence. We believe our readers will thank us for quoting as a specimen the following description of the music of the "Dead March in Saul":—

"The strain they played above thy grave
Gives comfort, as a sighing wind,
Or the moan of a falling wave,
Brings solace to the blind:

The strain they played above thy grave,
 With solemn pomp and muffled drum,
 Within my soul will go and come
 For ever—spirit-thrilling wail,
 That makes the happiest cheek turn pale,
 And the warmest blood run cold ;
 Wave on wave, and fold on fold,
 Like a storm-blown ocean rolled,
 Dashed on cliff and island bold
 In thunder : deep and wild the woe
 Of the music's troubled flow !
 Now it strikes upon the soul
 Like the death-bell's awful toll :
 Now upon the senses fall
 Shadows like a funeral pall :
 Now the pulses dance and quiver
 Like the sun on a glancing river
 Now the heart grows faint and sick,
 And the breath is slow and thick,
 And a whirling fills the ears,
 And the eyes are dimmed with tears :
 Passing wild and deep the woe :
 Of the music's troubled flow !
 Till a sudden blast is blown,
 A jubilant and stirring tone,
 Lifting up the swooning heart
 With highest, holiest joy—
 Faith has triumphed over death,
 And nothing can the bliss destroy."


With this mournful but elevating music in our ears, we pass to two other memorial notices, with which we must conclude our cursory record of such Irish matters as come within our range. Science and Archæology have recently been deprived of their most distinguished Irish representatives. The death of Sir William Rowan Hamilton, in September last, has been followed within the present year by that of Dr. Petrie. Few men have ever been mourned with a regret more sincere than that which on the 22nd of January gathered around the tomb of Petrie a numerous assemblage composed of many of the most eminent of Ireland's sons. He was indeed dear to all who knew him. His flowing locks of venerable grey, his countenance, in which sweetness, intelligence, and decision were beautifully mingled, presented an image which will be cherished in the memory of all who had opportunities of knowing how entirely it was in harmony with a mind which seemed by a special instinct to be attracted to everything that was true and beautiful and amiable. His value as a member of cultivated society in Ireland was inestimable, and if it does not suffer permanently by his loss, it will be, we believe, in no small degree because his influence has succeeded in imparting a tone of gentle truthfulness, and of graceful and spirited, but at the same time

reasonable nationality, to the circle of which he was the delight and ornament. With all the genial qualities of the Irishman, he joined a scrupulous accuracy as to facts, a deliberation in judgment, a severity in taste, a modest quietness of bearing, which are more usually associated with the English character. His accomplishments and attainments were varied. He was painter, musician, antiquary, man of letters ; and brought all these accomplishments into harmonizing action. In his landscapes, while not a vivid colourist, he manifested an imaginative sense of the picturesque, and anticipated the modern school in his faithful attention to the minute details of nature. We suppose that by no other individual was Ireland so thoroughly known. From his earliest years a frequent rover on foot through all its recesses, he gathered from its natural features and impressive ruins varied subjects for his brush ; of native melodies sung by peasant girls, or played at festival and wake, he transferred to his violin, and then to his notebook, many hundreds, some of which he has published, while more remain in manuscript ; and he gained a knowledge of antiquities, Celtic, Danish and Norwegian, Pagan and Christian, of which he learned accurately to discriminate their ages, and which he either saved, if small, from perishing, and added to his precious museum, or placed on record through the instrumentality of his minutely faithful pencil or truthfully describing pen. He was not, that we know, a composer of verse, but he was of an eminently poetic mind, at the least a "silent poet," and when his sympathizers in Ireland were probably within a score in number, conceived a passion for the poetry of Wordsworth, which continued fresh and warm to his very latest days. His principal works were his "Essay on the Ecclesiastical Architecture of Ireland," in which he establishes the Christian origin of the Round Towers ; a similar "Essay on the History and Antiquities of Tara Hill ;" and other papers contributed to the Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy, of which he subsequently became a Vice-President. As joint editor of *The Dublin Penny Journal*, he supplied that cheap periodical with numerous contributions illustrated by himself, describing many of the most interesting ruins and ancient reliques of Ireland ; these papers have added a value to the book which makes it now sought for, laid up, and referred to as a standard

work. He received many recognitions of his attainments and literary services,—some of them from abroad,—and during his latter years lived in quiet retirement with four daughters, upon a pension of £200 a year, bestowed upon him in 1850, by the appreciating judgment of the present premier. He had reached his seventy-sixth year.

In Sir William Hamilton, the late Astronomer Royal of Ireland, has passed from earth a great mathematician and a man of rare genius. He was endowed in the highest degree with the faculty of generalization, and he wielded this faculty with a giant's power over the fields of optics, dynamics, and pure algebra. His "Theory of Systems of Rays" was said by one of our highest authorities to have transformed the science of mathematical optics, and it led to his almost unparalleled scientific Prophecy of Conical Refraction. His application of the same general algebraical method to dynamics resulted in the solution of difficulties previously unsurmounted in that branch of science; and his paper on "Algebra as the Science of Pure Time" has presented to the student a metaphysical view of algebra, by which he is considered to have raised it above the rank of a mere art or language, and to have established its title to the appellation of a science. This is not the place to enumerate his many other valuable mathematical papers, but we must not leave unmentioned the latest triumph of his mathematical genius, the discovery of "Quaternions," a name by which he has designated a new and vastly extended calculus, which, by means of its four constituent elements, is able to grasp lines not confined to one plane, as in ordinary algebra, but drawn in all possible planes. He himself has suggested, as applicable to this calculus, the name of *quadruple algebra*, which seems rather more explanatory of its nature than that which, perhaps in modesty, he has preferred. It is plainly impossible even to guess at the results which may be hereafter attained by the practised use of so powerful an instrument, the discovery of which has been pronounced, in an able article of the *North American Review*, to be the "maximus partus scientiæ" since the discovery of fluxions. Sir W. H.'s genius was not confined to mathematical generalization. It dwelt

familiarly in the recesses of metaphysical thought, it mastered with ease in early life numerous languages, it ranged freely over the regions of classical and modern literature, and was essentially poetical, as he himself considered to be indicated by the inventive character of his mathematical works, as well as by verse compositions, which gave fervid and oftentimes beautiful expression to the impulses of a generous and affectionate heart. Simple as a child, but manly and courageous, earnest and laborious, his serious thoughts were happily tempered by a cheerful disposition, and a quick sense of humour and social pleasantness. With certain weaknesses, which he cared not to conceal, he was a sincerely, even a devoutly religious man, settled in Christian faith, but wide in his sympathies; neither, on the one hand, refusing just consideration to the results of modern thought, nor, on the other, relaxing his hold of what he considered the established historical truth and inestimable spiritual value of Christianity. He died of a bronchitic affection at the age of sixty, leaving to his country a memory which, we venture to predict, will be fresh and green after the lapse of centuries. A work, nearly completed at the time of his death, entitled "The Elements of Quaternions," is on the point of publication. It is the second on this subject. It will be followed, we have reason to hope, in due time by a biographical memoir, including correspondence, by an orderly arrangement of his poems, his lectures, his metaphysical and his other miscellaneous writings, and, lastly, by a republication of some of his scientific works, in combination with others to be gleaned from the manuscript books which have been deposited in the library of Trinity College. In the meantime we refer our readers, for further information respecting this great man and his works, to an admirable Eloge recently delivered by Dean Graves, as President of the Royal Irish Academy; to an obituary notice in the *Gentleman's Magazine* for January, in which we trace the able hand of Professor De Morgan; and to a longer memoir in the *Dublin University Magazine* for January, 1842. Sir William Hamilton's successor as Astronomer Royal is Dr. Brünnow, formerly assistant to Encke at the Observatory of Berlin.



NOTES FROM ROME.

THE winter in Rome has thus far been extraordinarily fine, with uninterrupted clear weather, blue sky, and a wholesome *tramontana* present. The vane has not veered a point for more than a month; and as there is only a faint ridge of rosy snow on the upper line of the Leonessa, the atmosphere has been the perfection of winter weather—bracing, not too cold, windless, with clear glittering nights, and days warmed by a constant sun. Yesterday, however, there came a violent, passionate gale from the sea, with thunder and lightning and hail—a sort of nervous crisis which soon spent itself in fury, and has now become again calm.

The quarantine is over, and the foolish and injurious fumigation, to which all strangers were subjected, has ceased. Not a single case of cholera has shown itself in Rome; and were it not for the unfortunate fact that Florence also has been equally free, without quarantine, from this scourge, it would have been loudly alleged, as it is superstitiously believed in private by the priests, that the prayers and religious faith of the faithful alone have preserved the Eternal City. The quarantine was not, however, abandoned until it had worked a serious inconvenience to the commerce of Rome. The Custom House is still filled with

goods, which accumulated in such quantities in consequence of their detention at Civita Vecchia, or in the purgation-houses, that a considerable time will be required before they can be all examined and passed. Meantime the season is going; Christmas and New Year's day are gone, and the chances of selling profitably the goods daily lessen.

The encouragement to commerce and enterprise is certainly very small in Rome; and a singular indication of the spirit of the Government has lately come under my notice. There is a regular trade carried on between Leghorn and Rome, by means of small sailing vessels which come up the Tiber laden with marble and other merchandise. These vessels, however, instead of being allowed to come up the Tiber freely, are regularly detained at Fiumicino (at the mouth of the river), and permitted only to ascend the river one at a time in rotation. The consequence is, that they are often delayed there for weeks, exposed to accident, incurring expenses, and wasting time. The sailors, having nothing to do, are naturally tempted to examine, as far as they can, the cargo; and being a reckless and not very honest class, packages and trunks are not unfrequently violated by them, and articles of value are stolen.

The changes in the ministry have had a decided effect on brigandage. It is well known here that Monsignor de Merode was favourable to any movement that might in his opinion serve the cause of the former kings of Naples, and injuriously affect that of Victor Emmanuel. He coquetted with the brigands; lent them countenance; and while he made feints of attacking them, he secretly encouraged them. A final order of his to his subordinates not to attack a certain band was too gross to be passed over; and the Pope was compelled to announce to him that his health required a change of air and of duty. Monsignor de Merode was exasperated beyond bounds at this intimation; declared his health to be excellent, and, as far as he could, refused to abandon his post. But the Pope persisted; and though in his rage De Merode is said to have beaten his head against the wall, he was forced to succumb, and his rival, Antonelli, took his place. Monsignor de Merode was possessed of admirable qualities; but he was not of this century. He was earnest, energetic, and bigoted. He believed blindly in the Roman Catholic Church, and he would have crushed its enemies with an unrelenting spirit had he possessed the power. He would have made an admirable inquisitor, but he was a very bad minister of war. He was violent in his passions, blind in his prejudices, and narrow in his opinions; but he was honest and earnest. While his politics were of the past, he belonged to the present in virtue of his love of municipal improvements, and his desire to embellish and modernize Rome. Some of his plans were admirable. The great difficulty was that the cost of carrying them out rendered them impracticable for the Roman Government; and nearly all of them proved abortive. He spent large sums of money, and depleted the treasury; but he never robbed it for his private gain; on the contrary, he threw into it a considerable portion of his own property, and left office, if not a wiser, at least a poorer man than when he took it.

L'Eminentissimo Antonelli has done little since he assumed the reins. The withdrawal of the French garrisons on the frontiers obliged the Government to show its hand, and its action has certainly been energetic against brigandage.

The French merely performed a ridiculous farce when they were there. Whenever an attack was ordered against the brigands, they were warned of their danger afar off, by the shrieking of the French trumpets and the rolling of the French drums; and of course they were never found. It was a very rare occurrence when a conflict took place; and if prisoners were taken, they were turned over to the Roman authorities. With Monsignor de Merode in command, it is easy to imagine what took place, and whether the punishment was severe. Now, however, since the Roman troops have succeeded to the French, there have been constant conflicts, and numbers of lives lost on both sides. Martial law has been proclaimed, and many brigands have surrendered. It is clear that, whatever may be the result, the French farce has finished.

But brigandage will not be easily put down. It has been too long fostered and winked at. And a long time must elapse before the country can be safe. The brigands are gathered in numerous bands, and are so powerful as to overawe the people. Besides, they pay very handsomely for all they purchase, and for the most part only prey upon the richer classes. They come down in numbers into the villages, and have it all their own way. No one dares to refuse them what they demand,—and their demands are large. But whenever Francis II. is persuaded that it is all over with him and his cause, brigandage, which is to a considerable extent a political organization, will receive a severe blow; and if the Italian and Roman Governments can be brought into any amicable relation, it will not long survive their co-operation.

A new company has been lately formed for the purpose of reconstructing the old Marcian aqueduct, and again bringing this water into Rome. In a city so abundantly supplied with water, and where more is daily wasted in fountains than would serve to supply a large city, this project would at first glimpse seem not to be justified by necessity, or to answer to any demand. Yet the fact is, that though there is a great quantity of water in Rome, it is all on a comparatively low level, and has not sufficient head to be carried over the houses in the higher part of the city. It spills away in the stone troughs of the courtyards, and bubbles in every yard, but it

must be pumped to the top of every house, or drawn up by pails: add to this, that the only waters which are really good to drink are the Trevi, the level of which is so low that it only supplies the least elevated part of the city; and the Acqua Sallustiana, which only flows to a very few houses, and is very small in quantity. The Acqua Marcia was celebrated among the ancients as the best water they had. It rises in the mountains beyond Subiaco, about thirty-six miles from Rome, and is said by Pliny to have been the coldest and most wholesome of all that were brought to Rome; while Vitruvius refers to it as being proverbial for its excellence. The level of it is so high that it will supply the loftiest houses in the city, and the quantity is as great as its quality is good. Much of the old aqueduct still remains, and it can easily be restored as far as Tivoli. Thence it is the design of the company to bring it to Rome by pipes laid under-ground, and to distribute it from a vast reservoir near the city. The project is an admirable one, and the general opinion in regard to it may be inferred from the fact that all the shares were immediately subscribed. The Government looks upon it with favour, and is ready to aid in its accomplishment. No time therefore will be lost in commencing operations, though some years must necessarily pass before it can be completed.

It has often been a question whether the ancient Romans were aware of the fact that water conducted under-ground in pipes would find its level; the great expense incurred in building their aqueducts above ground on lofty arches seeming to indicate that this fact was unknown to them; while, on the other hand, it scarcely seems possible that the first fountain constructed by them should not have clearly proved it. This question has, however, been now decided by the discovery at Alatri, during the past summer, of large terra-cotta pipes, admirably constructed and cemented, by which the water supplying that town was carried under-ground though the deep valley which separated it from the mountain opposite, from which it was drawn. We must, therefore, seek for other reasons than the ignorance of the ancients to account for those gigantic lines of lofty aqueducts which form so picturesque and remarkable a feature of the Campagna.

Among other reforms, we have a new tariff issued by the Senator of Rome, regulating the price of bread and meat. The prices of these articles had been run up lately to such an extent that the municipality interfered, and reduced them to a fair rate. Of course the bakers and butchers rage together, but the people are delighted. The prices of bread and meat are established as follows:—for select pieces of beef, 10 baiocchi the pound; for second quality, 7½ baiocchi the pound; for pork of first quality, 8 baiocchi, and of second quality 6 baiocchi: for bread of finest quality, 3 baiocchi and 1½ quattrino the pound, or 3½ ounces for a baiocco; of second quality, 2 baiocchi and ½ quattrino the pound, or 5½ ounces for a baiocco; of third quality, 1 baiocco and 4½ quattrino the pound, or 6½ ounces for a baiocco.

On New Year's day, according to custom, the Pope received General de Montebello and the French officers. He warmly thanked them for the service they had rendered, and gave his papal benediction to them, and to the Emperor, Empress, and the Prince Imperial, adding that he did this with all the more solemnity, because it was the last time that he should receive them on New Year's day. "When you are gone," he concluded, "wolves and other wild beasts will rush into the fold." This, I believe, is textually what he said, and it plainly shows that after the withdrawal of the French, he has little hope of sustaining himself alone. But it is the general belief here that he will not abandon Rome. It is easy to depart,—it is difficult to return. "*Non possumus*" is a strong fort, and after all, if he cannot hold it, he may turn round and play "*'possum.*"

Mr. Gibson, the eminent English sculptor, was struck with paralysis on the 10th of January. This incident deeply affected all society here, and especially the artists, to whom Mr. Gibson had always commended himself, not only by his rare talent and devotion to his art, but by the kindly and genial simplicity of his character. He was making a visit to some of his friends on Wednesday last, when he complained of dizziness and faintness. It passed away, however, in a few minutes, and he took his leave, declining to have a carriage called to take him home. After walking as far as the Piazza di Spagna, his strength failed him, and

he called a carriage, and ordered the driver to drive him to his studio. On his arrival there he could not move, and was carried into the studio by his workmen, and thence was at once conveyed to his lodgings. His anteroom was besieged by friends anxious to express their sympathy and learn the last tidings of his condition. He has been engaged during the winter on a large group, which would have been one of the most vigorous of his works. But he has been struck down with the work only half done. His life has been long and laborious. For more than a half-century he has been busy in his studio, elaborating those classical statues which are so well known to the world. He won success and fame, and he enjoyed what he had won; but he never stinted in praise of the works of others, was a generous critic, and had no taint of jealousy in his nature.

After lingering along for many days, he died on the 27th. On the preceding day he received a telegram from Her Majesty, expressing her sympathy, and making inquiries as to his health. This was the last gleam of pleasure which illuminated his life. He seized it in his hand, refused to part with it, and died with it in his grasp. Had his life been prolonged a single day, he would have received a Prussian decoration, which arrived only a few hours too late. But honours had not been wanting to him during his life. He was a Royal Academician, a member of the Academy of St. Luke at Rome, a Knight of the Legion of Honour; and to him, in company with Tenerani and Rauch, as the most eminent representatives of sculpture in their respective countries, a statue had been erected in Munich, under the auspices of King Ludwig of Bavaria. From humble beginnings he had mounted to fame. Fortune had smiled upon him continuously, never once averting her face. He lived a long, laborious, and happy life, cheered by success, surrounded by warm and steady friends, and enjoying the reputation he had won. The genial simplicity of his nature, the kindly spirit which breathed through all his acts and words, his entire freedom from that jealousy which so often deforms the temperament of the artist, his readiness to lend his help to all who needed it, and the generous largeness of his praise, won for him many friends, and warded him from bitter and hostile

feelings. He died universally regretted, and without an enemy.

His funeral took place at the Protestant cemetery, under the shadow of the Pyramid of Caius Cestius, where lie all that is mortal of so many whose names are dear and honoured. Military honours were accorded to him in virtue of his being a Knight of the Legion of Honour. The muffled drum beat the solemn approach of his body to the grave, around which was gathered a large concourse of persons, of every nation and profession, to do honour to his memory. Before the reading of the service a volley was fired, and at the close of it each soldier passing the head of the grave discharged into it one by one a final farewell shot.

Mr. Gibson was a pupil of Canova, and worked in his studio from the year 1817, when he first went to Rome, until the death of his master in 1822. There he learned his art, and imbibed those principles which characterize all his works. To the end of his life he retained the warmest feelings of gratitude to Canova for his kindness, and the highest admiration of him as an artist, and he never stepped out of the circle of artistic ideas and subjects then drawn around him. The influence of the ideal world by which he then found himself surrounded gave a permanent colour to his mind. His chief education he derived from translations of ancient authors, and these were almost the only books which he read. But he read them rather for the legends and myths which might afford subject for his art, than inspired himself with their ideas, their power, or their poetry. Modern literature did not interest him, and he knew little or nothing of the great English writers. He lived in a world of his own, and though born in the modern prose of Liverpool, he was by adoption a child of the past, and sympathized solely with forms and ideas averse from the spirit and the religion of his century.

The style of art to which he was inclined—not only by virtue of his training, but also by the natural bias of his nature—was of the so-called “classical school.” It was chiefly, almost exclusively, to subjects drawn from the mythology of Greece that he dedicated himself. His favourite legend was Cupid and Psyche, and he never tired of repeating and illustrating it. At the age of seventy-five years it was still

fresh to him, and one of his last works was a bas-relief of the sisters of Psyche returning from her laden with presents. Among his principal works are the Venus, the Amazon, Bacchus, Cupid, Phaëton, Hebe, the Hunter, the Wounded Hero and Amazon, Narcissus, and the Nymph with Cupid; and he left unfinished at his death a group which promised to rank among the best of his works, representing Theseus slaying the Robber. These works are all characterized by the same qualities, and are treated in the same style. They are simple and refined in sentiment, and are without exception in imitation of the antique. They are careful and conscientious in execution, studied more from ancient marble models than from living nature, and are an attempt to repeat the old in varied forms rather than to represent the spirit of this century. Mr. Gibson's genius was rather the result of a simple and educated taste, and of faculties trained by long study and exercise in his art, than an original and creative power. His works are more graceful than energetic, more refined than vigorous. They embody no individual profound conceptions, demanding and insisting on new forms for their expression. He sought for calmness of character, simplicity of form, and graceful shapes, rather than deep interior passions, tragic emotions, and impressive ideas. The spirit which in our own day has found utterance in the music of Beethoven, and in the poetry of Coleridge and Browning, never once inspired him. The antique character of repose was more akin to his nature than the spirit and aspiring devotional temper of Christianity. The only one of his works illustrating a

Christian subject is the basso-relievo of Christ blessing Little Children; and this is perhaps the poorest of all his productions, at once wanting the sentiment and the treatment appropriate to the subject. His statues were rather taken in from without, the result of observation, forms appropriated and applied to subjects, than created from within, shaping for themselves their own forms and expressions. They were foundlings, not children, born out of the life and blood of his inward being. His works were, like himself, animated by a graceful and refined spirit, but lacking in depth of spiritual meaning and earnestness of conception. But he was in his sphere an accomplished artist, careful in his work, and warmly devoted to his art. His studio was his home, his statues were his family, and for some of them he conceived warm and almost personal feelings of attachment. He could scarcely bring himself to part with his Venus, and for years after it was finished he kept it in his studio, and never tired of looking at it. He was of a most happy temperament, delighting in his art, and working on apparently with none of those misgivings of excellence which torment so many artists. He thoroughly enjoyed his success and his fame. He thought no ill of others nor of himself. He was gifted with a perfect facility of work, and in all that he did he showed the thoroughness of his training. His loss will be widely felt. England has lost in him her oldest and best sculptor, one who did honour to his nation, and whose name will be long remembered as standing in the same line with Flaxman—below him in design, but above him in execution, a faithful artist, a simple, honest, amiable man.



NOTICES OF BOOKS.

A Course of Lectures on the Third or Transition Period of Musical History, delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain, in 1861. By JOHN HULLAH. London.

WE sometimes hear music called the universal language. This is quite a mistake: the music of one nation is not intelligible to another. The Indian who sits down to yell for two hours and beat the "*tom-tom*" may possibly soothe the savage mind, but he drives the European mad. Mr. Hullah tells us of an Arabian artist who not only sang and played his "*εοὐδ*," or lute, out of tune, but refused to tolerate, from a French professor, anything in tune. Neither is the music of one age suited to the taste and feeling of another. Indeed, historically viewed, of all the arts, music would seem to be the least sympathetic. The monuments, the paintings, the literature of the past are still eloquent. We still admire Westminster Abbey, Notre Dame de Chartres, or the frescoes at Padua. We are still warmed by the rough geniality of Chaucer, and the lines of Petrarch and Dante are woven like golden threads into the fabric of our conversation and literature; but when we are asked to sit down with these worthies and hear a little music, we very properly decline. Think how it must have sounded! At their fairs and tournaments the *trouvères* and *jongleurs* would sing you a kind of melody without any bars, or time, or tune, or sharps, or flats; and at church the monks would treat you to a kind of harmony, consisting of one *bourdon* in the bass, and a few consecutive fifths and octaves to relieve the ear! This went on all through what Mr. Hullah calls the First Period. Modern Europe, from 700 to 1400, was preparing to make music.

The Second Period (1400—1600) is marked by a certain system of "tonality," or arrangement of the scale. The name of Josquin Des Prés may be connected with its rise and progress, whilst France and Belgium divide between them the honours of its early development. Bars appear soon afterwards, accompanied by flats and sharps and other novelties, which the professors seem to have retained as interesting discoveries, without knowing exactly what to do with them. Towards the close of the sixteenth century

the Gallo-Belgian was completely absorbed into the Italian school, and as Josquin Des Pres is the foundation, so Palestrina is the crown of the Second Period.

The Third Period (1600—1750), or the *transition*, bridges over the great gulf between the second and fourth periods, or between the ancient and the modern music.

The Fourth Period (1750—1861), or *modern*, concludes Mr. Hullah's first series. Next to the modern, the transition period is the most interesting, and it forms the subject of a separate volume (II.) of lectures, published last year. With Vol. I. we have not now to deal, though we may just glance at the last period, so full of familiar names, and try to form some estimate, as we read about what we know, of Mr. Hullah's value as a guide in the less frequented regions of the Transition Period. This glance is not altogether reassuring. To insert the names of Moscheles and Pleyel in a chronological table from which such men as Schubert, Chopin, and Gade are excluded is, to say the least, bad taste; and Mr. Hullah must have known that he was trifling with his audience when he ventured to dismiss the later developments of the German school with a sneer at Richard Wagner, and without even an allusion to Robert Schumann.

The Transition Period begins with the sixteenth century. The old *tonality* was the great obstacle to all progress. A scale of notes based on natural laws was the remedy. The old masters would begin a scale anywhere in the series, without writing flats or sharps to make the semitones fall in their natural places. The change from such a system to our simple *major* and *minor*, with its natural arrangement of accidentals, was immense. This, and the consequent discovery of the *perfect cadence*, made the radical difference between the old and the new music. No one man is responsible for these startling innovations, but most of them are attributed to Monteverde (1570). At all events it is certain that about this time the world got very tired of the old forms. And no wonder; for a scientific movement in music was worked out like an equation in algebra, and was necessarily devoid of either life or expression. The wild strains of the troubadours, on the other hand, were full of feeling, but had no consistency or method. In short, as Mr. Hullah well expresses it, "the scholastic music had no art, the popular music no science." The glory of the Transition Period is the marriage of art with science. Science, grim and ecclesiastical, peeped forth from its severe cloister and beheld the wild and beautiful creature singing her roundelays, captivating the hearts of the people, who followed her in crowds—detained by princes to sing the story of crusades and the triumphs of love—all the while knowing nothing and caring nothing for the modes "*authentic*" and "*plagal*," but striking the harp or bandoline to the wild and irregular rhythm of fancy or passion: and science, greatly shocked, withdrew itself from so frivolous a spectacle, just as the monks of the day lived apart from a bad world. But presently the grave face looked out once more, opened a window—a door—stepped forth and mingled with the crowd, just as the preaching friars came forth, until the line between the secular and the religious began slowly to fade. The stern heart of Science was smitten by the enchantress, popular Art, and conceived the daring plan of wooing and winning her for himself. It was a long process; it took nearly two hundred and fifty years. Science was so dull and prejudiced; Art was so impatient, and wild, and careless. But the first advances of Science were favoured by that wondrous springtide which followed the winter of the middle ages—the *Renaissance*. Emerging from the cold cell into the warm air and sunlight of a new world, Science relaxed, cast its

theories to the winds, sighed for natural Art, and raved incoherently about the 'musical declamation of the Greeks.' Here, then, was the first point of sympathy. Wild enthusiasm and impatience of forms was, for one moment, common to Science and Art, and that was the moment of their betrothal. Immediately afterwards, with Carissimi, Science recovered the lost equilibrium, but Art was captivated by the strong spirit, and the perfect marriage was now only a matter of time.

Carissimi (born 1585, died 1672) was the very type of The Transition. He might have seen Palestrina, and he lived to hear Corelli. The germs of every style of music known since, arose during his long and eventful lifetime. He witnessed the bloom and gradual decay of the madrigal in England and Germany; the birth and adolescence of the musical drama in France, under Lulli; the invention of the oratorio in the oratory of San Philipppo Neri, at Rome; and lastly, the rise and progress of instrumental music as an independent branch of the art. About 1659, Francisco Pistocchi established his great school of Italian singing at Bologna. "Before this," says an old writer, "they used to howl like wolves." He was followed, twenty years later, by Scarlatti at Naples, and this improvement in vocal operatic music made corresponding demands upon the orchestra. About 1700 arose the schools of the great violin makers near Cremona, the Straduarii, Guarnerii, and Amati, and with them rose at once the dignity and importance of instrumental music. Overtures, sonatas, quartetts began to be written in vast quantities, and the way was thus rapidly paved for the later developments of the modern symphony. Germany, meanwhile, though far from original, had not been idle. Deriving her inspiration copiously from Italy, she became, during the seventeenth century, the land of organs and organists, and at the beginning of the eighteenth showed signs of independent thought, and began to encourage native effort in such men as Keiser and Hasse.

But we must now glance, for a moment, at the place which England holds in the rise and progress of music. The gloomy period of the old tonality, *i. e.*, before 1600, is relieved in this country by the lustre of one great name,—John Dunstable. His fame was prodigious, and yet his own age could hardly have understood him. He had misgivings about the prevalent system of timeless music, strange anticipations of coming harmonies, and is even said to have invented *counterpoint*. But towards the close of the Second Period (1500—1600) was born a real English school,—a school, no doubt, which took largely from others, and, owing perhaps to our insular position, gave little in return, but a school which could boast of Tallis, Farrant, Byrd, and Bevin "in the service high and anthem clear;" Morley, Ward, Wilbye, and Weelkes in the madrigal; Bull, equally great as an executant and a composer; Dowland, the friend of Shakspeare, in the part-song; and, last in the catalogue, but first in every style of composition, Orlando Gibbons. Then comes a blank. The old traditions were fairly used up; and the echoes of the *Renaissance* music, with which France and Italy were ringing, had not yet reached us. The civil wars seemed to paralyze our musical invention, and extinguish our enthusiasm. In Germany, during the Thirty Years' War, organs and organists abounded, and composers were busy absorbing all the new influences. In England, under similar circumstances, music got old and dull; few composed or played, and fewer cared to listen.

In 1660, Pelham Humphrey, a chorister boy in the Royal choir of His Majesty Charles II., went to Paris. There he fell in with the new opera school of Lulli. He immediately placed himself under the great French composer; and the result was, that Master Humphrey returned in a few

years "an absolute Monsieur, disparaging everything and everybody's skill but his own" (*Pepys's Diary*). The astonished gentlemen of the King's band then got their first peep into the new world. Humphrey told them that, besides playing old rubbish, they could keep neither time nor tune; and as for the King's musical director, he promised to "give him a lift out of his place, for that he (Master Humphrey) and the King understood each other, and were mighty thick." In truth, "that brisk and airy prince" was charmed with the new style; and Pepys describes him nodding his royal head, and beating time in chapel with the greatest zest.

The songs of Lulli, founded on Carissimi, and the anthems of Humphrey, founded on Lulli, must indeed have come upon English ears like a revelation, and startled the lovers of Gibbons, Lawes, and Jenkins, as much as Mozart's "Idomeneo" surprised the operatic world, or Beethoven's "Eroica" the lovers of the older symphonies. Humphrey died in 1674, at the early age of twenty-seven; but his direct influence may be traced in Wise, Blow, and Henry Purcell. Purcell, born 1658, is distinguished by some of those rare qualities peculiar to genius of the highest order. He sympathized with and drank deeply into the spirit of his age, but was not, like Humphrey, absorbed by it. His music stands as it were nicely balanced between the past and the future. He felt his relations to the one by sympathy, and to the other by a kind of almost prophetic intuition. In his day, "that grave and solemn manner of music by Byrd, Tallis, &c.," was in sad disrepute,—the King liked cheerful airs he could hum and beat time to. Purcell satisfied him fully, and yet we cannot listen to his music without being struck sometimes by a certain old flow of rhythm and harmony, which we feel could only have been derived from a deep study of the schools of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth. As in reading Tennyson we are sometimes affected with a strange sense of George Herbert and Milton, so in listening to Purcell there steals over us a memory of the olden time,—like a kindly ghost that rises and floats by with a sweet and solemn smile.

One of the greatest blemishes in Purcell is a trick inherited from his master, Humphrey—imitation. The passion for expressing words in notes, founded on a puerile and mistaken view of the sphere and legitimate functions of music, reaches the ridiculous in him. For instance, he has to set the words, "They that go down to the sea in ships," and proceeds to perform that operation musically by taking the bass down a couple of octaves, and leaving him drowned at the lower *D*. The same unhappy bass is soon after "carried up to heaven" on a high dotted crotchet. Other composers have stooped to these unworthy tricks. Handel's "plagues" are full of them; Haydn's "Creation" rejoices in "a long and sinuous worm" of the earth, earthy; Spohr's "Power of Sound" has an eel "wriggling in the water;" the illusion of Beethoven's "Pastoral" vanishes with the appearance of a real cuckoo; and even Mendelssohn must disturb with his live donkey the enchantment of "A Midsummer Night's Dream"! But with all abatements, the music of Purcell, which after two hundred years has still the power to charm, bears a signal witness to the force and originality of his genius.

Purcell died in his thirty-eighth year, 1696. Handel came to England in 1710. His music is so well known, and his influence has been so great, that we ought either to say a great deal or hardly anything about him. Our limits suggest the latter course. The year 1706 is the turning-point in his musical history. In that year he visited Naples, and met Scaarlatti, Porpora, and Corelli. It was to him a period of rapid assimilation. With one stride he reached the front rank, and felt that henceforth no musician alive could teach him anything. Always voluminous, and generally original,

he nevertheless in his later years adopted three short and easy methods of producing music ;—1st, He worked up his earlier compositions to new words ; 2ndly, He reproduced his older works bodily with hardly any alterations ; 3rdly, When he had none of his own, he took other people's. He died in 1759, aged seventy-eight. There can be no doubt that Handel, by his single might, greatly advanced music in all its branches ; but his action is far more remarkable on vocal than on instrumental music. Modern instrumental music is simply the most extraordinary art-development which the world has ever seen. It can only be compared to the perfection reached so suddenly, after a certain point, by the Greek drama. But the stride from Corelli to Beethoven was too great even for the giant Handel ; and yet the men who completed that stride were Handel's contemporaries. Handel was forty-seven when Haydn was born, and Mozart was in his third year when Handel died. Musically, how many centuries does Handel seem to us behind modern music ! yet we can all but join hands with him ; and the musical enthusiast is filled with a certain awe when he thinks that men are still alive who may have listened to Mozart, and conversed with the venerable Haydn.

In parting with Mr. Hullah we cannot say that we are impressed with the comprehensiveness of his views, the accuracy of his judgment, or the elegance of his style. We do not think, in either volume, he has traced satisfactorily the influence of the *Renaissance* upon music ; and his allusions to the sister arts, by way of analogy, are, to say the least, vague. Perhaps few will be content with his treatment of Sebastian Bach, or agree to dismiss that great composer's strong individuality and strange idiosyncrasy with the remark that "his vocabulary was limited, his accent provincial, and his style obscure." But this is a very good description of Mr. Hullah's own style of writing, than which nothing can be more inelegant, rugged, and occasionally involved. Upon this point it would be invidious to dwell. It is no uncommon thing to find a man accomplished in the language of art but incapable of expressing his thoughts in any other. And yet we must not say that the professor of King's College, London, is incapable of expressing himself in English : everything is by comparison, and we are sure that any one who has heard the late Mr. Gibson talk, or try to talk, about his own statues, will be disposed to think that Mr. Hullah is rarely gifted as a lecturer on his art.

Of Mr. Hullah's learning, experience, and peculiar fitness for his vocation there can be but one opinion, and as we glance down the long list of his works on the dry departments of music, we must admit that if he does not always attain to the wisdom of the philosopher or the sweetness of the poet, he still remains the most able, patient, and laborious of instructors.

Thoughts on the Daily Choral Services in Carlisle Cathedral. By FRANCIS CLOSE, D.D., Dean. (Pp. 12.) Carlisle : Thurnam ; London : Hatchard.

WE confess that we have read this little pamphlet with unmingled feelings of pleasure, and of gratitude to Dean Close for the distinct and manly line which he has taken in its pages. There are, it seems, upwards of thirty thousand people living in the city and vicinity of Carlisle ; and yet the average attendance at the Cathedral service during a considerable portion of the year is not more than five or six. We suppose that the vicinity of Scotland must have leavened the people of "merry Carlisle" with exceptional antipathies to cathedral service : for we could mention a

southern cathedral, in a city of considerably less population, where the average attendance is more than sixfold that mentioned by the Dean.

However, whether six or thirty-six attend, there can be no question of the soundness of his view, as here put forth. Taking none but the families of Churchmen, and among those rejecting every case of preoccupation or objection, many persons might be found in every cathedral city who might attend at least once a day with profit to themselves, and even with enjoyment, who yet are never found on a week-day in the choir. The Dean sets forth with much feeling, and simple fervour of language, the real uses of daily service in such cases :—

“Were such persons called in the providence of God to attend daily service, as a duty imposed upon them, they would discover after a while that, far from its being irksome or supererogatory, it had become pleasant and profitable to their souls; they would find that not seldom, when vexed and harassed with the cares of ‘this troublesome world’ the hour of prayer was a little sanctuary, a sweet interval of refreshment, ‘a brook whereof to drink by the way’—rest in the midst of disturbance: the calmness, tranquillity, and repose of the little season of prayer are soothing to the inner man; and the active duties and arduous conflicts of life are resumed with fresh vigour and energy. Neither does the daily repetition of the same prayers prove irksome or unprofitable; so comprehensive, so suggestive are they, that piously, humbly, and devoutly used, they become the channels of fresh spiritual blessings, day by day, as our occasions and necessities arise. A steady attendance once a day on the part of those who have time and leisure at their disposal, would be found by spiritual persons a great blessing to their souls. On such a point, indeed, it is not well to dogmatize, nor to teach authoritatively that it is a positive duty to attend public worship daily, and that to neglect it is to commit sin; yet it may be confidently recommended as a religious privilege, and as a habit fraught with many advantages.”

He then meets the objection often urged against the musical character of the service. And here again we cannot but admire the temperate, and at the same time hearty manner in which the objections are dealt with. While acknowledging the undesirableness of the indiscriminate introduction of choral service into parish churches, he justifies its use in our cathedrals, and ingenuously confesses his own change of opinion on the subject since his elevation to his deanery :—

“At the risk of being judged egotistical in this matter, I must testify that an attendance upon musical public services daily for nearly nine years, has created a new habit in my mind; a decided preference to this mode of worship has been awakened; and unless I am greatly deceived, my conviction is that the comfort thus experienced in divine worship has been not a little enhanced by the regular cadence, the measured time, the continuous monotone, in which our prayers are uttered.

“Were the Liturgy of our Church always read as it might be, and ought to be—not only correctly and sensibly, but with true devotion—preference might still be given to an unmusical mode of worship; but considering how seldom this is the case, how frequently our services are disguised and distorted by endless and unsuitable varieties of emphasis and enunciation, there are few persons who are familiar with both styles who would not prefer the musical.”

We may perhaps divide the advocates of any particular view of Church matters into three classes. The first of these is represented by the party man, pleading the cause of his party with that party: and so far only is this pleading commonly persuasive, his weight being derived from the position which he holds in its ranks. The second is composed of those who are of no party; whose views can only make way by their own weight, without adventitious aid. The third, and by far the smallest class, consists of party men, who are open to conviction: who, without losing their place and weight among their own friends, are not ashamed to avow sometimes their adoption of views commonly attributed to the other side. Among this most useful, and happily increasing class, we are delighted to be able to number the present Dean of Carlisle.

Hymns on the Holy Communion. By ADA CAMBRIDGE, Author of "Hymns on the Litany," with a Preface by the Rev. R. H. Baynes, M.A. London: Houlston and Wright.

THIS is one of the many red-edged, and red-lined, and tastefully covered hymn-books, which these our years seem never tired of producing. Its contents are quite up to the standard of the better Church poetry of the day. We confess that, to our mind, there is too much of ritualistic sentiment in some of these hymns; but at the same time this would not be a fair criticism to pass on the book as a whole. There are depths of devotional feeling in it which dip far beneath the alluvial strata of ritualism: and there is true poetry, too good to be marred even by the millinery which occasionally enwraps it. Miss Cambridge has taken the Communion Service in the Prayer-book, and has written a short hymn, or rather poem, on each portion of it. Portions of some of the pieces are worthy to be placed beside the best parts of the "Christian Year." But that remarkable book is easily imitated: and we hope we may again meet Miss Ada Cambridge on ground of her own, which she is well qualified to occupy successfully, without seeking to imitate any one.

Preces Privatæ Quotidianæ Launceloti Andrewes, Episcopi Wintoniensis.
Edidit FRIDERICUS MEYRICK, A.M. Londini, Oxonii, et Cantabrigiæ:
J. et F. H. Rivington.

THE labours of Mr. Meyrick on behalf of the Anglo-Continental Society are well known to all. The object of that society is "to make the principles of the English Church known in the different countries of Europe, and throughout the world: helping forward the internal reformation of national churches and other religious communities, by spreading information within them, rather than by proselytizing from them; and to save men, whose religious convictions are already unsettled, from drifting into infidelity, by exhibiting to them a purified Christianity which they may be able to embrace." It is in pursuance of one of the principal means which the society uses for this purpose, that Mr. Meyrick has edited the beautiful "*Preces Privatæ*" of Bishop Andrewes. To any one who has ever read or used these prayers, there is no need to recommend them. To those who have not, we may say, from some experience, that there is no more acceptable guide to the thoughts in private devotion. There is no subject of prayer, penitence, or thanksgiving which they do not specify: and their tabular arrangement seems to suggest trains of supplicatory thought without fettering the free utterance. For this purpose we have also made use of the "*Preces Privatæ*" as the "notes," so to speak, for family as well as for private prayer.

Mr. Meyrick's edition is in admirable type, and a portable form, and we cordially recommend it for English use, as well as for that to which it is especially dedicated.

The Sanctuary Common Service Book, after the Grand Model of the English Church, Repetitions reduced, with Variations in Matins and Evensong. Bristol: Chilcott. 1865.

IN one of the literary newspapers, a few months since, there appeared an article headed, "The Worst Sermon we ever heard." Had it been the fortune of the writer to hear also these prayers used, the whole service would at least have been on a par. We never saw any change so absolutely

and without exception for the worse, as that which has in this book passed upon our beautiful Church of England service. It is our belief that the real difficulty of liturgical revision will lie after all in the fact, that there is now no man, and no body of men, at all capable of mending the Book of Common Prayer with words even approaching in fitness those displaced. But if the average of attempted revisions be already low, it will be considerably brought down by the accession of this last. That we may not be thought to be speaking severely without reason. we will give a few specimens of alterations and inserted rubrics :—

BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER.

"We have left undone those things which we ought to have done ; And we have done those things which we ought not to have done ; And there is no health in us."

REVISED BOOK.

"We have left undone those things which we ought to have done ; And we have done those things which are contrary to thy divine precepts : And saving health is not in us."

Inserted rubric (before the *Venite Exultemus*) :—

"We should ourselves endeavour to imbibe, and to impart life by the service, and to take our part so as to edify, but not to disturb those around us. And we entreat Organists to accompany the words and voices with taste and feeling, so as to raise the mind above earthly thoughts : the occasional swell is effective and sublime, but constantly overpowering the singers when in tolerable harmony, discourages them from doing their best, and tends not to edification."

Provision is made that on the nineteenth day of the month the metrical version of *Psa. xcvi.* may be used, to avoid repetition : a singular way of confessing how unlike that version is to the *Psalm* itself. But of this metrical version the second stanza is altered, and pointed thus :—

"O let us to his COURTS repair
And breathe our aspirations there
Upon the knee devoutly :—All !
Before the Lord our Maker fall."

The Prince and Princess of Wales are thus prayed for :—

"We humbly beseech thee to help our Heir, Prince Albert Edward, the Princess Consort, and &c." . . .

In the General Thanksgiving, "by giving up ourselves to thy service," becomes "by giving up ourselves more to thy service:" as if that which is entirely given, could be yet more given.

Passing onward over multitudes of changes just as unmeaning and absurd, we are not surprised that the author has not kept his marring hands from moving the hallowed ground of the Nicene Creed itself, when we read in his rubrical note to his Communion Office, that "*the Creed is important in a mixed Congregation, but out of place for advanced Christians at the Communion Service.*"

NICENE CREED.

"And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, Begotten of his Father before all worlds, God of God, Light of Light, Very God of very God, Begotten, not made, Being of one substance with the Father; By whom all things were made, Who for us men, and for our salvation, came down from heaven, And was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, And was made man, And was crucified also for us under Pontius Pilate."

REVISED BOOK.

"And in one Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God: Who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven, And was incarnate, And was made man, And was crucified also for us."

This Creed, occurring in his Evening Prayer, is followed by the Collects, of which the third runs thus :—

BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER.

"Lighten our darkness, we beseech thee, O Lord; and by thy great mercy defend us from all perils and dangers of this night; for the love of thy only Son, our Saviour, Jesus Christ. Amen."

REVISED BOOK.

"Lighten our darkness, we beseech thee, O Lord, by the gleamings of thy Holy Spirit : and of thy great mercy, make the close of this day comfortable to us : and defend us from all perils and dangers of this night : watch over our soul, and preserve our body the tabernacle of the soul in life and health on the morrow : for the love of thy Son our Saviour, Jesus Christ. Amen."

We are made in the next prayer to ask that our Queen may "so end this life in piety and faith, as to exchange the mortal for the supernal crown." And in the next we pray for the "Regal Family of this kingdom." In a prayer for the newly baptized, which follows, the expression "since our last Sabbath" is introduced : a name for the Lord's day, as we need not remind our readers, wholly alien from the usage of the Christian Scriptures, and of the Church of England.

Into the Prayer "for all sorts and conditions of men," the following sentence is introduced :—

"We also entreat thee to privilege (?) with thy presence, all those who, having a desire and longing to enter the courts of the Lord, yet through age, care or infirmity, must tarry with the household."

The concluding prayer in "Evening Service" we cannot abstain from giving entire :—

"A Prayer of St. Chrysostom ;" or, the prayer, "Let there be Light."

"O God, our God, and our fathers' God, the fountain of life and immortality, we look for thee in holiness, and have sought thee to-day in the sanctuary : may hallowed incense of prayer and praise, inflamed from the breast by faith, hope and charity, have risen up before thee seated upon the cherubim, to return in blessings most expedient for us. And with every holy service that brings us nearer and nearer to our last act of worship upon earth, bestow an increase of grace to bethink (*sic*) of death and eternity : to live nearer and nearer to thee : to die nearer and nearer to holiness and meetness for Heaven : and at our evening-tide of life 'Let there be Light,' the presage of light and life eternal, the foresight of beholding thy presence in righteousness, of awakening up after thy likeness, satisfied in glory, the home of the soul, ever with the Lord. Amen. 'Tis immortality."

We have made these extracts not because we suppose this wretched book to be of the slightest importance, but that we may show our readers what it is which some good men want, who urge a revision of our Liturgy. The publication of such revisions does good, if it only makes us more jealous over what we have, and less inclined to meddle with words whose beauty and reverent simplicity is as far out of the reach of the present generation as is their confiding faith, and power of lifting the soul to God.

Trust in Trial; or, Lessons of Peace in the School of Affliction. Meditations, with Prayers and Hymns, for the Sick and Suffering. By the Rev. W. O. PURTON, B.A. London : Hunt and Co.

WE can thoroughly recommend this unpretending little book. Its language is simple and fervent : and the reality of life in union with Him who is the source of our life is found in every one of its meditations and prayers. It possesses also one minor recommendation. The type is excellent, and the form such as may well be held in the hand in bed, and lie on the pillow.

Communion Services according to the Presbyterian Form. By the Rev. J. A. WALLACE, Author of "Pastoral Recollections," &c. Edinburgh : Johnstone, Hunter, & Co. ; London : Hamilton, Adams, & Co.

It is really delightful, in reading the meditations and devotional exercises of those who differ from ourselves in their views and their celebration of the Lord's Supper, to meet with so much pure, fervent piety, and earnest love for our common Redeemer, as breathe through every page of this valuable little work.

Our differences are abiding, and may not be compromised nor trifled with : but let us thank God and take courage, when we find that far, far beneath their disturbing influences there is in the heart of both Churches the "well of water, springing up unto everlasting life : " that in both the true believers feed on "the same spiritual meat, and are refreshed by the same spiritual drink." May this little volume have on it the blessing of the great Head of all the Churches, and tend to promote His glory among them that shall use it.

Studies in Parliament: a Series of Sketches of Leading Politicians. By R. H. HUTTON. (Reprinted from the *Pall Mall Gazette*.) London : Longmans. 1866.

MR. HUTTON is not, like some publicists of a different rank who have printed parliamentary sketches, a gossip, a caricaturist, a "word-painter," a reporter, an artist in patchwork reminiscences, or anything of the kind. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to say this to readers of our Review, but we may emphasize what they will gather for themselves. It is not at all difficult to write agreeable, telling matter about public men ; and sketching which passes for picturesque is now-a-days "cheap, and"—too often the other adjective as well. A good deal of facility, and an equal quantity of recklessness, will carry a writer over a large number of pages about political scenes and persons, and he will be found entertaining enough. The late Mr. Whitty probably carried the art of the rattling, vivid, slashing, political sketcher as far as it ever was carried. He was clever to a fault, and said a "good thing" every few lines ; he had humour, sagacity, and a natural turn for politics—a more exclusive faculty in that direction than Mr. Hutton's. Yet Mr. Whitty's parliamentary sketches (many of our readers will remember his brilliant series of papers in the *Leader*) were clever failures ; they never satisfied the mind of the reader, and events have quite falsified some of the predictions they contained. Take, for instance, the prophecy that Mr. Bright would never become an *influential* personage in the House of Commons, because he could not or would not conciliate, compromise, or lay himself out for a personal following. Mr. Bright's characteristics were not ill sketched by Mr. Whitty from his point of view, but he forgot that there were more ways than one to political influence, and that a massive persistency like Mr. Bright's *must* tell in the long run. It was not in his power, of course, to foresee the position which Mr. Gladstone would come to occupy, and the way in which that would affect Mr. Bright's ; but he did not *allow* for possibilities arising from changes in the march of the pieces on the board. Probably, too, the power of the persistence of principle, whether for good or for evil, is what never dawned upon Mr. Whitty's mind—as it now dawns upon minds like his—which see, as he saw, party combinations, ins and outs, the game of politics, and little more. Take, as another instance, his anticipations for Mr. Robert Lowe, on whom the memory of the Kidderminster brickbat then lay fresh and green. "There is an Albino among you, gentlemen,"—we quote from memory,—"*who will be a great man if he will but bring his cleverness down to working range,*" &c., &c. That must

be thirteen years ago. We have since seen "the Albino among you, gentlemen," at work. He has, by nature, some of the elements of greatness in him, but those who belong to the side Mr. Whitty then took in politics (his natural gravitation was towards Toryism) would now be the foremost to say that the very thing which had injured Mr. Lowe was his bringing his cleverness down to working range. They would with one voice maintain that, in getting the "working range," he had sacrificed the habit, if not the power, of taking those wider and higher sweeps of thought, on the capacity for which Mr. Whitty's prophecy was founded.

There was once a widow who startled a strange gentleman into whose company she was suddenly thrown, by bursting into incongruous tears. "Why, madam, do you weep?" politely asked the gentleman. "Oh, sir," answered the widowed lady, "you do so remind me of my late husband!" Upon the gentleman inquiring, with still politer sympathy, "Am I, then, so like him?" the lady replied, with a fresh gush of weeping, "Oh dear, no, sir! it was because you're the very opposite of him!" It is not, however, simply because Mr. Hutton is the very opposite of Mr. Whitty (though he is) that we have recalled the latter and his sketches in Parliament, but because he is the *only* writer we can remember, of anything approaching the rank of Mr. Hutton, as having taken in hand this kind of work. He presents the brilliant journalistic type at, perhaps, its best. It is not easy to conceive a more sparkling, effective writer, though writers of his type are common enough. Mr. Hutton is, we need scarcely say, a publicist of a different and far higher order. He gives us lambent brightness instead of doubtful, tiring sparkle, and generous, fluent humour instead of glittering point and epigram, which you find—

" . . . so all-but just succeeding"

in conveying the right idea. The matter of the book before us is solid and serious, but always pleasant, sometimes entertaining; the ornament, the pleasantries, and the anecdote not being stuck on like spangles, or just pitched in like stones into a pond, but floating freely and fairly down the current of the thought as it moves along to its end. Readers to whom politics are almost like physic may take them in this "elegant preparation." Learners may go to Mr. Hutton's sketches for an introduction to the politics of the day; the most advanced students of public affairs will not be able to turn over many of the pages without receiving guidance, corroboration, stimulation, or direct instruction. Pleased *every* reader must be. The author's matter has always a *soul* in it; he never gives you the mere "shop" of his subject. He can be agreeable without losing warmth or energy; and just to those whom he criticises without allowing his criticism to degenerate into what an American essayist called "a mush of concession." In the poise, the very varied and yet always characteristic rhythm, and the felicitous colouring of his style, he often reaches a point of excellence which is rarely reached except by those whose business is rather poetry than politics. The sympathetic flexibility of the "phrasing" (to use a musical word) is often very striking. The paper published on the day of Mr. Cobden's funeral, and sketching with—we were really on the point of saying *enviable* felicity, the character and career of that gentleman, is, with entire naturalness, distinguished from all the rest (even from the one headed "Lord Palmerston") by the liturgical ring of the opening. The sentences throughout have a gentle *largo*, and there is something of the sweep of the mourning robe in them. The felicity of the metaphors and metaphorical turns of expression is wonderful in its nicety of truthfulness. Mr. Hutton not only gives you an expressive word or image, he gives you *the* word and image; and it stays

in the mind and takes root there quite naturally. Nothing can be happier than this, for example, about Lord Brougham :—

"A hundred-handed intellect with small head; a body of eccentric orbit; a spasmodic motive-power; a destructive sign in the political firmament. . . . Lord Brougham has been a Briareus indeed, but also a Goliath,—a Philistine incapable of the higher discrimination between force and power; a man whose spear was like a 'weaver's beam,' but who has had no influence in proportion to his strength. . . . His eloquence consisted chiefly in a certain driving force; never pithy, but propagating a great living power through its anaconda folds, and capable of a great expressiveness in the direction of hate."

And here is another instance of most truthful felicity from the essay entitled "Mr. Cardwell :"—

"The Peelites, as Peelites, were not properly men of popular sympathies. They were for the most part men with hereditary faculties for business—Sir Robert Peel himself, Mr. Gladstone, and Mr. Cardwell, all having derived their means from large Lancashire houses, manufacturing or mercantile—men deeply tinged with Oxford culture of that tone, at once prudential and pious, which marked the Oxford of the last generation. Indeed we may almost say that the most characteristic 'note' of the Peelites was a sort of financial piety. Mr. Gladstone still feels finance almost a department of religion; and the late Lord Herbert, Mr. Cardwell, and even their teacher, Sir Robert Peel himself, ever spoke on finance as if it were a topic dearer to their feelings, nearer to their hearts, than any of purely political importance. They were assuredly the first statesmen to make the nation feel that the subject was capable of a certain harmony and even beauty of treatment which raised it out of the department of mere business into one of æsthetic art."

It is marvellously true, too, that Mr. Disraeli's intellect is like a cut flower stuck in the earth, which is fed from no root, and yet does not fade. Very frequently in these pages you come across sentences of moral criticism which are quite extra-political, and which have the true poetic pithiness in them. Here is one example :—"For *another* [meaning in *behalf* of another] there is no more thoroughgoing utilitarian than a disinterested woman." How exquisitely true! how unostentatiously said!

At this point, indeed, we strike the spade against the essential peculiarity of Mr. Hutton's political writing. The *basis* of all his political criticism is not any set of political ideas, which have no more vitality than a heap of rubble flung under the pier of a bridge. To use his own expression, his judgments have always a visible relation to "deeper assumptions" than any which are usually called up to tell political fortunes. Read what he says of Lord Westbury :—

"Lord Westbury impresses the world as a sceptic in spite of that famous lecture to the Young Men's Christian Association of Wolverhampton,—a sceptic who believes in 'the gymnastics of the understanding,' but little enough in *the deeper assumptions on which those gymnastics rely in order to get a purchase and a point of departure.*"

Again, of Mr. Disraeli :—

"His *assumptions* are not those of the English or any other people—the Semitic included. Probably there is nothing that we can strictly call moral assumption in Mr. Disraeli's mind at all."

And again, of Mr. Bright :—

"Mr. Bright knows as well as any man that the Saxon basis of our language, strong, homely, and all-important as it is, cannot quite dispense with the aid of the engrafted Latin elements, and no great orator ever used the latter with such happy and skilful discrimination. A critical eye can scarcely read a single speech of his without being struck by this. Take, as the briefest illustration we can give, the conclusion of that great speech in which he anticipated the time when 'England, the august mother of free nations, shall herself be free.' Mr. Bright, judged by his political creed alone, had scarcely a right to that term 'august.'"

This last is a striking instance of what we mean. It is perfectly true, and, to minds of a certain order, obvious, that Mr. Bright had no business with the word "august" in that place. The same kind of insight is found in the following passage :—

"Whatever Lord Russell's faults, of all statesmen of our own day he has ever shown the most deep and ingrained sympathy with popular *freedom*. In this respect neither Lord Palmerston, nor Mr. Gladstone, nor any other of our statesmen, can really approach him. Mr. Gladstone is more tender and humane, has a far deeper horror of popular *suffering*, and therefore of war, than Lord Russell; for Lord Russell's sympathy with freedom, like all true sympathy with freedom, has something a little sharp and stern about it—a little of the old Puritan carelessness whether it be happy or unhappy freedom. This is a mood of mind which the present age is almost learning to ignore, but its depth in Lord Russell has done us good service, not only in the agitation for Catholic Emancipation and Reform, but recently in saving us, through him, from casting in our sympathies as a nation with the slave-owners of the Southern States."

How well thought is this again, and how well said! This quickness of eye for the "purchase and point of departure" that must be presumed for a person's life is in Mr. Hutton a not infrequent source of real humour—for though not a joker (*absit omen*), he is a humourist. The consequence of all this—one consequence of it, is that Mr. Hutton is not likely to commit himself to half views or false prophecies like those which we briefly referred to just now for a purpose. Nor is there, we think, in all the book, a sentence which is not, in the high sense, *guarded*: that is, not that the writer flinches from expressing opinions, or puts them vaguely, but, having seen the "deeper assumptions" of the case, he finds it comparatively easy to cast his *dicta* in a mould the whole configuration of which exhibits the *natural* limitations of the subject. Readers of the *Contemporary Review* who shrink with horror from those "brilliant" *dicta* written by "clever" men, which are "swords in the loins" to all who think literature is something more than a gymnastic display, may take up Mr. Hutton, sure of being refreshed by his book.

The essays on Lord Palmerston and Lord Brougham strike us as being scarcely so exhaustive as the writer *meant* them to be? "Lord Palmerston," however, was written immediately after that distinguished man's death, when tenderness was the natural key of every discussion of his career; and besides, the attentive reader will supplement it by importing a sentence out of the essay on Mr. Stansfeld. It is no reproach to any man not to have made Lord Brougham intelligible; but there has been in him a consistency (of intent *at least*) on the intellectual and pure-ethical side which might help the student of that great puzzle. Mr. Hutton justly condemns the sarcasm which makes him out—like the foxhunting, drinking, duelling, blarneying, blundering "Irish Attorney" in the farce, who was so pathetically moved by the charge—"no lawyer." Lord Brougham may safely be called a *great* lawyer: and, indeed, reading an inaugural discourse of his the other day, delivered perhaps forty years ago, we fancied we discerned lines of greatness there too. It is difficult to warm up about Lord Westbury; but we half think Mr. Hutton does imperfect justice to the versatile "applicative strength" of the man's brain. Since Paley, has there been in Britain so clear a head?

We will only add that Mr. Hutton's list of "Studies" shows careful selection with an eye to the interests of the present hour (the manner of treatment is of universal applicability), and includes not only the chief of the Cabinet, and of the Opposition, but the latest arrivals, such as Mr. Goschen, Mr. Stansfeld, and Mr. Forster.

ERRATA IN No. II.—Compositors appear to have a spite against *M. Arsène Houssaye*, whose name, having been incorrectly printed *Arsenne Haussaye*, in Prof. Fawcett's Lectures, appears as *Arsène Hoursaye* in the attempted correction in p. 353. In p. 281, for "docteurs dès lettres" read "docteurs-ès-lettres." In this and similar academic titles, "ès" represents "en lès."



UNIVERSITY REFORM IN RELATION TO THEOLOGICAL STUDY.

1. *The Reports of the Oxford, Cambridge, and Dublin University Commissioners.*
2. *The Oxford, Cambridge, and Dublin University Calendars.*
3. *Index Scholarum in Universitate Literaria Fredericiana Hafensi cum Viteborgensi consociatâ per Hiemem Anni 1865-66, à die 16 Oct., usque ad d. 17 Martii, publicè privatimque habendarum.* Hæw
4. *Huber, Geschichte der Englischen Universitäten.*
5. *Sir William Hamilton's Discussions.*

THE state and action of the two great English Universities, more especially of Oxford, are attracting so much attention, that the readers of the *Contemporary Review* will not be surprised to see an article on the subject in an early number. A large and influential meeting was held last November, in the hall of Oriel, to consider how the benefits of University education could be extended beyond the comparatively small class that now enjoys them. An institution like the University of Oxford, with all the prestige of venerable antiquity and illustrious fame, "the very heart of England;" its colleges possessing revénues which count not by tens, but by hundreds of thousands of pounds sterling, and which will soon be vastly augmented; having still, after all suppressions and appropriations, between four and five hundred fellowships to reward pre-eminent merit, and giving away each year one hundred and fifty scholarships, might surely be expected to allure into its schools more than four hundred and fifty, or even five hundred students annually: and though Cambridge, with less wealth, has hitherto had more undergraduates than Oxford, the numbers on its books are still not enough to satisfy the sense of due proportion between means and end, outlay and result: nor do they bear any proportion to the expectations which the ever-increasing wealth

and population of England might naturally raise. This state of things is by no means of recent growth; but recent circumstances have powerfully called attention to it. In former days the great bulk of the youth educated at Oxford, and a very large proportion of those who graduated at Cambridge, took Orders in the English Church; so that men without an academical degree were rarely seen in her pulpits, except in the poorer and more rugged northern counties, for whose spiritual wants the seminary of St. Bees was originally intended to provide. But of late, whilst increasing population and the consequent subdivision of parishes are constantly calling for more clergy, the proportion of graduates who "enter the Church," to use a convenient though inaccurate phrase, has rapidly diminished. Some years ago, *one-fifth*,—at the last ordinations, *one-third*, are said to have been literates. This is a most undesirable state of things; for without disparaging zeal and piety, these qualities cannot supply the want of that wider and more refined cultivation, and of that scholarship, which, in the rule, can only be attained by an education culminating at the University. Nor is it well that an increasing proportion of the ministers of the Church should be taken from a lower rank of life. The condition of the Gallican Church abroad, and of the Romish Church in Ireland, gives a significant warning of the inevitable result. What the fate of the English Church would be if her pulpits were chiefly filled with devout and intrepid assertors of verbal inspiration, ready to challenge men of science to an unequal conflict in the attempt to "reconcile Genesis and geology,"—unfamiliar with modern thought, as it is found in those seminaries of refined scholarship, where the most accomplished youth of the nation and their instructors mutually develop it,—and meeting critical or scientific difficulties by evangelical anathemas or ritualistic pomp—it is easy to conjecture. A highly cultivated clergy is required to lead the religious thought of a highly cultivated people. The religion of the multitude will not rise above the intellectual level of its teachers. Accordingly, the diminished supply of graduates at their ordinations has roused the misgivings of several of the bishops, and contributed to animate the proceedings of the Oriel meeting. Nor can the diocesan theological colleges, which have lately sprung up, satisfy the emergency. In so far as they are auxiliary to the Universities, by giving some theological training to men who have taken degrees in arts, they only arouse a feeling of discontent with those venerable bodies which, with so much larger means and apparatus, and with the command of the choicest intellect of the country, yet give a training in theology so inadequate as to require being thus supplemented: whilst, in so far as they enable men who have never had a University education to qualify for Orders, they are only contributing to flood the land with

a clergy whose predominance in numbers and influence would be disastrous to the Church.

Various causes may be assigned for the diminished supply of University men. The throwing open of the Indian and Civil Services to competition; the immense development of our commerce, and the corresponding rise in estimation of commercial pursuits; the new career opened by colonization to our youth,—all these things have given much greater choice to young men than they used to have, and multiplied the possibilities of life. And besides increased allurements from without, there is a decrease of attraction within the Church. Her wealth is much more evenly distributed and less strikingly displayed than it used to be; the prizes are not so great, and the general position of clergymen is probably not quite so high as formerly. And though it may be said that men should be influenced by higher motives in the choice of the clerical profession, it is obvious that not only their own feelings, but the plans and wishes of their parents, will be greatly modified by other than merely spiritual considerations.

But besides the foregoing reasons, it is possible there may be a further cause for the diminished supply of graduates to the Church. Clerical training has not kept pace with the training for other professions. And though, at first sight, this might seem rather to hold out an inducement to enter the ministry, as requiring less study and self-denial than other professions do, it may very possibly act in the directly opposite way. There is a generous enthusiasm in youth which is not satisfied with that which costs no trouble, which turns away from that which excites no interest. And this feeling will be naturally strongest when the neglected subject is one which takes up so much attention, and engages the minds of men so much, as the subject of religion does. When youths at the University perceive that the momentous questions which are unsettling men's minds do not seem to rouse to greater activity those bodies which should be specially concerned about them, it is no wonder if they are chilled and perhaps a little disgusted with this apathy. The diminished supply of University men to the ministry may partly, therefore, be ascribed to the neglect of theology at the Universities. The present paper will confine itself to some considerations and suggestions on this latter subject.

“The absence of any efficient theological training at the Universities which profess to feed the ministry of the Church is a crying evil, which nothing but the acquiescence in anomalies, characteristic of this country, would have suffered to remain. It is not too much to say

that there is no country of Europe, Protestant or Romanist, in which so anomalous a state of things exists: every Church—Lutheran, Reformed, or Romish—but our own provides that her ministers shall undergo two or three years of theological study and preparation before they enter on their office.”* It is a disgraceful fact, that these words are still as true as when they were originally penned fifteen years ago; and it is the more disgraceful, because the great foundations which have so neglected their duty to the Church owe almost all their wealth to ecclesiastical ideas, and were much more intended to provide for ecclesiastical than for secular purposes. Oxford and Cambridge men must be aware of the state of the case, though it may be doubted whether they are sufficiently alive to it: for the benefit of others it may be well to give a sketch of the nature and amount of the theological education provided by the richest Universities for the future clergy of the richest Church in the world.

At Oxford there are six professors of divinity, or its cognate subjects,—the Regius, Lady Margaret’s, the Professors of Ecclesiastical History, of Pastoral and of Exegetical Theology, and of Hebrew. It is hardly necessary to add that these professors are amply endowed, being all of them, except the Professor of Exegetical Theology, canons of Christ Church, whilst the Regius Professor enjoys moreover the living of Ewelme. Probably not less than six thousand pounds a year, perhaps a good deal more, is thus spent on the staff of instructors in theology. Let us now see what is the amount of instruction imparted.

Each candidate for Holy Orders is required to attend not *six*, but *two* courses of lectures, each of these compulsory courses being completed in a single term! How many lectures are delivered in each such course the writer is not aware from personal knowledge; but the Regius Professor’s used to consist of *twelve* lectures.† So that in a single term after the youth has taken his Bachelor’s degree, he is qualified, in the judgment of the authorities, for ordination! Whilst he has been spending three years, or twelve terms, on his course in arts, not to say anything of the time spent previously at school, twelve or fourteen weeks is regarded as sufficient to spend upon theology! It is no answer to this to say that the undergraduate course at Oxford embraces a good deal of theological information, unless it be supposed that teachers of religion need hardly any knowledge of the subject beyond that which every educated gentleman should have.

But if the student is not overburdened with lectures, nor distracted

* Evidence of the Rev. E. A. Litton. Oxford University Commission Report: Evidence, p. 177. See also Rev. D. Melville’s evidence, p. 55.

† Oxford Commission: Evidence of Dr. Jacobson, p. 253.

by too great a variety of subjects, perhaps a rigorous examination at the end of these two formidable courses insures his having profited to the utmost by the little he has heard. Not at all: there is indeed an examination, but attendance at it is quite optional; the certificates he must present are given not for his tested proficiency, but for his bodily presence in the lecture-room.

If it be asked, What can be done in a course of twelve lectures? the best answer will be given by Dr. Jacobson's syllabus of his course.* Here it is:—

“Lecture I. Introductory to the Study of Theology and some Points of Clerical Duty.

“II., III. On some of the Aids to arriving at the Sense of Holy Scripture.

“IV., V. On the Creeds, particularly on the three incorporated into our own Services.

“VI., VII. On the Study of Church History.

“VIII. On the Continental Reformation.

“IX. On the English Reformation.

“X., XI. On the Book of Common Prayer.

“XII. On some of the Practical Duties of a Clergyman in Charge of a Parish.”

Fancy what kind of discussion such a subject as the Continental Reformation, or the English Reformation, or the practical duties of a parish priest, can receive within the limits of a single hour! or what can be done to elucidate the study of Church history in two hours!

Of course the University does not object to her *alumni* attending all the six courses delivered by the six professors. But they are not required to do so; and in such cases the minimum required will generally be the maximum performed. This is indeed pretty clear from the evidence of the Regius Professor; for whilst his public course—which is repeated three times each year for the convenience of students, so that they may not be detained at the University more than one term after they have passed the final school in arts—was attended (in 1850) by an aggregate number of two hundred and thirty-four, his private and uncompulsory lectures, delivered three times each week, were only attended by numbers varying from three to twenty-six: the average attendance for each term being exactly thirteen!†

I am not aware that there has been any material difference in the numbers attending of later years: the courses delivered do not seem to have materially altered.

We now proceed to the sister University. Cambridge possesses four professors of divinity,—the Regius, Lady Margaret's, the Norrisian, and the Hulsean, besides a professor of Hebrew. Lady Margaret's is probably the richest in the kingdom, being endowed with a net

income of more than eighteen hundred pounds a year, out of which, however, the present professor nobly devotes seven hundred a year to the building of a divinity school. Nor is the Regius Professor to be pitied, his income being about twelve hundred pounds a year. The Professor of Hebrew is also adequately provided for by a stall in Ely. The Norrisian Professor, however, seems to compensate by his poverty for the wealth of the older and statelier foundations, his whole professorial income, according to the Cambridge Calendar, being only one hundred and thirty-five pounds a year.

Such being the theological staff, let us see what use the students are required to make of it. And here the authorities of Cambridge fall short even of the moderate demands of Oxford; for while at Oxford *two* courses are imperative, at Cambridge *one* course, which may consist of *ten* lectures, is sufficient! And even this solitary course is only indirectly imposed thus: Hardly any bishop will now ordain a Cambridge man unless he have passed what is still, by an amusing bull, called the "*voluntary* theological examination," and no student is admitted to this unless he produce a certificate of attendance on *one* course of divinity lectures. But whose course, and what its subject, are matters with which the University does not trouble itself. So that there is no systematic training in divinity, so far as the few lectures required on the subject are concerned.

Professorial teaching, or indeed all teaching, in theology being treated with such carelessness by the English Universities, it is no wonder that it should be slighted by the students. At Cambridge forty is said to be a large class; and though at Oxford the numbers attending the Regius Professor are much greater, this must be ascribed in great measure to the fact that his lectures are generally considered compulsory on all Oxford candidates for Orders, while at Cambridge no professor enjoys the same reputed monopoly of compulsion.

It is indeed sometimes said that the deficiencies of public instruction are compensated by the amount of private reading through which candidates for Orders are compelled to go. This defence has some shadow of truth, so far as the Universities are concerned, at Cambridge; at Oxford it has none. For no examination is there *required* of the student in divinity. And though the "*voluntary theological*" does enforce some reading on those who stand it successfully, it must after all be very elementary, since it may be passed within twelve weeks after the student has taken his degree. What would be thought if the University offered to confer its degrees within twelve weeks of matriculation! But what would be scouted in Arts is calmly accepted in Theology.

No doubt the defects in their theological schools are not to be charged solely on the two Universities. They cannot enforce attend-

ance on theological lectures, or the passing of theological examinations. This, if it is to be done, must be done by the bishops. They can ordain whom they please; and if they do not choose to require anything more from University candidates for Orders, these will not be likely to do more. But on the other hand, the way in which the bishops laid hold of the "voluntary theological" at Cambridge sufficiently proves that they are anxious to meet the Universities half-way; they will be ready enough to enforce proper theological courses if the Universities will only provide them. By giving qualifying courses, which extend over one term, or twelve lectures only, the authorities of the Universities are doing their best to lull asleep the conscience of both candidates for Orders and bishops. How can the former be expected to do, and the latter to exact more, when Regius Professors virtually declare that so much is enough? It might be almost better that no lectures, no instruction, should be given, than that such a standard of sufficiency should be set up by such high authority. Here, at any rate, "the half is surely" not "better than the whole."

This state of things is the less pardonable in England, because a good example has been set by Ireland. Whatever the defects of the Irish Church or of the Irish University, the authorities of neither can be charged with neglecting to prepare young men for Holy Orders. The University of Dublin prescribes, and the Irish bishops exact, a divinity course of not less than *two complete academic years*. This course comprises lectures by the two divinity professors and their assistants, at the rate of four each week, two being professorial and two tutorial, during six weeks of each term, for a period of six terms; each year closing with an examination which tests not only the attention of the student to the instruction he has received from the professors and their assistants, but his proficiency in a very considerable course of reading. Besides these lectures, which are absolutely compulsory on every candidate for Holy Orders from the University of Dublin, inducements are held out to attend lectures also on Hebrew, the Greek of the New Testament and Septuagint, Ecclesiastical History, and Moral Philosophy; the courses in some of these branches extending likewise over two years, so that the learner is taken over a large surface of instruction. And if the results do not always appear to correspond with the excellence of the system, the blame must rest not so much on the Divinity School, as on the general state of the University. Residence is not enforced at Dublin except on divinity students, and thus the good effects of academic life and training are lost to the majority of the undergraduates; the pass examinations in arts are depressed to the general level of a non-resident class, who never visit the University except on the five or six days in each

year on which they are examined;* and the divinity student, in most cases only coming into residence when he begins to attend divinity lectures, is not on a level with a man of the same standing who has resided throughout his previous course. But besides this drawback, which the authorities are most anxious to get rid of, and which, as long as it continues, will injuriously affect the general character of the University, there is another, perhaps still more serious. Until within the last ten years, the fellowships of the sole college in the University of Dublin were given almost exclusively for proficiency in mathematics. Classics were indeed examined in, but the examination in them was almost a farce, and seldom had any calculable effect on the result. A Porson or a Bentley would have had no chance of a fellowship at Dublin, unless he had mastered a mathematical course considerably more extensive than is required for a senior wranglership; while, on the other hand, the veriest tyro in Greek and Latin was sure of success, provided he had the requisite amount of mathematics. Of course this was never intended by those who originally drew up the scheme of the examination; but "the monopolizing tendency of mathematics," to use the words of an eminent mathematician,† gradually excluded almost everything except mathematics from all real influence. The consequence of this has been that the whole teaching of the University, in arts and in theology, has been vested in men whose main qualification for teaching, whether classics or theology, was, that they were good mathematicians! To which of the cognate sciences, philology or theology, this absurd system has been more disastrous, it is difficult to say. "It is not very convenient," says Judge Longfield, "that the teachers of theology in its chief seat in Ireland shall, as at present (in 1853), be selected chiefly on account of their mathematical proficiency." It does not seem to have struck the Judge that it must be just as little "convenient" that the teachers of Greek and Latin in the chief seat of learning in Ireland shall be selected chiefly on account of their mathematical proficiency. The effective study of the learned languages could never be promoted by barren honours, or even by quinquennial scholarships, when the substantial rewards of the richest fellowships in the three kingdoms were contemptuously withheld.‡

* Eight examinations in arts, inclusive of the degree examination, must be passed by all students (except fellow-commoners) who do not attend lectures. For such as do, four are sufficient.

† Dublin University Commission Report: Judge Longfield's evidence, p. 377:—"I exclude mathematics altogether (from the course for proposed divinity fellowships), in consequence of their tendency to monopolize the whole, if admitted to a part." The Judge spoke from the experience of his own college.

‡ In 1850, the average income of a senior fellowship at Dublin was £1,800; the average income of a junior fellow upwards of £600. Since that time the senior fellows have sacrificed probably more than £400 a year each in founding studentships: the income of the

nor were men likely to be induced to read for classical degrees, by knowing that they would be examined by those who had never taken a classical degree themselves.* Thus higher scholarship was effectually discouraged: yet so closely are philology and theology connected, that without the former no progress can be made in the latter; whilst, on the other hand, it is not easy to see in what way the profoundest knowledge of the differential calculus, or the lunar theory, can prepare men for lecturing on theology. The Dublin Divinity School has accordingly suffered from the exclusive worship of what Sir W. Hamilton called "the Molech of Cambridge idolatry."† No doubt the professors and their assistants have done their best to make up for the defects of their previous training; but sound scholarship, and that peculiar cultivation which depends upon it, cannot be hurriedly got up to order in maturer life, when they have been neglected in the years most favourable for their acquisition.

To expose defects is no pleasing task; but in this instance the exposure is indispensable, to save the cause of theological education from being prejudiced by the failure of the Dublin Divinity School in doing what might otherwise have been reasonably expected from its scheme and apparatus. The Irish clergy, as a body, are zealous, but not learned. The defects in their University, however, which have discouraged learning, are now in process of being remedied. Classical attainment now enjoys a definite though not an adequate recognition at the fellowship examination;‡ and it may be hoped that the new spirit gradually infused into the body, under this improvement, will ultimately make the Dublin Theological School as distinguished in practice as it has been for the last thirty years in theory.

By way of contrast with what is done to promote theological science in England, let us see what is done in Germany, selecting for this purpose one of the smaller German Universities.

Halle has not less than six ordinary and five extraordinary professors of theology, besides a licentiate in that faculty. These titles demand explanation. A licentiate in any faculty must have passed an extensive and difficult examination in its subject, on which he receives from the University *licence* to teach or lecture in it. As

junior fellows, depending as it does chiefly on tuition fees,—all but four of them being tutors,—must be greatly increased, the number of students on the books being much greater now than it was at that time.

* Only two fellows have ever taken a classical degree.

† "Discussions," p. 326. Yet Cambridge never carried its "idolatry" so far as to appoint teachers and examiners in *classics* simply on account of their proficiency in *mathematics*!

‡ The full marks assigned to classics, including history and chronology, are 900; to mathematics, pure and mixed, and the cognate branch of experimental physics, are given 1,600, or very nearly double; mental and moral science have 600; Hebrew and Chaldee, together, 150 marks.

the lectures of licentiates have nothing but their intrinsic merits to recommend them—attendance on them being quite voluntary, and the licentiates never acting as examiners,—it is their direct interest to make them as able and useful as possible. Those licentiates who have most impressed the authorities by their learning and ability are selected to fill vacant chairs. Thus no one can rise to a professorship without passing a double ordeal. He must satisfy the University that he is qualified to teach, and satisfy the authorities that he is successful as a teacher; and when he is raised to the rank of professor, he must still go through the inferior grade of an extraordinary or supernumerary professorship, with inferior emoluments, and with no share in the government of his University, before he rises to the final dignity of an ordinary or full professor—promotion here again chiefly depending on the powers he has evinced. Thus the whole system is framed to encourage effective ability to the very utmost. It must not be forgotten that, as the same subjects are often treated by different professors or licentiates, and as the lectures required before the student can pass his final examination are determined by the subjects, and not by the persons who deliver them, students have a choice of lecturers—a privilege which, coupled with the circumstance that income largely depends on fees, prevents even the most dignified professor from stagnating in security.

The work performed under this stimulating system will appear prodigious to those who are accustomed to the style of English Universities.

Not one of these twelve lecturers on theology at Halle delivers less than two distinct courses,—most of them deliver three—each course consisting of from one hour to six hours a week, and this during an uninterrupted period of five months in the winter, and three months in the summer. During this very winter, lectures have been delivered at Halle on *twenty-seven* subjects in the faculty of theology alone.*

* Here is a list, translated from the "Index Scholarum," of the lectures delivered by the ordinary professors:—

Tholuck lectures on—(1) the Sermon on the Mount; (2) the Encyclopædia and Method of Theology; (3) the Three First Gospels synoptically treated: (eight hours a week.)

Hupfeld on—(1) the Songs interspersed in the Historic Books of the Bible; (2) Genesis; (3) the Archæology and Antiquities of the Hebrews: (ten hours a week.)

Julius Müller on—(1) Introduction to Dogmatic Theology; (2) Dogmatic Theology; (3) Practical Theology: (twelve hours a week.)

Jacobi on—(1) the Gnostics; (2) the Epistle to the Colossians; (3) Church History down to Gregory VII.; (4) Introduction to the New Testament: (thirteen hours a week.)

Beyschlag on—(1) Contemporaneous History of the New Testament; (2) Life of Christ; (3) Epistle to the Romans: (ten hours a week.)

Wuttke lectures on—(1) the Philosophical Theology of the Christian World, down to the Eighteenth Century; (2) on Christian Ethics: (seven hours a week.)

The five extraordinary professors and the licentiate do not fall short of the exertions of their more dignified colleagues.

Such are the labours of German professors. Nor are they carried on in one branch only. In jurisprudence, in medicine, in arts, not less is done by the most celebrated men. Nor do they ever complain that the eight or ten or twelve hours a week they devote to public instruction robs them of time or energy for those private studies which have made their public instruction famous; on the contrary, if questioned, they would probably say that to their public labours they owe, in great measure, the vigour of their private researches: for there is no greater incentive to study and reflection than the appreciation of an intelligent and sympathizing audience. Nor would there be half the theological or literary life which now exists in Germany were the very same staff of professors maintained in the dignified inertness of an English University.

The consequences of the abeyance of all regular theological training in England are but too obvious. The clergy are, in general, not prepared for those discussions which are inevitably approaching. As Ireland is behind England in general intelligence and information, so is England behind the Continent. Hence the sensation created by books like "Essays and Reviews," and Dr. Colenso's examination of the Pentateuch; hence, too, in some degree, the commotion caused by "Tracts for the Times," and the unhappy secessions which have taken place, chiefly due to an imagined ideal of the Church which thorough knowledge of ecclesiastical history would have shown never to have existed in practice. Nor would the phases of belief, or rather of feeling, which led so many astray, and which find their most complete picture in Dr. Newman's "Apologia," have ignored, to all appearance, the very existence of the Greek orthodox Church since the schism between East and West, had the study of Church history been prosecuted with the impartiality and thoroughness of a University course, and not with the favouritism which selects its subjects, in the absence of proper guidance, according to its bias.

How, then, it may be asked, has it come to pass that, whilst for other professions a regular professional education is required, the most important of all professions receives, in England, no proper training from those very bodies which owe their present greatness chiefly to its former predominance, and in which theology takes the highest rank? The true answer to this question is probably concealed in its very terms. It is *because* theology has always taken the highest rank at the English Universities that these bodies have virtually ceased to teach it.

In the English Universities medicine, law, and divinity have never been on an equality with arts. They have always been regarded as the inner sanctuary, to which arts was the portal: through the latter alone could they be approached. The original reason of this was that

in the early Middle Ages the Universities did much the same work which is now done by public and grammar schools. Such schools did not then exist. This one fact goes far to account for the enormous numbers which are said to have then crowded the Universities. They were crowded simply because they were the only places where any higher instruction could be got. Hence degrees in arts were then usually taken at a very early age. The undergraduates were in fact schoolboys. Under such circumstances, it was no artificial restriction which prevented students from entering on the study of theology, or law, or medicine, before they had finished their course in arts: nor could it be any hardship to a boy, who had graduated M.A. at an age when in these days he would hardly be thinking of leaving school, if he were required to spend in studying theology, the years that must elapse before he should have attained the canonical age for ordination. The rise of the great public schools, and the foundation of the innumerable grammar schools which dot the land, altered the circumstances of the students without altering the theory of the University. Boys no longer went up to college before they were in their teens; the average age of graduation in arts became much more advanced; yet graduation in arts was still required by the English Universities before men were permitted to enter the sanctum of the three higher faculties. The result might have been foreseen. Except in the case of those provided for by fellowships (many of which were founded with this very view), life was too short for the study of theology when that study could only be commenced seven years after matriculation, and when matriculation took place at seventeen or eighteen, instead of at ten or twelve, as heretofore. The same obtained of the other faculties in an inferior degree,* and thus the very loftiness of their position emptied the halls of their professors, and ended in their virtual extinction. Medicine has been taught elsewhere: law, until lately, like theology, has not been taught at all.

II.

These considerations possess more than mere antiquarian interest. The ascertainment of the original cause of present defects goes far to suggest their remedy. It may not indeed be possible to give theology in our Universities all the importance it possesses in those abroad, where the student at once matriculates in it on his entrance, and where he is therefore at liberty to devote three or four years to its exclusive study. Such a plan would require schools of the same

* In medicine and law the full time of seven years from matriculation was waived; and hence the degrees of Bachelor of Medicine and Law can be taken so much sooner than that of Bachelor of Divinity. But the principle was, and is, in all the same.

class, and possessing the same relations with the University, as the German *Gymnasias*, which give a uniform and very high average training to young men, and whose final examination must be passed by all natives of the country before they can go up to the University. But though theology can never be raised to the rank of an independent faculty at the English Universities, it might at least be more largely introduced into the studies of the faculty of arts, by having a separate final school or tripos dedicated to it. This plan has the very great recommendations of simplicity and facility. It might be carried out at once: all that is wanted is the creation of an additional final school of theology at Oxford, such as the Royal Commissioners recommended fifteen years ago ("Report," pp. 72-3); and at Cambridge the expansion of the present "voluntary theological" into a regular theological tripos, ranking with the other tripos examinations in extent, in reputation, and in reward; provision being always made that for those who cannot or will not rise to honours, a pass examination, not inferior to the present, shall be left. Let all candidates for Holy Orders be required to pass in this new final school or tripos; let the leading colleges reserve a certain number of their fellowships for men who have taken high distinctions in it, and it is not unreasonable to expect that theological science will soon rise from its present depression, and that the numbers attracted by a study now for the first time really encouraged and vigorously prosecuted, will once more restore the Church to the position from which it has of late been gradually sinking, and enable her to grapple more successfully with the problems suggested by modern discovery and thought.

This plan, however, involves a necessary supplement.

Examinations cannot supply the place of instruction. They will only make its want more acutely felt. Systematic and thorough instruction must be given by the Universities if the results of instruction are to be tested by them. What is now urged is quite independent of any question as to the relative merits of the professorial and tutorial systems of communicating instruction; though it may be said, in answer to those who decry the professorial system, and of whom the Rev. Mark Pattison, in his evidence given to the Oxford University Commissioners, may be regarded as the coryphæus, that the objections against it he so ably urges seem to have gradually dropped out of the sphere of University conviction since his time, inasmuch as everywhere there is a great increase of professorial teaching. It is a remarkable fact, also, that the force of these objections seems to be least felt by that profession which is of all others least shackled by antiquarian prejudice. The schools of medicine, while they refuse to license a student on a mere certificate of attendance at lectures, at the same time refuse to examine him at all unless

he has attended lectures. Yet the very same objections might be urged with equal truth against lectures in medicine and in theology. Books are to be had in medicine as well as in theology: the attention of hearers is just as likely to wander in medicine as in theology: it is difficult to see why lectures on medicine must be fruitful and profound, lectures on theology shallow and useless. The practice of the different medical schools is the best answer, because it is an answer based on practical experience, to arguments against professorial teaching, which would hardly indeed be urged by any one personally acquainted with its stimulating and impressive effect, as it is found abroad.

Probably the best system is that in which professorial and tutorial instruction are duly mingled. "A mere tutorial instruction must be scanty and mechanical," as Sir W. Hamilton remarks,* because the tutors are too little removed from the grade and position of those whom they teach, and because they do not devote all their energies to the one subject. A purely professorial system, unless kept in check by searching examinations, might be in danger of begetting vagueness and want of precision. Combined, the two supply each other's defects,—the professorial giving those general and more original views, the result of deeper thought and erudition, which cannot be expected from the comparative youth and the miscellaneous occupations of collegiate tutors; the tutorial saving the pupil from satisfying himself with mere largeness and breadth of views, without that accuracy of detail on which all large results must be based. And for such a combined system the adoption of the plan above proposed would pave the way, inasmuch as it would introduce into the leading colleges a considerable theological element, which would be available for tutorships, and out of which ultimately the professorships of divinity would be filled up, thus approximating to the system which is found to work so well abroad.

In any case the present system is indefensible. If professorial lectures be useless, why waste the valuable time of students and professors in delivering or attending even twelve? If they be useful, why reduce them to such a wretched minimum? Of course, to make their lectures succeed in doing in England what they effect in Germany, it would be necessary that the lecturers should be alive to the importance of their work, and capable, in some degree, of commanding attention. But this gift depends far less on mere ability than on the interest they themselves take in what they do. A lecturer who is thoroughly in earnest will soon make his hearers thoroughly in earnest. He must, indeed, condescend to be interesting; he must not shrink even from a certain amount of diffuseness and repetition;

* "Discussions," p. 321, First Edition.

he must stoop to a less perfect style than would be desirable in a book, which can be read and read again. For what he has to do must be done on the spot; if it be not, he has lost the irrevocable opportunity. But when he once fairly realizes his proper function, and the right means of approximately discharging it, when he speaks out of the fulness of his heart as well as of his intellect, on that which he feels as well as knows, a lecturer can command and sway his audience as no book can ever command and sway its reader. It is not merely dry information that men require. They want to be roused and animated, and made to feel the importance of what they are studying; they require to be furnished with those general and guiding views which no English books on theology in modern times even pretend to give.*

Whether the ancient system of the English Universities, which, as we have seen, is still the system of German Universities, might not be profitably restored; whether the *libertas docendi*, which is still nominally conferred by the degree of D.D., might not be revived, to the great advantage of theological interest as well as of theological science, since both interest and science are best promoted by unfettered freedom of discussion,—this is a question too large for any adequate examination within our limits. Yet it may be observed that at Oxford something very like the ancient practice seems to be gradually creeping in. When several colleges lend their halls, as it is said they now do, to lectures delivered, not by salaried professors but by volunteers, who have nothing but zeal and learning and interest in the subject to recommend them; such voluntary lectures, crowded by attentive hearers, are a strong proof that the professorial system, in its original breadth, is as well adapted to the nineteenth as it was to the thirteenth century; and they suggest the thought that its paralysis in modern times is chiefly due to its being narrowed within the necessarily small bounds of high salaries, and deprived of the healthy stimulus of competition. So long as the degrees which originally conferred the power of teaching in the Universities are given, as a matter of course, to persons of certain standing and able to pay certain fees, it will be impossible to restore the doctors to their nominal position; but if it be deemed unadvisable to make these degrees

* Perhaps the writer will be thought unduly prejudiced in favour of the professorial system, and too sanguine as to its results. But the views he entertains are not merely theoretic: they are based on an intimate knowledge of what that system is abroad; nor can he omit this opportunity of bearing grateful testimony to the aid and encouragement he received from it, and from the noble men who worked it. No one, indeed, can judge of the professorial system who has not felt its operation at one of those continental Universities, where the professors seem to throw their whole heart and soul into their work, and give the benefit of their counsel and advice to every one whom they see anxious to profit by his opportunities.

once more the purely honorary reward of merit, as they still are in the German Universities, where no one can buy the title of Doctor of Divinity, and where that title is, therefore, still valued, the University might introduce the system of licensing to teach after a sufficient probation of the merits of the candidate. Surely it is better that such licence should be granted by the solemn act of the whole body than that it should be bestowed by individual colleges in an irregular, undefined, and irresponsible manner.

It may be objected that the divinity course proposed could never be compressed within the three years of undergraduate life. Nor could it be. But when we consider how much time is devoted to preparation for other professions, one year's undistracted study of theology is surely not too much to demand for the most important of all professions. And if the Irish clergy, who, as a body, are much less wealthy than their English brethren, can afford two years at Dublin for theology, one of which years cannot possibly be taken till the twelve terms of the arts course are completed, an additional year may surely be accepted at Oxford and Cambridge, especially as many of their graduates actually sacrifice such a year to some diocesan theological college. Certain alterations, however, now to be suggested, would go far to remove every valid objection at the English Universities against that four years' course in arts and theology which for the last thirty years has been the minimum at the University of Dublin.


It has been noticed by several of those examined by the Oxford Commissioners, that the scale of necessary expenses differs at every different college, no two colleges agreeing in their charges. Yet each college has the same market, the same conditions of life to act upon. Why are not these unequal, and therefore inequitable, charges reduced to one uniform conscientious standard? There is no question but that they would be thus greatly diminished. Again, as Mr. Wilkinson remarked (Oxford Report: Evidence, p. 68), "Why is there any charge for rooms in those colleges where no new buildings have been raised for the special benefit of undergraduate commoners? *The present charge is an adequate percentage upon the cost of new buildings. In fact, the colleges have turned out, in a manner never contemplated by founders, excellent money investments.*" Were these two sources of not very reputable gain, whether to the college servants or to the college authorities, swept away, there does not seem to be any reason why the *necessary* expenses of college life should not be reduced to something less than £100 a year. Sixty pounds a year is the sum stated by Professor Jowett to be, in his estimation, sufficient at a hall, where everything should be regulated with a due regard to economy, not parsimony.* It is quite plain that the colleges might, if

* Evidence, p. 34. See also evidence of Rev. D. Melville, p. 53.

they chose, with their vast and continually increasing revenues, make much more extended and much cheaper provision for undergraduates than they now do. And to this they are bound in honour, for they are eleemosynary foundations; they exist not to pander to the exclusiveness of the rich, but to supply the means of highest education to those who would otherwise be unable to acquire it. Let, then, their charges be uniformly and conscientiously regulated with a view to the greatest economy consistent with propriety and decency. And lastly, let one or more exclusively theological halls be founded, dependent on the wealthier colleges, for the reception of divinity students during the last year of their studies. Means for doing this ought not to be wanting, at least at Oxford, whose revenues Mr. Neate lately declared would be increased in a few years by not less than an additional hundred thousand pounds a year. Were these recommendations adopted; were room-rent abolished where it is not required to form a building fund, college battels reduced to a uniform and proper standard, and theological halls founded where economy should be duly consulted, the whole expense of the four years' course in arts and theology might be brought considerably under the present average cost of three; and thus a year might be gained for theology without any additional burden on the student.

But the foundation of theological halls at the Universities is not merely a part of a system of economy. Such places would afford young men on the point of taking Orders that retirement from the indiscriminate and secularizing society of the colleges which is now often sought in places like Cuddesdon and Wells and Lichfield. Without unduly depreciating such places, it is evident that they cannot possess that larger spirit which distinguishes the thought and teaching of a great University, where varieties of minds meet, and which are saved by their very magnitude from degenerating into exclusive representations of a single party. No doubt they have been very useful in the lack of theological instruction elsewhere: but their tendency must always be to cramp and contract. Each has its ruling mind, of which the mind of every student tends to become a copy: each has its peculiar tone, insensibly adopted by its inmates: they are places to beget regularity and uniformity rather than independence and manliness of thought; and it would be a very serious misfortune to the English Church if the multiplication of diocesan seminaries, expressive of diocesan peculiarities and style, should make the Universities easy under their own shortcomings, and tempt them to prolong their neglect of obvious duty.

C. P. REICHEL.



DR. PUSEY'S EIRENICON.*

An Eirenicon: in a Letter to the Author of the "Christian Year."
By E. B. PUSEY, D.D., Regius Professor of Hebrew, and Canon
of Christ Church, Oxford. London: J. & J. H. Parker. 1866.

THERE are two subjects suggested by the discussion of the work which we have to consider. One is the general subject of the unity, union, or re-union of Christendom, which opens a vast field of historical, philosophical, and religious thought. The other is the particular mode of approaching this subject in the "Eirenicon." The object of these pages will be to state the reasons why, as it seems to me, the Church of England has cause to rejoice, on the whole, in the publication and in the general acceptance of this remarkable book.

Before, however, stating these reasons, I must clear the ground by a few remarks on the direct purpose, so far as I understand it, at which the learned author aims. I agree with what he himself calls "the candid and philosophic" article in the *Times* of December 2, 1865, that the organic union here proposed between the Churches of England and of Rome is too remote from any practical considerations to be worth discussing at length. If, indeed, by such a union were meant merely the right of individuals to partake of the Holy Communion in the respective Churches, there is, on our part, no impediment to the communion of a Roman Catholic in an English church,

* The substance of a paper read by the Dean of Westminster at a meeting of London Clergy.

if so he desired it, at any moment; and even in the Roman Catholic Church, the difficulties in the way of receiving a Protestant to that Sacrament, if he so desired it, would, I presume, arise rather from the preliminary accompaniments than from the ordinance itself. But if, as we must justly suppose, by the union proposed is meant an authoritative acknowledgment, on the part of the two Churches, of the same external laws and creed (as in the reconciliation between the two Churches in the reign* of Philip and Mary), it is obvious that, on the present occasion, the contracting parties are not brought on the scene, even in the most distant manner. There is not alleged the faintest probability of such proposals emanating either on the one side from the Court of Rome, nor on the other side from the Crown and Parliament of England.

I also agree with the able article in *Macmillan's Magazine* for February, and with a no less able speech in the same direction by the Duke of Argyll at Glasgow, that even if such an organic union were practicable, it would not be desirable, if urged and accepted on the grounds on which it is put forward in the "Eirenicon." A union between two or even three powerful Churches can hardly be said to be a union or re-union of Christendom, when it deliberately leaves out of consideration large masses of Christians, which, if less powerful than the two others, are certainly integral parts of the whole, and have rendered services to Christianity not inferior, in their way, to any rendered by the See of Rome or of Canterbury. Still more questionable would such an exclusive union become, if it were intended as "a combination of forces" against those who were excluded. Yet more questionable again would this be for us in England, inasmuch as whilst those who are to be included are communities for the most part more or less remote, those who would be excluded or attacked would be communities close at hand—the great Non-conformist bodies in England, the Presbyterian Churches in Scotland,—as it has been truly said, bone of our bone, and flesh of our flesh. More questionable still would such a scheme become, if, as may be inferred from the "Eirenicon," it were not simply a union between the great Churches of Rome, and England, and Constantinople, in their entirety, but a union between kindred parties or systems of policy and belief within those Churches for the sake of repressing certain other parties or systems of policy and belief no less contained within each of those Churches;—if it were intended as a combination to oppose those who in the Church of Rome hold the opinions recommended by Dupin and Simon in former times, and by Döllinger and Gratry now, or who in the Eastern Churches hold the opinions of St.

* The whole scene of that reconciliation, with its consequences, is admirably told by Mr. Froude, in the sixth volume of his *History of England*, ch. xxxii., xxxiii.

Gregory of Nyssa and St. Chrysostom—not to speak of some of the brightest ornaments of the modern Church of Russia,—or who in the Church of England hold the opinions of Archbishop Tillotson, Bishop Jeremy Taylor, and other distinguished Divines, dead or living, whom I need not more particularly name. All these, it may be inferred from passages in the “Eirenicon,” compared with the well-known and strongly expressed views of its author in other works, he and those who think with him would desire to exclude, as a preliminary or as a consequence of any union at all. However good, as far as it goes, may be a combination such as the “Eirenicon” proposes, for a particular purpose, it cannot, without considerable reserve, be called a scheme for a re-union of Christendom, when it excludes elements so vast, so beneficent, so pregnant with immediate advantages to our own time, and with remote advantages for the whole future of Christianity.* Nor, if it be thus proposed with a strategetical or polemical intention,—“a sword,” as Dr. Newman expresses it, “wreathed in myrtle,” “an olive branch hurled out of a catapult,”—can it, without considerable reserve, be called an “Eirenicon,” or Peace-offering.

In the foregoing remarks I have abstained from entering on the question, whether the organic union even of the whole of Christendom, under the same external laws, would of itself produce the inward unity for the sake of which alone any external union can be desired. There was, in fact, no such spiritual unity under the joint rule of Rome and Byzantium, amidst the frightful controversies of the fifth century; and the unity of Europe, such as it existed in the Middle Ages, belonged to an external framework, then believed to be as essential to the union of Christendom as the Papacy or the Episcopate, but which has since entirely passed away. The Holy Roman Empire was the united Christendom of the West. No existing external institution can now supply its place with the same efficacy.

I also abstain from stating any grounds of objection which may be justly entertained towards a closer union with the particular Church towards which the “Eirenicon” draws us. I would acknowledge the attractions, which the Church of Rome always possesses for a large section of mankind, to whom the mere assumption of authority has a charm, such as is implied in Bossuet’s celebrated appeal to Leibnitz,—“*Permettez-moi de vous prier d’examiner sérieusement devant Dieu si vous avez quelque bon moyen d’empêcher l’Eglise de devenir éternellement variable en supposant qu’elle peut errer et changer ses décrets sur la foi.*” I acknowledge the force of this appeal. I would only remark—first, that in order to a calm consideration of the subject, we must remember the fact brought out by the very controversy which the “Eirenicon” has awakened,—that, on the questions now most discussed in the world

and the Church, the Church of Rome has either not spoken at all, or has spoken in terms which, within her pale, are openly questioned or contradicted. On the questions of the inspiration and interpretation of Scripture—of the duration of future punishment*—of the relation of science to the Bible—of the effects of the progress of civilization—of the salvation of Protestants and of heathens,—the authoritative decrees of the Roman Church are silent, and the strong expressions used by the existing Pope on these subjects are either set aside or explained away by persons who are still distinguished members or ministers of the Church over which he presides. And secondly, we must bear in mind that there is a large section of Christendom which feels a positive repulsion from the claims to an infallible guidance, put forward with proofs so inadequate, and in which the answer of Leibnitz will awaken a far deeper glow of devotion and enthusiasm than the appeal of Bossuet,—“*Il nous plait, Monseigneur, d'être de cette Eglise toujours mouvante, et éternellement variable.*” In this belief, that the high destinies of the Church at large depend on its constantly keeping pace with the moving order of Divine Providence and with the increasing light of ages, I feel assured that many sincere and enlightened members both of the Greek and Roman Churches would themselves gladly join; and that they would regret any step which should fix the existing system of their own day as an eternal and unchangeable ordinance. And unquestionably this is the conviction of a powerful minority in our own Church.

It is not, therefore, on the ground of the probable success or intrinsic excellence of the particular scheme proposed that I have ventured to commend this work to your favourable consideration.

But it is the blessing of any attempt at peace that the indirect advantages are often greater than the direct advantages. That same “candid and philosophic” article which I quoted before, well pointed out that any friendly move carries with it a certain atmosphere of friendliness and charity. Leibnitz was raised above himself by his correspondence with Bossuet; and when his attempts to unite the Protestants and Catholics failed, he entered with scarcely less ardour into the attempt to unite Protestants with Protestants. “*It is not,*” as Philip Henry well said, “*the actual differences of Christian men that do the mischief, but the mismanagement of those differences.*” And by a better management of those differences, by a better understanding between all the different branches of Christendom, without any external amalgamation or formal reconciliation, it is to be hoped that a unity will spring up—it may be, to be realized only in some far distant age, but to be begun in our own—more like to that unity of

* See this well brought out in the *Christian Remembrancer*, December, 1864, pp. 449-52.

which the Bible speaks, than any which the Church has witnessed since the short period when the small community in Jerusalem was "of one heart and of one soul."

It is not maintained that differences, moral and intellectual, will cease, or be unimportant; but it will be more and more clearly perceived that they do not coincide with the external political and ecclesiastical divisions which intersect the Christian world. Intellectual as well as moral unity will still be sought after and valued. But, like moral unity, it will be deeper than the mere outward expressions of it which are found in ecclesiastical laws or formal confessions of faith. The hierarchical, repressive, and literalizing spirit, against which half of Christendom is contending, will be seen to exist in the Free Church of Scotland, and in some of the Nonconformist congregations in England, as much as in the Church of Rome, and more than in the Established Churches of England, Scotland, or Greece. The catholic and expansive spirit, against which the other half of the Christian world contends, will be found in the older Churches as certainly if not as visibly as in the newer. The unity which alone will at last prevail, will be found to belong to none of them exclusively. What that unity is, or will be, or what are the various means that will best conduce towards it, would lead us into too wide a field. It is my object on this occasion only to notice the three important aspects in which, as contributing to this blessed end, the work before us chiefly deserves its title of an "Eirenicon."

I. The "Eirenicon" approaches the differences between two estranged bodies with the unmistakable intention of making as much as possible of their points of agreement, as little as possible of their points of difference. And as far as I have observed, this disposition, so far from provoking any attack, has rather met with commendation. It is the rarity of this phenomenon in Christian controversy which renders its appearance doubly valuable, from whatever quarter it comes. The general rule amongst theological combatants has been,—and our own Church and our own time form no exception,—that the first duty is to resist our supposed adversary, however excellent in other respects,—if he is outside our own pale, by widening the chasm between us,—if he is inside our own pale, by trying to eject him from it. I have been told of the speech of a Free Church minister in Scotland, uttered with the fervency of a pious ejaculation,—"*O that we were all baptized into the spirit of disruption!*" Exaggerated as it sounds, this truly expresses the common ecclesiastical feeling. The "world," as we call it, has for the most part risen above this curious state of mind. But there are many in what we call the "Church" who still think it a sacred privilege and duty, still regard the actual expulsion and separation of men from

men, churches from churches, as a thing not to be avoided, if possible, but, if possible, to be fostered on the smallest provocation.

In the face of this, we have here a book which approaches a Church by most Englishmen regarded as full of error,—regarded by the author himself as having sanctioned, in the most recent and emphatic manner, errors of a very grave kind,—with no expression of bitterness or contempt or hostility. We know that copious vocabulary of abuse with which the writings of Protestant divines abound, even those belonging to the same school as that of the learned author of this book, even in formularies sanctioned more or less by the ecclesiastical authorities of our own Church,—*Antichrist—Babylon—The Woman on the Seven Hills—corrupt—idolatrous—blasphemous fables—Papist—Romanist—Popish treachery—hellish malice—detestable enormities*, &c., &c., &c. Not one of these occurs in this treatise, not even when lamenting that the Virgin Mary is described as “superior to God,” or that the Holy Ghost is described “as taken into a quasi-hypostatic union with each successive Pope,” though he were as wicked as Alexander VI., or as unwise as at least more than one that could be named in that high and important office. The doctrines to which objection is made are set forth in its pages clearly but calmly, in the words of their own framers, with an evident effort to appreciate their point of view, with every desire to suffer them “to explain to the utmost,” “to maximize our points of resemblance and to minimize their points of difference,” “to dwell on our real agreements instead of their differences of wording,” “to point out how much there is in common even where there is divergence.”

Considering what the “No Popery” feeling has been in England; considering its intensity, its bitterness, its effects in the dismemberment of households and nations, and in driving Protestants by reaction into the Church of Rome; considering the violence in which some of the best of our divines have indulged themselves in speaking of Roman Catholics, to a degree far below the calm and measured language employed by our men of letters and our statesmen,—considering all this, it seems to me a matter of sincere congratulation, not only that a book has been written, speaking of the Roman Catholic opinions which we condemn, in a temperate spirit, but that the book has not excited any strong remonstrance on this point from any but the extremest partisans of the opposite school.

But this is a very small part of the benefit which may accrue. What is approved as a mode of dealing with one set of opinions from which we dissent, or with one class of our fellow-citizens or fellow-Christians from whom we are separated, must be good also for others. In one passage in the “Eirenicon” we actually find this expressed towards Nonconformists in a tone of conciliation, remarkably contrasting

with the scornful language of the early "Tracts for the Times." It is obvious that, if it be right to discontinue those offensive epithets which are common against Roman Catholics, it must be equally right to discontinue those of a like kind which are used against others, and which are not equally authorized by venerable formularies, though some of them go back to the first ages of the Church. These also we know well. Their name is Legion;—"Atheist, Pantheist, Infidel, Socinian, Rationalist, Neologian, blasphemer,* dishonest, abominable, fiend, instrument of Satan, &c., &c., &c. They have been used against some of the holiest, purest, and most truthful of men; and in this case, as in the case of the Roman Catholics, they can serve hardly any purpose except to engender acrimonious and exaggerated feelings whenever they are used. Once let it be understood, as it is in the "Eirenicon," that they are banished from the works of theologians, as they have long been banished from the works of scholars, where they were once so rife, and the world will have less occasion than it has now to say, "See how these Christians hate one another!" and the Church will breathe more freely when the air has been purged of these sulphureous elements. And how much more if, with the change of words, came a change of spirit also! A French Roman Catholic divine said many years ago to a friend of mine, "*Nous avons eu assez de Polémique: il nous reste à avoir un peu d'Irénique.*" *Polemics*, as Archbishop Trench would remind us, are so much more congenial, if not to human, to controversial nature, than *Eirenics*, that we can hardly hope that the latter will soon become a legitimate word. Still, even in this difficult task it is conceivable that the soul of man may go through a new birth. The endeavour to accept opinions from which we differ as the counsels of a mistaken friend rather than as the attacks of a malicious enemy,—the endeavour to view controverted questions on their own merits, and not according to the names or positions of the persons concerned,—the endeavour to grasp the truths which lie beneath the words—is a severe moral and intellectual struggle, but it is one which, in regard to Roman Catholics, the "Eirenicon" has to a great extent mastered, and it is one which must be mastered in regard to other controversies, if anything like a unity of Christendom is ever to be thought of. "Had the human mind the same power of holding fast points of agreement as of discerning differences, there would be an end of the controversy." So an eminent living theologian speaks of one particular subject. But it might equally be

* It is hardly necessary to quote the sources from whence these epithets come. It is sufficient to say that they have been used personally against such men as Mr. Maurice, the Bishop of Natal, and the authors of "Essays and Reviews," in our own day, as, in former times, against the early Christians, and, in our own Church, against Tillotson, Barrow, and many others.

said of most of those abstract questions which have divided Christendom. "If our Saviour were to come again to earth" (so the same divine continues*), "which of all these theories would He sanction with his authority? Perhaps none of them: yet all may be consistent with a true service of Him. Who, as he draws near to Christ in the face of death will not feel himself drawn towards his theological opponents? At the end of life, when a man looks back calmly, he is most likely to feel that he exaggerated in some things. . . . The truths about which we are disputing cannot themselves partake of the passing stir: they do not change even with the greater revolutions of human things. They are in eternity, and the likeness of them on earth is to be found, not in the movement on the surface of the waters, but the depths of the silent sea. As a measure of the value of such disputes, we may carry our minds onwards to the invisible world, and there behold, as in a glass, the great theological teachers of past ages, who have anathematized each other in their lives, resting together in the communion of the same Lord."

II. I pass to a second point of pacification which the "Eirenicon" suggests. In the remarks just quoted, it is implied that one condition of a better unity is the acknowledgment of gradations of importance in religious truth and error—of an ascertainable distinction between things essential and unessential. This again is a principle against which theologians on all sides have vehemently contended. It has been constantly argued that we must believe all or nothing—"that since the truth is one whole, it matters not in which part of the body the poison of error is introduced; one drop spreads through the whole, and the whole faith of the man is dead." Impatience under the attack of a fly will, it is urged, lead a man to deny the goodness of God. The belief in some physiological fact about the frame of some inferior animal will, it is alleged, lead directly to atheism.

It is the same argument which is used by the false enchantress in the "Idylls of the King" to undermine the wise man's better wisdom:—

"Unfaith in aught is want of faith in all.
It is the little rift within the lute,
That by-and-bye will make the music mute.

"It is not worth the keeping: let it go:
And trust me not at all, or all in all."

We know the effect of this on the sage:—

"He lay as dead,
And lost to life and use and name and fame."

Widely extended as are the effects of this principle, it is, in fact, the position taken up by the extreme Ultramontane school in the severest form. It is evidently held by the present Pope, and runs

* Professor Jowett, "The Epistles of St. Paul," ii. 595.

through the denunciations of his Encyclical Letter, and his attacks on the Italian Government and on the Freemasons. It is the doctrine which I have heard asserted by an Italian preacher in defence of a fair held in honour of a wonder-working image, in which, after declaiming on the "rapid advances of Rationalism and Infidelity," he exhorted his audience to meet the enemy at the outposts as the "sentinels of the faith;" which "outposts" were accordingly to be the elaborate procession and the merry auction held in behalf of the gaily decorated image.

It is obvious that this doctrine increases the difficulty of union a hundredfold. It converts every point of religious belief, right or wrong, into a fortress which must be defended to the death. It converts every difference, on matters great and small alike, into an internecine war. It would, indeed, be so destructive of human intercourse, and runs so counter to all the facts of our complex human nature, that, even when held, it probably is never held with absolute consistency. But the interest of the "Eirenicon" in this respect is that the two principles of "all or nothing" on one side, and of a graduation of belief on the other, are brought into direct collision, and that the author, in this important divergence, takes his stand against the Pope, against the dogmatists, and is found on the side of peace, of discrimination, (will he allow me to say so?) of liberality and of free thought. He will not consent to be dragged on to believe every decree of the Pope, or every decree of the Sacred Congregations, because he believes in the Apostles' Creed. He accepts the position "that, in order to doubt of one doctrine, we need not doubt of all."* He thinks that there is a tenable standing-place between blank atheism and an acceptance of the Immaculate Conception and the verbal inspiration of the Pope. And for this he is taunted, as such moderation ever has been taunted, with denying the Divine origin of Christianity.† He is charged with complicity in heresy. He has exposed himself to the denunciations of the Encyclical Letter by declaring that the Papal civil power is a speculation of human wisdom and not of Divine faith. He even seems to recognise, with Schleiermacher, that opinions from which he would greatly differ may be necessary for the ultimate development of truth, as manure is to the harvest.‡

How widely this liberal and pacifying principle strikes into our modern divisions, it is needless to say. Perhaps one of its earliest statements was in that remarkable chapter in Baxter's Narrative of his Own Times,§—in itself an Eirenicon of priceless value,—where,

* P. 258.

† *Dublin Review.*

‡ P. 282.

§ This chapter (conveniently read in Wordsworth's "Ecclesiastical Biography" vol. v., 559-97), which, many years ago, was recommended to me by Sir James Stephen, I have often ventured, and still continue to recommend, to all theological students.

amongst other indications of the greater calm and moderation produced by growing years, he finds that "of truths certain in themselves, all were not equally certain to him." Nowhere has it been more powerfully set forth than by those distinguished Roman Catholic divines who have to struggle, as we in our own Church have had to struggle also, against the tendency which exists, equally in Rome as in England, to exalt the floating opinions of popular theologians to the level of dogmatic authority. "The great scholastic theologians maintained that it was not less heretical to declare that to be an article of faith which was not *de fide*, than to deny an article of faith altogether."* *O si sic omnes! O si sic omnia!*—whether on questions of Papal or Biblical inspiration; whether on the literal flames of Purgatory or the endless duration of future punishment; whether on the Dominican or Franciscan theory of the Immaculate Conception, or the Anselmian, or Lutheran, or Calvinistic, or Grotian theory of Justification and Atonement.

III. The most striking result of the "Eirenicon" and its acceptance is the effect on the future position of the Thirty-nine Articles, and with them, of ecclesiastical Confessions generally. It is not necessary to go through in detail the explanations by which at least twelve of the thirty-nine are reduced in this learned work to mere truisms, which, under such explanations, certainly no one would think it worth while to retain, as no one would originally have thought it worth while to issue them. It is enough to say that Tract XC. has been re-affirmed, and the general result is that stated by a well-known quarterly journal,† the recognised exponent of the views expressed by the "Eirenicon," in an article which is one sustained eulogy upon it, and which I believe has never been disavowed by any of the school which it represents. The reviewer says:—

"One is tempted to ask with wonder, How is it that men ever have placed such implicit belief in the Articles? . . . No other answer can be given than that they have been neglected and ignored. . . . It is impossible to deny that they contain statements or assertions that are verbally false, and others that are very difficult to reconcile with truth. . . . What service have they ever done, and of what use are they at the present time? . . . Their condemnation has been virtually pronounced by the 'Eirenicon.' Virtually, for it is after all only an implicit, not an explicit condemnation of them that the volume contains. . . . We venture to go a step further, and boldly proclaim our own opinion, that before union with Rome can be effected [that is, before that can be effected which the reviewer thinks most desirable], the Thirty-nine Articles must be wholly withdrawn. They are virtually withdrawn at the present moment, for the endorsement of the view of the 'Eirenicon' by the writer in the *Times* proves that, as far as the most important of the Articles are concerned, there are persons who sign them in senses absolutely contradictory."

* Professor Döllinger's Address to the Conference at Munich.

† *Christian Remembrancer*. January. 1866. p. 188.

The peculiar position thus assigned to the Articles is rendered doubly important by the contrast between the furious outcry with which this dissolving and disparaging process was received twenty years ago, and the almost complete acquiescence with which it has been received now. There are many of us old enough to remember the agitation in 1841, and still more in 1845, when the matter was brought to its final issue in the famous Oxford Convocation of the 13th of February. We have seen many theological disturbances in our time, but nothing equal to that. The religious and secular press were up in arms. The Bishops in their charges charged long and loud. (I do not mean with absolute unanimity; there was at least one Bishop who abstained then, as he would have abstained now, had he still lived, from joining in any of the indiscriminating Episcopal denunciations which have been so common in the last few years. If ever there was a theological treatise under a ban it was Tract XC. And now it is republished, virtually, in the "Eirenicon,"—actually, in the pamphlet* which may be called a postscript to the "Eirenicon." Not a word of remonstrance. The Heads of Houses are silent. The Bishops are silent. The leading journals even approve it, and consider the former outcry "as ludicrously exaggerated and onesided." The learned author of the "Eirenicon" has, I believe, received no serious annoyance from this bold step. "The explanations" (I quote again from the same journal) "which in Tract XC. were regarded as pieces of the most subtle sophistry, are repeated in the 'Eirenicon' not only without rebuke from anybody, but with the approving sympathy of thousands.† . . . What the Bishops and others in a panic of ignorance condemned in 1841 is accepted and allowed to be entirely tenable in 1865."

Such a phenomenon in itself, irrespectively of the subject, is of a most reassuring and pacificatory kind. It is interesting and consoling to trace such a palpable instance of the total collapse of a great theological bugbear, such a proof of the ephemeral character of protests and denunciations and panics, such an example of the return of public and ecclesiastical feeling to the calm consideration of a topic which once seemed so hopelessly inflammable. The Hampden controversy, the Gorham controversy, the "Essays and Reviews" controversy, the Colenso controversy—all have had their turn; but none excited such violent passions, and of none would the ultimate extinction have appeared so strange whilst the storm was raging, as the extinction of the controversy of Tract XC.

But still more interesting in the cause of peace is it when we regard the subject-matter. It was the question of the binding, stringent force of our chief historical Confession of Faith. It had appeared

* Tract XC. Republished, with a Preface by the Rev. E. B. Pusey, D.D. 1866.

† *Christian Remembrancer*, January, 1866, pp. 163, 167, 179.

in 1841, that this Confession had suddenly given way on the points on which it was thought the strongest; that eminent divines had burst through the bonds with which the old Philistines—the Earl of Leicester and King James I.—had bound them, “as a thread of tow is broken when it toucheth the fire.” On no theological question was it believed that the Articles had spoken more certainly, and with a more deliberate intention, than against the doctrines of the Church of Rome; and Tract XC. announced that they had been so carelessly or so ambiguously framed as to admit those who held these very doctrines. This it was which produced the alarm. What has produced the calm? Many causes have contributed;—the recrudescence of the High Church party; the charm thrown over the history of that time by the “Apologia;” the exhaustion of the *odium theologicum* in another direction. But mainly, and beyond all question, and long before these events, it was the growth of the conviction, that such formularies must not be overstrained; that their chief use is that of historical landmarks of the faith of the Church at a given time, but that they cannot, by the very nature of the case, bind the thoughts and consciences of future times. This conviction had already begun to prevail even when Tract XC. appeared. By the time of the fierce and final attack in 1845, what has since been called the Liberal party in the Church was sufficiently powerful to make a strong rally in favour of toleration. The first force of the intended blow against Tract XC. was broken by two vigorous pamphlets from this quarter—one by the present Bishop of London, the other by Mr. Maurice. It was resisted in the Oxford Convocation by almost all those who have since been most vehemently assailed by those whom they then defended—by four out of the five Oxford Essayists, and by others of like tendencies, but who have been fortunately less conspicuous.

The good cause has triumphed at last. It is true that the particular form which Tract XC. and the “Eirenicon” take of dissolving the Articles may not be—I think it is not—historically tenable. It is true that the vehement attack upon them in the *Christian Remembrancer* is exaggerated in tone and substance. But the general principle of the inefficacy and inadequacy of such Confessions is the same as that which has been stated in the most lucid and energetic language by the Dean of St. Paul’s, in his speech on the Thirty-nine Articles in the Royal Commission, and by Principal Tulloch in his Address on the Westminster Confession to the students of Divinity in the University of St. Andrews; and this change of feeling has coincided with, and resulted in, the fundamental change in the terms of subscription effected by the Legislature last year.*

* I quote the substance and effect of this change from the speech of Mr. Charles Burton

The republication and general acceptance of Tract XC., brought about as it has mainly been through the growth of the principles here described, render it henceforth almost impossible that the Articles can again be used for the purposes for which they have been usually hitherto employed. The celebrated passages from Archbishop Usher and Archbishop Bramhall, which Dr. Newman quoted in his own behalf in his defence of Tract XC., have now a chance of receiving a universal application, such as perhaps at that time he himself little contemplated. There is a hope that they may become indeed, as they are called by these two Primates, *Articles of Peace*,—Articles of Peace, because not Articles of Belief; Articles of Peace, and therefore not weapons of hatred. "That work which Tract XC. effected will never be undone, so long as the Articles shall last."* That work, indeed, in a deeper sense than the author of those words may have intended, never will be undone—the work of showing how every opinion can find its resting-place somewhere in their manifold statements; how none can be condemned merely because of apparent inconsistency with them; how none can be taunted with neglecting their details if he accepts their general substance. They may still be used as guides to the theology of the Reformation; they may still be used as protections for the weaker party in the Church; they may still be employed as a framework of theological education, and as expressions of the form which the general doctrine of Christianity has taken in the English Church. But they can no more be used, as they have hitherto been used, for the purpose of multiplying division and distrust, and of furnishing food for those unhappy insinuations of dishonesty and inconsistency and perfidy, which apply either to no one or to every one, and which

in the House of Commons—a statement doubly important from the fact that he was himself a Royal Commissioner, and that it was not contradicted by any of the Commissioners present, nor by any member of the Government, and that most of the changes proposed were those which, both by many of the Bishops in Parliament, and by Convocation, had been so long resisted:—"It was of the greatest importance to observe that all those phrases which indicated that the subscriber declared his acceptance of every dogma of the Church had been swept away; and this had been done expressly and of forethought. As regarded the Thirty-nine Articles, the Commission had agreed to sweep away the words, 'each and every of them;' implying, therefore, that the subscriber was only to take them as a whole, even though he might disagree with them here and there. As regarded the Prayer-book, the change was even still more marked; for, instead of declaring his assent and consent to all and everything it contained, he only declared his assent to the Book of Prayer—that is to say, to the book as a whole,—and his belief that the doctrine of the Church therein set forth was agreeable to the word of God. Observe that he would not declare that the doctrines in the plural number, or that each and all of the doctrines, were agreeable to the word of God, but only the doctrine of the Church in the singular number. It was expressly and unanimously agreed by the Commission that the word 'doctrine' should be used in the singular number, in order that it might be understood that it was the general teaching, and not every part and parcel of that teaching, to which assent was given."

* Dr. Pusey on Tract XC., p. xxviii.

either invite legal processes against every one or against no one, of all those who have signed them, from the Primate down to the Curate, from the extremest Liberal to the extremest Conservative of the laymen who vote in the Oxford Convocation.*

I need hardly say that, as regards the bearing of the Thirty-nine Articles on the recent disputes in the Church of England, this heavy blow to their authority is of no direct consequence. Not only has the highest Court in the Church and realm declared that the Articles have left those questions perfectly open, but the venerable poet to whom the "Eirenicon" is dedicated, has long ago acknowledged the same important fact. "If a man were minded to deny the inspiration of Holy Scripture,† and the eternity of Hell torments, he would have only to point out that they are not affirmed in the Articles."‡ The Liberal clergy of the Church (as they are called) have every reason to be grateful to the Articles for the protection which they have afforded to those whom the unauthorized clamour of individuals would have driven from their positions. The Thirty-nine Articles, as well as the Decrees of Trent and the Westminster Confession,§ are doubtless, from the mere fact of their composite and official origin, more gently and cautiously expressed than documents on the same subjects issuing from mere individual zeal.

It is not on behalf of any recent events, therefore, that I have dwelt on this phase of the "Eirenicon." But not the less needful is it to observe, that on all points on which the Articles have expressed or are supposed to have expressed themselves, the enormous latitude opened by Tract XC. and the "Eirenicon" must extend to every opinion condemned by them. Even the adherents of Barclay's "Apology," and of the Racovian Catechism, as far as the wording of the Articles goes, and the explanations of Tract XC. are concerned, might claim a position within the Church of England as tenable as that which is offered by the "Eirenicon" and its supporters to the adherents of the Decrees of Trent. And the real cause for rejoicing is not that this or that set of opinions should be admitted which was once believed to be excluded, but that this decisive proof of the inadequacy of the theological language of a past age to bind the thoughts of suc-

* The fact that the old stringent forms, which have been abolished for the clergy, still remain in force for the lay degrees at Oxford, only adds to the importance of these considerations.

† What is meant, probably, is the peculiar theory of inspiration held by the venerable author. But his statement is equally true respecting any theory that has ever been proposed.

‡ Keble's "Eucharistical Adoration," p. 162.

§ This has been well shown in a lecture of Professor Mitchell, of St. Andrew's, on the Westminster Confession, in which he points out, in some respects, its superiority, in point of comprehensiveness and depth of view, both to the Irish Articles and our own.

ceeding ages places all such Confessions of Faith everywhere on their right footing.* It is to be welcomed for the sake of the Roman Catholics, and for the sake of the Scottish Presbyterians, as much as for ourselves. If the definition of Original Sin by Dr. Newman seems to our ears almost impossible to reconcile with the letter of the Decrees of Trent; if the noble protest which Dr. Macleod has made against the extreme Sabbatarianism of Scotland, or the equally determined protest which the Free Church has made against the ecclesiastical authority of the civil magistrate, seems, in either case, difficult to reconcile with the letter of the Westminster Confession—these are but instances of the inevitable collision which must take place between the letter and the spirit of each succeeding age; between the form of words which was drawn up with one purpose, and the growth of sentiments and opinions which have sprung up with a totally different purpose. Such formularies cannot be the true safeguards of faith and devotion. Whatever else may be their uses, they have manifestly failed in this, whilst, on the other hand, they have been employed for those baser ends of recrimination and attack for which they were never intended. But no Church will gain more by this acknowledgment of the secondary position of dogmatic Confessions than our own, because it is thereby enabled to return to its true position, which it enjoyed before the Articles were imposed on its members, as the Church of the whole nation. By such disentanglements the Church of England will become free in a far deeper, more spiritual sense, than that in which we have lately heard that “the Church of South Africa is free,”—free, not (as in that case, if so be) from the restraints and protection of English law, but free from the embarrassments in which the factions of former times involved it; free to occupy that great position which De Maistre assigned to it, touching with one hand the Churches and thoughts of the older world, touching with the other the Churches and thoughts of the newer world. These two mighty

* It is of course not intended that the general acceptance of the “Eirenicon” has equally the same effect on all Confessions. The more simple and ancient Creeds are more universal in character than the modern Confessions; and the great theological words which have moulded the thoughts of men are more powerful and pregnant, in proportion to the length and depth of the associations which they carry with them, and the precision with which they were framed. Yet even here it is sufficient to point to the fact—(1) that the phrase *homobousion* was first used by heretics, and condemned by one council as heretical before it was adopted by another council as orthodox; and that Athanasius himself, after its adoption, rarely, if ever, used it again in his own polemical writings; (2) that the word *hypostasis*, which in the Athanasian Creed is translated *person*, was in the original Nicene Creed used as synonymous with *substance*; and (3) that the *Alloque* in the Athanasian and the present Nicene Creed is certainly not invested with the same importance by those who are now anxious to effect a union with the Eastern Churches, as it was by those who introduced the phrase with the express object of condemning those Churches.

tendencies can grow up in a healthy Christian growth nowhere so securely and safely as within such a National Church as ours, which, with the author of the "Eirenicon," we humbly trust "has not without some great purpose of God been so marvellously preserved until now."*

For the three reasons, then, which I have adduced, the "Eirenicon" seems to me to call for the thankfulness of those who care for the peace of Christendom. It is not my intention, on the one hand, to have merely pressed an *argumentum ad hominem*. I wish to merge the individual in the body, and to make it, if I may so turn the phrase, an *argumentum ad clerum*. On the other hand, whilst speaking of this learned work as a step, I shall not be understood to describe it as the chief, or the most necessary step in "the more excellent way" towards the true unity of Christendom. Even confining ourselves to the peacemaking effects of books, there are many which ought to be ranked amongst the "Eirenica," of a yet higher and more persuasive order. Such is the "Imitation of Christ." Such are the "Christian Year" and the "Pilgrim's Progress,"—each proving by its general acceptance the strength and the number of the religious ideas common to the whole of English Christendom. Such, again, are the Sermons of the lamented Robertson, also accepted as the chief of English preachers by almost every phase of English religious thought. Such, to take a higher flight, are the masterpieces of the theology of great men—Bacon, Butler, Pascal, Shakspeare. Such, to descend a step lower again, are such homely practical works as that, the removal of which from its former place in the recommendation of Bishops, I often hear mentioned with deep regret—Hey's "Lectures on the Articles." Such—to take an instance from words pacific in intention, and which would, if they were known as they deserve to be, commend themselves as an Eirenicon of the highest rank, to all who read them—are those admirable pages in Professor Jowett's "Essay on the Interpretation of Scripture,"† on the effects of a deeper study of the Bible. Such is the effect of that remarkable book, of mysterious origin, the *Ecce Homo*, awakening a thrill of emotion and sympathy in so many diverse minds by the force with which it presses, in all its power and simplicity, the mind and work of Him who needs only to be thus understood "to draw all men to Himself."


These works aim at that true unity of doctrine—or dogma, if you choose to call it so—which throws the outward form of dogma or doctrine into the shade. They aim, not merely at the means, but at the very end itself, and the all but universal approval of them shows that, apart from personal and party feeling, the end is such as is by the highest religious and theological tendencies of the time fully recognised.

The "Eirenicon" has another object, within a more limited, because external and ecclesiastical sphere. But within that sphere it still contributes something, through the three aspects which I have noticed, and yet more through their general acceptance, towards the same end. Though we may reject, as impracticable or undesirable, the particular remedy which it offers, yet like the researches of alchemy after the philosopher's stone (to use the illustration of Leibnitz), it may bring to light elements of which the Divine Chemistry will avail itself in ways that we know not of. Morally, we may be allowed, I trust, to consider it as leading, not directly, perhaps, but indirectly, towards that true spiritual unity longed for by the eminent Nonconformist whom I have already cited, in which, "notwithstanding the sad divisions in the Church, all the saints, so far as they are sanctified, are one; are one in their aims, one in their askings, one in amity and friendship, one in interest, one in their inheritance. . . . The things in which they are agreed are many more, and more considerable than the things wherein they differ. They are all of a mind concerning sin, that it is the worst thing in the world; concerning Christ, that He is all in all; concerning the favour of God, that it is better than life; concerning the world, that it is vanity; concerning the word of God, that it is very precious."* Intellectually, we may be allowed to regard it, in the three points which I have mentioned, as not alien to that unity or Truce of God, advocated by the eminent Roman Catholic divine whom I have also quoted more than once, as the result of the Theology of the nineteenth century, when he points to "the sphere where those elsewhere religiously divided may come together and carry on their work and their inquiries in harmony; where all, impelled by the same thirst of knowledge, and drinking out of the same sacred fountains of truth, grow together in one common fellowship; and from this fellowship and brotherhood of knowledge there will one day proceed a higher unity and conciliation, embracing the whole domain, first of historical, and then of religious truth; when, under the influence of a milder atmosphere, the crust of polemical and sectarian ice will thaw and melt away as the patriot and Christian hopes and prays."†

A. P. STANLEY.

* Philip Henry. See his Life in Wordsworth's "Ecol. Biog.," vi. 344.

† Funeral Oration of Professor Döllinger at the death of the late King of Bavaria.



CRETE.

Travels and Researches in Crete. By Captain T. A. B. SPRATT, R.N.,
C.B., F.R.S. Two Volumes, 8vo. London.

Travels in Crete. By ROBERT PASHLEY, Esq. Two Volumes. London.

THERE are probably few countries in Europe that are less known to the bulk of our readers than the large and important island of Crete. It is, we believe, one of the *idées fixes* of many continental politicians that its possession is eagerly coveted by English statesmen, and is one of those objects of which *la perfide Albion* never loses sight. And it was in accordance with this view that its acquisition was the bait held out to our Government by the Emperor Nicholas, in his memorable conversation with Sir Hamilton Seymour, concerning the division of the spoils of "the sick man." But no hand was held out to grasp at the tempting offer; and since that period our cession of the Ionian Islands has probably done something to convince even foreign statesmen that England seeks no aggrandizement in the Mediterranean at least. So little do English politicians in reality trouble themselves about this supposed object of their ambition, that we suspect very few of them know much more about the island than its geographical situation, and the old legends of Minos and Dædalus, that rendered it famous in antiquity.

The fortune of the island has indeed been singular. It may safely be asserted that among the many fair and fertile lands that girdle the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, there are few more fertile or more beautiful than Crete. In the enthusiastic words of one who saw this "superb island," as he justly terms it, before it had been desolated by

recent civil wars, "Crete is indeed the garden of Greece, and were it thoroughly civilized and cultivated, would produce in vast abundance corn, wine, oil, silk, wool, honey, and wax. The land is stocked with game, the sea with fine fish; fruit is plentiful, and of a delicious flavour: its valleys are adorned with a variety of flowers and aromatic shrubs, and with groves of myrtle, orange, lemon, pomegranate, and almond trees, as well as with interminable forests of olives. The southern coast is destitute of ports, and has scarcely any safe roadsteads; but on the northern side are several excellent and capacious harbours." Great part of the island, it is true, is occupied by lofty ranges and masses of mountains, that rise to a height exceeding the most elevated of those of continental Greece, and are, even under the thirty-fifth parallel of latitude, covered with snow for at least two-thirds of the year. But bordering on, and alternating with, these rugged mountain tracts, which abound in scenery of the most picturesque and varied character, are valleys and plains of surpassing richness and beauty. An old English traveller who visited the island in the beginning of the seventeenth century, while it was still under the Venetian rule, breaks out into raptures concerning the plain that surrounds Canea, of which he says, in his quaint style, that "it may easily be surnamed the garden of the whole universe, being the goodliest plot, the diamond spark, and the honey spot of all Candy."

An island possessing such great natural advantages, and situated at the very entrance of the Archipelago, as it were a stepping-stone from Europe both to Asia and Africa, would seem to be marked out by nature to exercise a commanding influence over the whole eastern Mediterranean. Yet it is certain that Crete has never played a part in history comparable to that of the neighbouring island of Rhodes, so far inferior to it both in extent and population. Even in ancient times we hear singularly little about it; its traditions of mythical times were indeed numerous; and the legends of Minos, his naval power and his wise legislation, would seem to point to a bygone period, when Crete held a position far more important in relation to the Hellenic world than at any subsequent time. But all such visions of departed splendour are peculiarly untrustworthy, and the mythical glories of Crete must, we fear, be consigned to the same limbo of historic doubt with those of Troy or the "seven-gated" Thebes. A more substantial source of pride was derived from the fact that the Cretans possessed, even in historical times, laws and institutions that were ranked amongst the wisest in Greece, and which are compared both by Plato and Aristotle with those of Sparta. According to one tradition, indeed, the latter had been in great part borrowed by Lycurgus from the legislation already existing in Crete.

But however much these institutions may have contributed to the

internal tranquillity and prosperity of Crete, they did nothing to give her power or consideration in her relations with other states. No trace can be found of any federal organization or permanent union among the different cities of the island, obvious as the formation of some such union would appear to our modern ideas. Every city had its own republican government, and formed alliances or waged wars with its neighbours at its own free will; and the few incidental glimpses we obtain of Cretan history show that such internal wars were of common occurrence. Hence, doubtless, it arose that an island of such magnitude and importance, which seemed calculated by its position, as Aristotle himself remarks,* to obtain the supreme command of the Grecian seas, and by that means of Greece itself, never plays any part of importance in Greek history. The Cretans, as a people, held aloof both from the Persian and Peloponnesian wars: they had no share in the dangers or the glories of the great contest with Xerxes; and appear to have looked on with unconcern at the long-protracted struggle for supremacy between Athens and Sparta: indeed, their name occurs only incidentally either in Thucydides or Xenophon. At a later period we find some passing notices of Cretan affairs in the extant fragments of Polybius—*notices which all point to the same state of things,—a perpetual succession of petty wars among the cities of the island, arising from the same jealousies and ambition of supremacy that led to the more important and more celebrated contests of their continental countrymen. It was one of these disputes which first gave the opportunity for the intervention of the Romans in their affairs, which ended, as usual, by the complete subjugation of the whole island. Of the details of this war we know almost nothing, and we can only infer that the islanders must have opposed an obstinate and long-protracted resistance to the Roman arms, as the victorious general, a member of the proud house of the Metelli, already ennobled by so many triumphs, did not disdain to assume the surname of Creticus, in commemoration of his conquest of the island.*

Throughout this period, however, while the Cretans, as a people, took no part in the wars or politics of the rest of Greece, they continued to furnish, like the Swiss in the Middle Ages, numbers of mercenary soldiers, which figure in almost all the contests of the continental Greeks. These troops were doubtless supplied for the most part from the mountainous districts of the interior, where the hardy and lawless race of the Sfakiotes still retain much of the same characteristics as their predecessors of old. The well-known Scolion, or drinking song, composed by the Cretan poet Hybrias, and supposed to represent the sentiments of one of these ancient soldiers of fortune,

breathes a spirit that would be recognised as congenial by the mountain freebooters of the present day, whether in Crete or the continental districts of Greece :—"My wealth is in my sword and spear, and the fair buckler that protects me from harm. With these I plough, with these I reap, with these I press the sweet wine from the grape."

But it was not on the sword and spear that the Cretan soldiers mainly relied : it was for their skill in the use of the bow that they were chiefly renowned in antiquity, and Cretan archers are continually found serving as mercenary auxiliaries, both in the Greek and Roman armies. So diligently, indeed, did they continue to practise the use of this favourite weapon, and so long did they retain it, that even under the Venetian Government it was still in general use among the Sfakian mountaineers, who are described by Foscarini, as late as 1596, as always carrying their bow and quiver of arrows, with which they shot "most excellently well."

As a province of the Roman Empire, Crete disappears altogether from history, though it is evident, from existing remains and inscriptions, that some of its towns at least must have enjoyed a considerable amount of wealth and prosperity. But all this, doubtless, came to an end when, in the general dissolution of the empire, the piratical invasions of the barbarians were extended to the sea as well as the land. Crete, however, continued to vegetate as a province of the Byzantine Empire until the ninth century, when it fell into the hands of the Saracens (about A.D. 820), who retained possession of the island for 140 years, till it was again wrested from them by the Greek Emperor, Nicephorus Phocas, in 961. In the partition of the Eastern Empire by the Franks, after the conquest of Constantinople, Crete appears to have been given to Boniface, Duke of Montferrat, and from him it passed by purchase to the Republic of Venice, in 1264.

It was during the long period of the Venetian rule in the island that the name of "Candia," originally applied to the capital city, and itself a corruption of the Arabic "Khandax" (a fortress or entrenchment), came gradually into use with the nations of Western Europe as the name of the whole island : a vulgar appellation which still retains its place in many of our maps and books of geography. But the ancient appellation of Crete is the only one that has ever been known in the island itself, and has always continued in use with Turks as well as Greeks. When Mr. Pashley visited Crete in 1834, he found that even the highest ecclesiastical dignitaries were wholly ignorant of the name of Candia, as applied to the island, and observes that in this sense "it has never been pronounced by any Cretan unacquainted with the Italian language."

The long struggle between the Venetians and the Turks for the possession of this important island, so essential to the maintenance of naval supremacy in the Archipelago, culminating at last in the celebrated siege of the city of Candia in 1667-69, gave for a time an European celebrity to its name, which gradually died away as the island sank under the lethargic influence of the Ottoman despotism. Crete was doomed to experience all the evils of that yoke in their most aggravated form, and became, according to the testimony of Mr. Pashley, "the worst-governed province of the Turkish empire :"—

"The local authorities were wholly unable to control the licence of the Janissaries, who consisted solely of Cretan Mohammedans, and made it a point of honour not to suffer any one of their number to be brought to justice for any ordinary crime. So completely did every pasha, appointed by the Sublime Porte, depend on this turbulent militia, that his authority always ceased as soon as they resisted it, which on several occasions they did, so far as even to depose him, and to send to Constantinople in order to obtain the confirmation of his successor's election, as made by themselves. In one or other of their regiments almost every Cretan Mohammedan was enrolled, and it is easy to conceive what must have been the condition of the Christian population. Besides the grinding oppressions of the regular authorities, and of the different corps of Janissaries, every Greek was also at the mercy of the lowest Mohammedan of the island, who, in consequence of the weakness of the local government, could make any demand and perpetrate any enormity with complete security. Thus, literally, no Christian was master of his own house : any Mohammedan might pass his threshold, and either require from him money, or, what was far commoner, send the husband or father out of the way, on some mere pretext, and himself remain with his wife or daughter. So atrocious and frequent were such acts of violence and oppression, that I have been assured by persons well acquainted with Turkey, and certainly favourably disposed to the Turks, that the horrors and atrocities which were almost of daily occurrence in Crete, had hardly a single parallel throughout the whole extent of the Ottoman Empire."

No wonder that, in 1821, when the standard of liberty was raised on the mainland of Greece, the Cretan Greeks enthusiastically followed the example of their brethren, and rose in revolt against their oppressors. Though opposed not only to the Turkish Pasha and the Mohammedan population of the island, but to the far more formidable power of Mehemet Ali, the Viceroy of Egypt, they maintained the contest with various alternations of success, and were in fact masters of the greater part of the island, when the decree of the Allied Powers, in 1829, while it established the liberty of the continental Greeks and the islanders of the Cyclades, handed over those of Crete to the Egyptian Viceroy. The short period of his rule, though in some respects more enlightened, was certainly not less tyrannical than had been that of the Porte. The promised introduction of "European institutions" was confined to that of European modes of taxation, which

grievously increased the burdens of the inhabitants, without giving them in return any of those advantages which the people ordinarily receive in the most heavily taxed countries of Europe. Crete had certainly little to lose by the exchange, when, after the fall of Acre and the overthrow of the Egyptian dominion in Syria, it passed once more (in 1841) under the direct dominion of the Sultan.

Previously to the publication of Captain Spratt's recent researches, our knowledge of Crete was almost wholly derived from the elaborate work of Mr. Pashley, who visited the island in 1834, and in the course of a prolonged tour examined almost every part of it. He brought to the exploration of its ancient remains the resources of a profound and accurate scholar, as well as a conscientious and diligent observer, while his remarkable command of the modern language and dialects of Greece enabled him to collect much interesting information concerning its present inhabitants and their condition. His book has consequently ranked ever since as the standard authority upon the subject, and has held its place by the side of those of Colonel Leake on continental Greece, and of Mr. Wm. Hamilton on Asia Minor. Unfortunately, for some reason that was never explained, his travels in certain portions of the island were not included in his published work, and several ancient sites, which we know that he visited, were left undescribed. Nor have the gaps thus left in our information been filled up by any subsequent traveller. A curious contribution to our knowledge of the antiquities of the island was indeed published by Mr. Falkener in 1854, in some extracts from the note-book of Onorio Belli, a Venetian architect, who visited the island in 1583, and made notes and plans of the ruins of ancient buildings then remaining, many of which have since been destroyed, either wholly or in part. There seems every reason to believe in the trustworthiness both of his plans and descriptions, and we thus obtain from this interesting record (which is still preserved in MS. in the Venetian archives) a curious proof how many ancient edifices survived through the Middle Ages to perish in comparatively recent times.

Captain Spratt has undoubtedly enjoyed great advantages for the completion of the task thus left unfinished. During the course of the elaborate survey of the coasts of Crete, on which he was engaged for several years in succession, and of which the main result is embodied in the beautiful charts of the island that form part of the noble survey of the Mediterranean Sea, executed under the directions of the British Admiralty, he was not only rendered familiar with every point of the sea-coast, but had the opportunity of making many tours through the interior of the island, and visiting every locality of interest either from its ancient remains or physical peculiarities. Of

the merits of Captain Spratt as a hydrographer it is impossible to speak too highly; and he has added to his claims on our gratitude on this account by presenting us with a general geological survey of the island, which derives additional interest from the resemblance of its leading characteristics to those of the neighbouring region of Lycia, where Captain Spratt had served his geological apprenticeship under the guidance of that highly-gifted naturalist and geologist, the lamented Edward Forbes.

Nor can we too much commend the diligence and energy with which Captain Spratt sought out the ancient remains, and evidences of ancient sites, with a view to complete or correct the topographical conclusions of his predecessors. Unfortunately, something more than zeal and energy is requisite in order to make any real progress in the thorny paths of ancient topography; and Captain Spratt was altogether deficient in the previous training requisite to enable any one to tread their mazes with security. His scholarship, indeed, appears to be confined, so far as we can gather from the volumes before us, to a diligent study of Dr. Cramer's well-known book on the Geography of Ancient Greece,—a useful compilation, as every student knows, though in many parts executed in a hasty and perfunctory manner, and nowhere more so than in this very portion relating to Crete, which was at that time in great measure unexplored and unknown. But Captain Spratt seems to regard the work of the Oxford Professor with something of the same reverence that we have known many tourists on the Continent evince for their "Murray,"—as an authority not to be questioned or disputed. Hence he is frequently disposed to censure Mr. Pashley for departing from the views of Dr. Cramer, even in cases where the former, having visited the localities himself, and compared the ancient authorities on the spot, was unquestionably right, and Dr. Cramer, writing without adequate information, as unquestionably wrong. On the whole, the result has been, that while Captain Spratt has furnished us with valuable additional materials for the future labours of scholars and topographers, his own views and suggestions have done little or nothing to advance our knowledge of the ancient geography of Crete.

Our readers will doubtless gladly excuse us from entering into these disputed questions, the more so as the remains of antiquity still visible in the island are of a kind interesting chiefly to the antiquarian or topographer. In no instance are there any monuments remaining calculated to attract general admiration by their architectural beauty, or imposing by the character of rude but massive grandeur, so conspicuous in the remains of Tiryns and Mycenæ. Two sites only may claim a passing notice, from their connection with the earliest mythological legends of the island. The tomb of Zeus, which

was shown by the "lying Cretans" in the flourishing days of Grecian mythology, to the great indignation of the pious Callimachus, is still pointed out by the rude shepherd at the present day on the summit of Mount Juktas, an isolated mountain that rises from the plain a few miles south of the city of Candia, and in full view of the harbour. The locality is marked only by some fragments of ancient walls, of very rude and massive masonry, enclosing a cave of small dimensions; but its identity seems to be well established, the spot having, as in many similar cases, continued to be the object of superstitious reverence long after the introduction of Christianity.

Another site that has been visited by all travellers in Crete is the famous Labyrinth, a subterranean gallery, or rather series of galleries, of most labyrinthine sinuosity, through which it must indeed be an arduous task to trace one's way without the clue of Ariadne. There is no doubt that it is an artificial excavation. Colonel Leake supposed it to be a catacomb, but Captain Spratt is probably correct in regarding it as nothing more than a vast quarry, excavated in the white tertiary limestone, which forms an excellent building material, not unlike the celebrated Malta stone, and evidently the same which was largely employed in the buildings of the neighbouring cities of Gortyna and Phaestos. But there is one grave difficulty in the way of identifying this supposed labyrinth with the famous work of Dædalus and the abode of the Minotaur. All the legends relating to the latter associate it with the city of Cnossus, the reputed capital of Minos; and, what is still more conclusive, the coins of Cnossus almost all bear the type of the labyrinth on the reverse, as the distinguishing emblem of their city, while no such symbol is found on those of Gortyna or any other city of Crete. But the labyrinth now extant is situated in the immediate neighbourhood of Gortyna, on the opposite side of the island from Cnossus, with which it could never have had any connection whatever. There can, therefore, be little doubt that the appellation is a mere misnomer as applied to the particular quarry in question, though it is not improbable that some excavation of a similar character in the neighbourhood of Cnossus,—the hills around which consist of the same soft limestone, and abound in natural caverns as well as rock-hewn sepulchres,—may have given rise to the notion of the fabulous structure so celebrated in antiquity.

We have already mentioned that a large portion of the island is occupied by mountains. A glance at Captain Spratt's admirable map will at once show the reader that these do not form a continuous chain, as they are represented on ordinary maps, but consist of several detached groups or masses, separated from one another by intervening tracts of plain or valley, or comparatively low hills of tertiary formation. The most westerly of these groups

is that of the White Mountains, now called the Madara Vouna, the highest peaks of which equal, if they do not exceed, in height the central summits of Mount Ida,* for which they have been often mistaken by voyagers as they approach the island from the coast of the Morea. Their highest summits are covered with snow till near midsummer; beneath the snow-line appears a scanty sprinkling of a kind of cypress (probably the *Juniperus excelsa* of botanists), while the extensive pastures and broad upland plateaux that border their flanks, accessible from below only by abrupt and difficult gorges, and ravines easily defended, have been the abode, from time immemorial, of a race of hardy mountaineers, who have retained their virtual independence in their mountain fastnesses through all the vicissitudes of centuries. These Sfakian highlanders, if they be not the lineal descendants of the "Eteocretes" of Homer, are certainly in one sense their modern representatives. They are "the genuine Cretans," the Cretans *par excellence*, a people who have changed so little from what they were two thousand years ago, that the scholar will find in their habits, their superstitions, even their dress, perpetual reminiscences of classical times. Their character and peculiarities are well described by Mr. Pashley, who enjoyed the advantage of visiting their villages, accompanied by a guide who was himself a Sfakian by birth, and possessed all the characteristics of that peculiar people.

Captain Manias, as this worthy was called, may be regarded as one of the notabilities of Crete. He had taken a leading part in the war of the revolution, in which he became a captain, having a considerable body of men under his standard. When the insurgents were for a time cowed into submission by Khusein Bey, he armed a light vessel, and made piratical descents on the coast of Crete, in the course of which he made prisoners, in the space of about two years, no less than sixty-four Mohammedans, whom he sold as slaves in the market of the neighbouring island of Kasos. "The life of war, rapine, and bloodshed which he had led," adds Mr. Pashley, "proved of the highest utility to me, for it had made him so well acquainted with every hill and dale, path and river in the island, that there were few parts of

* Captain Spratt's statements on this subject are singularly vague and fluctuating for one who had so long been engaged in an elaborate survey of the island. In his map, as well as on the original chart of the Admiralty survey, he gives the height of Mount Ida as 8,060 feet, and that of the highest peak of the White Mountains as 8,100 feet. Yet he himself states that Ida exceeds the latter by a few feet, while in the account of his ascent of Mount Ida, at the opening of his work, he says that its summit is 8,200 feet above the sea-level. Again, he tells us that he found by observation the height of Agio Pneuma, the only one of the peaks of the White Mountains which he ascended, to be about 7,800 feet above the sea, but that there were peaks "a few hundred feet" higher to the west. But the height assigned to Agio Pneuma on the map is only 7,650 feet. There is evidently still an opportunity in Crete for an enterprising member of the Alpine Club, with a good mountain barometer, to do useful service.

it where he would not have proved an unerring guide even at midnight." In other respects this wild warrior, who accompanied Mr. Pashley during the greater part of his travels in the island, proved himself not only an invaluable guide, but "a man who, though entirely destitute of education, was yet possessed of extraordinary abilities." We may add that he survived his travels with Mr. Pashley many years, and accompanied Captain Spratt on some of his excursions in the island, but died at Ierapetra, while acting as pilot to the surveying ship around the eastern coasts of the island, with which he had become familiar during his piratical cruises. Captain Spratt bears emphatic testimony to his noble qualities as well as his great abilities, but protests against his being taken for the type of a class.

This remarkable man seems, indeed, to have been the very ideal of the wild and lawless but noble-hearted mountaineer, such as Lord Byron would have loved to draw. "He was a specimen," says Captain Spratt, "of lion-hearted patriotism, combined with lamb-like gentleness in all the common intercourse of life; his form and constitution were herculean; but his manner was fascinating, and his voice he could modulate to a tone as soft and persuasive as that of a maiden." We can well believe that such romantic heroes as this are rare in the wild mountains of Sfakia as well as anywhere else.

We regret that we cannot introduce Captain Manias to our readers as he is presented to us by Mr. Pashley's artist, in full Cretan costume. A splendid figure he must have been, and fully justifies Captain Spratt's remarks on the picturesque effect of the Cretan style of dress. The great peculiarity of this, as distinguished from that of other Greeks, consists in the high, tight-fitting boots of leather, generally of a brown or red colour, sometimes bright scarlet, and often highly embroidered and laced. It is remarkable that these high boots, by which the Cretan is at once recognised among other Greeks, are noticed by Galen,* in the second century of the Christian era, as equally characteristic of the Cretans in his day. We know few instances of so permanent a fashion in any article of dress.

Notwithstanding his other merits, Captain Manias would, in one respect, have proved but an unsatisfactory *dragonman* to any traveller less familiar with the modern Greek dialects than Mr. Pashley. He spoke nothing but his native tongue, the peculiar Sfakian dialect, which differs so much, not only from ordinary modern Greek, but even from that spoken in other parts of Crete, as to be at first with difficulty intelligible, even to one familiar with the latter. Mr. Pashley has, in consequence, preserved to us some interesting specimens of this primitive dialect, in two or three songs which he took down from the mouth of his guide, and a curious story of a vampire, which he heard from the

* Cited by Pashley, vol. ii., p. 253.

peasants at Anopolis. As might be expected from their secluded position, the Sfakians have preserved in their dialect many Hellenic and old Doric words as well as forms, which had been wholly lost in the vernacular Romaic. The preservation of all such dialectic remains of the ancient language is an object of the highest interest to the philologist, and Captain Spratt has rendered a real service to that science by inserting in the Appendix to his first volume a vocabulary of Cretan Greek, compiled by a M. Khurmuzi, a native of the island, with the valuable addition of a dissertation on the relations of Cretan and modern Greek by that accomplished philologist, Viscount Strangford. We cannot but concur with the latter in his expression of regret that the rapid extension of the modern Greek educational system—meritorious as it is in many respects—should have the effect of displacing,—as it is rapidly doing even in Crete, with the exception of the mountain districts,—all traces of the popular dialect, thus “displacing a form of speech which might have been made to bear the same relation to classical Greek that Italian bears to Latin, and substituting in its stead a strange language, now perhaps unavoidable and past remedy, in which a revived or factitious ancient vocabulary is galvanized, rather than animated, by the idiom of modern French newspapers.”

The White Mountains, as well as the summits of Mount Ida, are still frequented by the ibex, or wild goat, for which the island was celebrated in ancient times, and the figure of which is found as a characteristic symbol on the coins of several of its cities.* But the mountain shepherds, in these regions, have no occasion to guard their flocks from the attacks of wolves, so numerous and destructive on the mainland of Greece, no beast of prey more formidable than a fox or a badger being found in the island. Crete also enjoys the same immunity as many other large islands from the presence of snakes or other venomous reptiles. This privilege, which was granted to Ireland by St. Patrick, and to Malta by St. Paul, is ascribed in Crete to the favour of Titus, the companion of St. Paul, who, according to their ecclesiastical traditions, was the first archbishop of the island, and continued to be venerated as its patron saint, until, under the Venetian rule, his place was in some degree usurped by St. Mark. St. Titus is, however, still looked up to as their especial patron by all the Christian inhabitants of Crete.

The mountain group of Ida occupies as nearly as possible the centre of the island, and though not nearly so extensive as that of the White Mountains, is more imposing, from its more detached and commanding position. It is now known as Psiloriti, or Ypsiloriti (Υψηλορείτιον, a

* A considerable herd of them was seen by Captain Spratt during his ascent of Mount Ida; notwithstanding which, he elsewhere tells us that they are *exclusively confined* to the White Mountains.

curious kind of diminutive of *ὕψηλον ὄρος*, the high mountain *par excellence*), but the ancient name is still preserved in that of Nida, given to an extensive upland basin about 2,500 feet below the highest summit, affording a convenient halting-place for the traveller who ascends the mountain. The roots and branches of Mount Ida extend down to the sea, both on the north and south coasts, thus forming a natural barrier across the island. East of this is a broad tract of hilly—but not mountainous—country, comprising some of the finest and most fertile portions of Crete. It is here that were situated in ancient times the two rival cities of Cnossus and Gortyna,—the one within a few miles of the northern coast, the other on the southern slope of the hills. Here also is placed, immediately on the sea-coast, a few miles from the site of Cnossus, the modern city of Candia, or as it is called by the Greeks, Megalo Kastron, so long the capital of the island under the Venetians, and still the largest and most populous town in the island, though the dignity of the capital has been transferred by the Turks to Canea, or Khania, which occupies the site of the ancient Cydonia, about seventy miles farther to the west.

The eastern half of the island, east of Mount Ida, is again broken into two portions, united by a kind of isthmus of low land, not exceeding eight miles in breadth; and each of these is again marked by a group of mountains of considerable elevation, which send down their offshoots and branches on all sides to the sea, forming bold and rugged headlands, alternating with deep bays and occasional tracts of a softer and richer character.

It is this peculiar conformation of Crete—its long and narrow form, broken into various portions which seem to hang loosely together, and traversed in all directions by mountain ranges and ridges, sometimes descending abruptly to the sea, sometimes leaving a broad margin of fertile plain or rich valley—that undoubtedly contributed in ancient times to perpetuate its divided condition, and confirm that strong municipal spirit of self-government, which was one of the leading characteristics of the Greek mind. Doubtless the "hundred cities" of the heroic ages, or even the ninety to which they are reduced by Homer in another passage, were a mere poetical or popular exaggeration. But the number of so-called "cities,"—that is to say, in the Greek acceptance of the word, towns forming municipalities, and enjoying full rights of self-government,—

Without attempting to enumerate

republics of Gersau or San Marino, many of them are sufficiently proved, by the number and variety and the artistic execution of their coins, as well as in some cases by the extent and character of their remains, to have been places of wealth and importance. We have already mentioned that there are no temples or other ruins still remaining in Crete that have retained enough of their architectural character to be striking to the uninitiated; but in many cases the remains of theatres and other public edifices, with numerous shattered columns of marble and of granite—the last of which must unquestionably have been brought from Egypt,—sufficiently attest the ancient opulence of the cities that once occupied these now-deserted sites. In other instances, on the contrary, there are found nothing but foundations of a very massive character, often of the polygonal, or so-called cyclopean style of masonry, without any indications of the site having been inhabited at any subsequent period. One of the most remarkable of these appears to be the site discovered by Captain Spratt, on the slopes of the Lasethi Mountains, and identified by him (on very questionable grounds) with that of the ancient Olus. But the correct attribution of such ruins, where neither coins nor inscriptions are discovered on the spot, must be always a matter of much uncertainty.

It is curious to compare these evidences of the ancient populousness of the island with its present condition. At the present day there are only *three* towns on the north coast of the island,—the two already mentioned, Candia and Canea, both of which were fortified and rebuilt by the Venetians, and the third, Retimo, intermediate between them, and the least considerable of the three. On the south coast, the only place that can be called a town is Ierapetra, which is proudly termed by Captain Spratt, “the fourth city of the island,” though he himself adds that it is a poor, miserable place, with about 2,000 fever-stricken inhabitants. The ancient Hierapytna, of which it occupies the site and preserves the name, still exhibited in the sixteenth century* (when it was visited by Onorio Belli), the remains of a naumachia, an amphitheatre, and two theatres, besides temples, thermae, and aqueducts.

Nor must this estimate be taken as proving any remarkable prosperity at the former period; from official reports found in the Venetian archives, it appears, that although the inhabitants of Crete had at one period of the sixteenth century been reduced as low as 250,000, this was regarded as a proof of the great depopulation of the island, in consequence of the tyranny and oppression of its local governors. Whatever may have been the case in ancient times, it is certain that Crete might, at the present day, very well sustain a population of five or six hundred thousand souls.

Captain Spratt's volumes throw but little light upon the present condition of the island under its Turkish rulers—a subject upon which we should have gladly obtained some further information. He tells us, indeed, vaguely, “that on the whole there are few people in the Levant at the present time more free and independent, or less taxed and oppressed, than the Greek community of Crete;” and if any dependence can be placed upon the estimated increase in the numbers of the population, it is evident that there must have been considerable progress. But it is certain that at the time when he was in the island, **the twenty-five years which had elapsed since the civil war had as yet but very imperfectly repaired the damage done by those long years of rapine and bloodshed.** Upon this point Captain Spratt's testimony is distinct and explicit. Even in the rich plain of Khania, in the immediate vicinity of the present capital, he tells us that when once the traveller penetrates the grove of olives that covers the whole as seen from a distance, **“the heart will soon grow sad at the numerous marks of devastation and ruin which everywhere meet him. Half populated villages, partially restored farms and dwellings, and the smoke-black windows and tottering walls of others in ruin, tell of the misery which has stalked through this fair land, the result of a merciless war of extermination between the two races and religions who possess it.”**—(Vol. ii, p. 162.) A little farther on he adds: “From what I have stated of the devastation and ruin, still so evident in the vicinity of the present capital of the island, and upon one of its most fertile spots, an idea can be formed of what exists in all the low country of Crete. Ruin meets the traveller in every village; the result of a devastating war lies impressed upon the face of the land, and upon many a countenance, still; and a sorrowful tale is ever ready for the ear.”

The mode in which the war was carried on was indeed one of which the traces were not likely soon to be effaced. Startling as is Mr. Pashley's estimate that the population was diminished by one-half in consequence of the war,—including, it must be remembered, a

a Mussulman yoke,—the details which he collected in his rambles through the island, while the memory of these events was still fresh in people's minds, are such as to render it not improbable. A few instances will suffice. The village of Episkope at the time of his visit, he tells us, consisted of about sixty dwellings: it had contained nearly three hundred at the outbreak of the revolution, thirteen years before. At Peghé, a village where about one hundred and sixty Greeks paid the poll-tax before the revolution, the number of inhabited houses did not exceed forty. Melidhoni before the Greek revolution contained one hundred and forty Christian and ten Mohammedan families,—about four times its population in 1834. In the plain of Mesará, one of the most fertile districts of the island, “the villages suffered greatly during the war. There were here no lofty and almost inaccessible mountains to flee to as a place of refuge. In most of the villages, full three-fourths of the houses are in ruins. One which formerly contained twenty houses has now only two.” “‘A single day,’ observed Captain Manias, ‘suffices for clearing a plain.’” Individual instances told the same tale. At the village of Arkhânes, where Mr. Pashley lodged, his host had lost his father and three brothers; his wife's father and one of her brothers had also been put to death by the Mohammedans, and the poor woman herself died of grief. But the most striking case of all is that of the family of the Kurmulidhes, one of the most illustrious in the island, who took an active part in the contest: out of sixty-four men of the family, *two* only survived the murderous war.


It must in fairness be added that the sufferings and losses of the contest were as severely felt by the Mohammedan inhabitants of the island as by the Greeks; indeed, if we are to judge from the general result, they would appear to have fallen upon them even more heavily than upon the Christians. According to Mr. Pashley's calculation, at the time of the outbreak of the war in 1821, about half the population of the island consisted of Mohammedans. Captain Spratt estimates them, at the present day, at not more than one-third, and attests the fact that here, as in most other parts of the Ottoman dominions, the number of the Christians is steadily increasing, and that of the Mohammedans gradually diminishing. A very small part of the latter are Turks; by far the largest proportion are of genuine Cretan race, whose forefathers were induced to abandon their creed and adopt that of Islamism, tempted by the worldly advantages held out to such apostasy when the island was wrested by the Turks from the Venetians. In many instances the change was at first merely external, and some families, especially that of the Kurmulidhes, already noticed, are said to have continued to profess Christianity in secret, and even to baptize their children as well as

circumcise them, from the period of the Turkish conquest till the outbreak of the Greek revolution. As a general rule, the new converts did not change their language with their creed, and hence Greek has continued to the present day to be the universal language of the island. In other respects, also, there is little difference between the Cretan Greeks and their Mohammedan compatriots, their common descent and use of a common language giving rise to a freedom of social intercourse between the two, greater than in any other part of the Turkish Empire. Even intermarriages between persons of different religions are not uncommon. "The Cretans of both creeds, too, dress so much alike, that the distinction is often not recognised by residents of long standing, or by Greeks from the neighbouring islands."

Under these circumstances, the period of tranquillity that succeeded the restoration of the Turkish power had, it is said, already done much to soften away the mutual antipathies between the adherents of the two creeds; but this process of amalgamation was in great measure interrupted by the revolutionary demonstration of the Greeks of the island in 1859,—a movement which originated with the wild Sfakian tribes of the mountains, and is represented by Captain Spratt as altogether unjustifiable and without excuse. It was at all events ill-timed and ill-advised, and like all premature attempts at revolution, tended to retard the very cause it was meant to advance. But we cannot wonder that this "mistaken and misguided patriotism," as it is termed by Captain Spratt, should be ever ready to blaze up afresh in the hearts of the Cretan Greeks. It would be difficult to conceive a more trying position than that in which they were placed by the result of the civil war. Their struggles for independence and freedom had certainly not been less resolute or less persevering than those of their neighbours on the mainland of Greece, nor had the war been stained by fewer of those atrocities that leave a feeling of mutual exasperation which generations will hardly efface. Crushed for a time by the overwhelming power of Mehemet Ali, they rose again more fiercely than before, after the battle of Navarino had given a check to his progress, and drove the Mussulman troops before them. "The Christians reaped the harvests of 1828 and 1829 unmolested by the Mohammedans, who were again cooped up within the walls of the fortified towns, and would soon, in all probability, either have abandoned the island, or perished in it, had not the three Allied Powers decided that Crete should be united to the Government of Mehemet Ali, and notified their decree to the Christian population."* Thus did the Cretan Greeks see themselves, at the very time when they were looking forward with confidence to the triumph of their cause, handed over once more

to the hated yoke of a Mohammedan governor, supported by a power which it was idle to think of resisting. That they should submit was a necessity; but it was not to be expected that they should rest contented.

It is true that the Turkish Government is not what it was before the revolutionary war. The Janissaries have disappeared; the irregular, vexatious oppression of their petty tyrants is more or less effectually controlled; their taxation may be light: but the longing for independence and self-government remains unsatisfied, and is fostered by the circumstance that the Cretan Greeks see their fellow-countrymen, almost within sight of their shores, enjoying that freedom for which they themselves fought so long without success. The Venetians are not more likely to acquiesce in the Austrian domination, now that the rest of Italy is free; nor can we expect the Greeks of Crete to submit patiently to the Turkish yoke, while they know that the islanders of the Cyclades have established their independence. It is vain to advise them to acquiesce patiently in the present state of things, and devote themselves to the advancement of their material prosperity. Under such circumstances the yoke of "the detested foreigner" weighs like an incubus upon the energies and spirit of a people; and even if its oppression were altogether as visionary, they cannot breathe freely till they have shaken it off. To the strength and universality of this feeling in the Greek population of the island, Captain Spratt is an unexceptionable witness; the more so because he seems to look upon all such aspirations with unfavourable eyes, and is clearly of opinion that their wisest course would be to bide their time in patience. "The one strong feeling," he tells us, "which ever rankles in the heart of a Cretan Greek is the hope that they will one day be freed from the government of their present masters." That day may be more or less distant; but we feel confident that it can hardly be very far removed. The separation of Crete from the other islands of the Archipelago at the time of the settlement of the Greek kingdom was one of those arbitrary acts, dictated by a temporary policy, that can only be defended on the score of the expediency of the moment. That policy has passed away; for it must be remembered that Crete was then assigned, not to the Porte, but to the Viceroy of Egypt, whom it was then thought desirable to uphold, but it was soon found necessary to humble. The reunion of Crete with the Morea and the islands of the Cyclades—the countries with which it has the closest geographical connection, as well as the most active relations—is one of those measures which cannot be long delayed, now that the English have set the example by yielding to the popular feeling in the case of the Ionian Islands.



PASTORAL WORK.

*Directorium Pastorale. The Principles and Practice of Pastoral Work
in the Church of England* By the Rev. JOHN HENRY BLUNT
Second Edition. London: Rivingtons. 1865.

THE Parish Priest has to fulfil a variety of duties which require in him a corresponding diversity of attainments. Supposing the all-important conditions to be fulfilled, that he is sincere and conscientious, that he sets forth his doctrine in his life, and that consequently he is a Christian gentleman,—he should also be a scholar and a divine, a good reader, a persuasive preacher, in the schoolroom apt to teach, in the sick chamber gentle and sympathizing, not wanting in tact and delicacy for the discernment and treatment of spiritual maladies, nor afraid of speaking unpalatable truths. He must have a deep knowledge of human nature, derived as well from intercourse with the world as from reflection on his own conduct and motives. He must be conversant with the management of secular business, able to preside at the meetings of his parishioners, and to administer the parochial charities. It is impossible that a book should instruct him fully in his multifarious duties, or forestall the teaching which he will receive from the exercise of his holy calling, and from conference with his clerical friends and neighbours. Yet even here a book may do him good service by laying down the principles which are to guide him in each of his ministrations, and by giving examples of the application of those principles to matters of detail. This useful purpose is, we think, to a great extent accomplished by Mr. Blunt's "Directorium Pastorale."

The work is evidently what it professes to be, "the result of varied experience, much observation in different parts of England, and a careful reading of most of the works that are extant on the pastoral office." It does not show the abundance of theological learning which is to be found in the late Professor Blunt's "Duties of the Parish Priest;" it is not equal to Archdeacon Evans's "Bishopric of Souls" in eloquence and tenderness of feeling; nor, perhaps, is it so comprehensive as Archdeacon Sandford's "Parochialia." But we think it yields to none of those excellent treatises, nor to any other on the same subject with which we are acquainted, in real usefulness. Always holding before the clergyman a high standard of personal holiness and zeal, sound in its general principles, and full of practical suggestions, compendious and well arranged, it seems to us in every way well fitted to be the pastor's manual. Many a clergyman is called upon to undertake the responsibilities of a parish who has had little or no previous training in parochial work; and it is not every one who, under such circumstances, finds among his clerical neighbours, or even endeavours to find, the friendly adviser of whom he stands in need at almost every step. To such persons this book will be a most valuable guide; and few, we should suppose, of the elder clergy are so well versed in their duties that they may not be the wiser for its perusal.

The author has apparently prescribed to himself the strictest abstinence from controversy; and he has thus been compelled to pass by many points upon which we might have been glad to have his opinion. The chapter treating of the administration of the Holy Communion is on this account, as he acknowledges, especially incomplete. But to have treated of such questions in a cursory way would have been almost useless; and had he discussed them fully, he must have greatly enlarged the scope and dimensions of his book, and rendered it less generally acceptable than he may now expect it to be. Some idea of the contents may be gathered from the following list of the headings of the chapters:—I. The nature of the pastoral office; II. The relation of the pastor to God; III. The relation of the pastor to his flock; IV. The ministry of God's Word; V. The ministry of the sacraments; VI. The visitation of the sick; VII. Pastoral converse; VIII. Pastoral guidance; IX. Schools; X. Parochial lay co-operation; XI. Auxiliary parochial institutions; XII. Parish festivals; XIII. Miscellaneous responsibilities.

After expressing so strongly our approval of Mr. Blunt's performance as a whole, we shall hope to be forgiven by him if, in the following observations, we notice a few of his statements which seem to require more or less of qualification.

properly lays it down that "ministerial acts and words have a power derived from God as well as an outward form;" but he is not perfectly accurate when from this he proceeds to say,—

"Whatever is the spiritual effect of words or actions that are used by the ministers of God, that effect is produced by God alone; and the minister of God can no more be said to produce these results than the conduit which conveys water from the mountain spring to the lips of the drinker can be said to quench his thirst."—(P. 35.)

To this it may obviously be replied that the minister is a reasonable and free agent—the conduit no more than a passive instrument; and so far as it is at the discretion of the minister to do the act or to pronounce the form of words to which the spiritual effect is attached, so far he has it in his power to produce that effect. The weakness of the comparison is conspicuous in the case which Mr. Blunt has adduced as an illustration of it, the Absolution used in the Visitation of the Sick: "If the sick man humbly and heartily desires it,"—and as to this the minister must judge,—he is to be absolved according to a form which in its terms is judicial and unconditional, "I absolve thee." We cannot think the similitude of the conduit will satisfy those who feel a difficulty about this form of absolution. Either they will be fain to explain it (like Wheatley) as having reference only to ecclesiastical censures, or else they will import into it a reservation which makes it conditional, such as this, "I absolve thee if thou art truly penitent," or "if nothing hindereth." A reservation of this kind seems, after all, to be adopted by Mr. Blunt. For with reference to the words, "Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them," &c. (John xx. 23), he says,—

"These words must be interpreted in the sense indicated by our Lord's previous words on binding and loosing, viz., that what the apostles did in their ministerial office, had power towards the souls of men, because, though done by men on earth, it was done by those who were acting as the deputies of the Chief Shepherd, and would consequently be, *nothing hindering*, ratified in heaven."—(P. 37.)

This may be a reasonable interpretation; but it is not taking the words as Mr. Blunt, at p. 35, thinks they easily may be taken, "in their simple meaning." Upon the whole, considering that the indicative form, "I absolve thee," as well as the delivery of the power to remit and retain sins in the Ordination Service, appears never to have been used in the Church before the twelfth century,—an age whose precedents are not entitled to our unqualified respect,—it is no wonder if many of the clergy in their ministrations, like Bishop Bull on his deathbed, prefer the precatory form with which the whole of Christendom for ten centuries was content.

Starting from the injunction in the Preface to the Prayer-book,

which requires the minister, "being at home, and not being otherwise reasonably hindered," to say the morning and evening prayer in his parish church, Mr. Blunt pleads strongly for the revival of the daily service, dwells on the blessings likely to arise from it both to the pastor and his flock, and meets some of the objections commonly made to it, such as the length of the service, its interference with domestic duties, and the inappropriateness of certain passages of Scripture appointed for the lessons. We also value highly the daily service, and should wish it to be resumed wherever there is a good prospect of its being regularly maintained and fairly attended. But we think the clergyman, if he be single-handed, may with a good conscience plead that he is "reasonably hindered" from it. When once he has commenced it, he will always be unwilling to let it be interrupted on account of his indisposition or absence from home; and thus it can hardly fail in time to become a strain on his health, and a restraint on his needful recreation. Outside the walls of the church, the ministrations of the parish priest have much increased since the injunction was given to which reference has been made. The religious teaching in schools, and the general superintendence of these and other parochial institutions, claim a large share of his time and attention; while the domiciliary visitation, from the increase of population and other causes, is a far more onerous part of the pastoral work than it was two or three centuries ago. Moreover, in religious families of the upper classes, family prayers have to a great extent occupied the place of the Church service. Undoubtedly, they cannot compare with it in solemnity and the "beauty of holiness;" but they have their special advantages. The whole household may without inconvenience be brought together to join in them. They admit the introduction of domestic topics: they may be lengthened, or shortened, or otherwise adapted to the circumstances of the family; and in the use of them the master of the family is reminded of his responsibilities as a priest in his own house. It seems to us that family prayers hardly deserve to be dismissed by Mr. Blunt with the somewhat disparaging *soubriquet* of "breakfast-table devotions."

As a mode of shortening the Church service, Mr. Blunt suggests the omission of all the prayers intervening between the third collect and the prayer of St. Chrysostom; and in support of this abbreviation he alleges that the rubric after the third collect requires the five prayers following to be said *when there is an anthem, but not otherwise* (p. 58). The abbreviation has, we believe, in some churches been adopted. We object to it (much as we should like to have a shorter form of daily prayer) because it cuts out nearly all the intercessory part of the service, leaving only two or three short supplications, "O Lord, save the Queen," &c.; but if we thought it in itself unobjectionable,

we should be sorry to have to maintain in a court of law the construction of the rubric which has been put forward in its defence.

The chapter on "The Ministry of God's Word" contains many judicious observations and suggestions on the practice of extempore preaching, which King Charles II. vainly endeavoured to restore by a proclamation addressed to the University of Cambridge, but which, we may hope, is in our time gradually reviving. Some persons, no doubt, possess in a greater degree than others a natural capacity and predilection for the attainment of eloquence; but we believe with Mr. Blunt, that the correct expression of ideas by word of mouth is rather an accomplishment, to be acquired by study and practice, than a "gift," and that a fair proficiency in the art of public speaking is within the reach of almost every young man who resolutely sets himself to attain it. Every clergyman certainly should do his best to possess himself of this most valuable accomplishment, before he resigns himself entirely to the habit of writing his sermons, and preaching from book.

Yet we would warn the clergyman, more strongly than Mr. Blunt has done, on no account to give up writing. We believe that by doing so, and trusting entirely to their acquired or natural fluency, many have seriously impaired their effectiveness in the pulpit. If they have gained in animation, it has been at the cost of becoming verbose, inaccurate, inelegant, incoherent, or given to vain repetitions. Nor is it the case that an increase of animation always attends the successful attempt to preach extempore. We have ourselves known one (probably not a solitary instance) who acquitted himself well as an extempore preacher, was easy and fluent, and being less ambitious in his style was in that respect more pleasing than when he had composed his sermon beforehand; but the fervour of tone and manner which he never failed to throw into the written discourse, he seemed unable to command when he had to carry on simultaneously the two processes of composition and delivery. We cannot take exception to anything Mr. Blunt has said on this subject, but wish he had recommended the preacher who has not confidence in his extempore powers, to try the experiment of writing his sermon, and committing it to memory. This practice prevails in the Scottish kirk, and is followed, we believe, by many of the continental clergy, and by some eminent preachers of our own Church, with good effect.

It is truly observed by Mr. Blunt, in his chapter on the Visitation of the Sick, that the practice of the clergy at the present day with regard to that part of pastoral duty very far exceeds the standard set up in the Prayer-book and the canons of the Church. For whereas the 67th canon only requires the minister to visit for the purpose of giving instruction and comfort to a parishioner whom he knows to be

dangerously sick, and the rubric before the Visitation Service enjoins that, when any person is sick, "notice thereof shall be given to the minister," the practice is not to defer the visit until notice be given, but to seek out as well the aged, the infirm, and the permanent invalids as the "dangerously sick," and to give them the consolations and exhortations which may appear needful, though no provision is made for such cases in the authorized service-books of the Church. Mr. Blunt does not lay so much stress as some recent writers have done on the use of the office prescribed by the Prayer-book, and appears to recommend its use in one case only, that of well-instructed habitual church-goers who are in mortal sickness; and he adds, that when the Visitation Service has been once completely used, it should not be repeated. We doubt whether, even in this one case, the majority of the clergy are in the habit of using the whole service. By very many it is thought to be inconvenient and insufficient, and somewhat antiquated in its language; and by some the Absolution is felt to be a stumbling-block. They think too, not without reason, that they are released from the use of the office by the terms of the 67th canon, which says,—

"When any person is dangerously sick in any parish, the minister or curate, having knowledge thereof, shall resort unto him or her (if the disease be not known, or probably suspected, to be infectious), to instruct and comfort them in their distress, *according to the order of the Communion Book, if he be no preacher; or if he be a preacher, then as he shall think most needful and convenient.*"

In general, we believe the clergy prefer to combine portions of the Visitation Office and other parts of the Prayer-book with prayers of their own, prompted at the moment by their sympathy with the sufferer, by the conversation which they have just had with him, and by their sense of his peculiar spiritual needs and infirmities; or else they use some one of the numerous manuals published for their guidance in this most important and difficult part of their duties. We are very much of Mr. Blunt's opinion, that none of these manuals fulfils all the conditions necessary for the judicious and convenient visitation of the sick; and we think his suggestion a good one, that the clergyman should supply this want for himself, and that, for this purpose, he will do well to purchase a Bible and Prayer-book of small size, but of as large type as possible, in sheets, and to have the Prayer-book bound up together with the books of Job and Isaiah, and fifty or sixty sheets of blank paper, on which may be written down lists of psalms and Scriptures suitable for various cases, notes for exposition, exhortation, and prayer, and a few prayers taken from our best divines.

Archbishop Whately tells us, in his "Parish Pastor," that he

raised a great outcry against himself by saying that a Romish priest, who believed in confession, absolution, and extreme unction, "will feel himself called on to encounter greater risks from infectious disease than it would be needful, or even allowable, for a Protestant minister to expose himself to." Our author discusses this question, and in his conclusion so far concurs with the Archbishop as to say—(1) that the pastor "is not to rush into danger when his services are not sought for, nor likely to be of use;" but (2) that "he is not to shrink from danger when he is summoned to visit a person suffering from an infectious disorder." We cannot but think that, in this one instance, Mr. Blunt's teaching falls below the existing standard of ministerial duty; for although the 67th canon (quoted above), which was framed at a time when there was much apprehension of the plague, might seem to relieve the clergy from the duty of visiting in cases of infection, there are few clergymen at the present day who, in such a case, would consider themselves justified in waiting until they found that their services were sought for, or were likely to be of use.

With regard to the Communion of the Sick, Mr. Blunt, speaking of the previous arrangements, says,—

"The surplice should certainly be used on such occasions. Indeed, the office is framed in so exact an analogy with that for the celebration of the Holy Communion in public, that it is very singular the habit of administering it privately in a common walking dress only should ever have grown up among the clergy. It certainly cannot be accounted an over-strictness, in regard to externals, to reckon the seemly vesture prescribed for the purpose among the 'all things necessary' for reverent celebration, directed by the rubric."—(P. 214.)

And this view is enforced at greater length in the valuable work entitled "*Visitatio Infirmorum*" (Introduction, p. cxxiv.). It will be allowed by many who cannot be accused of paying undue reverence to externals, that the use of the surplice is unobjectionable in itself, and is likely to add to the solemnity of the ordinance by leading the communicant to disconnect it from the other ministrations of the sick-room, and to associate it in his mind with those of the Church. Yet it seems to us that Mr. Blunt speaks rather too strongly when he says it "should certainly be used." In the absence of an express direction of the Church (and we cannot think the 58th canon, which has been cited in this behalf, is at all conclusive on the point), and without the sanction of general custom, some clergymen may hesitate as to the propriety of wearing the Church's vestments for other purposes than those of public worship. And if in any case it is probable that the surplice will disturb the mind of the sick person, we should say it certainly ought *not* to be used. From what we have heard, however, our

impression is that on this score there need be no fear. The practice is becoming common, and is not entirely of recent introduction : in the great parish of St. George's, Hanover Square, it has prevailed for very many years, as we are informed, without giving offence.

Mr. Blunt deals in no austere spirit with the questions, not always easy of solution, which arise out of the daily intercourse of the pastor with his flock. He adopts rather the social and genial than the ascetic view of the clerical character. He allows the clergyman to mingle in society and to take part in its lawful festivities and amusements, provided he always bear in mind that the grand object of his conversation must be to gain the confidence and good-will of his parishioners for pastoral, not for secular purposes. Some persons may be shocked, though we are not, to find that attendance, on special occasions, is permitted even at a ball or a cricket-match :—

“It may be expedient to remind society that it is Christian even in the midst of social joys ; and in the gayest scene, as elsewhere, the presence of the servant of God, as such, may be a strong rebuke to an excessive spirit of worldliness, as it may be a visible memorial of a Master of all, whose eye is never absent.”—(P. 82.)

We confess, however, we think the occasions on which the clergyman is seen at a ball should be “few and far between.”


It may seem almost an insult to the reader's common sense to submit to him a paragraph on “the importance of towns.” But it is by no means unnecessary to remind the young man who is about to choose his sphere of pastoral work, that the town, however inferior to the country in natural charms, is superior to it in one important point, inasmuch as it calls out more completely all the powers of a man, and gives greater scope to his energy and zeal. And we readily forgive Mr. Blunt the title of his paragraph, for the sake of the following observations which form the staple of it, and which seem to us just and true in the main, whether the comparison suggested in them between America and the North of England be admitted or not :—

“There has always been a preference for country parishes among the clergy ; and of books that have been written on the subject of pastoral work, I know hardly any which at all deal with it as if England was a land of manufacturing towns as well as agricultural villages. Let English clergymen avoid the seductions of the charming sophism that ‘God made the country, and man made the town.’ Under the influence of love for country life, they went a long way, in past generations, towards losing the hold of the Church of which they were ministers over the populations of our large towns. And yet one great city thoroughly gained for the Church would have more influence on the revival of Church of England principles, and of practical religion, than the largest county of mere agricultural parishes. It is in the cities and towns that the intellectual powers are being developed among the classes who do the headwork of the country. It is there that

the great social questions of the day are being tried out; there that the secular part of education is being pushed to its utmost limits. This is especially the case in the North of England, which in many parts is a kind of Anglicized America in its feelings, institutions, and habits; the principal difference, and a most important one, being, that there is still a strong underlying force of national tradition, which gives a stability to the northern counties of England, derived from the consciousness of a past, such as America, in its unmitigated newness, cannot yet possess. If it should be the lot of a clergyman to be cast in any town parish where the characteristics here hinted at are conspicuous, let him look on it as a ministerial privilege—let him consider that he has been placed in a position where all his learning, energy, zeal, piety, and tact will be required. He has been placed in the vanguard of the army which is fighting the Lord's battle against immorality and sin, and has had put into his hands the most hopeful material that can be found for building up a 'Church of the future,' such as will be a true development, for a busy age, of the ever fresh and young Church which has been the guide of so many generations."—(P. 92.)

We must now take leave of Mr. Blunt's book, with the hope that many of our clerical readers may be induced by our commendations, and even by our criticisms, to examine it for themselves.

W. G. HUMPHRY.



THE CONSCIENCE CLAUSE.

The Conscience Clause : its History, Terms, Effect, and Principle. A Reply to Archdeacon Denison. By JOHN OAKLEY, M.A. London : Ridgway. 1866.

The Conscience Clause of the Education Department, illustrated from the Evidence taken by the Select Committee of Education, and from the Correspondence of the Committee of Council on Education. By JOHN GELLIBRAND HUBBARD, M.P. London : Masters. 1865.

MR. OAKLEY has had the courage to come forward as the champion of an unpopular cause against a formidable antagonist. For the last two years the name of Archdeacon Denison has been identified with the question of the Conscience Clause. If it had been invented for his special benefit, it could not more effectually have answered the purpose of giving him a grievance, and within the walls of the Jerusalem Chamber, and without, he has made the most of it. Easy as it is to mistake noise for strength, and the concerted action of a party for the utterance of the mind of the Church, it is probably no exaggeration to say that on this question he has a very large following among his brother clergy, and that many zealous laymen are ready to support him. The causes of this influence are not far to seek. Personal character, manifest earnestness, indomitable courage, oratorical power,—these are combined in no ordinary measure in the leader of the movement against the Conscience Clause, and they qualify him for the post he has assumed. Few men living possess the demagogic power in a higher degree of excellence ; and where he is *en rapport* with the *demos*, where he speaks to men whose convictions, feelings, prejudices he shares, he knows how to wield them at his will. With a skill in avoiding monotony which is either a natural gift or the growth of long practice, he knows how to pass from one rhetorical extreme to the other. Spurgeon is hardly more comic, Dr. Pusey

hardly more awful. Pleasant jests about his telling the boys of his village to duck a school inspector,* and tremendous denunciations of those who would sacrifice the *depositum fidei* for the sake of a Government grant, actually jostle each other in his speeches, and "cheers and laughter" alternate with the thrill, half of horror and half of complacency, of those who listen to anathemas against their opponents.

It is no disparagement to the Archdeacon to add, in dwelling on these special gifts, that his speeches are better heard than read. The juxtaposition of the grave and the ludicrous, which may be welcomed as a relief by those who listen, is felt as an incongruity by those who read; and marked as every letter of his is by terse and vigorous English, and by a bold assertion of principles, they are yet wanting in the fulness and completeness which bring out all the salient points and facts of a case in their right relation to each other, and each with the evidence and arguments that of right belong to it. We do not look, in such a man, for the dispassionate calmness of the judge. We are contented if we can find, as a help to our own judgment, the eloquent pleading of the advocate.

What is wanting in Archdeacon Denison's speeches is supplied by Mr. Hubbard's pamphlet. That gentleman, distinguished for a zealous loyalty to the Church which has shown itself in many higher and nobler works than controversy, has not shrunk from taking a foremost place as her champion in that field also. In the Church-rate question as in that of the Conscience Clause, he is the lay-brother, almost the *alter ego* of the Archdeacon; and in the latter has brought together, with a method and compactness due, it may be supposed, to his parliamentary training, all the most material facts and arguments of his case.† The reader who takes his pamphlet on the one side and Mr.

* Speech in Convocation: *Guardian*, Feb. 7, 1866.

† It is right to add that Mr. Hubbard's pamphlet is not limited to this. With a striking fairness he gives, often *in extenso*, evidence and arguments on the other side. But I am compelled to add that there is sometimes a want of power to enter into other men's feelings, or see the bearing of an argument, which betrays him into what seems, but is not, unfairness. Thus (1) as Mr. Oakley points out (p. 16), he has, with no conceivable justification (p. 33), charged Mr. Lingen, or the Lords of the Council, in whose name he writes, with "discreditable trickery" because, having urged the Committee of the National Society to adopt a given measure as founded on an Act of Parliament, and being met with the answer that the National Society was specially exempted from that Act, he replies that "he knew this all along," and that "if it were not exempted" the correspondence would have been unnecessary," because the Act would have settled the question. And (2) having, in p. 8, quoted a sentence of Lord Granville's, admitting the right of a clergyman to exclude from the secular instruction of his schools those who do not choose to receive his religious teaching, and added there, with characteristic honesty, Lord Granville's limitation—"the question appears to me to be quite changed when money from general taxpayers is required for the purpose of promoting that school," he afterwards (p. 31) first quotes the first clause without the limitation, and proceeds to argue from it as though Lord Granville

Oakley's full and masterly argument on the other, may feel sure that neither cause suffers through the weakness or violence of its advocate, and that if he errs in judging it, will not be from want of information. If I were to name any other statements as specially worthy of notice it would be those contained in the evidence of the Rev. G. H. Fagan before the House of Commons' Committee (Report, pp. 268-94).

The history of the Conscience Clause may be traced at wearisome length through interminable correspondence. The substance of it is briefly this. The Committee of Council on Education had been appointed in April, 1839, to administer the grants for educational purposes which Parliament had been induced to vote, on the basis (1) of securing "training in the principles of the Christian religion," and (2) of "respecting the rights of conscience." The idea of any State interference with the education of the people was then new and unwelcome to the great body of the clergy. In June, 1839, came the first great storm. There were signs that the Government contemplated a Normal School on the plan of a comprehensive religious basis, and intended to admit to the benefit of their grants other schools than such as were in union with the National or British and Foreign Societies (State-aid to education having hitherto passed exclusively through those Societies as its channels), and so to exercise a more direct control over the education of the country. Petitions to Parliament against any such action poured in from both Churchmen and Dissenters. On June 14, Lord Stanley moved an Address to the Crown, praying that the Minute of Council appointing the Committee be rescinded, and was supported by Lord Ashley, Mr. Gladstone, and Sir R. Peel. After an adjourned debate the motion was lost, in a House (including pairs) of 623, by a majority of five only. In the House of Lords the opposition was much stronger, and a string of resolutions, condemning the action of the Committee as unconstitutional, was moved, on July 5, 1839, by the Archbishop of Canterbury, and carried by 229 to 118. An Address, embodying the resolutions, was presented with great solemnity to the Queen, and an answer, reasserting the rights of conscience, put into her mouth more of the nature of a rebuke than a triumphant majority of the Peers had ever before met with. As it

had conceded the point unconditionally, and then, when he returns to the limiting clause, meets it by saying, that as the promoters of schools pay taxes, they are only receiving back their own money, and are therefore entitled to claim as unfettered a freedom in dealing with it as if it had never passed through the hands of the Government. He does not seem able to grasp the thought that, the taxes once being paid, the Government is a trustee, not for the denomination that pays, but for the whole people. So, in his letter to the *Guardian* of Jan. 31st, he quotes the first half of Lord Granville's answer, with absolutely no reference to the limiting clause.

was, the collision, hot as men's passions were at the time, did good. But for the Conservatives, the Whigs would have gone on with schemes for a "comprehensive" education which would have utterly broken down. But for the Whigs, the Conservatives would have crushed all Government action but that of transmitting money to the two recognised societies, and, if they had been true to their principles, would have hindered any direct recognition of dissenting schools, or of schools where dissenting children were admitted, and their parents' rights of conscience respected. The result was, that projects for secular or united education were shelved. The denominational principle was practically recognised. It was agreed that grants should be given for the building and support of Church of England schools, and for those of other religious bodies, on identical or analogous conditions. Security was to be given for the permanence of the site, for the efficiency of the master, for the order and sanitary arrangements of the school, for its periodical inspection by a Government officer; but the religious teaching given was to be left in all cases to the control of the local representatives of the body with which it was connected,—in the case of Church schools, *i. e.*, to that of the parochial clergy. A preference was avowed for schools that would accept a Conscience Clause (Minute of Dec. 3, 1839), but the rule was not pressed on Church schools, was hardly wanted in those of the British and Foreign Society, and was accepted by Wesleyans and other Dissenters. Controversies as to the appointment of Government inspectors and the management clauses of such schools were arranged, after much discussion, by satisfactory compromises. The arrangement worked in many ways admirably. The managers of schools soon got used to what at first seemed the needless or vexatious restrictions of official red-tapeism, and the applications for grants, which had fallen off in the panic of 1839, increased so largely, that the Parliamentary grant, which had begun with a modest £20,000 in 1833, had risen, when Mr. Lingen took office in 1849, to £75,000 or £100,000, and mounted gradually till it reached £840,000 in 1862. It is to this very success, by the confession of Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Committee of Council themselves,* that we may trace the increased strictness of administration which threatens, in its direct and indirect consequences, to be so serious an interruption to the working of the whole scheme. The grant came to be inconveniently large for Chancellors of the

* Evidence, 648, 1,040. Hubbard, pp. 49, 54. Mr. Robert Lowe, with an almost cynical candour, confesses that he was "as well or better pleased that the public money should be saved as that the Conscience Clause should be adopted." So he states (642) that he has "never considered the extension of the education of the country as the duty" of the Educational Department. How far these are worthy notions of a statesman's function, is a question on which men's minds may perhaps differ.

Exchequer anxious to introduce economy into the national expenditure. The Committee had to see where and how they could diminish it. They must be satisfied that a school was needed, and would meet the local need, before they could grant a sum in aid of its foundation. They could not sanction a grant to more than one school, where the number of children to be taught was under 150. If the one school was in union with the National Society, or otherwise exclusively Church of England, a grant to it seemed to involve the infliction of a hardship on dissenting parents, who were thus left without any provision for the instruction of their children, except on conditions to which they might legitimately object. How was this to be avoided? In their attempts to answer this question, "My Lords" of the Committee of Council, at the suggestion of their permanent secretary, Mr. Lingen,* hit upon the expedient of the so-called "Conscience Clause." It was, in cases like that just described, to be a condition of a grant to the Church school, that its founders should consent to admit the children of Dissenters, when they formed what is called an "appreciable minority,"—which is defined at from one-seventh to one-fourth,—without enforcing upon them either attendance at Divine service in church, or the doctrines and formularies of the Church of England. The first indication of the wish to introduce such a clause was the signal of resistance. It was urged by Archdeacon Denison and those who thought with him, that no school in connection with the National Society could adopt such a clause, that no school adopting it could be admitted into connection. By the charter of that society the Catechism of the Church of England is to be taught to "the children"† in its schools; and it was argued that "*the children*," in its natural and obvious sense, means all and not some. Sir John Coleridge gave the weight of his high authority to this interpretation. At first an influential party in the managing body of the society—bishops, other clergy, and laymen—were in favour of concession. The requirements of their charter were adequately met, it was said, if the Catechism was taught as a rule. As a matter of fact, there already were, and always had been, numerous exceptions, and they had been tacitly at least sanctioned.‡ To admit dissenting children without stringent conditions was the most

* Evidence, 299.

† There has, however, been a significant series of changes in the phraseology of the terms of union,—(1) "all the children without exception;" (2) "all the children;" (3) "the children" *simpliciter*.

‡ See the admissions of Mr. Hubbard himself (p. 11) and Archdeacon Denison (p. 71), and the evidence of Mr. Kennedy (2,551) and Mr. Girdlestone (3,310). Yet more striking is the elaborate vindication of the practice of admitting dissenting children into National schools without requiring attendance at church, by the late Archdeacon Hare (Charge, 1854, p. 72) and Archdeacon Wilberforce (quoted, *ibid.*). It is right to add that Archdeacon Hare's defence implies their instruction in the Catechism, except so far as truth compelled them to change its statements of fact.

likely way to bring them within the Church's fold. Whatever pleas could be urged for moderation, expediency, peace, were urged, at first with apparent chance of success; but in the end the principles represented by Archdeacon Denison and Mr. Hubbard prevailed, and the National Society, in spite of Mr. Walpole's admission of the "manifest injustice" done to Dissenters, entered its protest against the Conscience Clause as incompatible with the terms of its own charter.*

This, of course, was a serious evil. It forced upon the founders of schools, under the circumstances referred to, an election between the alternative sources of support, and so far crippled their appliances. Those who look back and deplore the course which events have actually taken, may be tempted to think that it might have been possible even then to avert or diminish the evil; but whatever attempts were made, were, as a matter of fact, failures. The Society had set up its back, and "My Lords" set up theirs. The Conscience Clause was more and more frequently made a condition of any grant being given. The proportion of dissenting children which required its insertion in the deed fluctuated from time to time at the discretion of the Vice-President or Secretary.† Under the shelter of the official personation, which Mr. Lingen so elaborately defends,‡ he was able to meet the complaints and remonstrances of clerical and lay founders by assuring them that "My Lords" had fully considered them, and were compelled to adhere to their original determination. Country clergy were led to think that the Peers and Right Honourable gentlemen who formed the Committee had decided against them with the full weight of authority, and did not know (how could they?) that "My Lords" were often but as a shadowy Mrs. Harris, a name to be used when the titular dignity of the office was wanted to back the judgment of the Secretary that any given case came under a principle previously sanctioned.§

The result of all this was an ever increasing soreness. A decreasing minority, though still respectable in name and character, including several bishops and archdeacons, adhered, if not to the principle of

* The National Society claimed the right of blowing hot and cold in the same breath. "The promoters ought not to be compelled to state, either that *every* child shall be required to learn the Catechism, . . . and attend school and church on Sundays, or that *no* child shall be compelled to do so, in case its parents or guardians on conscientious grounds object."—(Mem. of July 23, 1860.)

† *Supra*, p. 5.

‡ Evidence, 145-8, 277-91. Hubbard, p. 43.

§ I impute no wilful abuse of a routine to Mr. Lingen. Doubtless he did but use that which he found established, and he appears (Evidence, 148) to have referred all new or special cases to the Lord President. But the routine itself is so clearly a misleading and mischievous figment, that it ought to be broken through at once. Mr. Lowe makes merry (Evidence, 812) with the simplicity of "the majority of clergymen," who "think that there is always a Board sitting round a table with green cloth, and wax candles burning."

the Conscience Clause, yet to the policy of admitting it, or if not to the policy of enforcing, to the principle of acting on it. The followers of the Archdeacon, in growing numbers, looked upon it, on the other hand, as but the thin end of the wedge, the beginning of a system intended to introduce secular, and subvert the whole fabric of Church education. The Church was in danger. The very *depositum fidei* was at stake. For a clergyman to accept the Conscience Clause was to violate his most solemn obligations, to be unfaithful to his ordination vows. Diocesan societies, following the lead of the National Society, but not under the same necessity, decided that no aid should be given to any school which had the Conscience Clause in its trust-deed. The warfare was carried on in many different forms. The Committee of the late House of Commons, appointed to inquire into the general working of the Committee of Council, had this special question brought before it, heard witnesses on both sides, and printed their evidence, but ended its labours, owing to the dissolution of Parliament, without making a report. It has been reappointed in the present session, and it is probable enough that any full discussion of the question will be postponed till the new Committee has reported. In the meantime other agencies have been at work. Archdeacon Denison made an elaborate and effective speech at the Church Congress at Norwich, in October. Archdeacon Allen, who till then had defended the clause, announced his conversion, and ascribed it to the interpretation of the clause given by Mr. Lingen, in his letter to the Rev. W. B. Caparn. With some ineffective opposition from the more moderate party in the Lower House of Convocation, a resolution condemning the clause, and pledging the House to take measures against it, was passed at the opening of the present session, by a considerable majority.

In this state the question at present stands. Sooner or later the battle will probably be carried into Parliament.

I cannot join those who would deprecate a discussion there. It is the natural and constitutional arena for debating any grievance, real or imaginary, complained of by any considerable class or party in the State. Statements, arguments, declamation that pass muster on the platform, or in a purely professional gathering, there get sifted, tested, and not unfrequently torn to rags. If a question like this is to be ventilated anywhere, it had better be where the winds blow freely. What is much more mischievous is the agitation which goes on, as in the movement for revising the constitution of the Final Court of Appeal, heating men's minds with passion and alarm, filling them with spectral phantoms of coming danger, "prognosticating a whole year of sects and schisms;" but which never musters courage, or takes definite shape, to come to Parliament and say, "This is what we want. Here is the bill we wish to pass into a law. Will

you accept the principle on the second reading, and let it go into committee?"

It is with a view to such a debate as possible—to temper the hopes or fears with which men look forward to it—to estimate the real state of the questions at issue, and to suggest the principles on which we ought to judge of them, that these pages are written.

It is well in such a case to start with the *corpus delicti*. Here then is the Conscience Clause, as communicated by Mr. Lingen to the National Society, on February 8th, 1864:—

"The said committee" (*i. e.*, of the schools accepting the clause) "shall be bound to make such orders as shall provide for admitting to the benefits of the schools the children of parents not in communion with the Church of England as by law established; but such orders shall be confined to the exemption of such children, if their parents desire it, from attendance at the public worship, and from instruction in the doctrines and formularies of the said Church, and shall not otherwise interfere with the religious teaching of the said scholars, as fixed by these presents, and shall not authorize any other religious instruction to be given in the school."

In dealing with this document I purpose following an order which, however natural and obvious it may seem, has not always been observed by those who have discussed it. I shall begin, not with abstract reasonings as to the functions of the Church or the State, and the relations between them,—not with denouncing indifference on this side or intolerance on that, but with the simple question, What does the Conscience Clause mean? What will be its probable or possible working? What will be the probable or possible working of a school to which it would have been applicable, but by the promoters of which it has been rejected? What, with these *data*, is the judgment which true Churchmen ought to form, and the course which they ought to take, concerning it? Till we have settled these points, all declamation as to the rights of conscience, or the *depositum fidei*, is but the surplusage of an idle rhetoric, dust thrown into men's eyes to hinder them from seeing clearly.

Of the clause itself an official interpretation has been given by Mr. Lingen in his letters (1) to the Rev. W. B. Caparn, and (2) to the Rev. Charles Craven.* I will deal with each of these and the comments on it separately. In the former, being called upon to meet an extreme case, thrust upon him as a crucial instance, and therefore, however apparently invidious, argumentatively fair, Mr. Lingen admitted, (1) that under the Conscience Clause "a parent might require his child to be exempted from instruction in the Apostles' Creed, if

* Hubbard, p. 92. *Guardian*, Jan. 31.

the parent belonged to a communion wherein that creed was not used;" and (2) that the clause "allows the managers to make the daily reading of the Bible, by every child that can read, an absolute rule of the school, as long as the text of the Bible is not employed to enforce doctrine which (*ex hypothesi*) is that of the Church of England, but is not also that of the parent."*

Mr. Lingen's letter was read at the Norwich Church Congress, and apparently caused what, in reports of French debates, is termed a "*sensation vive*." Its effect in one instance was to produce an instantaneous conversion in one who till that time had been a staunch defender of the Conscience Clause, and had stood firm against all the written or spoken arguments of Archdeacon Denison. Archdeacon Allen, who had sent up his card to the President of the Congress as wishing to defend the clause, "felt," as he says, "that Mr. Lingen's replies cut the ground from under his feet," and like a barrister who finds his chief witness go dead against him, he threw up his brief in disgust.

This was the beginning of a curious chapter in the history of the progress of error. Archdeacon Allen, with characteristic truthfulness and honesty, and, one is compelled to add, with characteristic impulsiveness, wrote at once to the *Times* to announce his conversion, and did so, though he had read, or at least heard Mr. Lingen's letter, on the ground that it was to the effect that the Committee of Council would interpret the Conscience Clause as "*stopping*† a clergyman from (1) teaching the Apostles' Creed, and (2) giving instruction on a passage of Scripture read."

It is possible that the Archdeacon may have meant that this "stopping" was conditional on the express application of the fathers of the exempted children, but his phraseology, if he meant it, was singularly infelicitous; and if he did not mean it, he misapprehended Mr. Lingen's meaning, and missed the turning-point of the whole controversy. Taken literally, his words convey the impression that the Conscience Clause forbids the instruction specified to be given to *any* children. Interpreted by the circumstances of the case, they at least imply that it forbids it to be given to any dissenting children.

The next stage is a more serious and surprising one. Sir John Coleridge, reading Archdeacon Allen's letter, and without waiting to

* I cannot entirely agree with Mr. Oakley (p. 29), that the Conscience Clause "binds" the managers to this. It would have done so *had* the National Society been able to accept the clause as applicable to schools in union with it, or modified its terms of union so as to meet it; but as it is, in schools not so in union, the other clauses leave the religious teaching under the control of the clergyman of the parish, and that may take the form of daily Bible lessons or not. The alternative clause, used in the older trust-deeds, and given by Mr. Oakley (p. 22), contained a specific provision for such lessons.

† The italics here, and in Sir John Coleridge's letter, are mine.

see the documents to which it referred, without looking (we must believe) to the text of the Conscience Clause itself to see whether such an interpretation were even possible, writes a letter which appeared in the *Guardian* of October 11. He adopts the Archdeacon's statement, and expands it, as an inaccurate statement is sure to be expanded, by filling up its omissions. "I am afraid," he says, "that we must take Mr. Lingen as asserting, in effect at least, this, that any clergyman accepting the Conscience Clause *is prohibited* from teaching to the children of Dissenters, however numerous they may be in his school, and *however willing their parents may be*, the Apostles' Creed, and equally from explaining to them the Holy Scriptures." Here, then, we find a restriction which had been most carefully limited, both in text and comment, to cases in which parents objected, transformed into an absolute prohibition of religious instruction, even where parents were not only consentient but eagerly desirous of it.

The character of Sir John Coleridge is rightly held in highest honour by all who know him personally or by report; and a statement followed by the well-known initials of that *clarum et venerabile nomen* led men to think that they now had a quasi-judicial exposition of the meaning of the Conscience Clause, as they had before had, from the same high authority, a like exposition of the National Society's terms of union, and contributed to swell the tide of feeling against the clause so expounded. In proportion as we share that respect we must regret that one whose career, if it pledged him to anything, pledged him to avoid haste in judging on imperfect *data*, should thus have acted, in one solitary instance, inconsistently with the training of his life, by accepting merely hearsay evidence. It is even more startling that, having seen *in extenso* the correspondence which suggested his letters, and had time for looking at the text of the Conscience Clause, he should adhere to the statement that, "substantially, Archdeacon Allen's summary represents its effect with accuracy."* It is true that he says that if he had seen it before he wrote his letter he might have "modified some expressions," but the one expression which is directly at variance with Mr. Lingen's letter he does not modify, and leaves his readers still to believe that the children of Dissenters are excluded from instruction in the Apostles' Creed and Scripture, "however willing their parents may be" that they should receive it.

I return from this episode to the actual interpretation. The appetite for the cheap amusement of baiting a Secretary with imaginary extreme cases is one which grows by what it feeds on, and the apparent success of Mr. Caparn's movement stimulated another

clergyman, the Rev. Charles Craven, to put instances yet more invidious. "How," he asks, "are the managers of a school to act with the children of parents who are Universalists, Unitarians, Rationalists, Nothingarians? The *ipsissima verba* of Scripture are, in such cases, as much against the convictions of the parents as any 'doctrine or formulary' can be. How, then, are the rights of conscience to be respected? May the children of such parents, in the presence of the other children, put their own sense upon the words of Scripture, or refuse to read the Bible at all? or are the managers and teachers to be allowed to maintain and uphold the Church's doctrine on these several points, and to insist upon the reading of the Bible as a necessary part of the school instruction?" In his reply to this letter Mr. Lingen, though substantially repeating his answers to Mr. Caparn,* is somewhat more diffuse, and hardly as definite and clear. There is, naturally enough, an undertone of irritation, as of a man who does not like being baited, and this leads him to a fulness far beyond the official brevity which was all that a letter like Mr. Craven's—a second-hand copy of a poor original—called for or deserved. It would have been enough to say, as in answering Mr. Caparn, that the Conscience Clause only authorized the parent to claim exemption from any teaching or exposition at variance with the tenets of the communion to which he belonged, and that it did allow the managers to require the attendance of all children at the daily reading of the Bible. He goes, however, beyond this. Mr. Craven, with a strange misapprehension of the possibilities of interpretation, had asked whether children were to be allowed to put their own sense, *e.g.*, a Unitarian or Atheistic (!) sense upon a passage of Scripture, in the presence of their schoolfellows, and Mr. Lingen ably and distinctly shows that the terms of the Conscience Clause render such a permission impossible. It would be inconsistent with the duty of the managers to the other children. So far all was well; but he proceeds to meet the more insidious question, How were the rights of the parents' conscience in these extreme cases to be respected? and, after a natural protest against the invidiousness of putting them, suggests an answer. He says:—

"It would be open to say, if this principle could be complied with by no other means, to one of the parents whom you describe, 'Your child need not attend the Bible or Catechism lessons. At the hours when these lessons are given, it must stay away from school, or be employed at so-and-so, as the managers may decide. . . . If you wish your child to attend the Bible and Catechism lessons, they will not be in the slightest degree modified on account of its presence: it must do nothing to interrupt or discredit them; and the utmost that can be offered to you is that your child will not be required to join actively in them.'"

It will probably seem to many readers that this goes beyond his

letter to Mr. Caparn, and gives the objecting parent a right to *claim* exemption even from Bible-reading as distinct from exposition. There is, too, it must be confessed, a slight ambiguity in the wording of the suggestion. At first, entire absence from the Bible as well as Catechism lesson seems recommended, and then at the close, the "utmost offered" is that the child should not be required to "*join actively*,"—a phrase of doubtful meaning, which might be held to be compatible with enforced presence, so long as the child was not compelled to answer questions in a way at variance with its father's creed. The really important words, however, in this paragraph are those of the first clause. "It would be open to you," Mr. Lingen says. That is one course which the Conscience Clause would *allow*. He does not withdraw the statement that it also allows the managers, *i.e.*, the parochial clergy, to make Bible-reading part of the instruction of every child in the school. Which is the wisest and best course in such cases is left, rightly and wisely, to their discretion. The parent could not claim the exemption, though the managers may concede it.

We must deal, of course, not only or chiefly with any comments, however official, but with the clause itself; and its terms lead, I believe, under the strictest possible interpretation, to the following conclusions:—

(1.) They leave the managers of a school accepting it unlimited freedom in requiring all Church children, and all dissenting children whose parents do not object, to learn the Catechism, or any other Church formulary which they may think proper.

(2.) They do not require the religious teacher, in explaining the Catechism or Scripture to the children of Churchmen, or non-objecting Dissenters, to suppress, mutilate, or modify anything that he may consider essential to the statement of Christian truth as held by the Church of England, and suited to the capacity of his pupils.

(3.) They do require the managers to exempt from instruction in any given formulary, or the exposition of any given doctrine as contained in Scripture, children whose parents *specifically* object to that formulary or doctrine. In the extremest case conceivable—so extreme as to be infinitely improbable,—that objection may extend to *any* formulary or the exposition of *any* doctrine.

(4.) They at least authorize the managers to make the daily reading of Scripture part of the instruction given to all children.

II.

How would such a clause work? In many cases, perhaps in most, it would make comparatively little change. Many clergymen have for years admitted dissenting children; have allowed them to attend their

own chapels on Sundays; have modified the categorical statements of the Catechism, which such children could not truly utter, into potential or future ones;* have, in very many instances, refrained from insisting on their learning it at all; have met with no objections on the part of parents; have, with Christian wisdom and charity, endeavoured to avoid collision with the peculiar tenets of the fathers, and have so succeeded either in winning the children to the Church, or disarming Dissent of at least half its bitterness. Such men Archdeacon Denison looks down upon with a tolerant condescension. He won't quarrel with them, or in terms condemn them, but he points to his own inflexible rule as the "more excellent way." Not a single child of a Dissenter is admitted to his school, except on the condition of Church baptism,—in most cases, *i. e.*, of a re-baptism, on the hypothesis of the nullity of what the highest Ecclesiastical Court has declared to be valid. When admitted, every such child is compelled to learn the Catechism, and all that may be taught as implied in it, and to attend the parish church on Sunday.† Even Mr. Hubbard, and others who do not go so far as their leader, obviously look on the more moderate course as that of a temporizing policy, only justifiable where it is part of a system of avowed proselytism,‡ and where every effort is made to set the minds of the children against the distinctive tenets of their parents.

It is possible, however, that the sense of a new and secured right might lead Dissenters to object who had before acquiesced. Mr. Hubbard's objection to the clause is that it confers such a right. He would not forcibly exclude all dissenting children from Church schools, but would leave the clergyman unfettered discretion as to admitting them at all, and as to the terms of admission.§ Their foot-

* A good cause is always better for getting rid of weak arguments, and I, for one, must reject as such the reasoning which defends the Conscience Clause as the only way of escape from compelling Dissenters' children to utter categorical falsehoods.—(See Mr. Robinson's evidence, 5,794; Hubbard, p. 88.) It is obvious that the slightest possible change is enough to meet the imaginary difficulty. Such a change in such cases was contemplated by the last revisers of the Prayer-book.—(Cardwell, "History of Conferences," p. 357.)

† Evidence, 3,695-8. Hubbard, p. 70.

‡ "The religion of the Church is one and indivisible; . . . The teacher of that religion must teach it in its integrity, or not at all," p. 13. See Mr. Oakley's reply to this, p. 42.

§ Mr. Hubbard appeals to the analogy of other forms of private benevolence. "Great good is done by men who found or support hospitals, dispensaries, and the like; but if the State were to interfere to give any applicants a legal title to relief, the measure would be," as he describes the Conscience Clause to be, "tyrannical and revolutionary" (p. 31). Quite so, if the institutions are supported by private benevolence only, and Lord Granville (Evidence, 2,454) admits as much in respect of schools; but Mr. Hubbard will hardly maintain that the State should wholly or in part found or support a benevolent institution from which Nonconformists should be excluded. Fancy a vote in Committee of Supply for a hospital, the door of which was shut in the face of a Dissenter with a compound fracture, with the mild apology, on the part of the house-surgeon, that they "were very sorry, but couldn't compromise a principle to meet a prejudice!"

ing should be, in the strictest sense of the term, precarious. They might be admitted by one incumbent, refused by his successor, or admitted only on conditions as offensive to the parents as those which Archdeacon Denison imposes. With a strange want of power to enter into other men's feelings, Mr. Hubbard (p. 36) objects to the clause that "it leaves the position of the Dissenters unimproved." He seems to think that the present system meets their wishes and their wants. They may get what they ask for from the charity of some now. They would not be better for being able to demand it. They may be fed as paupers with crumbs that fall from the rich man's table. They would not be better off for a law of settlement.

Assuming this case then, at a certain hour in the day's work a class is called up, say for a Catechism lesson. Six or eight boys, whose parents have objected, are sent to another room or part of the room. They have to write out hymns or texts while the others are being taught. But the teaching goes on for all others as if they were not there. The dogmatic instruction is as full. There is not the slightest inducement to suppression or modification of any part of it, as there might conceivably be if they were present. As a matter of daily practice, the teacher would probably make no reference to them. But it would be open to him at first, or at any fitting time afterwards, to explain to the class the reason of the withdrawal of their companions. "I teach you," he might say, "what the Bible teaches you, and what the Church teaches. Those boys' fathers think otherwise. The boys are not to blame for it. Perhaps their fathers, too, are not to blame, for they were brought up to it when they were boys. But so it is. And because a father has, by English law and God's law, the right to determine what religious teaching shall be given to his child, and because it is wrong to set a young child against the religion of his father, and equally wrong to leave a young child untaught, they are allowed to do something else while I am teaching you what God wills that you should believe and do. You are better off than they are. Only don't think the worse of them, or call them nicknames. Show them by your conduct what Christian children and Church children should be." Such an explanation would, I submit, be perfectly natural and simple. Would it necessarily tend to make the Church children indifferent to truth, or involve the admission that all opinions were equally true and equally false, or tend inevitably to a purely secular system of education? Would not they feel that they had something which the others had not? Would not even the dissenting children gain the knowledge that the difference between them and the Church children was something

real and tangible, matter for thoughtful inquiry when they grew up to manhood?*

Or take the Scripture lessons. Here, as I have said, as regards reading, there is unrestricted freedom. The teacher may so arrange the lessons that all truth which he deems essential may come, in the words of Scripture, in its due order. At his discretion he may either regulate his teaching so as to meet the wishes of those who differ in non-essentials, or, if that goes against his conscience, or his range of essential truths is a very wide one, so that he can expound no passage of Scripture without impinging on the belief of some Dissenter, he may exempt children, whose parents apply for such exemption, from his expositions altogether. In this case, the children all join in the Scripture reading. When it is over, either sometimes, or uniformly, the exempted children withdraw to their texts or hymns again, or are set to write from memory the substance of what they have just read. The explanation given before applies here also. The teacher might repeat it in almost the same words. If there is any risk, it is that the Church children should be puffed up with the thought of knowing more of the Bible, and being better off than their neighbours. In the meantime, what has happened to the exempted children? Have they learned nothing? Have they had *no* religious teaching?

Archdeacon Denison and his followers do not shrink from answering these questions in the affirmative. In their eyes, there is no religious teaching in the words of prophets or apostles, or in those of Christ himself—none in the Sermon on the Mount, or the Epistles of St. Paul or St. John—none in the parables or Psalms or Proverbs—none in the history of the Old Testament, or the Gospels—none in the life of Christ, unless and until they are interpreted in accordance with the teaching of the Church.† It is on this point that I am compelled to join issue with them. Admitting as I do, in common with most Churchmen and non-Churchmen, that men need the help of an interpreter in order to arrive at the full meaning of Scripture; that a

* See an interesting letter by Mr. Chester (Oakley, p. 39).

† "The Church may not minister to the delusion that the reading of the Bible is the same thing with teaching and learning religious truth."—(Archdeacon Denison, Reason 5.)

"Under the Conscience Clause . . . it is perfectly possible or conceivable, and, indeed, in many cases where there is a large proportion of Dissenters I apprehend it would happen, that there would be *no* religious instruction in the school."—(Archdeacon Denison: Evidence, 3,731. See also Mr. Fagan's answers, 4,555-6.) Hooker's well-known words, "The Church, as a witness, preacheth God's mere revealed truth by *reading* publicly the sacred Scriptures" ("Ecl. Pol.," B. v. 19, § 1), might have checked these rash statements. The objection, that reading without exposition was no religious teaching at all, then came from the Puritans: but extremes meet, and this is but one of many grave questions of theology and polity in which the teaching of the Venerable Archdeacon is diametrically opposed to that of the venerable and "judicious" Hooker.

theology constructed even by a mature intellect from the Bible only, without the aid of that Christian tradition which preserves, more or less purely, the diffused truth which the Books of the New Testament presuppose, would be incomplete; and that the incompleteness would be in the direct ratio of the immaturity of the mind so taught,—I am not yet prepared to affirm that the religious knowledge so gained is necessarily or commonly a nullity. Of parts at least of that teaching, we must recollect that they presupposed little or nothing—were spoken to men as untaught, or more so, than the children of an English village. If it be impossible to explain the Ten Commandments fully without wounding the conscience of a Dissenter, the letter of the Commandments is at least intelligible enough. If the Sermon on the Mount conveys *no* religious teaching now (as Lord Ashley maintained in 1839, and Archdeacon Denison maintains now), unless it is supplemented by the Nicene Creed, it follows that it conveyed no religious teaching when it was delivered to the multitude to whom neither that Creed, nor the truths embodied in it, were or could be known. No; the seed sown may require many conditions for the production of a full harvest. It may be choked by tares or thorns, or grow too quickly or too rankly, but the word of God is still *the* seed; and if it fall upon the good ground, it may bring forth fruit to life eternal, and the moral discipline and even mental training of a good school may do much, apart from all dogmatic teaching (however true and precious that teaching may be), to make the ground good.

In such cases—those, *i. e.*, where the clause is freely accepted and honestly acted on,—something of a kindly relationship is established between the pastor of a parish and the lambs of the wandering sheep.* They are no longer mere “little heathen,” against whom he shuts the door of his schoolroom with the cursory remark, that he is “very sorry,” but “can’t help it.” He too can say, “Other sheep I have, that are not of this fold;” and there is some chance of their being brought even to the fold of which he is the appointed shepherd. Their parents will, at least, be likely to respect him for his faithfulness at once to his own Church and to his compact with them. There will be no ill-will, suspicion, prejudice, to come between them and his witness of the truth.

III.

Let us see how the refusal of the Conscience Clause is likely in its turn to work. “Trust,” says Mr. Hubbard, “to the discretion

* See the account of Mr. Fowle’s schools at Hoxton (Oakley, p. 33), as an illustration of what may be done in this way. If that narrative, in many cases, stirs men to scorn and anger, as letters in the *Guardian* from opponents of the Conscience Clause compel one to think it does, there are at least some in whom it kindles the glow of a new hope.

and kindness of the clergy. Don't fetter them in any case with rules. If they practically admitted dissenting children before, they will do so still." Well, we will assume the most favourable hypothesis. The incumbent has not reached the Archdeacon's counsels of perfection. Children are admitted without enforced re-baptism—are not forced to attend Church, or Sunday schools—are not compelled to repeat the Catechism, either in its categorical or hypothetical forms—receive the kind of religious teaching which lays stress upon the points in which Dissenters and the Church agree, not on those in which they differ. So far, there *is* no great evil. Few Dissenters, it may be, would in such a case wish to withdraw their children. The sense that he is dependent upon the bounty of the clergyman may make the dissenting parent more compliant; and those who value such compliance may score it, if they will, to the credit side of the account. But the worth of a system is seen not when it is worked out by those who do not accept its principles, but when it is in the hands of those who do. A change comes. An incumbent arrives with a higher standard of duty and a more sensitive conscience. He cannot do violence to that conscience to meet the "prejudice" (as Mr. Hubbard always puts it) of dissenting parents. Their children, if taught anything, must be taught a theology which leads them to look on their parents as involved in the guilt of heresy and schism, for the Church's teaching is "one and indivisible." Then the dissenting parents have to choose between three courses:—(1.) If they are lukewarm and dishonest, they may allow their children to be so taught for the sake of the secular instruction; and then the Church has the chance of proselytes of the Mortara type, bribing Mortara *père* to be accessory to the kidnapping of his child. In this case, the children soon come to understand the reason of their parents' conduct, and learn that, as men give up a less good for the sake of a greater, the secular knowledge for which religious conviction has been sacrificed is infinitely the more precious of the two.* (2.) They may allow their children to be taught in this way for the sake of the secular knowledge, and yet, having convictions of their own, trust to counteracting the theology of Anglicanism by stronger doses of Dissent at home; and then the children grow up between the opposing blasts of doctrine, under conditions in which scepticism, brutal or acute, is all but inevitable, in which, if there is not scepticism, there must be the lying hypocrisy of saying at school or at home that which they do not believe. (3.) Lastly, if parents are honest and thorough in their

* I remember an instructive passage in a letter of Madame de Maintenon's. She is writing after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and laments the large number of simulated conversions that followed on it; but "at all events," she adds, with devout thankfulness, "we shall gain the souls of the children." What they were gained to was shown in the history of the successors of the Most Christian King whose conscience she guided.

belief, if they belong, *i. e.*, to the class of Dissenters whom we ought most to respect, they will refuse to barter their birthright of religious freedom—the “conscience” which is stigmatized as “prejudice”—for the mess of pottage of secular education, and will withdraw their children. And then there are two alternatives. Either the children remain, *ex hypothesi*, without instruction of any kind, and are left to the chances of brutal or fanatical ignorance; or else the liberality of richer dissenting neighbours sets up a school of their own, and a denominational school is established precisely under the circumstances where it enters most into rivalry with the Church, and is most likely to be conducted in the spirit of antagonism. It remains for those who urge the abandonment of the Conscience Clause, and are prepared to act on the principles on which they rest their arguments against it, to show either that such results are not probable, or that they are beneficial to the Church and nation.

IV.

There remain, however, some distinct arguments urged by Mr. Hubbard and Archdeacon Denison, which have still to be noticed. The latter, indeed, has no less than seventeen distinct reasons which “never have been answered and never can be,” and which he nails up like a second Luther on the door of the Privy Council Office. I own that for the most part I am distrustful of reasons when they get beyond the moderate limit of a dozen. With a *catena* of authorities, or a converging series of evidence, number may, of course, add weight. But with major premisses, most of which hover in the shadowy region of theories of Church and State, and are sometimes truisms and sometimes paradoxes, with minor premisses seldom given and still more seldom proved, a detailed examination of the seventeen, as it would carry me beyond the limits which I must here assign to myself, so also it would be, I believe, weary and unprofitable work for my readers. If any one should think that I am but a recreant knight in fearing to face such formidable foes, I can refer them to Mr. Oakley’s able analysis of the whole batch* as a proof that they can be and have been answered, and that if I do not attempt to repeat the process, it is because there is no profit and little glory in slaying the slain, or hitting even arguments when they are down. I content myself with condensing the chief reasons in which Mr. Hubbard and the Archdeacon agree, and in which, therefore, the majority of their followers may reasonably be supposed to concur.

(1.) It is alleged that the introduction of the Conscience Clause is a “distinct breach of the contract between the State and the Church” (Evidence, 3,689, 3,776), of the “definite basis and express under-

* Oakley, pp. 35—58.

standing" between the Committee of Council and the National Society as representing the Church of England. In this apparently, as in most other cases which the experience of life brings before us, when men talk of "a contract *and* understanding," it will be found that they mean the latter only, and that it leads before long, with an inevitable fatality, to a *misunderstanding*. Evidence of a compact between two bodies capable of contracting with each other, and binding each other in perpetuity, there is not, and in the nature of the case cannot be. An executive officer cannot bind his successors to general principles. There is no *concordat* between the Council Office and the Church of England. The understanding amounts to this. The Committee of Council were appointed "to extend the benefits of education to as large a number of Her Majesty's subjects as possible consistently with respect for the rights of conscience." They adopted (whether willingly or reluctantly is not now the question) what is called the denominational system as the best means of attaining this end. It was better (absolutely, or under existing circumstances) in the same place to have one Church school, and one open to Dissenters, than to attempt a mixed or purely secular system. But there arose the *casus omissus* of a parish in which the number of children was too small to justify grants to two schools. How were they in that case to act on their commission? To refuse the grant would be to exclude all its inhabitants from the benefit of their operations; to give it unconditionally would be to place it in the power of the managers to exclude some, or to admit them on conditions that trampled on their freedom of conscience. How could they provide for the new case except by a new clause? * The only compacts they had made were with the several founders of previous schools. Which of those compacts have they set aside? What was there in any Act of Parliament or Minute of their own, or document signed and sealed, to prevent their making from time to time new regulations for the better execution of their duties? If the regulations were *ultra vires*, as against law, † the courts were open. If within the law, but unconstitutional in character, it was in the power of any person aggrieved to appeal to Parliament. A grievance which shrinks from appearing there, and prefers the masquerade dress of a *gravamen* in Convocation, is not likely to be a very substantial one.

(2.) It is urged that the one duty of the Church, and therefore of her ministers, in the work of education, is to train her own children in the one faith, and bring others to it. "Other knowledge without that one faith is an evil, and not a good. To consent to give the one without the other is to be unfaithful to the highest duty of a Christian. In a

* New, *i.e.*, as applied to schools in connection with the Church of England. In many others it had been used, in substance and even in terms, from the first. See Oakley, p. 3.

† Archdeacon Denison: Evidence, 3,751.

minister of the Church it involves a violation of his ordination vows" (Evid. 3,787). The principle thus asserted is proclaimed with a solemnity that gives it, with those who are the slaves of high-sounding words, an almost axiomatic character. There must be something very bad in what is so denounced, and they would rather avoid the risk of having anything to do with it. When we look, however, into the formidable major premiss, we find that it amounts to this, that it is the duty of the Church and her ministers to do nothing unless they can do all; and that is not an axiom, and breaks down utterly when we test it by analogous instances. Animal life, without religion, is hardly a greater blessing than intellectual knowledge. Health for those who are without religion does but multiply powers and activities of evil. Does it follow that the relief of the poor in workhouses and hospitals is a work entirely secular, which it is wrong for a clergyman, and in a less degree for any Christian to support, unless provision is made for securing that all who are relieved are sound in the faith when they are admitted, or are brought to it during their stay? Must we never give soup unless we also give tracts? But if this is not so, then why are the life and health of the mind lower and less worthy than those of the body? Is it not a far truer statement of the calling of every Christian, and therefore of the Christian minister in the highest degree, to be ready to do all in raising the life of body, soul, and spirit, and to do what he can; doing that little, if hindered by the rights of other men, or the laws of his country or his Church, "not grudgingly or of necessity," seeing that here also "God loveth a cheerful giver." Here, at all events, Archdeacon Denison and his followers must go farther. If it is wrong in the Church to help to give knowledge without the "one faith," because such knowledge is an evil and not a good, then it is wrong in the State also, so far as it has a Christian character, and is identified with the Christian faith. It ought to do no more than barely tolerate the existence of Dissenters. To help them to educate their children in their own way, is the first step towards national apostasy. It were better for the country that they should grow up in brute ignorance than learn reading, writing, arithmetic, and have the chance of applying their knowledge to reading the Bible and the "Pilgrim's Progress." Children brought up on any system but that of the "one and indivisible faith" are on the way to be only "clever devils" (Evid. 3,759). A *reductio ad absurdum* is never a pleasant argument to use, but those who start with paradoxes as premisses must not be surprised if they land in insanities as conclusions.

The opposite principle has, at any rate, been acted on freely, and without enactments, in many parochial schools, in a thousand grammar and proprietary schools throughout the country, in the Metropolitan College with which I am myself connected, and which has not commonly been considered as wanting in loyalty to the

Church, or guided under its past and present Principals by men indifferent to religious truth.* It was the opposite practice which Bishop Blomfield recognised as legitimate, "with any latitude that Dissenters might wish," admitting all denominations, not excluding Jews, though he refused, with a characteristic "*sic volo*," to agree to it as part of an Act of Parliament.† It is the opposite principle which Lord Derby speaks of as "sound and reasonable," "uniting strict adherence to the doctrine and discipline of the Church of England with a judicious and wise toleration."‡ Lastly, to refer to one who, in his freedom from all heat and passionate partisanship, deservedly commands the respect of all the parties, none of which can claim him—it is the opposite principle which the Archbishop of Dublin, having acted on it for years in a London College, purposes to take as the groundwork of one which he hopes to found in Ireland.§ For the system based on that principle even Sir John Coleridge admits that many "pious persons may find a reason satisfactory to their own conscience, though it escapes him."||

Mr. Hubbard, however, appears in what some will think a new character, as the defender of religious freedom. He does not blame those who thus act of their own free will. He even goes so far as to say that Archdeacon Denison "finds no fault" with them; but he objects to any clause in a foundation deed making it part of the perpetual constitution of the schools. Authority and reasoning seem to him to go no further than placing the principle in question among what the Jesuit casuists called "probable opinions," and he contends that it is "tyrannical" to

* I do not shrink from comparing the practice with the principle of which it is, I believe, the true exponent. That, as formally stated in the College Calendar, runs thus:—"That every system of general education for the youth of a Christian community ought to comprise instruction in the Christian religion as an indispensable part; without which the acquisition of other branches of knowledge will be conducive neither to the happiness of the individual nor the welfare of the State." In no part of our system do we omit that instruction. It forms part of every complete course. We so far bear our witness that we look on other knowledge without it as leaving the "happiness of the individual" (I adopt the language of the document) and "the welfare of the State" incomplete. But having done this, *liberavimus animas*. We do not draw from it the inference that it is essentially evil for a Dissenter's son, as such, to learn Euclid or read Thucydides. We believe it to be better for him to learn them from Christian men, and, so far as the two come into contact, on Christian principles. We will not shut him out, and by so doing drive him into antagonism. We have adopted this system spontaneously, and it works well. If the State were to aid us I should hold that it had a right to engage us to make the system permanent.

† Lord Russell's evidence, 2,938. Bishop Blomfield's Speech, July 5, 1839.

‡ Speech at Liverpool, Oct. 10th, quoted in "Oakley," p. 67.

§ "Such a college, to succeed, should, as I conceive, know no other religious teaching but that of the Church, but at the same time should freely admit and invite those of other communions to profit by as much of what it offered as conscientiously they could."—("Primary Charge," p. 20.) The Archbishop, for eleven years, filled the office of Principal and Professor of Divinity in Queen's College, London, where we have all along spontaneously acted on the principle of the Conscience Clause. Of this college the Bishop of London is *ex officio* Visitor.

|| Letter in *Guardian* of Oct. 11. Hubbard, p. 94.

fetter the consciences of successive generations of clergymen, and compel some to do what they look upon as sinful. The answer to this is, I believe, simple and obvious enough. Legislation cannot bend to the possible extravagance of a conscience unhealthily or falsely scrupulous; and the weight of authority in this instance, over and above the judgment which the Legislature may form on the facts or principles of the case, is enough to prove that a healthy and enlightened conscience need not be offended. And if so, and the practice be necessary or desirable, if without it the consciences of Dissenters must be wounded or their children left in ignorance, then the State, through Parliament, or executive bodies acting under the authority of Parliament, is justified in imposing the condition, and would not be justified in exposing the rights of Dissenters to the shifting caprices or morbid scrupulousness of individual clergymen. May I remind the two champions of Church-rates that it is precisely the fact of compulsory enactment that frees the conscience of successive managers from a false and perplexing position? They argue (and in part, though not entirely, they argue, I think, rightly) that Dissenters have no cause to complain of the payment either of tithes or Church-rates, because they purchase or otherwise acquire land or houses with the knowledge of the obligation thus connected with them. They are not taken unawares. They come by their own act into a situation in which, even in the *forum* of their own conscience, obedience to the law of the land is a primary duty, and non-participation in supporting an ecclesiastical establishment is but secondary, and they may, therefore, and ought to submit cheerfully. So without the Conscience Clause each clergyman has the difficult task, in each individual case, of balancing and deciding, and by a wrong decision may do infinite mischief; but with it, it forms part of a system to which, as a whole, he voluntarily submits. He takes office, and holds a living, under this condition. Unless the law clashes with his deepest religious convictions, obedience to it is a primary, and adherence to his own theory of education is a secondary duty. If it does so clash, as it would do with one who accepted the "seventeen reasons" as a new creed—the Encyclical Letter of an Anglican pope,—he must go elsewhere and find a position in which he will not be thus trammelled. We may be "very sorry" for him, but it is a less evil than that he should be free to "shut the door" of his school against children who, till his arrival, had been admitted, and leave them to become the "little heathen" that he is ready to call them.

It would be hard to explain the success which has attended the movement against the Conscience Clause, were it not that its leaders appeal not only to principles and convictions which, however misdirected, are worthy of all respect, but also to the antipathies, latent or avowed of their followers. I do not charge all who oppose the

Conscience Clause with this feeling. I respect the characters of many of the most prominent opponents too highly to suppose it possible that it can influence them. There are at least two memorable instances in which language used in 1839, and almost identical with Archdeacon Denison's now, has been proved to be compatible with the noblest temper and the widest sympathy, and the recollection of that language forbids the hasty judgment which would assume it to be incompatible now. All that I say is, that as indifference to truth may assume the garb of liberality, so dislike may, and often does, cloak itself in the disguise of zeal for truth. That there is such antipathy on the part of a larger portion of the clergy and gentry of the English Church must, I imagine, be acknowledged. They inherit it from their fathers. It is the residuum of the old feeling of the Cavalier towards the Puritan. Its atmosphere surrounds them at home, and it is strengthened at school and college. The Dissenter is not of their order, and yet does not look up to them. He thinks for himself, and votes against them. They do not meet him in society, and will take no steps towards it. Over and above all conviction that Church-rates are necessary to the maintenance of the fabric to which they are applied, they prize them as a badge of superiority and a means of coercion. And to such men there is something quite intolerable in the thought of being compelled to admit any dissenting child to whom they cannot say, "*You shall learn the Catechism; you shall be taught that your parents are heretics.*" The very thought of the presence of a nonconformist boy of ten under the roof of their schools in any other character than as a catechumen, is to them as the greased cartridges were to our Indian Sepoys. The first effect is to set their teeth on edge with the sense of a caste privilege that has been outraged; and if they afterwards take up and reproduce sententious sophisms* or declamatory rhetoric, as the Sepoys cried "Religion," it is rather because they welcome them as helping to justify their antipathy to themselves, than because they are the real grounds of their convictions.

V.

I have thought it best to deal with the general principles of the question rather than with the special circumstances of cases in which their application may seem to have been attended with more or less hardship. To examine those circumstances would involve an extension of this paper beyond all reasonable limits; and except so

* There is, as Mr. Gladstone said of Mr. Bright, a "transparent earnestness and sincerity" in Archdeacon Denison's speeches which excludes the thought of all *sophistical animus*. But just as the most fatal form of hypocrisy is that which does not know itself to be hypocritical, so the most perilous sophisms are those in which a man believes

far as they run up into those principles, the only interest connected with them is that of determining the personal merits or demerits, the courtesy or obstinacy, of the several parties to the correspondence. Full details of the Llanelly case, which forms what may be termed the crucial instance of the controversy, may be found in both Mr. Hubbard's and Mr. Oakley's pamphlet, and the columns of the *Guardian* during the past two years would fill a blue-book with complaints or narratives of a like kind.

Holding as I do that the Conscience Clause is right in principle, and that the true freedom of the clergy would be secured by willing obedience, not by wilful resistance to it,—by spontaneously asking for it, even where it is not imposed as a condition,—I am not careful to examine in detail the several amendments which have been proposed in Convocation, in Mr. Oakley's pamphlet, and elsewhere, as tending to a reconciliation. I do not say that such proposals do not deserve a full consideration. I believe that men of influence and calm temper and clear judgment among our leading clergy and laity, men, *e.g.*, like the Bishops of Ely and Lincoln and Mr. Walpole, can hardly render a better service to the Church than by smoothing the way for a better understanding. But these are matters which require a close discussion of single words and phrases, and come within the scope of a Select Committee rather than of an inquiry into principles. It may be better, as Mr. Oakley suggests, that daily reading and teaching in the Bible should be in terms a necessary rule of the school instead of being a practice which the clause permits; or, as the Dean of Ely proposes, acting apparently on Mr. Walpole's suggestion, that the managers should be "bound" to make some arrangement for the consciences of dissenting parents, but left with full discretion as to the kind of arrangement.

I confess that I cannot agree with those who think that the managers ought to have a right of redemption, so to speak, at any period after the foundation, and get rid of the Conscience Clause, by paying back what had been received as a building grant, and refusing annual grants for the future. To do so would be to give an invidious power to mere wealth, and enable a rich incumbent, or one backed by rich friends, to exercise a disturbing, and, it might be, oppressive, power in a parish which had become accustomed to the working of the clause, while his poorer predecessor had been compelled to acquiesce in it. It would be playing fast and loose both with the Government and the people. The former would practically be bartering for money the trust which they exercise on behalf of the latter, and selling a licence to do what they look upon as unjust. The proposal

* Personally I agree with Mr. Hubbard (*Guardian*, Jan. 31), that the indefiniteness of this plan "would fail to satisfy a malcontent," and "establish an unfailing medium of agitation."

assumes that all rights and duties are purchaseable by money, and forgets that though it may be optional with any man to create a trust, the trust when created involves a moral responsibility, and is not determinable at the option of him who created it.

A more reasonable suggestion is that the Conscience Clause should cease to be operative when the circumstances which rendered it necessary have altered, when the number of children increases so as to allow a Government grant to a second school, and a second school open to Dissenters is established, either in that way or by private liberality. Such an arrangement would be strictly fair in principle, would be a concession to the feelings of the clergy, and, guarded by some restrictions, to prevent sudden changes, does not seem likely to present any great difficulties in its actual working.

I am reluctant to speak with anything but sympathy and approval of a proposal made by Mr. Hubbard himself (*Guardian*, Jan. 31), as "the basis of a good understanding with the Educational Department." He thinks apparently that there might be a "distinct understanding" between that department and the National Society, that no dissenting child should be required to attend the Church services or the Church schools on Sundays. The temper in which the proposal is made is admirable, and Mr. Hubbard proves, in making it, that he is true to his better nature, and strives after peace. But surely he must see that it too will "fail to satisfy the malcontents;" that, if it is an "understanding" only, it will be subject to indefinite variation; and that if it be inserted in the trust-deeds, it may be quite as great an outrage on the consciences of men who, with Archdeacon Denison, insist on Sunday attendance as a condition, as the Conscience Clause itself. "Are we," they might argue with some force (and I do not see how Mr. Hubbard, from his standing-ground, could answer them), "are we to connive at, nay, sanction, heretical and schismatical teaching? Are we to allow the dogmatic instruction we have given in the 'one faith' to be counteracted by Unitarianism, Universalism, Nothingarianism, on the Lord's day? Are we to expose our lambs to these grievous wolves, and thrust them into the danger of utter unbelief, as the result of such conflicting doctrines?" If Mr. Hubbard can give an answer to these questions on his own principles, I shall be glad to hear it. If he cannot, then I trust that the wish, "*Talis cum sis, utinam noster esses!*" may be exchanged for the satisfaction of welcoming into the camp of the defenders of the clause one whom we recognise, even as it is, among the Church's truest sons in heart and act.

My chief wish, however, has been to set forth, first to my own mind, and then to that of others, the grounds on which I have been led to think that those who defend the Conscience Clause are bearing their witness for the true office of the English Church, and are help-

devout as many of them are, are yet acting with a zeal not according to knowledge, and are widening the gap, already wide enough, between her and the English people. I know not whether it will be given to us to get rid of that antipathy of which I have already spoken,—to shake off the inheritance of prejudices, divisions, antagonisms which we have received from our fathers, and seem likely to transmit to our children. Notable efforts have been made lately to cut off this entail of curses, and to diminish the bitterness which has come between us and the great Churches of the East and West. Such efforts, however imprudent or impracticable they may seem to us, ought at least to command our respectful sympathy. We are so accustomed, in thought and act, to take up the spirit of the old proverb, and say that “the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge,”—to throw the blame on the sins of a past generation, and then to repeat the sins ourselves,—that it is well when any one rises and speaks as with authority, and bids us know that we ought to have “no more occasion to use that proverb in Israel.” But to look thus wistfully, with outstretched hands, to the alien Church that snubs us, that even now rejects us on any terms but those of absolute submission, and then to act in the very same temper to those who dwell among us, bone of our bone, and flesh of our flesh, reading the same Bible, the same “Pilgrim’s Progress,” the same “Saint’s Rest,” singing the same hymns, heirs of the same national life,—this is surely to be guilty of a melancholy inconsistency. Efforts at promoting the union of Christendom seem practically satirical when we are at the same time aggravating and perpetuating disunion at home: our Eireneicon is turned into an Eironicon.

I do not pretend to fear much actual pressing evil from the agitation against the Conscience Clause. There is not the remotest probability that Parliament will reject a principle which has been affirmed by most men of mark on both sides of the House of Commons, and which (with the exception of Lord Cranbourne) has hardly an opponent among statesmen.* There is even less that, when Parliament has settled the question, there will be any sequel like the disruption of the Established Church of Scotland. There will be, as there were in 1839, a number, gradually decreasing, of refusals to accept any grants on these terms, and a few schools will be founded in the spirit of protest, and with an open-handed liberality. There will be angry speeches and addresses, with signatures by the thousand, and memorials to the Archbishops, and then


* Mr. Oakley (p. v.) rightly calls attention to the wish expressed by Lord Granville (1,931) for the extension of the Conscience Clause to annual grants as a sign of the probable result of an appeal to Parliament. He (Lord Granville) believes, that as it is, it does not go far enough to satisfy the House of Commons, and holds back in his anxiety to avoid a collision with the Bishops and clergy of the Church.

the agitation will die out, as other agitations have died out before it, and the leading agitators will be remembered (unless they have, as doubtless many will have, other and better works to leave behind them) as Sacheverell is remembered now.* But in the meantime one great evil will have been done. The sour grapes will have been once more eaten, and the teeth once more set on edge, and another drop of gall added to the bitter waters. Those who, in order to avert this evil, are willing, as Mr. Oakley and Mr. Fowle have shown themselves, to lose caste with their brethren, to be distrusted by many whom they esteem, and to be denounced as traitors or half-hearted friends, are, I believe, worthy of all sympathy and honour. It may not be given to them to see that union of Christian England, or Catholic Christendom, for which their hearts passionately long; but in proportion as we take any steps towards even a diminution of the evils which we cannot cure, they will be remembered as men who, in a day of trouble and rebuke, sought to "repair the waste cities, the desolations of many generations;" their names will be known as those who have at least striven to be among the "repairers of the breach," the "restorers of paths to dwell in."

E. H. PLUMPTRE.

* * I have to add yet another witness to the list of those whom I have cited in p. 597. The Bishop of Oxford, according to an *authorized* report (*Guardian*, July 14, 1865) of the substance of his speech at a Conference of Diocesan Secretaries at the National Society, on May 31st, 1865, "stated his conviction that a Conscience Clause of some kind would be insisted on by any Government," and "did not think any principle was violated by our giving the Dissenter instruction in reading, writing, and arithmetic, however short such instruction may fall of the true idea of education." It is not easy to see how this admission is consistent with "strong objections to the clause as it now stands," though he may legitimately think that it has been enforced on insufficient authority, and at too arbitrary a discretion. May we not hope that here also, as in the Church-rate question, Mr. Gladstone, "shaping his old course through a country new," may be led to make some proposal which will reconcile the contending claims of Churchmen and Dissenters, and that he will find in the Bishop of Oxford a zealous and powerful coadjutor in that good work?

* I have thought it worth while, for the sake of readers who are curious in historical parallelisms, to make an anthology from this divine's celebrated sermon on "The Perils of False Brethren :"—"If to comply with Dissenters, both in public and private, as persons of tender conscience and piety, . . . to defend toleration and liberty of conscience, and under the plea of moderation excuse their separation, are the criterions of a true Churchman, God deliver us from such FALSE BRETHREN. . . . If any upstart Novelist" (our word, of course, would be Neologian), "or self-conceited enthusiast, out of ignorance, . . . or perverseness, . . . or ambition and vain-glory, should break in upon the sacred *depositum* of the Church, . . . should we stick to call such a rebel to God and traitor to the Church a FALSE BROTHER? . . . Let our superior pastors do their duty in thundering out their ecclesiastical anathemas, and let any power on earth dare reverse a sentence ratified in heaven . . . :—" and so on, *ad nauseam usque*. It would be idle to bring a charge of literary plagiarism, where the resemblance is beyond all doubt unconscious, but I seem to have heard and read something like this during the last twelve months.



ORIGINES EVANGELICÆ :—"ECLECTIC NOTES."

Eclectic Notes; or, Notes of Discussions on Religious Topics at the Meetings of the Eclectic Society, London, during the years 1792—1814.
Edited by JOHN H. PRATT, M.A., Archdeacon of Calcutta. Second Edition. London: Nisbet. 1865.

"JUVAT integros accedere fonteis, atque haurire;" or, to take another similitude,—We live in alluvial days, and the conventional opinions around us are but the detritus of great boulders which cropped up and were fretted down in other times. Party terms and confessions are now thoroughly understood, and it must be a very original thinker indeed who can add one idea to the store already labelled and stowed away.

It is on this account that we hailed this volume, expecting to find in it the first earnest and warm expression of the great truths which in the providence of God were revived among us by the fathers of the Evangelical movement at the end of the last century.

The book consists of notes taken by the editor's father, the Rev. Josiah Pratt, during the sixteen years mentioned in its title. Archdeacon Pratt states in his Preface, that he republishes the notes entire as they were, notwithstanding that "the interest of the discussions somewhat falls off towards the end of the volume, and although some of the remarks are of inferior value." This is said no doubt in deprecation of the disappointment which must be felt by all who have carefully read any large portion of the book. We looked for a rich treat in discussions conducted by such men as John Newton, H. Foster, Thos. Scott, R. Cecil, John Venn, Basil Woodd, Charles Simeon, and others almost as well known. But on perusal, the

old revelation occurred to us, "With how little wisdom the world is governed!" And it certainly appeared that the discussion of the many weighty subjects announced at the head of the debates had not been productive of much solid gain to the Church. For the most part, the remarks made are hardly more than commonplace. But there are some striking exceptions, and for the value of these exceptions we are, notwithstanding the commonplace, thankful for the book. And even besides these, it may tend to show us by what simple and single-minded men that great movement was conducted, very near to its first rise in our country.

Foremost among them in originality, as in grasp of thought, stands, as might have been expected, the honoured name of RICHARD CECIL. A few specimens of his sayings in the debates may be acceptable to our readers. On the question of "the manner of the temptation of our first parents," he says,—

"I remember a result from a former examination of this question. It was, '*Hitherto shalt thou come, and no further.*' It is something like the man with his hand under his cloak: 'What have you under your cloak?' 'I carry it there that you may not know.' A man in opening such a book as the Bible, has no chance of finding out anything without humility. God speaks with majesty. He asks not, 'What think you of my creation?' The sober man would say, 'I expect everything to be wonderful in such an account.'"—(P. 50.)

Speaking of the wedding garment :—

"I find nothing hit my idea so much as that particular scripture, '*Put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ.*' Ah! one says, that means putting on Christ as our righteousness. But put Him on as wisdom, sanctification, and redemption also. . . . If we narrow this ground, and make it mean any particular doctrine, we seem to put on our particular spectacles. Two persons, a lady and a curate, looked through a telescope at the moon. The curate, smelling a cathedral, thought the horns looked like the two spires of a cathedral; while the lady thought them like the ends of Cupid's bow. Making the wedding garment signify ecclesiastically either justification or sanctification, is dividing Christ. What will exclude me? No particular deficiency; but that I am separated from Him."—(P. 53.)

On "occasions of enmity to the Gospel :"—

"A religious quiz is an occasion of enmity to the Gospel. Ask him a question, he'll stare in your face and look very spiritual. I remember a person at Lewes who accosted another thus,—'Farmer, what do you know of Jesus Christ?' There was a quantity of spiritual pride in this. A grievous want, too, of breeding and good sense. The world, therefore, forms this idea: Religion makes a man a fool or mad; therefore I won't be such a creature."—(P. 65.)

On one occasion, several speakers had been speaking more or less seriously on *dreams*. Mr. Cecil, among other remarks, said,—

"Dreams appear to me as intended to suffer man to act out his part, while

he is saved from the consequences at the time, that he may learn the folly of his own heart, and God's restraining Providence. 'Come, you shall go and act the villain, and see what misery it ends in.' Dreaming is like thinking or acting. Dreams run in his own channel. We are creatures of habit. The habit will prevail. It's a man's scourge. Man will act his part in dreaming as in waking. If he be a good man, Satan will worry him. This is one of his modes of temptation. If he can present a seducing image, he will. Yet we must not lean too much towards the superstitious side. Mr. Wesley's people do this. Dreams can afford no implicit ground of comfort and guidance. There is no doubt that a man's peculiar occupation has much to do with dreams. I think I could dream any given night any given subject. Such and such dreams, I find, generally follow such and such conduct. I've a class of dreams that follow a particular habit. I'm in a burying-ground, or I see a body half consumed, or I see the hedge of the churchyard cut into the form of a dragon, &c. I've dreamt these dreams a hundred times; but have always said in the morning,—'You drank porter for supper.'—(P. 84.)

On keeping diaries, he says:—

"A distinction is necessary. There is a dissenting diary which some of the dissenting writers advise a man to keep. If a man keeps a record of leading features, it is useful; I am altogether for it. I have for many years made it my practice, and for this reason:—If you walk under a church, it is grand; if you view it at a few miles distance, it is scarcely seen. So in the affairs of the mind. The thing seen near is grand and interesting; at a distance, cold and dull.

"There is a duty, too, involved: '*Thou shalt remember all the way which the Lord thy God led thee.*' It is of vast importance that we should not lose the benefit of the lesson through the treachery of the memory. Making a record, therefore, of our journey, is a useful and important thing. But a wise man will leave an order to burn it, because other characters are often involved. . . . A well-managed diary is a most important thing. An ill-managed one, like other things, is pernicious."—(P. 311.)

On the question, "What kind of preaching is best calculated to guard a people against declension in religion?" he says,—

"The question is how to keep a piece of meat, which has a tendency to putrefaction, from putrefying. None deny that some kinds of preaching have a greater tendency to preserve from declension than others. . . . It is not a very judicious mode of preaching which will let the thoughts run wild, and set the man ruminating about the stocks, and his wife about the pudding, the daughter's eyes upon the next cap, the young fellow looking at his boots. . . . Our preaching must not be general, but particular. '*It is not lawful for thee to have her to wife.*' This was John the Baptist's style. We must collar men. '*Thou art the man!*' 'I mean you, sir!' We are not half enough convinced of the evil of *general* preaching. . . . The beef must have the salt of truth, and the saltpetre of life; but it must be rubbed in by particular application; and rubbed into every part by a comprehensive mind; and rubbed in by clean hands."—(P. 218.)

The following remarks on family prayer are excellent:—

"It is easy to keep up the attention of a congregation in comparison to that of my family. I have found most attention by bringing the truth of

Scripture into comparison with the facts which come before us. More stimulus is thus put into family expositions. I never found a fact lost; the current news of the day always comes in aid. 'How does the Bible account for that fact?' 'That man murdered his father: that happened in our house to-day: what says the Scripture of that?'

"If I have no fact to illustrate Scripture, I bring the Scripture to illustrate facts.

"It is a hard thing to fix and quiet the family. The servants want to go to stew the walnuts. There's perhaps a fume between the mistress and the servants. Catch the opportunity. Don't drive [at] them at the time; but do not let the matter slip by.

"It is a great matter to keep regularity. If certain hours are not observed, you are sure to find all in a bustle.

"Religious truth should be cautiously applied to a family. The old Dissenters wore their children to death. Jacob reasoned well about his cattle.

"There should be something little, gentle, quiet. We should not scold: all should be pleasant and sweet. I would not have a uniform mode of proceeding. There is something bad in uniformity, if carried too far; but eccentricity is still worse. The human mind, however, revolts at uniformity. Sometimes I make remarks; at others, none.

"Make it as natural as possible. And let the feeling be, 'We are a religious family; how natural it is that we should thus meet together.'

"It should not be a superstitious thing; neither should it be looked on as indispensable. If it were ordered, as the Jews were ordered to bring a lamb, why, it must be absolute. But this is my *liberty*, not my *task*.

"I do not mean the contrary, however. Servants and children should see—'I will speak of Thy testimonies before kings.' Whatever great man happens to be there, let them see I deem him nothing before the Bible."—(P. 196.)

If these excellent rules had been more observed, family prayer would not have become, as we are afraid all must confess it has become, rather an unmeaning task than a hearty exercise of social faith. It seems to us there is no practice of ours which more wants reforming and revivifying.

Mr. Cecil's remarks on what tends to enliven or depress devotion in *public* prayer are equally sensible:—

"What use is there in exciting attention, if there be nothing to be attended to? It is therefore of first importance to put a meaning into all that is done, no matter how different men's faculties and means are.

"Too little attention is paid in reference to man. I would consult him in all points. I would give him cushions, if he would then sit easier. I would make him warm and comfortable, and would not be so foolish as to tell him to be warm in God's service, while he actually shivers. I would let no doors creak, no windows rattle, nor *night's foul bird* scream," &c.—(P. 68.)

On the question, "How far the plea of nervous weakness is to be admitted by ministers in relaxation of Christian temper and duties," he says,—

"What is the real state of the case? Is it, on the whole, physical or moral? If physical, it is to be treated with entire tenderness; if moral, with faithfulness.

"An inactive life may be punished with inability. They have said, 'I will do nothing.' God says, 'You *shall* do nothing.'

"Such a man as Watts is to be allowed to scream at going through a door. He had worn out the machine. These pleas are often a cloak to cover weak piety and half-heartedness in religion. We shall daub the wall with untempered mortar if we allow this plea. . . .

"Great strokes of calamity are often advantageous in such cases."—(P. 411.)

In the course of the same discussion, the Rev. Josiah Pratt makes a remark which is noteworthy, considering that its date is 1807:—

"Nervousness seems to be a disease of modern times. Perhaps tea-drinking has been one cause of it."

We noted in passing the following short sayings of Mr. Cecil:—

"'Becoming pride' is but a gilded devil."—(P. 406.)

"Let popularity be the shadow that follows us, not that which we pursue."—(P. 407.)

"Paley is an unsound casuist respecting the extenuation of drunkenness. Multiply the crime of getting drunk into the possible consequences, and you have the sum total of a drunken man's guilt."—(P. 274.)

"I know no worse symptom in a man, than to be shy of one part in the Scriptures. The Christian loves the very part that condemns him, and humbles himself under the word which lays him low."—(P. 277.)

"Whitfield answered Erskine well. 'Come among us, for we are the Lord's people.' 'For that reason,' said he, 'I won't, for I am sent to the devil's people.'"—(P. 34.)

"I was cured of expecting the Spirit's influence without due preparation, by observing how men talked who took up that sentiment. I have heard men talk nonsense by the hour, as the 'Spirit enabled them.'"—(P. 167.)

"I should never have thought a man's religion so much depended on the circulation of his blood as it does, if I had not experienced it. . . . Twenty years ago, I would have taken a man by the collar and preached four sermons a day to him. Now, I am glad if circumstances bring on an excuse."—(P. 185.)

It would be impossible that such a man as JOHN NEWTON should have spoken on many subjects near his heart for years, and not have left much worth remembering. We cull just a few of his sayings,—partly for their own sake, partly to show what sort of opinions were current, in those early days of Evangelicalism, among its staunchest upholders.

On the question, "What are the main points of instruction to be derived from the book of Job?" he remarks,—

"As to allegory, the whole Scripture is allegorical in one sense. There is not an idea there of the eternal world, but is represented to us under the image of sensible things. We are not to suppose a personal conference between God and Satan.

"I have learned from this book the unprofitableness of controversy. If God had not interposed, and Job and his friends had tried till this day, they would have disputed till now."—(P. 211.)

On the difference of pastoral work in town and in the country:—

"In the country, it is easy to lift up the leather latch, and walk in and converse. In town, one has to wipe one's shoes, send up one's name, and speak as if afraid to be understood."

In the following saying of his, we discover a trace of the Puritan spirit of asceticism which pervades many of the discussions:—

"There is no time for a sinner, a pardoned sinner, living among miserable sinners, to spend in jocoseness. There is nothing in the New Testament, from beginning to end, recommending levity."—(P. 115.)

On effectual preaching:—

"Whoever of us can say—'*Ye are witnesses, and God also, how holily and justly and unblameably we behaved ourselves among you that believe*'—may command and rule his people's souls.

"Paul was a reed in non-essentials, an iron pillar in essentials.

"A minister has almost hit the mark, if, when his sermon is over, some call him an Antinomian, and some an Arminian.

"There are not only ministers who bring 'milk' and 'strong meat,' but some who bring mere *bones*."—(P. 153.)

"The great point I would aim at is this: that whether people will accede to what I say or not, they may have a full persuasion that I mean them well. A young minister's exordium is too often in this spirit—'I know you all hate me.'

"I have been forty years in acquiring my present views. I reject some things I thought valuable: and receive some I before hesitated at. Now, why should I expect any man to receive my sentiments in half an hour, which I have been forty years in acquiring?

"It was a common saying with Mr. Whitfield,—'If I am faithful, you'll either fall out with me or with yourselves. A lady once found fault with my speaking too loud in preaching. Mr. Thornton said afterwards, "Don't mind that: she was cut by what you said, and must say something. If she had not found fault with your speaking, she would have done so with your buttons."'"—(P. 171.)

On the very sensible question, "How is the duty of reproving sin to be distinguished from the temptation?" Mr. Newton says,—

"It seems to me that some have a gift for reproving. Some are so prompt, wise, gentle, winning in their manner of administering reproof. A friend of mine had this, who used sometimes to stop and reprove swearing by saying, 'Sir, give me leave to swear next.'

"Yet, when it is our duty to abstain from *speaking* in reproof, we should nevertheless show it by *looks*.

"There is a good deal in tempers and dispositions. I am phlegmatic and not impetuous. If I feel inclination to reprove, I am not likely to do wrong. But the impetuous may be wrong in following their feelings.

"I tell infidels that I don't believe them. They try to carry a bold face, but they are wretched at heart.

"If a gross thing pass in company, I would either reprove, or leave the room.

"Reproof should be *in season, in secret, and in love*.

"I knew a minister who used to reprove swearing by taking off his hat when he heard it."—(P. 185.)

We cannot forbear reintroducing Mr. Cecil, for the sake of his remarks in this same debate:—

"I have traced a little the root of this shrinking from difficult duties. We are more concerned to be thought gentlemen, than to be felt as ministers. Being willing to be thought of as a man that has kept good company, cuts at the root of that rough work which is often required of us in bringing God into His own world. It is rough and hard work to bring God into His world. To talk of a Creator, and Preserver, and Redeemer, is an outrage and violence on the feelings of people. There is something of truth in what Mr. Wesley said to his preachers, though I have heard it much ridiculed—'You have no more to do with being gentlemen, than being dancing-masters.' The character of a minister is a great deal above the character of a gentleman. It takes a higher walk. I would not have a man rude, and disclaim to learn how to handle his knife and fork ; but to be a gentleman should not be his chief aim."—(P. 187.)

Two more sayings of John Newton's:—

"If any heathen can be brought who sees the vanity of the world, &c., and says from his heart, 'Eus entium, miserere me!' [mei ?] I believe he would be heard. But I never found one such, though I have known many heathen."—(P. 265.)

"In preaching, the upper part of the score, which the people hear, runs off well. But there is an under part full of discord. If the people heard this, I should be ready to jump out of the pulpit."—(P. 290.)

Occasionally we have some shrewd and even valuable remarks from the dry old commentator, THOMAS SCOTT:—

"Woodd thinks there is a difficulty in Christ's being at all the subject of temptation. In proportion to the purity of the soul, the danger decreases, but the anguish increases. In proportion to the impurity of the soul, the anguish decreases, but the danger and pollution increase. Take the example of a woman tempted to murder her child. Her danger is less in proportion to her love ; but her anguish exquisite in the same degree."—(P. 40.)

Speaking of the Lord's day, he says,—

"A man should say—'I have been in a storm all the week ; now I bring forth my instruments to make my observations.'"—(P. 44.)

Of detecting hypocrisy, he remarks,—

"We should lean to the favourable side, and be as the judge, an advocate for the prisoner. If we are too determined, we may strengthen the hypocrite in his hypocrisy, and wound in a way God has not wounded. We might have thought Judas a more unexceptionable man than Peter. Perhaps not one of the apostles suspected who was meant when our Lord said—'I have chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil.'"—(P. 213.)

The following remarks of his also struck us as worth noting:—

"I have a great objection to 'experience meetings.' They are a short sermon upon the little word 'I.'"—(P. 191.)

"That is a beautiful character where everything is in order ; in which, for example, we see boldness, but meekness ; meekness, but courage ; in which a man is seen penitent, but believing ; believing, but penitent. The true character blends colours as the rainbow. Jesus Christ is the only perfect example of this. St. Paul is the most wonderful among fallible men."—(P. 169.)

"There are many reasons connected with our sufferings which, if we could

see them, would make them to be no sufferings; but then they would not answer their end, for we *must* suffer in the dark, in order to illustrate the Divine mercy."

We would pass from collecting sayings of the chief members of the Eclectic Society, to noting some of the opinions expressed in their discussions, as characteristic or instructive. We observe, as might be expected, a strong Puritan leaven prevalent throughout; less indeed in Mr. Cecil's speeches than in those of the rest, but sometimes even in his. On music, the Rev. W. Fry remarks,—

"The introduction of music into private parties of Christians is a device of Satan to waste time. In what is called sacred music, there is often much profanation."—(P. 340.)

And Mr. Cecil:—

"There is a distinction between the world and us as to music. Put songs in the fire."—(P. 391.)

Among the adverse signs of the times, and together with "Sunday newspapers, and conjugal infidelity in the higher orders," the Rev. H. G. Watkins (p. 368) classes "the increase of circulating libraries"!

The Rev. T. Scott says, p. 115,—

"It is truly said, man is the only laughing animal. It is a question whether God or sin made him such. Christ sighed and wept, but never laughed."

At the same time we find a wide liberty of opinion on some subjects, which would be sought for in vain among the successors of the "Eclectics." For instance, on the question, "What is the obligation of the Christian Sabbath?" the Rev. H. Foster says,—

"I have had many embarrassing questions put to me at times by various persons. I have generally advised giving up any business not compatible with the obligation of the sabbath. I did this, more from compliance with general custom, than from thorough conviction. . . . My private opinion has been, that a man might go, if in an inferior relative situation, after attending worship, to his usual employment. But I confess that there is danger in this way of talking, because men will plead for themselves. But I have an idea that there is a liberty which men may take with a good conscience, which would be called by some a violation of the sabbath."—(P. 41.)

And Professor Farish, on the same subject:—

"It seems manifest that Christ meant to relax the strictness of the sabbath. A part, therefore, of the command is abrogated, as other political institutions were. Christianity is mild and accommodating. Yet it is manifest that the religious and physical benefits are of great importance and necessity. The sabbath is therefore of perpetual obligation, though not in its strictness."—(P. 42.)

We have the following capital remarks on fasting, from the Rev. T. Scott;—

"Fasting is not once prescribed under the law. The only expression like it is—*afflict thy soul*. Therefore (?) it is not of perpetual obligation. Yet it is of moral obligation, whatever the obligation is. It is a circumstantial,

occasional thing. It is an acknowledgment that we have forfeited our right to all the creatures of God. Therefore it is a proper attendant on all occasions of humiliation. By analogy, it will teach the inclination to submit to the judgment. It will enthrone conscience and judgment in all points. Fasting is of great use and expediency when we have any special blessing to seek from God. It is spoken of in this view with great honour in Scripture. In observing it, a devout man says, 'I'll have my mind as much separated as possible. I'll be alone with God this day.' We seldom set apart a day in such a spirit without getting good. At the time it may be felt heavy perhaps, but good in the result."—(P. 96.)

Among many good remarks in a discussion on theatrical amusements, are some curious and characteristic ones. Mr. B. Woodd says,—

"Mrs. More's sacred dramas have done injury. They have associated an idea of innocence with the drama."—(P. 160.)

Now it does strike us as dealing somewhat hard measure to the drama, to find fault not only with its abuse in the hands of the immoral, but also with those who have attempted to vindicate it from this abuse. A more curious remark still is this of the Rev. W. J. Abdy:—

"The imitation of thunder and other such works of the Almighty, as in the witch scene in 'Macbeth,' I think objectionable."—(P. 161.)

But how is thunder more the work of the Almighty, than the sound of the human voice, or any other utterance in nature?

There is something very striking in Mr. Cecil's saying, in this same debate,—

"The atmosphere of the play-house is poisonous. I remember how it was with myself. I've looked at my watch. The play is almost done. I must go to my dungeon. There's my father groaning with his infirmities. There's my mother with her Bible! What can I do? Is there any other place open? Why, if I've a shilling in my pocket, I'll find out that place."—(P. 162.)

Some of the subjects discussed have a curious sound to our ears; *e. g.*, "By what arguments shall we plead with God to deliver us from the French?" On this Mr. Venn remarks,—

"If France prevail, everything great and good will be extinguished. You might as well hesitate about praying against a horde of lions and tigers as against the French. 'Arise, O God, and maintain thine own cause.' Every man had better die at once, than come under their sway. Bonaparte is Satan personified, and his legions."—(P. 335.)

Yet, if this sound strange, we must remember its date, May, 1804, when the terror of invasion was at its height.

Here is an estimate to which we are not now accustomed, of the relative importance of a clergyman's duties:—

The Rev. Basil Woodd:—

"Many ministers have caught their death visiting the sick. The pulpit is of the first importance; visiting the sick is subordinate."

And Mr. Cecil says, in the same strain,—

"A minister is not called to go where a physician may. It is the physician's sole calling; but the minister has other duties."—(P. 351.)

The following would startle most of those on whom the mantle of the "Eclectics" has fallen:—

"If a believer presents his child in baptism, disbelieving baptism to be a means of regeneration, so far he is an unbeliever."—(Rev. W. Fry, p. 373.)

"The baptized are incorporated into the visible Church of Christ, and thereby entitled to the pardon of sins, and received into the number of God's children, through Christ, and have a right to expect the Spirit's influence so long as they do not wilfully violate their baptismal covenant. They are born again, or regenerated into a new state, have entered on new relations, are obliged to lead new lives, are admitted into the body of which Christ is the head, and in which the Holy Spirit dwells. This is baptismal regeneration, and what will be attended with the renewing of the Holy Ghost, where there is no obstruction to His sacred influence."—(Rev. Josiah Pratt, p. 377.)

Some allusions are beyond our comprehension; as, for instance, in enforcing on parents the duty of engaging their children in works of benevolence, Mr. Basil Woodd says,—

"Cut like Dorcas, instead of drawing strings across to imitate engravings."

On the uselessness of attempting to teach the heathen through the doctrines of natural religion, Mr. Simons says,—

"The wolf once went to school. His master said he never had so untoward a scholar. He got over *a* to *g*, and skipped to *n*, *u*, *s*, but never learned more."—(P. 432.)

It is a remarkable circumstance that, among all the various questions handled by the Society, amounting to upwards of 300, there is not one relating to the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper; nor have I found even so much as a mention of that ordinance throughout all the discussions. No wonder, that the next great oscillation of theological opinion was in the direction of sacramental grace.

The *historical* interest of the discussion at the Eclectic Society's meetings is considerable. On March 18th, 1799, the subject was, "What methods can we use most effectually to promote the knowledge of the Gospel among the heathen?" and the result of the debate was the foundation of the *Church Missionary Society*, on the 12th of the next month. It was to be established "on the *Church* principle, not the *High Church* principle" (Rev. J. Venn, p. 98): and the maxim handed down by him who survived the longest of the three most eminent after Mr. Venn, was, "It must be kept in Evangelical hands." Those who have watched the proceedings of the society know how thoroughly it has kept to this its traditional maxim; while many who wish it God speed, and are deeply thankful for its work in the world, are sometimes disposed to yearn for a larger spirit of Christian charity in its counsels, and to look forward with no little apprehension, amidst the declension and secularization of the great Church party to which it belongs, to its prospects for the future.


A discussion was taken on the 4th of February, 1799, on the question, proposed by Mr. Pratt, "How far might a periodical publication be rendered subservient to the interests of religion?" the result was the establishment of the *Christian Observer*, which still holds its ground as the organ of a portion of the Evangelical party. Its circulation is we believe not large, and its influence, where it does circulate, certainly not great: but occasionally it contains thoughtful papers, and reviews of books carefully and fairly done.*

An interesting incident, forgotten now, may serve to show the spirit of Catholic Christian charity with which these venerable fathers of Evangelicalism were animated.

The Directors of the London Missionary Society, in 1794, purchased and fitted out a vessel called the *Duff*, to convey their missionaries to the South Sea Islands, the first scene of their labours. Her first voyage was prosperous, and thirty missionaries were landed in Tahiti. But the second voyage ended in calamity. The vessel fell into the hands of a French privateer, and was sold as a prize, twenty-nine missionaries and their families being left to shift for themselves, and subjected to great hardships. The members of the Committee of the Church Missionary Society, who were in the main identical with those of the Eclectic Society, on hearing of this misfortune, raised among themselves, and sent to the London Missionary Society, a donation of a hundred guineas, as a testimony of regard and condolence. Archdeacon Pratt cites this as illustrating "the spirit of charity and kindly feeling which the Church Missionary Society has always shown towards all other kindred societies which are engaged in the same work." We wish we could feel this to be uniformly true with regard to the attitude assumed by its members towards its elder sister in the same work, the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel.

On the whole, the "Eclectic Notes" form a valuable monument in the history of the great parties in the English Church. If, as we said in the beginning, we do not find in them many treasures of theology, much originality of conception, or wide grasp of thought, we are at least introduced to men who were sowing the seeds which have since produced fruit in the Church; men of single purpose for their holy work, of child-like simplicity and lion-like boldness, working against the current opinions of a low and worldly age. And if in our own time those unworthy opinions have in any measure been borne down by higher and wiser maxims, and altered for the better, it is to these men, under God's providence, that we mainly owe the change.

* We may notice, as an evidence of carelessness in the preparation of this second edition of "Eclectic Notes," that in the account of the early writers in the *Christian Observer*, mention is made (in 1865) of the "present" Bishop of Calcutta,—meaning, of course, Bishop Wilson, who has been dead many years.



DEAN STANLEY ON THE HEBREW KINGS AND PROPHETS.

Lectures on the Jewish Church (Part II. From Samuel to the Captivity)
By ARTHUR PENRHYN STANLEY, D.D., Dean of Westminster
London; John Murray. 1855.

THROUGH the winter months this volume has been in the hands of many various and diligent readers. The graver theological students have been submitting it to close criticism, the results of which we shall probably soon see in some of our weighty contemporaries. But the charm of the volume is so great, and its interest so diversified, that it has equally attracted those to whom theology is merely a branch of general literature. It has been read aloud in families of almost every temperament, sedulously used by schoolmasters to make Bible lessons alluring, and the clergy have laid it under large contribution for the purpose of giving liveliness to discourses from the pulpit. It is our evident duty, without further delay, to give our own account of its contents, and some part of the impression which a very careful perusal of it has left on our minds. The author's position, too, is so eminent, the respect inspired by his character is so great, and his contributions to historical theology have been so considerable—and, we must add, there is so much disquietude and anxiety in many serious minds regarding the influence exerted by his writings, that longer procrastination would neither be respectful to him nor fair to the readers of this journal.

A great difficulty, however, presents itself at the very outset of our task. These Lectures cover a very large space of Sacred History; their contents are manifold and diverse; and very grave questions are

raised even in the incidental portions of the work. Thus it is impossible within moderate limits to give both a sketch of the narratives and the biographies, and also an analysis of the religious results which are either expressed or suggested. Are we to dwell chiefly on doctrine, taking little notice of our author's marvellous power of grouping and describing? or are we to give only the pictures, throwing all the more serious topics into the shade? If we adopt the latter course rather than the former, it must not be supposed that we accept all the explicit conclusions which we do not attack, or that we are blind to the consequences that logically follow from many sentences, which, though lightly passed over by the fascinated general reader, will infallibly catch the notice of the theological eye. It seems to us, indeed, that in regard to the substantial statement of positive religious truth, this volume is a satisfactory advance upon the former. It may be that the Dean of Westminster feels more than previously the importance of disarming unjust suspicion, by bringing doctrinal truths more definitely forward. Or it may be, that we ourselves feel less than previously the want of such definiteness of doctrine, because here we find ourselves on more secular ground than before. The history of the Hebrew Monarchy must necessarily have much in common with the history of other monarchies. The details of the Scripture narrative in this period are profuse and minute, and even on its Prophetic side it has points of closer contact with our own times than ever could be realized in regard to the careers of Abraham and Moses, or of Joshua and Eli. For these reasons, considering the peculiar bent of Dr. Stanley's mind, and his customary method of dealing with the Bible, we should expect, *à priori*, this volume to be his best; and we think most readers will agree that the expectation is fulfilled.

However this may be, the volume undoubtedly possesses all the merits of its predecessor. There is the same high moral tone, the same diligent use of materials gathered from every quarter, the same series of pleasant surprises in sudden contrasts and comparisons, which are almost always appropriate, and almost always unexpected. Above all, there is the same power of vivid and distinct representation. Dean Stanley's faculty of putting before us living characters, and (if we may use the expression) living facts, and of concentrating an immense amount of light for a moment on a given point, is truly wonderful. The reader is enabled to go through these Lectures with a light and easy step, as if he were walking in the freshest air over elastic turf scattered over with flowers. And this we regard as no trivial advantage. It is a great merit to have written a book on the Bible which is really attractive, and which the most impatient can read. No doubt such a power involves correlative dangers. There is the double risk of too readily using precarious materials for the elabo-

ration of the picture, and of subordinating and neglecting graver and more important subjects for the sake of the picture. Nor has the Dean, with all his powers, been altogether preserved from either of these risks. But these Lectures have conferred no slight benefit on the Biblical student, if viewed merely on their descriptive side. After studying such an account as that which is given* of all the details of David's retreat from Jerusalem on the first sad day of Absalom's rebellion, we feel that we have obtained a firmer hold on the history than before. No one, after making himself master of all the incidents and circumstances of that cold winter's day, when the book written by Baruch at Jeremiah's dictation was destroyed by the Jewish king, will listen with quite so vacant a mind as before to the first lesson in the afternoon of the 15th Sunday after Trinity.† And we hope it will not be quite useless if we endeavour in the following pages to give such impressions as the Dean has enabled us to form of the Hebrew Kings and Hebrew Prophets, interspersing here and there some additions and remarks of our own.

The first portrait in this gallery of Jewish Monarchs is of course that of SAUL; and the portrait is given with most lifelike reality, and with a sympathizing kindly treatment of that mixed and perplexing character. The time to which the son of Kish belonged was "transitional,"—between "the patriarchal and nomadic state" which was now passing away, and "the fixed and settled state" which afterwards became continuous. His career is "the eddy in which both streams converge."‡ And his characteristics were in harmony with the requirements of the time. He was to conduct the war against the Philistines, who held the greater part of the country in their terrible grasp, and he was chosen in great measure for the royalty of his outward appearance. Conspicuous among the people for his "stately and towering form," he was like one of the heroes in Homer. Dr. Stanley compares him with Agamemnon. It would be a natural thought also to compare him with Ajax, both from his stature, his madness, and his suicide, and for the sake of an obvious contrast: and there are passages in these Lectures which suggest (whether justly or not) that there was something of Ulysses in David:§—

"Tibi dextera bello

Utilis; ingenium est, quod eget moderamine nostri.

Tu vires sine mente geris; mihi cura futuri est.

. Tu tantum corpore prodes:

Nos animo."||

The circumstances in the midst of which Saul was summoned to the throne may appear very trivial, but they were not really so. In that strayed drove of asses we have "still the cherished animal of the

* Pp. 118-23.

† Jer. xxxvi. See pp. 536-8.

‡ P. 5. § See pp. 60, 72, 80.

|| Ovid. "Metam.," xiii. 361-5.

Israelite chiefs.”* And even if it were so, we must remember that the moral import of Biblical events does not depend upon their magnificence according to the human standard. “The asses of Saul’s father are strayed away. What is that to the news of a kingdom? God lays these small accidents for the ground of greater designs. Little can we, by the beginning of any action, guess at God’s intention in the conclusion.”† Our author does apply the word “trivial” to the religious part of the first transaction between Saul and Samuel: but we think without sufficient reason. He uses the term *bakshtish* for the gift which the young chief placed in the hands of the seer. This surely brings down the Prophet to a level far too low. Rather we should view the gift as an expression of subjection—as the δῶρον, or gift of homage, which was to come back in δωρεαί, or gifts of favour and bounty, from the superior.‡ The relations throughout of the King with the Prophet ought very carefully to be noticed. It is in comparison with the uniform and consistent goodness of Samuel, that we see most clearly the irregular zeal, the wild impulses, the superstition, the fitful changing temper of Saul. Something of this is perhaps to be explained by the tribe to which he belonged. “I will send thee a man out of the land of Benjamin,” was the word spoken to Samuel.§ And Saul was “a true Benjamite from first to last,” || not merely in such loyalty and family feeling as showed itself in the case of the men of Jabesh-gilead, but in “the strange union of fierceness and of gentleness, of sudden resolves for good and evil, which run, as hereditary qualities often do run, through the whole history of that frontier clan.”¶ But there is also a deep and most painful individual interest in this first of the Jewish Monarchs: and in this Lecture we are carried rapidly and vigorously through all the varied scenes which bring all this interest to view—the victory of Michmash—the confused flight of the Philistines down the defile of Beth-horon—the reckless vow—the heroism and generosity of Jonathan, faithful alike to his father and to his friend—the anguish of the final separation from Samuel—the alternate love and hatred for David—the gradual gathering of the gloom over the king and his fated house—the weird midnight expedition to Endor—the battle, and the coming up of the “wild Amalekite,” when Saul was sinking in “the dizziness and darkness of death.”** For a few pages we are carried on to the close of the tragic history of his house and dynasty; and then, with dramatic propriety, we are brought back,

* P. 6. † Bishop Hall’s “Contemplations on the Old Testament,” xii. 4.

‡ The contrasted use of these two words is very consistent in the New Testament. Compare, for instance, Matt. ii. 11; xv. 5, with John iv. 10; Ephes. iv. 7. See “Eirenica,” by the Rev. W. B. Marriott (Pt. ii., p. 187), who illustrates this Eastern custom of placing a gift of homage in the hands of a superior, that it may be returned in a far richer gift of royal bounty, by the great Durbar held by Sir John Lawrence in the Punjab.

§ 1 Sam. ix. 16.

|| P. 12.

¶ P. 40.

** P. 31.

and the Lecture closes with David's elegy over Saul and Jonathan, "the mighty Archer of the Archer tribe,"—"the song of the bow"—"the bow which never turned back from the slain."*

Next in the series is a whole-length picture of DAVID. We had already been familiar with the first sketch of this monarch in the "Dictionary of the Bible:" but here the figure and face are before us, framed in the history, and carefully finished with minute individual touches. One Lecture was given to Saul. David, as is reasonable and fitting, has three, divided according to three obvious topics,—his youth, his reign, and his fall. Our plan precludes us from giving special attention to the Lecture on the Psalter, which, though linked on here to David, in fact was parallel with the whole course of subsequent Jewish history. It is not now the tallest, the most robust, that is chosen, the most heroic according to the barbarous standard,—but the youngest, the gentlest, the most despised at home, though universally loved and admired by those who gathered round him from all quarters during the course of his life. It would be quite impossible, without profuse quotations, to do any justice to the whole of these three Lectures. We can only indicate a few of the more salient points, for the purpose just of showing how David appears on the canvas, and by what scenery and companions he is surrounded.

We are reminded of the full materials which we have for the most intimate knowledge of David. He comes before us throughout in the most vivid personality. We have even the means of fixing his actual appearance in our minds—his auburn hair, his bright eyes, his short stature, his grace and comeliness.† We commonly think of him as a light stripling; but in his fleetness of foot and the vigour of his movements there was more than a mere supple activity of limb: he was doubtless possessed of great muscular and nervous strength; and probably we ought to take this into account more than it is our custom to do in thinking of that moment when he rushed against the Philistine with all the enthusiasm of a Divine impulse. Among the circumstances, too, which belong to the biographical aspect of the man, we may mention the beauty of his children. The house of Jesse seems to have been famous in this respect; the ill-fated Absalom being "the flower and pride" of the whole family, and indeed of "the nation:"‡ "in all Israel, there was none to be praised for his beauty" like him; "from the crown of his head to the sole of his foot there was no blemish:" while in the next generation but one, the same characteristic appears in Maachah, the favourite queen of Rehoboam.§ David's affection for his children and his kindred was passionate and intense. This everywhere appears through the history. Even at the last, when he is dying, after having worn the crown for forty years, he is still

* P. 38.

† P. 49.

‡ P. 115.

§ P. 391.

"David, the son of Jesse."* Nor among the circumstances which tend to bring out these individual features, must we forget his close connection with, and strong attachment to, Bethlechem. Here was his early home. In this neighbourhood he "kept watch over his flocks by night." Here was the ancestral burying-place. To this spot his nephew Asahel was borne, after he fell so sadly by the spear of Abner.† From the fields near Bethlechem he gave that property to Barzillai's son, which we trace long afterwards in the writings of the prophets.‡ "He never forgot the flavour of the water of the well of Bethlechem." That adventure in his unsettled wandering life does more than a world of description to bring out to view some of the marked characteristics of the man. Above all, we have a large number of Psalms, which reveal to us his deeper experience, his feelings and his motives, his joys and his sorrows. Leaving on one side the general subject of the Book of Psalms, we may just point to the 23rd, "the first direct expression of the religious idea of a shepherd, afterwards to take so deep a root in the heart of Christendom," §—those which may belong to the period of the wanderings, such as the 31st, the "Fortress-Hymn," where the metrical version of Tate and Brady has inserted "Keilah's well-fenced town," ||—or those which seem to recall the familiar scenery and providences of those days of danger, as the 11th and 18th ¶—the high royal resolves of the 101st **—the solemn thankfulness of the 3rd and 4th, which have been assigned to the evening and morning that succeeded the first eventful day of his flight in the revolt of Absalom††—and of course the 51st, the Psalm of Psalms for the penitent souls of all ages. The great variety, again, of incidents and characters with which David came in contact through those successive changes of life, are all subservient and helpful towards our realization of that remarkable combination of differing qualities—that union of sagacity, discretion, enthusiasm, tenderness, courage, generosity, and sympathy,—which have rarely, if ever, been united in any man as in David, and which gave him that extraordinary power which he exercised, and still does exercise, over the hearts of men.

Turning now to follow the general progress of the nation through David's life and reign, it is interesting to notice the gradual accession of the tribes to his obedience. Even in his youth and during his unsettled period of wild adventure, we find members of various tribes forgetting their clan feeling and attaching themselves to his fortunes. In the stronghold near En-gedi there were already men of Benjamin as well as Judah;‡‡ and at the Court of Achish, in Gath, Benjamite archers and slingers are conspicuous.§§ Gadites swam the Jordan

* P. 136. † See pp. 47, 77. ‡ P. 46. See p. 64. 2 Sam. xix. 37-8; Jer. xli. 17.

§ P. 51. || P. 65, note. ¶ P. 72. ** Pp. 88-9. †† P. 123. ‡‡ P. 63. §§ P. 70.

that they might rally round him.* “On his march to Gilboa, and on his retreat, he was joined by some chiefs of the Manassites, through whose territory he was passing;”† and his warm message afterwards to those members of that tribe, who had taken Saul’s body from Beth-shan, was both politic and generous.‡ While reigning still at Hebron, he had deputations from “all the tribes,” specially from Levi and the sons of Issachar, “who had understanding of the times, to know what Israel ought to do;”§ and in the consecration hymns at the reception of the Ark, “the two warlike tribes of the North, Zebulon and Naphthali, are conspicuous.”|| It is evident that personal influence had much to do with the consolidation of the whole nation, when he founded his capital on the frontier line between Saul’s tribe and his own. We must not dwell on the military organization of the kingdom, on the officials of the Court, and the foreign wars of this reign, which are described so completely by Dean Stanley. The one point on which chief stress is to be laid at this moment of the history, is Jerusalem. From the time when “the City of David” was made the centre of the religious and political life of the nation, a new period was begun, rich in ever-growing prophecies of the Messiah. Jerusalem and David are inseparably connected, and lie in the heart of all our sacred associations. Even in the Gospels Jerusalem is “the Holy City,” “the City of the Great King.”¶ Even in the first great outburst of Pentecostal life we are reminded by an Apostle that David’s sepulchre is there “unto this day.”

The best Lectures in the book are, in our opinion, those which relate to SOLOMON. This was, perhaps, to be expected; for here we have the Jewish History and the Jewish Monarchy on their most strictly secular side. Nothing can surpass the admirable way in which the characteristics of his reign are gradually opened and spread out before us. It is pointed out truly (perhaps a little too strongly) in contrast with David, how few personal incidents are recorded of Solomon. But on the other hand, we have a large and rapid development of the relations of the Hebrew kingdom with foreign countries. The contemporary Egyptian monarch, whose name is made known to us in the Jewish annals themselves, may still be seen depicted on the walls of Karnac.†† “This reign contains the first historical record of the contact between Western Europe and Eastern India. In Solomon’s fearless encouragement of ecclesiastical architecture is the first‡‡ sanction of the employment of art in the service of a true Religion. In his writings, and in the literature which springs from

* P. 64. † P. 71. ‡ 2 Sam. ii. 5—7. § 1 Chron. xii. 32. || P. 84.

¶ Matt. v. 35; xxvii. 53.

** Acts ii. 29.

†† P. 166.

‡‡ But does not the Dean forget here Aholiab and Bezaleel, and what he said himself in his first volume, pp. 167-8?

them, is the only Hebrew counterpart to the philosophy of Greece ;” while in this thousandth year before the Christian era we are “on a level” with the familiar beginning of the great Classical times.† No contact of sacred history with general history—we may say, no contact of it with modern times—can possibly be more interesting. We must add, too, that here we have the beginning of that world-wide connection of Judaism with trade, which has subsisted ever since.

The “wisdom” with which Solomon was so highly favoured is to be regarded chiefly as denoting practical sagacity, tact, discretion, a penetrating and comprehensive view of human character, with the power of managing public concerns on a large scale: and it is particularly to be remembered here how great a part of the duties of the Oriental monarch consisted in the administration of justice. In no respect were his practical wisdom and administrative ability more clearly shown than in his establishment and organization of Hebrew commerce. The public works of Solomon, and his internal arrangements for the safety, strength, and prosperity of his kingdom, are well described by Ewald in a few vigorous pages.‡ As to those external relations of which we are more particularly speaking, we see no reason to doubt that, north-eastwards, in the direction of Syria and Mesopotamia, Tadmor is identical with Palmyra, and that, with Baalbec, it was established at this time as a mercantile depôt with a garrison. As regards Egypt, the King’s unhappy marriage must alone have tended to keep up and increase an active trade with that country; and it is interesting, too, to notice the nature of the imports and exports—a subject into which Dr. Stanley does not largely enter—horses and linen yarn in one direction, probably oil and wine in the other. But it is the mercantile intercourse with Phœnicia which more especially demands our attention. It is evident that the most elementary lessons of political economy suggest the advantage of a mutual interchange of products between that country and Palestine. There were indications of this feeling even in David’s reign;§ and at a much later period of Scripture History we are reminded|| how naturally the country of Tyre and Sidon might become dependent for its food on “the King’s country,” whether it were King Herod’s or King Solomon’s.

We see clearly that Solomon turned his active mind and powers of organization very vigorously in this direction. Hiram’s fleets commanded all the commerce of the West. The Israelites themselves had had no experience in ship-building, and it was evidently

* P. 168.

† P. 166.

‡ “Geschichte des Volkes Israel” (2nd Edit., 1853), iii., pp. 329-49. Dr. Stanley, though his treatment and grouping of his subjects is his own, shows an evident wish throughout the volume to express his obligations to the eminent German Historian of the Jews.

§ 2 Sam. v. 11; 1 Chron. xiv. 1.

|| Acts xii. 20.

not bad policy to place Tyrian rather than Edomite sailors in the ships which traded in the Eastern seas; while Phœnicia herself would obviously derive benefit from this large development of her mercantile relations.* Thus there resulted the two great navies which are connected with the names of Tarshish and Ophir. We see no valid reason against identifying these two regions with the South of Spain and the South of India; and all the difficulties of the Scriptural expressions seem to be sufficiently removed (as is suggested here in a note) by accepting that circumnavigation of Africa which Herodotus shows to have been probable at a very early period. Solomon went himself to Ezion-geber, on the Red Sea, to see the preparations for some of these voyages;† and most interesting it is, in connection with this subject, to notice in the Book of Proverbs the frequent allusions to trade and to commercial products,‡ while even sea-sickness is employed there to point a warning for the shameful drunkard.§ And far down in the Hebrew annals we see the effects of this mercantile greatness of the reign of Solomon. The head of the Gulf of Akabah is again, though unsuccessfully, made the scene of mercantile enterprise under Jehoshaphat, in conjunction with a foreign alliance;|| and still later, we see efforts of the same kind in the reign of Uzziah;¶ while in the time of Ahaz, the loss of the seaport of Elath is one of the indications of the waning powers of Judah.**

The articles, too, of this Solomonian trade form a very attractive subject of research. Thus, one precious import, which might come by either the eastern or western fleet, reappears frequently in the history, in the "throne of ivory" of the kings of Judah,†♣ in the "ivory palaces" of the forty-fifth Psalm,—whatever the occasion or scene of that Psalm may be,—in the "ivory house" which Ahab made, in the "beds of ivory" for which Amos blames the luxurious nobles of the North.‡‡ But above all a strange interest is connected, not simply with the spices and precious metals and fragrant algum wood,§§ but still more with the monkeys and peacocks, the very names of which associate them with Southern India, and with the Southern India of that particular period.|||| With the mention of these animals we come upon another side of Solomon's activity. We see here partly, perhaps, the love of display, but we appear to see also something of the exercise of his wisdom in the

* Some of the best chapters in the late Dr. Kitto's "Daily Bible Illustrations" are those which relate to Solomon. See especially "The Wisdom of Solomon," "The Royal Merchant," and "Trade with Egypt," in the volume on the Kings; and "The Garden and the Pool," in the volume on the Poetical Books.

† 2 Chron. viii. 17.

‡ P. 243.

§ Prov. xxiii. 34.

|| Pp. 387-8.

¶ Pp. 434-5.

** P. 459.

†† P. 195.

‡‡ Pp. 270, 286-7.

§§ See the article on "Algum wood," by Dr. Forbes Royle, in Kitto's "Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature." |||| See Max Müller, "Lect. on the Science of Language," pp. 204-6.

direction of science. And if this curiosity was manifested by him in reference to the animal world, we can hardly imagine him indifferent to the world of plants. "I made me gardens and orchards," he says in the Book of Ecclesiastes, "and I planted trees in them of all kinds of fruits: I made me pools of water, to water therewith the wood that bringeth forth trees."* And if, as some travellers assert, there are near the traditional pools of Solomon, "a number of plants, self-sown from age to age, which do not exist in any other part of the Holy Land,"† we have a confirmation of a very natural conjecture, and there still remains a trace not only of the Royal Merchant, but of the Royal Naturalist, "who spake of trees, from the cedar tree that is in Lebanon even unto the hyssop that springeth out of the wall: he spake also"—and here the classification is really scientific—"of beasts, and of fowl, and of creeping things, and of fishes."‡

This train of thought leads us to the consideration of those books of Holy Scripture which we are always in the habit of associating with King Solomon; and it is very satisfactory to find that Dr. Stanley does most distinctly associate with this monarch both the Proverbs and Ecclesiastes.§ He might indeed, even if the evidence had been less strong, have been under some temptation to accept this conclusion for the sake of its attractive symmetry, and the great help which it gives for completing the picture of Solomon. And we think he has in some degree yielded to this temptation, in assigning, with M. Renan, so confidently to this age the derivation of the Book of Job. It is true there is force in the arguments, that the allusions to such animals as the peacock and the hippopotamus lead us naturally to think of Solomon's collections, and again, that the Gentile relations of the book are in keeping with the wide and general scope of his life and reign. But the conclusion is far more precarious in this case, than with regard to those other two books which the Church has always connected with his name. And certainly those books help us to fill up, in a very instructive and pathetic manner, the full proportions of his biography.|| The Book of Proverbs is truly in harmony with all our impressions of Solomon, whilst it holds, as Dr. Stanley shows, a most important place in the sacred Canon. "It is the philosophy of practical life. It is the sign to us that the Bible does not despise common sense and discretion. It impresses upon us,

* Eccles. ii. 5, 6. † "Daily Bible Illustrations:" "Solomon and the Kings," p. 101.

‡ 1 Kings iv. 33.

§ The Proverbs are explicitly assigned (p. 243) to Solomon as their chief author; and of Ecclesiastes it is said (p. 255), that "there can be no doubt that it embodies the sentiments which were believed to have proceeded from him at the close of his life."

|| It should be added, that Dr. Stanley assigns the Canticles also to "the age, if not to the pen of" Solomon, and associates that book with a supposed favourite resort of the King near Lebanon, overlooking the plain of Damascus. See pp. 198, 240.

in the most forcible manner, the value of intelligence and prudence, and of a good education ;” * while its method of teaching, “the illustrations from natural objects, the selection of the homelier instead of the grander of them,” † carry our thoughts onward to the Parables, and to Him who taught in “Solomon’s Porch,” and who referred with emphasis to “the wisdom of Solomon.” Still closer, though more melancholy, does the connection seem between the Book of Ecclesiastes and this prosperous unhappy monarch. “It is the bitter, the agonized, and in this sense the most true and characteristic, utterance of one who has known all things, enjoyed all things, been admired by all men, has seen through all the littleness and worthlessness of all these things in themselves, and yet not been able to grasp that which alone could give them an enduring value, or compensate for their absence.” ‡ No part of the Bible is more sad, none more seriously instructive, than the account of the later years of Solomon. Worldly splendour and voluptuous habits had brought on satiety. Selfish despotism had sown the seed of future revolution. The enemies of that superb kingdom were gathering on the frontier. This part of the Scriptural narrative “contains the most striking witness to the instability of all power that is divorced from moral and religious principle.” § It is clear that Dr. Stanley—great as is the evident pleasure with which he has elaborated his account of this reign—is far from extending to Solomon that sympathy which he gives so ungrudgingly to the impulsive and inconsistent Saul. No worse character could be assigned to any man than the description given of the career of David’s successor, namely, that it was “the union of genius and crime” ||

After the death of Solomon we enter very rapidly on the diverging histories of the two separated kingdoms. The causes, so well drawn out by Professor Blunt, which even in the reigns of David and Solomon were silently preparing the way for division, are clearly indicated. ¶ The great house of Joseph, which had received the patriarch’s special blessing, could not easily forget the glory of Joshua, Gideon, Jephthah, and Samuel, or see with patience the political and religious pre-eminence of Shechem and Shiloh merged in Jerusalem. It needed only the foolish oppression of Rehoboam, and the appearance of the popular JEROBOAM on the scene, to excite disaffection and complete the revolution. The connection of Jeroboam with Egypt is one most interesting and significant part of this narrative. Thither he had been banished by Solomon ; and there—“like his ancestor Joseph” ** —he acquired so much influence, that the reigning monarch, Shishak, parted from him reluctantly, and gave him an Egyptian princess in marriage. The subsequent progress of Jewish history was most

* P. 243.

† P. 247.

‡ Pp. 257-8.

§ P. 248.

|| P. 253.

¶ P. 272. See Blunt’s “Undesigned Coincidences,” Pt. ii. 15.

** P. 275.

seriously affected by this connection. We find Rehoboam, when strengthening himself in his restricted kingdom, giving prompt and great attention not only to the fortification of the metropolis, but to garrisons along his southern frontier. "The reason for this soon became apparent. The great Egyptian monarchy was not now allied with the House of Solomon, but with the House of Jeroboam; and now, for the first time since the Exodus, Judah was once more threatened with an Egyptian bondage."* Jerusalem was actually captured, and the Temple lost its golden shields. But again it was in Egypt† that Jeroboam had become familiar with those outward forms under which the Divine Power was represented and worshipped; and hence came the suggestion, not only of the golden calves that were set up in Bethel and Dan, but also of the formula which attended this profane consecration,—“Behold thy gods, O Israel, which brought thee up out of the land of Egypt.”‡ The mark which Jeroboam set at this moment on Hebrew history, and the mark which God set on Jeroboam, are impressive for all time.

From this point the Dean of Westminster gives the annals of the two kingdoms in several lucid, learned, and instructive lectures. In his general arrangement he does not exactly pursue the plan of Ewald. But first he follows the kingdom of Israel to its close in the Assyrian exile, and the introduction of the new settlers; and thence he goes back to resume the history of the kingdom of Judah, which then he conducts continuously to the fall of Jerusalem and the Babylonian Captivity. If there is some disadvantage in following separately and in succession, from their source, two streams which are not only parallel, but very close together, there is gained on the other hand great clearness of representation. This plan, too, is peculiarly suitable to a volume of Lectures; nor is it difficult to combine the two histories at any point.

As to the spirit and tone in which this work is done, we must say that Dr. Stanley seems to us to have made too little of the evil of separation and of the idolatry with which it was connected: and we think that the impression derived from these pages is not quite in harmony with the feeling left by Holy Scripture in the mind. But leaving this topic for the present, we must here call attention to the instructive way in which the author sets before us some of the contrasts of the Northern and Southern kingdoms.

Even in the outward aspect of the two territories there is a signal discrepancy. "The fertility, the freshness, the beauty of Ephraim and Manasseh, the wild forest scenery of Zebulon and Naphthali,"§ are even now remarked by all travellers as opposed to the barrenness and bareness of Judah and Benjamin. Nor was this contrast without

* P. 384.

+ P. 278.

‡ 1 Kings xii. 28.

§ P. 269.

its effect on the course of the history. Scenes like these in the North may possibly have had some share in producing the "force and freedom," the "life and energy," of some of its characters, which appear, as the author remarks, "nowhere equally in the South."* And it must necessarily have had some influence in reference to another characteristic of the Israelitish kingdom. Here "the Court was not, as in Judah, confined to a single capital. Shechem, in spite of its unrivalled attractions, never became to the North what Jerusalem was to the South. The sovereigns of Israel followed the tendency by which Princes of all times have been led to select pleasant residences apart from the great cities of state. This difference arose partly from the absence of fixed religious associations at Shechem, partly from the succession of dynasties. It was also fostered by the greater opportunities furnished in the North for such an increase of royal residences. In the territory of Ephraim—in this respect the exact reverse of Judah—the fertile plains and wooded hills, which are its characteristic ornaments, at once gave an opening for the formation of parks and pleasure-grounds like the 'Paradises' of the Assyrian and Persian monarchies. The first of these was Tirzah, in the hills north of Shechem, of proverbial beauty, selected by Jeroboam, and during three reigns the residence and burial-place of the royal house. Another was Jezreel. The chief of all was Samaria, which ultimately superseded all the rest."† And what was true of the monarch was true in its degree, and for the same reason, of the nobles of the North. Our attention is rightly called to "the stately independence of Naboth in his vineyard at Jezreel," to "the lofty hill of Shemer, which he would sell to the King only at a vast price," to "the great lady of Shunem in her well-known home on the slopes of Esdraelon."‡

Other elements of contrast enter more deeply into religious realities. Dr. Stanley presents to us the history of the Northern kingdom as the history of the "nation,"§ while the history of the Southern is rather that of a "dynasty" and a "city."|| To this distinction we must somewhat demur. The concession is immense which allows to the South the unbroken dynasty of David and the Holy City of Jerusalem. It is true that ten tribes were rent from the twelve to form the new political community; that "all Israel"¶ is described as following Jeroboam; that the "God of Israel"*** sanctioned not only this original division, but likewise at least one subsequent step of its progress, in the appointment of Jehu. But our author so speaks of this community by the word "national," as almost to imply some preference of it over the other community. And this view appears to colour some of his minor references and illustrations. Thus the

* P. 271. † Pp. 268-9. ‡ P. 270. § Pp. 263-6. || P. 381.

¶ 1 Kings xii. 20.

*** 1 Kings xi. 31; 2 Kings ix. 6.

"twelve stones" of Elijah's altar on Carmel, which we are always disposed to view as a symbol of the union which ought to be, Dr. Stanley presents to us as a symbolic sanction of the disunion that is.* The aspect under which he exhibits the subject in another place is far more religiously and instructively true, namely, that God's grace comes to help when discouragements seem darkest, and overflows what we might conceive to be its appointed channels.† For whatever we may say of the "National" character of the Northern kingdom, its "Prophetical" character is undoubted. During the period which is immediately before us, the activity of the Prophets, the schools of the Prophets, are associated with the North, whilst Prophecy was comparatively a blank in the South. There the main interest is centralized in Jerusalem, in the Temple and in the Priesthood. The contrast indeed, so far as this particular period is concerned, may be approximately summed up in the antithesis between the Priest and the Prophet,—while it is never for a moment doubtful to which side the preference of Dr. Stanley inclines.

Unwritten prophecy rises to its highest point in ELLIAH, at the very time when the apostasy (for so we must still call it) of the ten tribes sinks to its lowest point in AHAB and JEZEBEL. The biographical interest of these three characters is immense. The crisis was tremendous. "For the first time, the chief wife of an Israelite king was one of the old accursed Canaanite race."‡ The marriage with Jezebel seems to have resulted in an organized effort not only to establish the false and foul divinities of Tyre and Sidon, but to root out even the modified remembrance of Jehovah, which was kept up by Jeroboam's institutions. She stands forth in the history as a Queen utterly reckless and licentious in character, and yet with a strange "magical fascination," §—fierce—stern—regardless of consequences, and with a spirit quite unbroken even in the terrible retribution of her end.|| That name, which was a proverb among the Israelite people, might well become the warning of Christendom in the Apocalypse.¶ The weakness of the husband, contrasted with the strength of the wife, comes before us as one of the most instructive and impressive portraitures of Scripture. And yet there is almost a certain pathos in Ahab's character; at least there is a particular aspect of his weakness, which gives definiteness to the individuality of the picture. We are rightly reminded of that "peculiar mood of sadness" which is described on two occasions in him, and "in no one else."** In the character also of Elijah there is a pathetic side. He is indeed the "public champion" of God and of the cause of God; but first we see him "as an individual sufferer."†† There is

* P. 303.

† P. 376.

‡ P. 286.

§ P. 288.

|| P. 334.

¶ 2 Kings ix. 22; Rev. ii. 20.

** P. 312. See 1 Kings xx. 43; xxi. 4.

†† P. 296.

much tenderness in the recollections of Cherith and Zarephath, and almost more in the last scene of all, when the separation from Elisha was impending, with the young prophets looking on from the ledges of Jordan.* Elijah, too, has his weakness,—in the dejection and impatience at Beersheba, and the unbelief which led him to suppose himself alone in his loyalty to Jehovah. But all this only enhances and brings out into relief the magnificence of his rugged nature, and the fearlessness with which his mission was discharged. “He stood alone against Jezebel; vindicated the true religion from the nearest danger of overthrow; and set at defiance by invisible power the whole forces of the Israelite kingdom.”† Elijah’s position is forcibly set forth by Dr. Stanley, both as a Prophet and as a precursor of Prophets, and especially the latter. He says that, like Luther, he was “a Reformer, not a Theologian.”‡ This perhaps is hardly fair either to Luther or Elijah; for each of these men is surely in some degree to be valued “for what he said,” as well as for “what he did.” Still it is true in the case of the Tishbite, that attention is called to him rather for what he “destroyed” than for what he “created.” And certainly “for this, his special mission, his life and appearance especially qualified him.” All his wildness—his isolation—his roughness—the suddenness of his appearances—his swiftness of foot and unexhausted endurance—his rough garb—the long shaggy hair flowing over his back—and his large rough mantle of sheepskin—are here most vividly depicted. Some of the most animated and impressive descriptions are found, as might be expected, in this part of the volume, such as the account of the storm and stillness on Horeb, and of the uproar and wild fanaticism of the idolatrous priests on Carmel. The concluding scene of that critical occasion is set before us with remarkable life and beauty; and the quotation may be given with advantage before we pass on to Elisha. The Prophet was on a declivity lower than the top of the mountain, “in the Oriental attitude of entire abstraction;” the attendant boy was on “the highest ridge of all,” whence there is a wide view westward over the blue Mediterranean. “The sun must have been now gone down. But the cloudless sky would be lit up by the long bright glow which succeeds an Eastern sunset. Seven times the youthful watcher ascended and looked; and seven times ‘there was nothing.’ The sky was still clear; the sea was still calm. At last, out of the far horizon there rose a little cloud, the first that for days and months had passed across the heavens, and it grew in the deepening shades of evening, and quickly the whole sky was overcast, and the forests of Carmel shook in the welcome sound of those mighty winds which in Eastern regions precede a coming tempest. Each from his sepa-

* P. 320.

† P. 290.

‡ P. 291.

rate height the King and the Prophet descended. The cry of the boy from his mountain watch had hardly been uttered when the storm broke upon the plain, and the torrent of Kishon began to swell. The King had not a moment to lose, lest he should be unable to reach Jezreel. He mounted his chariot at the foot of the hill. And Elijah was touched as by a supporting hand: and he snatched up his streaming mantle and twisted it round his loins, and amidst the rushing storm with which the night closed in, he outstripped even the speed of the royal horses, and ran before the chariot—as the Bedouins of his native Gilead would still run—with inexhaustible strength, to the entrance of Jezreel, distant though visible from the scene of his triumph.”*

Two short and very beautiful Lectures follow, of which ELISHA and JEHU are the contrasted heroes: and here again the biographical interest is very great. One sentence in the lecture on Elijah gives the connection well between the former period and this. The Tishbite thought in Horeb “that his work was over:” but it was “only begun.” He was still “to anoint Gentile and Hebrew, King and Prophet.” “In the three next names, Hazael, Jehu, Elisha, is contained the history of the next generation of Israel.”† The name of Hazael belongs to the subject of Syria, to which we shall come immediately. As to the other two names,—the abrupt call of Nimshi’s son—his deep reserve and tenacity of purpose—the terrible rapidity of his movements—his mad driving up to Jezreel—the death of the two kings—the brief grim allusion, in the words addressed to Bidkar, to the time when they two sat together behind Ahab’s chariot—the curious episode of Jehonadab—the unsparing slaughter of the members of the last royal family—the utter destruction of Baal’s images and Baal’s priests—the establishment of his own dynasty on the throne—are all given in the most lively narrative. The name of Elisha demands a longer pause; and we cannot do better than give, in Dean Stanley’s own words, the general impression of Elijah’s successor. “The succession was close and immediate, but it was a succession of contrast. . . . Elisha was not secluded in mountain fastnesses, but dwelt in his own house in the royal city; or lingered amidst the sons of the Prophets, within the precincts of ancient colleges; . . . or was sought out by admiring disciples in some town on Carmel, or by the pass of Dothan; or was received in some quiet balcony, overlooking the plain of Esdraelon, where bed and table and seat had been prepared for him by pious hands. His life was not spent, like his predecessor’s, in unavailing struggle, but in widespread successes. . . . His deeds were not of wild terror, but of gracious, soothing, homely beneficence, bound up with the ordinary tenour of human life. When

* Pp. 305-6.

† P. 309.

he smites with blindness, it is that he may remove it again; when he predicts, it is the prediction of plenty, not of famine. . . . At his house by Jericho the bitter spring is sweetened; for the widow of one of the prophets the oil is increased; even the workmen at the prophets' huts are not to lose the axehead which has fallen through the thickets of Jordan into the eddying stream; the young prophets, at their common meal, are saved from the deadly herbs which had been poured from the blanket of one of them into the caldron, and enjoy the multiplied provision of corn." And the lesson is strikingly drawn from this contrast of the two great Israelitish Prophets,—a lesson all the more valuable, because it is applicable to all men in common times. "Elisha was greater yet less, less yet greater, than Elijah. He is less. . . . We cannot dispense with the mighty past even when we have shot far beyond it. . . . Those who follow cannot be as those who went before. A prophet like Elijah comes once and does not return. Elisha, both to his countrymen and to us, is but the successor, the faint reflection of his predecessor. . . . Less, yet greater. For the work of the great ones of this earth is carried on by far inferior instruments but on a far wider scale, and it may be in a far higher spirit. The life of an Elijah is never spent in vain. Even his death has not taken him from us. He struggles, single-handed as it would seem, and without effect; and in the very crisis of the nation's history is suddenly and mysteriously removed. But his work continues; his mantle falls; his teaching spreads; his enemies perish. The Prophet preaches and teaches, the martyr dies and passes away; but other men enter into his labours. . . . What was begun in fire and storm, in solitude and awful visions, must be carried on through winning arts, and healing acts, and gentle words of peaceful and social intercourse; not in the desert of Horeb, or on the top of Carmel, but in the crowded thoroughfares of Samaria, in the gardens of Damascus, by the rushing waters of Jordan."

But there is another side to the character and career of Elisha. During his whole life, as well as during that of Elijah, Syria and the Syrian wars form the dark though varied background of the history. Much earlier, indeed, premonitions had occurred of the struggle which the Chosen People would be required to maintain with that kingdom of which Damascus was the capital. During David's reign two of the sons of Zeruiah had conducted campaigns in this direction; the metropolis had been taken; the Israelite empire extended to the Euphrates and the Orontes; and those golden shields were brought to Jerusalem, which were the destined ornaments of Solomon's temple, and the loss of which has been mentioned above. In Solomon's own reign the power of the Jewish crown was easily reasserted and how strong its hold was over this north-eastern territory is sufficiently

shown by what has been said before of Baalbec and Palmyra. But when the Northern and Southern kingdoms were separated, the Syrians grew stronger as the Israelites became weaker through division. These wars belong more to the Northern kingdom than to the Southern: but they touch them both very seriously; and they bring them both before our view together. The alliance of Ahab and Jehoshaphat in the earlier part of this period is reproduced in the alliance of Joram and Ahaziah in the later. Ramoth-gilead is, so to speak, the local link between the two histories, as Athaliah, daughter of Ahab, daughter-in-law of Jehoshaphat, is the personal link. Both these points of connection are set before us by Dr. Stanley with much force and distinctness. For the significant history of that Princess who carried into the veins of Judah the poison introduced by Jezebel into those of Israel, appropriate use is made of Racine's finely conceived "*Athalie*."* To see the significance of "the great frontier fortress,"—"the rallying-point of the Trans-Jordanic tribes,"—it is enough to adduce the questions asked when consultation was held regarding the undertaking of the war—"Know ye that Ramoth-gilead is ours, and we be still, and take it not out of the hand of the King of Syria?" "Shall I go against Ramoth-gilead, or shall I forbear?" or the question raised "when a cloud of dust was seen approaching Jezreel from the East,"—"Is it peace in Ramoth-gilead?"† To follow all the alternations of the war—the possession of "streets" in Samaria by the Syrians—the possession of "streets" in Damascus by the Israelites—the giving up of the sacred treasures of Jerusalem by Joash—the league of Asa with the Syrians against Israel,‡ revenged long afterwards by the league of Israel with the Syrians against Hezekiah,§—to relate all this is impossible. The highest interest of these Syrian wars is concentrated in the biography of Elisha. In the terrible siege of Samaria he becomes the support of his countrymen, "the life and soul of the patriotic party in the invaded kingdom," and the means of baffling the Syrian King. But besides this, we are reminded that he is the Prophet of Syria as well as of Israel, and that in this respect he marks an epoch. "It is from his time that the Prophets of Israel appear as the oracles, as the monitors, not only of Israel, but of the surrounding nations."|| This "larger comprehensiveness" is eagerly seized upon by Dean Stanley, who notes with evident satisfaction that it is this feature of his character which is caught in the only reference to him which the New Testament contains.¶ But this passage concerning Naaman tempts us to a word of adverse criticism. Two things in this part of Elisha's life are noted as instances of victory over exclusiveness, and as indications of "a gentle and catholic spirit," namely the injunction to

* See pp. 335, 394, 402. † 1 Kings xxii. 3, 6, 15; 2 Kings ix. 18. See pp. 343-4.

‡ P. 386.

§ P. 459.

|| P. 345.

¶ Luke iv. 27.

the King not to kill those whom he has not taken as prisoners of war, and the permission which is understood as accorded to the Syrian to perform the customary act of devotion to the false god Rimmon.* Now certainly both these acts may be included under such general terms as "liberality" and "comprehensiveness:" but to be merciful to an enemy and to take part in idolatry are "comprehensive" and "liberal" in two very different senses: and it appears to us very doubtful whether the simple "Go in peace" implies any such definite sanction at all. To conclude, however, with the two scenes which close the career of Elisha in connection with Syria. He is once in Damascus itself; and his interview with Hazael, perplexing as it is, displays human emotion to a degree not usual with the Hebrew Prophets. He speaks indeed "as one constrained by some overruling power:" but "the foreboding of national calamity" causes tears to rush into his eyes.† And the last scene of all is very affecting, when "Elisha was fallen sick of the sickness whereof he died," and the old Prophet laid his hand on the King's hand, and the arrow was shot through the eastward window,—“the arrow of the Lord's deliverance, the arrow of deliverance from Syria.”‡ Speedily and very effectually—and with great results for the appointed time—was this vivid prophecy fulfilled by JEROBOAM II.

But at the period at which we are now arrived another power appeared on the Eastern horizon, more formidable than that of Syria. Nineveh now becomes the dread name at which the hearts both of Israel and of Judah are made to tremble. It was probably the growing might of Assyria which had made the successes against the Syrians possible. In another respect, too, this moment is a marked epoch in the Jewish annals. Now appear the Prophets, whose utterances were committed to writing, and whose writings have come down to us. The earlier cycle of the Minor Prophets, from Jonah and Joel to Nahum and Habakkuk, including likewise Amos, Hosea, Micah, and Zephaniah, covers all the ground of the history from the conquests of Jeroboam II. in Israel to the reforms of Josiah in Judah. The later cycle, including Obadiah, with Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi, does not fall within the chronological range of this volume. There is no more instructive method of grouping into one view the incidents of these 250 years, than to consider them in connection with the warnings and encouragements of this older cycle of prophecy, defined as above. For the elucidation of the five earliest of all these Prophets we have now the great advantage of Dr. Pusey's devout and elaborate commentary; while for the connection of all these Minor Prophets with the History, we have the extraordinary penetration and ingenuity of Ewald. There is, indeed, a shrewd and

* P. 316.

† P. 347.

‡ 2 Kings xiii. 14—19.

very true remark made by Dean Milman, in the Preface to the last edition of his "History of the Jews," to this effect, that it would be satisfactory to see Ewald criticised by an Ewald; but it seems agreed by all Biblical scholars that this acute and able, but far too self-confident writer, has, by putting together scattered notices in the Prophets, which might easily be overlooked, thrown marvellous light on the history of the Jewish monarchy. The period before us is of course divided into two portions, by the destruction of the Northern kingdom, the Assyrian Captivity, and the first establishment of the Samaritans in Palestine. In the earlier of these portions, for about a hundred years, taking our commencement from Uzziah in the Southern kingdom, and the second Jeroboam in the Northern, we have Jonah, Joel, Amos, and Hosea as the great moral teachers of the time. JONAH stands indeed apart, calling our attention to the heathen Nineveh, not to anything which is taking place in Israel or in Judah. We conceive that Dr. Stanley is quite correct in making him the earliest of the Minor Prophets; and whatever be the difficulties connected with Jonah's voyage and mission, the Dean has pointed out convincingly the high and permanent moral lessons of this part of the Scriptural Record. Meanwhile, two Prophets describe, in poetry and parables, the moral corruption of the Northern kingdom, and the need there was of some consolation for the few righteous who remained. AMOS—rich in all the pastoral imagery drawn from the neighbourhood of his native Tekoa,—HOSEA—with lessons coloured and strengthened by his own bitter experience*—give us a terrible picture of the prevalence of drunkenness, extending even to the ladies of Samaria,† and with this shameful vice, its attendant evils of dishonesty, oppression, profanity, and impurity. The vigorous invectives of these religious teachers are true for all times of luxury and self-indulgence. We are reminded that when Savonarola wished to denounce the sins of Florence, he used the Prophets of this period as his text-book. His sermons on Amos are almost like Amos himself come to life again.‡ So too are the encouragements of these Prophets of perpetual force, even in the worst of times. Nowhere in any part of the Old Testament do we see more clearly than in Hosea, "the power of the forgiving love of God."§ Meanwhile the moral condition of the Southern kingdom was not greatly better, notwithstanding the continuance of the line of David, and the possession of the Temple and the legitimate Priesthood. The religious reaction under Joash and Jehoiadah had led to very imperfect results. The observances of worship indeed were strictly kept up, but (as has been too often the case since) side by side with luxury and vice. The "nobles" of Judah appear now as a conspicuous class, accumulating wealth,

* See p. 370.

† Amos iv. 1.

‡ P. 358.

§ P. 370.

oppressing the poor, and leading lives of profligate display. Meanwhile calamities of various kinds were closing round the country. The plague of locusts, which fills the dirge-like poem of JOEL, was doubtless a literal reality; but it was also an image of a worse and more relentless foe, which threatened the throne and the people. Now, too, the Northern tribes having been dispersed and replaced by an alien population, Judah was more than ever at the mercy of Assyria. With MICAH—still sterner than Joel in his denunciations, still more distinct in his prophecy of blessing in the far off distance*—we come to the contemporaries of the great Isaiah. “The reign of HEZEKIAH is the culminating point of interest in the history of the Kings of Judah.”† Still his diligent reformation of Religion, and his deliverance from Sennacherib, did not save the country, but only delayed its destruction. The corrupt and disgraceful reign of Manasseh followed. At this period, Palestine was the debateable ground between the two mighty monarchies‡ of Egypt on one side, and Assyria on the other. The convulsions of the time, too, were made more terrible by that inroad of the Scythians which left its trace not only in the name, Scythopolis, which the old city of Beth-shan received, but also in the writings of the contemporary Prophets. At this time ZEPHANIAH (from whom the opening words of the “*Dies iræ*” have been borrowed) is “the herald of the great catastrophe which, step by step, he sees advancing,” and “looks out, according to the full meaning of his name,—the Watchman of Jehovah,—over the wide and awful prospect, in which nation after nation passes in review before him;”‡ and NAHUM sings, in what have been well called “unrivalled lyrics,” the dirge of Nineveh, which soon finally “vanishes from view, to be no more seen till in our day the discovery of her buried remains has given new life to the whole of this portion of sacred history;”§ while HABAKKUK, in the prospect of all this general overthrow, proclaims the principle of all true religious recovery, in the words—twice quoted in the New Testament—“The just shall live by his faith.” The monarchy of Judah has one more gleam in the reign of JOSIAH, but it is only momentary. Great as was the permanent example of that King for all future reformers, the amendment in his own age did not reach below the surface. His own fate was sudden and disastrous. Venturing to oppose the Egyptians in their northward march, he fell in the plain of Esdraelon, and was brought to Jerusalem to die. His elegy was composed by Jeremiah, who now appears on the scene; and the mourning of that day was never effaced from the memory of the Jews.||

The long Lecture on JEREMIAH, blending as it does the biography of that Prophet with the story of the final catastrophe of Judah and

* See pp. 445-6.

† P. 461.

‡ Pp. 503-4.

§ P. 373.

|| 2 Chron. xxxv. 25; Zech. xii. 11-14.

Jerusalem, is one of the most interesting, most original and instructive. If, in this short sketch and criticism of the book, we have hitherto mentioned only the Minor Prophets, and now conclude simply with Jeremiah, it must not be supposed that Isaiah and Ezekiel find no place in our author's pages. The former has his due pre-eminence assigned to him, both historically and theologically; and the latter comes forward to play his great and solemn part in the very last scene of the great Hebrew drama.* But our space is limited, and is now rapidly narrowing to its end; and Jeremiah deserves our especial attention, from the touching traits of personal character with which he stands out amid the crash of his country's hopes.† The pathos of the man corresponds with the pathos of the history; and the Decline and Fall of the Monarchy, and the personal sorrows and bitter experiences of the Prophet, are together told with much feeling in the Lecture before us.

After the dispersion of the ten tribes, Assyria waned before Chaldea, or rather the empire of Nineveh was merged in that of Babylon. This transition of the history has been well given in Professor Rawlinson's latest volume, with a description of the Babylonians, or (as the Scripture calls them) "the Chaldeans, that bitter and hasty nation,"—their high civilization, their learning and trade; with a description also of the character and policy, and terrible cruelty, of Nebuchadnezzar.‡ And especially we may call attention to his geographical account of that long avenue between the parallel ridges of Lebanon, that "Hollow Syria" (stretching southwards from "the entrance of Hamath") which was the magnificent high-road of the Babylonian armies on their march to Palestine.§ Nebuchadnezzar defeated Pharaoh-necho at Carchemish on the Euphrates, and rapidly became master of the whole country to the Egyptian frontier. Then follow the brief reigns and dwindling power of Jehoiakim and Jehoniah, the Babylonian occupation of Jerusalem, the desecration of the Temple, and the beginnings of the Captivity. "The nation reeled under the blow. It seemed to them as if the signet ring of His promises were torn off from the hand of God Himself. It could hardly be believed that the young Prince, the last of his race, should be cast away like a broken idol, a despised vessel, and that the voice of the young lion should be no more heard on the mountains of Israel, that

* Daniel is just beyond the range of this volume. Thus the important questions connected with that book are only mentioned in general terms. See pp. 542, 589, 590.

† Ewald's "Propheten" (1840-2) has been published many years; but the introductory matter concerning Jeremiah is very copious. Neumann, in his recent Commentary ("Jeremias," 1856-8, p. 16), points out the close personal links which this prophet has with the history of his times.

‡ "The Five Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World," vol. iii., pp. 328, 489, 496, 501.

§ Rawlinson, p. 251.

the topmost and tenderest shoot of the royal cedar-tree should have been plucked off by the Eagle of the East and planted far away in the merchant city of the Euphrates. From the top of Lebanon, from the heights of Bashan, from the ridges of Abarim, the widowed country shrieked aloud, as she saw the train of her captive King and nobles disappearing in the distant East. From the heights of Hermon, from the top of Mizar, it is no improbable conjecture that the departing King poured forth that exquisitely plaintive song in which, from the deep disquietude of his heart, he longs after the presence of God in the Temple, and pleads his cause against the impious nation, the treacherous and unjust man who, in spite of plighted faith, had torn him away from his beloved home. With straining eyes the Jewish people and Prophets still hung on the hope that their lost Prince would be speedily restored to them. The gate through which he left the city was walled up, like that by which the last Moorish king left Granada, and was long known as the Gate of Jeconiah. From his captivity, as from a decisive era, the subsequent years of the history were reckoned.* The foolish resistance of Zedekiah led only to the terrible siege and destruction of Jerusalem, and he himself was carried off an exile, and brought before Nebuchadnezzar at "Riblah in the land of Hamath,"—the above-mentioned meeting-point of all Eastern roads,—where the conqueror "was encamped, awaiting the double result of the sieges of Jerusalem and of Tyre."† It is hardly necessary to mention that last shred of the history which is furnished by the tragedy of Gedaliah. "The Lamentations of Jeremiah" are its natural close.

But besides this cloud of sorrow from without, under which the Prophet lived, he had to suffer from the wretchedness of discord and party spirit within the city itself. The mutual distrust which divided friends from one another; the insolent resistance of the King to Divine warnings; the opposition of false prophets; the party of the nobles who still clung to heathen idolatry; the superstition of the Jewish priests, who thought that the Temple itself would be a charm against danger,—these things must be well considered before we can appreciate the long agony of Jeremiah, his tender sympathy and noble firmness. He is the central figure in all this suffering and disgrace; and a careful study of his prophecies, in conjunction with the history, brings him before us in most distinct individual characteristics. We perceive this all the more clearly if we contrast him with Isaiah, whose personality was, as it were, merged in his prophecy, and with Ezekiel, whose residence on the Chebar dissociates him from Jerusalem, while the peculiar structure and subjects of his writings make us think far more of his visions than of the man. Dean Stanley has naturally compared Jeremiah with St. Paul;‡ and this parallelism

* Pp. 540-1.

† P. 554.

‡ Pp. 513-19.

might with justice have been carried further still. Not only in the "fascination," on the one hand, which he exercised over his friends, and "the tender sympathy which they received from him,"—and on the other hand, in the solitude of great part of his mission, when "he had no man likeminded with him,"—is there a similarity of character and experience between the Prophet and the Apostle; but there is the same commanding inspiration combined with strongly marked individuality—the same intrepid courage combined with shrinking sensitiveness—the same deep love for Jerusalem—the same rapid alternations of style, expressive of sudden interchanges of feeling. We might even pursue the comparison into minor details. Jeremiah, like St. Paul, lived a life of celibacy; he was exposed to imminent danger in the very Temple precincts; he was more than once imprisoned, sometimes "with a certain amount of freedom;" and Baruch, like Onesiphorus, was "not ashamed of his chain." Such details enhance very much the interest with which we contemplate the attitude of Jeremiah in this last crisis of his country's ruin. Such human weakness, if we can call it weakness, gives a higher elevation to his holy testimony and example. Naturally "the most retiring, the most plaintive" of all the Prophets—in the midst of terror from without, and of faction, selfishness, prejudice, heathenism within,—still he is "the solitary fortress, the column of iron, the wall of brass, undismayed, unconfounded—the one grand, immoveable figure, which alone redeems the miserable downfall of his country from triviality and shame; for forty years, day by day, at early morning, standing to deliver his mournful warnings, his searching rebukes, in the royal chamber or in the Temple court:"* and this spirit continued to the end, with the combination also of most practical wisdom and prudence, till the captivity was complete, and he died, himself an exile, probably in Egypt. We cannot wonder that a peculiar feeling of the dignity of Jeremiah and the significance of his career continued afterwards among all generations of the Jews. So great was his traditional fame, that he has been called the Patron Saint of Judæa. We read of his appearing to Judas Maccabæus "with grey hairs, exceeding glorious, of a wonderful and excellent majesty."† "As time rolled on, he became the chief representative of the whole prophetic order,"—and this feeling in regard to him may illustrate, though it does not explain, that reference to him in one of the Gospels, which has puzzled the theologians of every age.‡

Three subjects lie in the background of nearly all this history, and are made the occasion of separate and very important Lectures,—the Psalter, the Temple, and the Priesthood. The first two of these subjects are, for different reasons, in the highest degree attractive: but

* Pp. 521-2.

† P. 562.

‡ Matt. xxvii. 9.

the third assumes peculiar importance in this volume, because it was omitted in the former. It was felt to be very strange that, in an account of the first establishment of Jewish institutions, scant notice should be taken of that sacrificial system which, by express Divine appointment, was one of its most prominent characteristics. Nor even now, when all the Hebrew annals have been unrolled before us, from the call of Abraham to the captivity of Jerusalem, do we think that due prominence is given to the Priesthood and the Sacrifices. There seems throughout to be, not indeed an undue enthusiasm for the Prophets, but an undue repugnance to the Priests: and the record in the Books of Chronicles seems always to be set before us as liable to considerable suspicion from its sacerdotal bias. Yet it was the Priests who saved Joash from the fury of Athaliah, and became the guardians of the Monarchy at a critical time: and, setting aside all questions of inspiration, it does not seem fair, in the case of a people divinely provided with the priestly element, that its annals as presented on the priestly side should fail to have our confidence.* But it is as we approach the bearing of Sacrifice on Christian doctrine and Christian experience, that the question assumes its most serious importance. The whole subject is discussed here with far too little reference to the Epistle to the Hebrews: and when that Epistle is quoted, its language is presented to us too much as if it were mere illustration taken from the Old Testament, as it were, accidentally. But we crave something more than this when we look steadily at the whole Epistle, and think closely of the significant connection of the two dispensations, and when we combine with all this the reference in other parts of the New Testament to "the Lamb which taketh away the sin of the world," to "the Paschal Lamb sacrificed for us," to "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world." Most true it is that the blood of dumb animals "cannot take away sin:"† and most true that David says, in the hour of his deepest repentance, "Thou desirest not sacrifice, else would I give it Thee:"‡ but his allusion in the same Psalm to the ceremonial "hyssop" cannot in fairness be set aside; nor must we forget his looking forward to the offering of the Levitical sacrifices as a happy result, for which God's favour was making preparation. It seems to us that Bishop Horne's old-fashioned comment on the 51st Psalm is far more helpful than Dr. Stanley's, in enabling us to see the harmonious teaching of various parts of Scripture in regard to this great subject of Reconciliation; while we believe that the awakened and enlightened conscience

* Dean Milman's remarks on this subject ("Hist. of the Jews," Third Edit., i. 362) are in a different tone. See also his note on the Book of Chronicles, p. 329.

† On the Efficacy of the Mosaic Sacrifices, see Macdonnell's "Donnellan Lectures on the Atonement," App. to Lect. I.

‡ Psa. li. 16. See p. 112.

is always in deep harmony with that teaching. We must confess to have read with a painful feeling some parts of this volume where this subject is touched; as when, in giving Ezekiel's grand announcement of the doctrine of individual responsibility, the author pauses to remark, that "the doctrine of substitution is not known in any form in the teaching" of that prophet.* Now certainly we lay no special stress on the word "substitution," which is nowhere found in our English Bibles. But we must not expect that every part of religious truth is to be given in any one book of Scripture; still less that a book of the Old Testament will give what is fully revealed only in the New. We are most anxious to be entirely just in our criticism; and elsewhere, we are thankful to say, Dr. Stanley does speak of "that spiritual nearness to God, which, through the life and death of Christ, has been communicated to all who share in His Spirit;"† but it is a duty to be extremely sensitive in regard to a truth which, in the experience of the saints of all ages, has been felt to be the vital essence of Christianity, the strongest motive for self-sacrifice, the encouragement of the best religious efforts, and the stay and support of the soul in great temptations and in the moment of death.

We must be forgiven if we make one other grave remark before we finally close Dr. Stanley's captivating volume. If we regret the absence of more definite lines of doctrine, we feel also that he has gone too far in a mere naturalistic treatment of the Bible. This is carried to such an extent that we almost doubt whether a reader, who had never heard of a Revelation, might not go through very considerable portions of these Lectures without being made conscious of the existence of a Revelation. No doubt Dr. Stanley would say (and, in a certain sense, most truly), that by bringing the Bible *au niveau* with ourselves, we are taking the most effectual method for raising the human to the Divine. But there is also, on the other side, the danger of bringing the Divine down to the human, and with consequences the most disastrous. There is a levelling process carried on in various ways throughout the volume, which seems to us to threaten the destruction of many things too precious to be lost. Prophecy appears to waver in Dr. Stanley's hands very uncertainly between vague presentiment and definite prediction. Josephus and even Mahommedan traditions are presented to us as if they were co-ordinate authorities of almost equal value with the Holy Scriptures. Though the moral tone, as we have said, is always very high, yet a very undue stress is laid, throughout the volume, on "freeness and breadth," as though these could in themselves be characteristic of truth. We are told that Saul was only "half converted,"‡ and yet St. Bernard is blamed for saying he was not saved.§ If such a ques-

* P. 569.

† P. 428.

‡ P. 21.

§ P. 36.

tion is raised at all, it is surely important to bear in mind the tremendous severity of the New Testament, which draws the line inexorably between the sheep and the goats, the tares and the wheat, and shuts a door between the foolish and the wise. In speaking of the wars between the two Israelite kingdoms, and the pulling down of Ramah, that Geba and Mizpeh might be fortified with the fragments, the great French preacher's saying,—“*Bâtissons les forteresses de Juda des débris et des ruines de celles de Samarie,*”—is quoted to illustrate the duty, “not of rejecting the materials or the arguments collected by unbelievers or by heretics, but of employing them to build up the truth.”* But it is to be remembered that Bossuet speaks here of the absolute “ruins” of heresy and unbelief, not of the adoption of their buildings unbroken, or of any obliteration of the frontier line. Again, there seems almost a mischievous humour in the way in which the heretic is brought forward on the conservative side, and the orthodox in defence of what is precarious; as, for instance, when we are told that Dr. Colenso retains too tenaciously the traditional titles of certain Psalms,† and that Calvin suggests that some of the Psalms were written under the Maccabees.‡ Throughout the Lectures, and in various ways, there is too great a disposition to treat serious differences as if they were unimportant. Too often the effect is like that of a beautiful snowstorm, which gently hides the old familiar lines, and mixes perplexity with our admiration.


The Dean of Westminster is the last man in the world to blame that free criticism which the very excellence and popularity of his works render quite inevitable. Some indignation indeed must be caused among his friends when, as has occasionally been the case, such a man is made the object of reckless and vulgar vituperation. Such language, so ill-directed, can only recoil on those who use it, and promote the progress of opinions which are felt to be dangerous. But it can hardly be a matter of surprise if, even among those who have the utmost respect and admiration for his character, some misgiving is mingled with their gratitude for his services to Biblical Science. The antidote, however, against any errors, whether of defect or excess, which exist in these Lectures on the Jewish Church, is near at hand, and is to be found simply in a closer and more careful study of the Scriptures themselves. The great danger is—and no one would deprecate it more than the Dean himself—lest these two charming volumes should be read, even by theological students, not with the Bible, but instead of the Bible.

J. S. HOWSON.

* P. 386.

† P. 587.

‡ P. 150, note.



POLITICO-ECCLESIASTICAL QUESTIONS OF THE DAY IN ITALY.

SUPPRESSION OF MONASTERIES—REARRANGEMENT OF CHURCH PROPERTY
AND OF THE CHURCH ESTABLISHMENT.

DISCUSSIONS on the abolition of the monasteries, and on the rearrangement of Church property, as well as of the Church establishment itself, appear likely to form one of the gravest occupations of the present session of the Italian Parliament. After the repeated attempts made by successive Governments, during the last few years, to arrive at some satisfactory settlement of these vexed questions, it would be hazardous to predict what will be the precise form in which they will be settled, if at all, during the present session. Recent circumstances, however, point with greater probability than before to something being done. The financial embarrassment of the country continues unabated,* whilst the conviction is general that the property of the Church forms the main resource readily available for restoring the equilibrium between the national income and expenditure. This furnishes a powerful stimulus to Parliament to attempt a thorough solution of the question. The word of the Government and of the King himself has also been recently pledged to the country,

* The generous idea of raising a national subscription to relieve this embarrassment was put forth just after these words were written. It is, as yet, too early to judge what will be the result of this patriotic movement, but it has already produced an appreciable effect in staying the recent downward tendency of the Italian funds, and restoring them to somewhat higher quotations in the principal money markets of Europe. It is to Piedmont, the cradle of its national freedom, that Italy is indebted for this as for so many other noble examples of patriotic self-sacrifice.

with more than usual solemnity, that a settlement shall be promptly made.

Last year, not long before the dissolution of the late Parliament, and at the very moment when Veggezzi's mission to Rome was undertaken, in response to the Pope's proposals for filling up the vacant bishoprics, the Government, doubtless anxious to conciliate rather than irritate Rome at such a juncture, withdrew their measure then under discussion, rather than accede to the pressure put upon them by the more advanced party in the Chamber of Deputies, who one day suddenly carried a proposal that those monks who wished to continue to wear the habits of their order, after the dissolution of their monasteries, should not in that case receive their pensions. The withdrawal of the Government measure was interpreted, rightly or wrongly, by the country, from one end to the other, as a marked concession to Rome. So strong was the outcry raised by the press, and in public meetings, that the Government hastened to put out a special circular, addressed to all the prefects of provinces, solemnly pledging themselves that that measure, so long and constantly called for, should be one of the first submitted to the consideration of the new Parliament. And when, in the Royal Speech on the opening of this Parliament, the King said, "The Italian people must disencumber themselves from those relics of the past that prevent the full development of their new (national) life. You will therefore have to deliberate on the segregation of the Church from the State, and the suppression of the religious corporations,"—these words were greeted with prolonged applause, falling short only of the extraordinary burst of enthusiasm with which the whole House (with the exception of the very small band of ultra-clerical deputies) greeted a preceding paragraph, in which His Majesty, in marked accents, announced,—“On the close of the last Legislature, from respect to the head of the Church, and in the desire of giving satisfaction to the religious interests of the majority (of the nation), my Government entertained proposals of negotiations with the Pontifical See, but found it its duty to cut them short when the rights of my Crown and of the nation might have been offended by them.” Those who witnessed the storm of enthusiastic applause which instantaneously broke forth from all quarters of the House on the utterance of these words, and which obliged His Majesty to pause for some time before he could proceed with his speech, felt that Italy had indeed uttered a response which must have echoed strangely in the halls of the Vatican. Accordingly, a project of law was drawn up afresh by the late Minister of Grace and Public Worship (Cortese), in concert with the then Minister of Finance (Sella), and was about to be presented, when the fall of that Ministry caused a delay.

But as, on the reconstruction of the Ministry, under the continued presidency of General Lamarmora, the Cortese-Sella project has been distributed to the members, with additional statistical and historical information, and has just now undergone the usual preliminary examination in the permanent committees of the House of Deputies, it is presumed that the Government still adheres to it in its essential features. If this present attempt fails, it will be an additional illustration of the truth of the Italian proverb,—“Tra detto e fatto va un gran tratto.”*

Meantime, we shall best give our readers a clear idea of the questions under discussion, as well as of the sentiments of Italian statesmen upon them, by drawing freely from the Cortese-Sella project, and its accompanying Report.† For whatever may be the result of the present attempts, this document not only gives the main statistical data upon which these questions must eventually be decided, but also undoubtedly expresses opinions widely current amongst educated Italian laymen, and to some extent amongst the more patriotic of the clergy. The practical points aimed at are—

(1.) The entire suppression of the monastic orders, male and female.

(2.) A large reduction of the existing bishoprics, episcopal seminaries, capitular bodies, and benefices without cure of souls.

* Perhaps we should just explain here, for the benefit of our readers unacquainted with the details of Italian parliamentary procedure, that their mode of dealing with a bill appears nearly to reverse our own order, *i.e.*, instead of the bill being read a first time *pro forma*, and again, after discussion, a second time, and, if so far approved, then going through committee for detailed examination and amendments,—an Italian bill is first submitted to each of the nine permanent committees into which the House of Deputies is divided. They simultaneously examine and privately discuss the measure, and suggest such amendments as occur to them. A commissary is then nominated by each committee, to report its conclusions to his brethren nominated by the other committees. These nine members thus constitute a select committee, who again discuss the various suggestions made by their respective permanent committees, and finally agree on the modified shape in which the bill shall be laid before the House, with a report embodying their proposed changes and the reasons for them. It is upon the bill thus modified that the parliamentary discussion is then taken. In this way a Government measure may come before the House profoundly modified. This was the case twelve months ago, when a project somewhat similar to the present was essentially altered by the select committee of which Baron Ricasoli was the president. That committee, however, was not unanimous, and, on the general discussion, the House rejected what was in truth a new measure, of far bolder and more decisive character than the original project. We will indicate afterwards the main changes proposed by Ricasoli in select committee.

† To Signor Carlo Lievre, Keeper of the Archives, and other officials connected with the Chamber of Deputies, the hearty thanks of English visitors are due for the great courtesy and kindness they show in furnishing information. The writer of this notice carried no introductions, but simply presented himself as an ordinary English traveller in search of information. Signor Lievre, on furnishing him with documents, kindly wrote, “I am happy in being able to oblige a citizen of that noble country, England, for which I nourish profound sympathy of long standing.”

(3.) The gradual sale, within ten years, of the real property of the Church—including that of the secular clergy, as well as of the suppressed religious orders: the proceeds to be invested in the national funds, and applied (1) to payment of pensions to the existing monks and nuns; (2) to expenses of public worship; and (3) to payment of the ecclesiastical stipends recognised by the State. In order to make clear this last expression, it must be understood that the State, according to this project, does not wish to consider the clergy as its direct stipendiaries (*e.g.*, as in France and Belgium); but in the rearrangement of the Church property the State reserves to itself the right of fixing the number of bishoprics, and other ecclesiastical dignities and parochial benefices, whose legal existence and stipends it will recognise. It is proposed that the stipends allotted to these shall be inscribed in the great book of the national debt, in the names and interest of the respective holders of these ecclesiastical benefices; thus securing them a somewhat more independent position (at least in appearance) than that of clergy directly salaried by the State. They will, in short, stand on the footing of all other persons who have invested in the public funds. Also the churches, ecclesiastical residences, and adjoining gardens and seminaries, thus recognised by the State, will not be included in the sale of the rest of the property of the Church, but will remain attached to their respective benefices.

(4.) The State, it is hoped, will be largely benefited by these measures;—(1) From the unlocking of a vast amount of lands now lying comparatively unproductive in the hands of monastic and other religious corporations. These lands, it is expected, will be readily purchased and improved by numerous proprietors. (2) From the surplus accruing after defraying the payments above-mentioned. This surplus will relieve the State of some existing expenditure for Church purposes, and will help to defray the expenses of national education, and public charitable institutions, as hospitals, &c. The poorer parochial clergy will also be benefited by an increase of their stipends,—the *minimum* to be fixed at 800 *francs* per annum,—so that reckoning, as we fairly may, a franc in Italy as equivalent to a shilling in England, for what it will bring the owner, the poorest curates will thus become “passing rich on £40 a year.” When we learn that at present there are in Italy more than 10,000 benefices the annual income of which is under 800 francs, we can better appreciate this feature of the scheme.

The entire project, however, besides and beyond its financial aspects, is intended so to define the respective positions and attributes of Church and State, and their mutual relations, as to remove occasions of conflict between them. Its aim is to give practical application to Cavour’s famous dictum of “Free Church in Free

State," by effecting that *segregation* of the two bodies recently alluded to in the Royal Speech ;—segregation appears intended as a milder term than separation, and to be used to mark the careful restriction of the action of Church and State within the limits of their respective spheres, rather than their absolute and entire separation. That this idea finds favour with the great majority of educated Italian laymen, no one can doubt who watches the utterances of public opinion—specially in the great cities. It is felt to be urgently needful that the State should resume its full independence of action where that has been interfered with by ecclesiastical arrangements, whilst the Church should be left equally free to do its own work in its own sphere.

Civil marriage and national education present the two most notable instances in which this idea has begun to be put into execution at present in Italy. The State now requires all marriages to be celebrated by the civil authorities, whilst leaving all free to solemnize their marriages with whatever additional religious rites they may desire. Moreover, on passing the Civil Marriage Act, Parliament distinctly declined to insert a clause excluding priests and others, bound by religious vows, from civil marriage as citizens, and already several priests have availed themselves of this right. The question, however, is not yet finally settled, as it remains with the law courts to decide the interpretation of this act, taken in connection with the first article of the Constitution, declaring the Roman Catholic religion to be the dominant religion of the State. A case in which the civil functionary in Genoa declined to marry a priest, on the ground of his marriage being incompatible with this article of the constitution, has just been referred to the superior tribunal in Piedmont ; meanwhile, a similar case has been decided by the Naples tribunal in the priest's favour, after serious discussion, and in accordance with the formal opinion of the Crown Procurator, that as the civil code, in vigour since January 1st, 1866, mentions no explicit or implied restriction concerning persons bound by ecclesiastical vows, the priest had certainly the right to marry, and he has been married accordingly. The *Emancipatore Cattolico*, organ of the Liberal Priests Association, Naples, recently reported twenty-five marriages of ecclesiastics. The press generally, with the exception of the ultramontane clerical portion, has spoken decidedly in favour of this civil liberty being secured to the clergy. It appears, therefore, highly probable that such of the clergy as desire to assume their civil rights as married citizens, rather than remain under Rome's enforced yoke of celibacy, will find themselves free to do so in Italy far more readily than in France. There can be little doubt, however, that Rome's dislike and dread of this very great innovation arises far more from the great loss

of clerical influence entailed by the withdrawal of the legal celebration of marriage from the Church, forming, as it did, an important element of priestly influence in families, than from the facility thus afforded to a certain number of the clergy to exchange a life of concubinage, as immoral ecclesiastics, for that of honest matrimony as moral citizens. It would be wrong, however, to suppose that the effect of this new freedom will be confined to such ecclesiastics. There appears every probability that really good and earnest priests, who have become convinced that Rome's *enforced imposition* of celibacy is wholly without warrant, either from Holy Scripture or primitive Catholic teaching and practice, will thankfully avail themselves of this lawful mode of throwing off a yoke they have felt intolerable, and a vow they feel never ought to have been imposed, although they have preserved outward purity of life, despite severe struggles in heart and conscience. Such men will doubtless aid the spread of Reformation ideas which are daily, though often secretly, extending among their order; of course the Church retains full liberty to deal with such ecclesiastics as she thinks fit. On the vitally important question of national education, the State is daily manifesting more and more determination to entrust the general instruction of the people to lay hands, leaving to the clergy the special training of candidates for Holy Orders. Several episcopal seminaries have recently been partially transformed into ordinary public schools, under lay teachers and Government inspection, the highest department alone, that of theology, being left in the bishops' hands. This was done by the recent Minister of Public Instruction, Baron Natoli, who recently instituted a searching inquiry, by Royal Commissioners, into the present condition of the episcopal seminaries throughout the kingdom. His Report furnishes ample and striking proofs of the wretchedly low standard of education prevailing throughout these diocesan colleges, as well as of their anti-national tendencies, in too many instances. This Report deserves to be pondered by all English Churchmen interested in the grave question of clerical training, and desirous of learning the practical results of the system pursued by Rome since the Council of Trent, when, in order to shield her youthful Levites from the shock of that vast impulse given by the Reformation to freedom of thought and discipline, she withdrew theological teaching from the hands of the ancient universities, and isolated it in her episcopal seminaries. So she withdrew, as far as possible, all youths who aspired to serve at her altars from familiar intercourse with their fellows of every other class, and thus from that noble emulation in the fields of literature and science, which we have continued to value so highly as the most effective training in our own "seminaries of sound learning and religious education," in order that we may never want "a supply of persons

duly qualified to serve God both in Church and State." The comparison between the results of the systems thus respectively pursued by Rome and our own National Church, since their divergence three hundred years ago, is, we are profoundly convinced, amongst the most instructive and comforting that an English Churchman at this day can draw.

Italy furnishes a conclusive proof that Rome's system utterly fails to produce a body of clergy capable of exercising the moral and intellectual influence so essential for the attainment of the highest end of their ministry amongst educated men. It throws light also upon the remarkable attempt made, not long ago, by the greatest among the Anglican converts to Rome, to reknit the links between his newly adopted communion and our own ancient university education; whilst Rome's emphatic refusal to sanction Dr. Newman's attempt to carry out Roman Catholic education in connection with the highest and most vigorous intellectual training amongst us in Oxford, and her suppression of the ablest attempt to harmonize her own faith with contemporary criticism and science in the *Home and Foreign Review*, is a striking proof of consciousness of her inability to hold her own in this field.

Baron Natoli's Report affords a forcible warning against our ever entertaining the idea that diocesan colleges can be relied on as effective substitutes for the general training of our clergy, in company with their fellows in every rank, in our public schools and universities. To *supplement* not to *supplant* should clearly be their office. But this subject would carry us quite beyond our present limits. We have digressed on the two points of civil marriage and national education, because, in reality, they are more closely connected with the other ecclesiastical questions about to be discussed in the Italian Parliament than might, at first sight, appear. In the minds of Italians, these questions are all connected by one common idea, as tending to work out the conception of "*libera Chiesa in libero Stato*."

We will now briefly notice the main features of the project under discussion. (1.) For the monastic orders, this project only professes to deal with that portion which, on suppression, will have claims to pensions. Its statistics, therefore, do not include—(1) the monastic orders possessing property already suppressed in the old provinces of Piedmont, in the Marches, in Umbria, and in the Neapolitan provinces, whose pensions have been already arranged—these arrangements it proposes to adhere to. (2) The similar bodies in Lombardy, whose property was placed under peculiar guarantee by the treaty of Zurich, and who, therefore, on their own disposal of their property within a given time, will not have a claim to pensions. (3) A considerable number of educational institutions, not having any corporate

existence in the eye of the State, or not being purely monastic, but lay, and in dependence on the lay authorities. (4) Individuals admitted into convents since January, 1864, public notice having previously been given that no such persons would have a claim for pensions. The deductions leave, according to the ministerial calculations, 38,396 members of monastic orders to be recognised as having a right to pensions; whereas, according to a previous census, the whole body of "regulars" amounts to 73,379 persons. The mode in which these returns were obtained was as follows:—Towards the end of 1864 a printed form was sent to each convent, in which was to be entered the name and surname of each member, his age, the date of his profession, and similar indications; these forms were returned, with the signature of the head of each religious house, who attested the truth of the notices therein contained. The civil authorities were charged to get additional information where omissions occurred; but it appears that the members of the monastic houses were themselves anxious to insure the due return of their names, fearing the loss of their pensions if they were omitted; and numerous instances of omissions, arising from absence or other accidental causes, were speedily corrected, by requests from the missing members to the civil authorities: so that the minister claims that there is every probability that the number obtained is nearly accurate. It must be further explained that nearly two-thirds of the mendicant orders appear in these returns as "already smitten with suppression," *i.e.*, decrees of suppression of their convents have been already passed; but they were allowed, by those decrees, to remain in their convents if they wished, but no new members could be admitted. Should the present project become law, the monks will have to leave—the nuns may remain if they wish, as it is felt that they would oftentimes find it more difficult to return to private life than the monks would. The provision of pensions to the mendicant orders has been one of the main difficulties of the question, as there is no property to meet them, and consequently they will fall a dead weight on the funds. Thus it was first provided that the mendicant orders should not be interfered with, but allowed to die out gradually; but it has been felt better to complete their suppression with the rest, and assign them small pensions.

(2.) For the orders possessing property, it is proposed that the pensions shall range from 600 francs for priests and professed nuns of sixty years of age and upwards, to 360 for those under forty. The lay brethren and sisters, of all ages, to have uniform pensions of 240 francs. The pensions for the mendicant orders are to be, for all priests, 250 francs; for lay brethren over sixty years, 144 francs; for those under that age, 96 francs. In judging of these orders it must be

remembered that they are taken, almost without exception, from the peasant class, and have been largely accustomed to agricultural labour. The priests will be open to appointments as secular clergy, but their pensions, in that case, will be deducted in proportion to any clerical income thus obtained.

Of male monastic orders possessing property now to be suppressed, we find,—

Monasteries.	Members.	Lay Brethren.
625, comprising	5,687, of whom are	1,813

Generally speaking, the lay brethren appear to average nearly a third of the whole number.

These monasteries are divided amongst thirty-two orders. The Carmelites are the most numerous, having 100 houses, and 892 members.

As a departure from their original institution, we note the minor conventuals of St. Francis of Assisi, returned at 666 members, in 84 convents, with an acknowledged rental of over half a million of francs.

The Tertiaries of S. Francesco also figure in 17 convents with 86 members, and a rental of 156,000 francs.

The learned order of Benedictines are represented by 16 convents, with 263 members; they are far the wealthiest body, their rental being returned at a trifle over 1,270,000 francs. The only Benedictines in Italy who now keep up their ancient fame for learning are those of Monte Cassino and the convent of Sta. Trinità-Cava. The monks of Vallombrosa, nearly akin to them, number only 67 members in 4 houses, all confined to Tuscany.

The Dominicans muster 526 members in 72 convents, and the Augustinians only 20 less in 59 convents. It is a curious fact that the largest Dominican convent in Naples, famous as the abode and school of St. Thomas Aquinas, is now the head-quarters of the Liberal Priests' Association, of which the President Cavaliere, Don Luigi Prota (himself a monk of the order), occupies a cell formerly tenanted by a Dominican bishop noted for his vigorous working of the Inquisition. The *Emancipatore Cattolico*, the organ of this association, is also printed in the convent, under the eye of Signor Prota as editor. This convent is one of those "already smitten with suppression," but in which those monks who choose are, as yet, allowed to live on their pensions in common.

The Eremites are reduced to 2 priests and 10 lay brethren in 3 convents, still enjoying a rental of 20,000 francs.

Of teaching orders, the brethren of Christian schools only figure in these returns as 125, in 9 houses, with a modest rental of 12,000 francs.

The Scolopians are 464, in 42 houses. Their schools in Florence are far the largest in the city, numbering some 1,600 scholars of the upper and middle classes; they are conducted with great vigour and success; but it is to be deeply regretted that the fathers seriously lost credit, not long ago, by dishonest manœuvres in furnishing false certificates to some of their scholars, which necessitated public inquiry, and led to the Government being obliged to withdraw their power of giving certificates.

One order only—the Hospitalers of St. John of God, or “*Fate bene fratelli*”—are returned as specially devoted to the care of the sick; they number 129 members, in 27 houses.

The rest of the orders are of smaller account, both in numbers of members and houses.

Of these 32 orders, 10, in 43 houses, are returned as “dedicated to public instruction,” of whom the brethren of Christian schools furnish 5 houses and the Scolopians 26. Of the remainder, the Barnabites, Filippini, Somaschi, and missionary orders (*i.e.*, those who preach “missions” in the country), furnish 2 each and 1 house is contributed by each of the Augustinians, Cistercians, and Teatines.

The total annual rental acknowledged by these 32 orders amounts to over 6,714,000 francs, or, on an average, 1,180 francs for each member, lay brethren included; but as one-fifth is allowed for patrimonial burdens and expenses of administration, this is reduced to an average of under 950 francs, still leaving, as is hoped, a considerable margin after the proposed pensions shall be paid.

Of this whole amount, *not one tenth* is returned as belonging to the houses dedicated to public instruction and the care of the sick. Their joint receipts are given at a trifle over 603,000 francs.

It will be noted that such educational institutions as the seminaries attached to the famous Benedictine monasteries of Monte Cassino and Monte Trinità della Cava, near Naples, and Vallombrosa, do not appear amongst houses “dedicated to public instruction.”

It has been already observed that a large additional number of schools are still in the hands of religious bodies, either already suppressed, but as yet allowed to live in their monasteries, or bodies not possessing corporate existence in the eye of the State. Thus the Minister of Public Instruction recently returned 19 orders, with 185 houses, including those given in this Report. Many of these have been “already smitten with suppression.” The one minister wished to show the whole number of schools of all kinds under management of monastic bodies; the other confined his attention to those who would have to be pensioned. Hence the discrepancy in their returns.

The female orders possessing property far outnumber their brethren, though in fewer convents.

The Report gives—

Convents.		Members.		Lay Sisters.
537,	comprising	12,481,	of whom are	4,217.

Thus the proportion of lay sisters is a trifle over one-third.

They are divided amongst 31 orders.

Of these the Benedictines are far the most numerous, having 153 convents, and 3,463 members, with an acknowledged rental of nearly three millions of francs.

The Sisters of Sta. Chiara number 1,234 members in 49 houses.

“Colleges of Mary” stand next highest on the list—73 houses, with 1,037 members. These, and other modern female sisterhoods, have been introduced from France, and are said to have little relation with the older monastic bodies.

846 Salesians are comprised in 22 convents, and 835 Dominicans in 27; an equal number of Augustinian convents include 685 members.

The Carmelite Sisters do not figure so prominently as their brethren, numbering only 31 convents and 671 members.

Franciscan and “Franciscan Observant” Sisters, like some of their brethren, escape the original vows of poverty, and gather 685 members in 29 convents, with a rental of nearly half a million of francs.

One small house of “Canonesses of the Lateran,” with 11 nuns and 8 lay sisters, flourishes in Sicily on 14,500 francs.

13 Sisters of Mercy (2 of them lay) appear to constitute the sole Italian representatives of their order in this return, in a small house in the province of Genoa, and with a very modest rental of 2,856 francs.

The list is closed by 25 educational “conservatories and institutes,” comprising 765 members, of whom nearly one-third are lay.

Of the female orders, 18 are returned as “dedicated to public instruction,” in 129 houses; of these the “Colleges of Mary” far outnumber the rest, 58 being thus employed, whilst no other order furnishes more than 9. Is it not a token of the general tendency of Rome’s teaching at this day, that 58 “Colleges of Mary” should be thus engaged, whilst only one house of “Daughters of Jesus” is found in this field; also 1 of “Sisters of the Good Shepherd” to 6 of “Sisters of St. Joseph”? 6 each are also furnished by Benedictines and Ursulines; Augustinians, Salesians, and Oblates contribute 9 each; Dominicans 8; the rest, in ones and twos, make up the total of 129 houses.

Here, again, we have to remark that these statistics give but a very incomplete sketch of the actual number of schools in the hands of female monastic bodies; the Minister of Public Instruction having

found no less than 927 schools, under the management of 33 orders and congregations. The explanation given above for the male orders applies equally to the female.

The rentals acknowledged by these female orders amount to 7,008,624 francs, of which only 904,313 (rather more than one-eighth) is returned by the houses dedicated to public instruction. Patrimonial burdens and expenses of administration are returned at rather more than one-fifth of the whole amount; thus leaving an average of rather more than 450 francs for each member—lay sisters included.

It is to be noted that, in these returns, the Government distinguishes the rentals returned by male and female houses devoted to public instruction and care of the sick from the sum total of the acknowledged rentals, as it is intended that these sums shall continue to be devoted to these purposes. Thus a net rental will accrue from the male orders of rather more than four and three quarter millions of francs, and nearly the same from the female; their joint net rental thus will give upwards of nine millions and a half of francs. To this must be added, to complete our sketch, nearly eight millions of net rental arising from the monastic bodies already suppressed, and at present administered by the ecclesiastical chests in Turin and Naples. Thus the total annual rental looked for from this source will be nearly seventeen millions and a half of francs. The total annual amount of pensions to monks and nuns now paid, and to be paid on further suppression, is over seventeen millions; so that only a sum of 350,000 francs will be at first available as surplus; but this will naturally increase yearly as the pensioners diminish.

The Mendicant orders are "already smitten with suppression" to a very large extent, in the qualified sense explained above. Thus we find in this category of male orders,—

Monasteries.	Members.	Lay Brethren.
800, comprising	12,336, of whom are	5,210

There remain to be suppressed,—

Monasteries.	Members.	Lay Brethren.
409, containing	6,520, of whom are	2,798

Of these, 188 houses are Capuchins; the rest are Franciscans, Minor Observants, or Minor Reformed orders.

If the present bill passes, all these will have to leave their convents.

Of the female Mendicant orders have been "smitten with suppression," but allowed to live on together,—

Convents.	Members.	Lay Sisters.
24, comprising	520, of whom are	125

These were almost all Capuchins, with one small convent of 5 Stimatine Sisters.

There remain to be suppressed,—

Convents.		Members.		Lay Sisters.
19,	with	852,	of whom are	371

These also are Capuchins: it would appear as though some of the suppressed had taken shelter in these remaining convents.

In order to guard against the revival of the suppressed ecclesiastical corporations, both monastic and others, a clause in the project declares that *gifts, and bequests to them will be null and void*; and the Report points to France as at present furnishing a striking warning that such a precaution is absolutely necessary. Our readers will remember that Lord Russell proposed, but afterwards abandoned, a similar provision when the Pope appointed the present Roman Catholic Episcopate in England. Of ecclesiastical mortmain, the Report declares that—

“It has been most destructive to the welfare of the people: wherever the Church possessed itself of vast real property, there the best source of public wealth became gradually dried up. It suffices to glance only at Sicily, one day the granary of Italy; there the landed property of the Church is greatest (*it actually includes two-thirds of the island*), and there, too, is the desertion and sterility of the fields the greatest.”

The project therefore forbids all ecclesiastical bodies, for the future, to acquire real property, with very limited exceptions, and then only on condition of at once converting it into rental from the national funds.

The grounds alleged by the Report for the necessity of similar conversion of the whole existing Church property are so quaintly expressed that we cannot forbear quoting them:—

“In this poor Italy of ours, overrun again and again by barbarians, tyrannized over during so many ages by a band of lordlings impotent to defend it from the stranger, most powerful to oppress and tear it in pieces,—on every rapid change of masters was renewed the spectacle of donations of a part of the public and private patrimonies, as spoil of conquest, to the Church, in order that she should either absolve the sins of the potentates, or fortify their dominion with the support of her influence amongst the credulous populations. Thus gradually went on an exchange of parts: to civil society was opened an ever widening field in the kingdom of heaven; to the Church were abandoned the goods of this world. But the inadequate worldly forces of the clergy, and the obligations of a life that promised no fruit to individual activity, caused that those vast properties, more than abundant for the collective needs of the moral corporation, remained in great part uncultivated and desert, and the fruit, to the grave detriment of the country, did not correspond to the productive forces of its richest soil, on which entire populations, lean and ragged, dragged themselves to the doors of the convents to beg a miserable bowl of broth.”

That this graphic sketch is no unfaithful description of many parts of Sicily and South Italy even at this day, many of our readers can probably testify.

Next comes the boldest and, in all respects, the most important proposal of the project, viz., a sweeping reduction of the bishoprics. Here, again, we must let the Report tell its own story, as we cannot compress its facts and arguments into shorter or clearer shape, and it fairly expresses opinions widely prevalent:—

“OF THE EPISCOPAL REVENUES.

“From the predominancy of the Church over the State, and from the alliance between despotism and the clergy in Italy, we have inherited not only the many religious corporations for whose suppression the first article of the present project of law provides, but there has also come to us an almost incredible quantity of other institutions, which contributed greatly to extinguish in the country the germ of its intellectual and economical development, thanks to a false education and a most extensive system of mortmain. In our kingdom, over a population of 21,000,000 of inhabitants, we have 235 dioceses, divided into 45 archbishoprics, 184 bishoprics, and 6 abbeys, with jurisdiction and attributes quasi-episcopal. The picture which, in an appendix, we present to you, sets forth all these dioceses, with the population and with the income of each, with the number of parishes, and in many cases also with the number of the priests. From this we see that in Italy there is on the average a diocese for every 90,000 inhabitants. Now in France, over 38,000,000 of inhabitants, there are 16 metropolitan archbishoprics and 72 bishoprics, including that of Algeria; there is, therefore, on the average a diocese for every 450,000 inhabitants. In Spain, in Catholic Spain, with a population of about 15,000,000 of inhabitants, you find 9 archbishops and 45 bishops, with a patriarch for the Indian possessions, and 2 bishops for Ceuta and Teneriffe; you find therefore a diocese for every 300,000 inhabitants. In Portugal, with about 3,500,000 inhabitants, there are 3 archbishops and 14 bishops, besides an archbishop and 3 bishops for the foreign possessions; that is to say, a diocese for every 266,000 inhabitants nearly. In Bavaria, over a population of 3,176,000 Catholics, there are 2 archbishops and 6 bishops,—a diocese for every 397,000 inhabitants. In Belgium, over a population of about 3,500,000 inhabitants, there is only 1 metropolitan and 5 bishops, viz., a diocese for every 590,000 inhabitants. In the Austrian Empire, over a population of about 36,000,000 of inhabitants, there exist 73 dioceses, between archbishops and bishops of the Greek and Latin rites; that is, there exists a diocese for every 490,000 inhabitants. We could easily multiply examples, adding those of other countries in which the Catholic population is mixed with those of dissenting confessions, to show how exorbitant in Italy is the number of episcopal sees in comparison with all the other countries of the world; but it is enough for us to say that in the whole Catholic globe there exist about 680* archbishops and bishops, of which number our kingdom counts 235, more than a third! But how are

* The *Unita Cattolica*, the leading clerical journal, demurs to this number as taking no account of some 200 bishops *in partibus* with other prelates. If, however, the sees in the remaining Papal territory, and in Venice, are taken into account, it will still appear that very nearly a third of the whole Roman Catholic Episcopate is in Italy, and far more than a third of the settled hierarchy.

these episcopal sees of the kingdom distributed? Their circumscription, does it at least arise from a wise and well-considered conception of fitting them to the wants of the population, to the nature of the places, to the difficulties of communication? The above-named picture clearly proves to you how arbitrary, ill-arranged, and even absurd is the actual diocesan circumscription of Italy in respect to the population, to the localities, to the number of parishes and priests, and to the revenues. In fact, you find one diocese, that of Milan, which contains 1,117,000 faithful; you find two, those of Naples and Turin, which number more than 500,000 inhabitants; 13 from 200,000 to 400,000; 48 from 100,000 to 200,000; and then descending gradually, you see 21 from 80,000 to 100,000 inhabitants; 48 from 50,000 to 80,000; 44 from 30,000 to 50,000; 28 from 20,000 to 30,000; 23 from 10,000 to 20,000; and 7 with less than 10,000 inhabitants, as those of Sarsina, of Ogliastro, of Troia, of Urbania, and Sant' Angelo in Vado, of Montevergine (abbey) and of Cotrone, more parishes than real dioceses. And what shall we say of the Bishopric of Ales, a little village in Sardinia, with scarcely 1,000 souls, and with a cathedral chapter of 20 canons and 18 benefited clergy! And greater anomalies will appear if you compare a little the number of the dioceses with respect to the various provinces of the kingdom. In fact, you find Lombardy with 8 dioceses and 3,000,000 of inhabitants; the Romagna with 12 dioceses, peopled by a little more than 1,000,000 of the faithful; the Duchies with 9 dioceses, and more than 1,000,000 inhabitants; the Old Provinces, including the boundaries of Vigerano and of Boffio, with 25 dioceses and little more than 3,500,000 inhabitants; Tuscany, with nearly 1,800,000, and 21 dioceses; Umbria, which does not contain 500,000 inhabitants, has 17 dioceses; Sardinia has 11 dioceses, and about 500,000 inhabitants; the Marches, that hardly count 1,000,000 inhabitants, with 21 dioceses; Sicily contains 2,300,000 inhabitants, and 18 dioceses; and finally, the Neapolitan Provinces, which with little more than 7,000,000 of inhabitants, number 96 dioceses, including the abbeys with episcopal jurisdiction. Therefore it appears that in the greater number of the provinces of the kingdom, the average ratio of the population to the respective dioceses descends much below that already mentioned of a diocese for every 90,000 inhabitants: thus for example, the mean in Umbria is 29,000 souls for a diocese; in the Marches, 47,000; in the Neapolitan Territory, about 65,000: so that any one who wished to take as a model the dioceses of Catholic France, would find more than sixfold in many of our provinces, and in some others even more than fifteen times as many. The same anomalies appear in the number of the parishes included in each diocese: and indeed, in the annexed table, it is shown how 56 dioceses have more than 1,000 parishes; 2 more than 500, namely that of Milan, which contains 769, and that of Como, which has 677; 49 dioceses which reckon more than 50 and less than 100; 72 from 20 to 50, 36 from 10 to 20, and 23 less than 10. The number also of the priests reveals the bad composition of the actual dioceses of the kingdom. The before-mentioned table indicates for many provinces the number of the priests which are contained in them, and shows how in several this number keeps pace with that of the diocese; and it also proves, and it is necessary to confess it, that where the ranks of the clergy were most widely extended, there arts and industry flourished least, and the ignorance of the population was greatest.

"But the revenues of the 235 episcopal sees of the kingdom, are they at least equally distributed? The revenues of these bishoprics amount to more than 8,000,000 francs a year, after deducting taxes and expenses for repairs.

If this revenue was divided in just measure between all the bishoprics, each would have about 34,000 francs a year, a sum more than sufficient to sustain the dignity of the episcopate. But from the picture we have placed before your eyes, you will discern what an enormous difference exists between the riches of one bishopric and of another. In fact, some, as those of Pisa, Ferrara, Ravenna, Palermo, Cefalu, Girgenti, Mazzara, and Catania, have great wealth, having a revenue of more than 100,000 francs per annum; 16 sees are enriched by a revenue of between 50,000 and 100,000 francs annually; 58 from 20,000 to 50,000; 94 from 10,000 to 20,000 francs; 43 from 5,000 to 10,000. You find 14 which have less than 5,000 francs a year; and some, lastly, whose revenues scarcely reach 2,000 francs, as those of Gerace, Pescia, Nusco, and the Abbey of Acquaviva. In France, things are arranged very differently. The episcopate, which rules and guides the spiritual interests of 38,000,000 of souls, costs the State about a million and a half. The archbishops have usually 20,000; the bishops 12,000 francs a year, besides some other allowances for special circumstances; and the Archbishop of Paris alone has 50,000 francs. In Spain, the Archbishop of Toledo has 45,000 francs; the bishops from 20,000 to 28,000; and in all, the Spanish episcopate costs generally 1,247,000, with 16,000,000 of inhabitants. Instead of this, in the Italian Kingdom, with 21,000,000 of inhabitants, the episcopate costs more than 8,000,000 a year!

“But the greatest anomalies and the greatest inconveniences of the actual diocesan divisions of Italy arise from the manner in which they are arranged, and run one into another in the limits of their administration. The confusion that arises from this state of things is indescribable, and the inconvenience of the citizens insufferable. It happens not unfrequently that you see in the same commune a religious practice permitted in one portion forbidden in another, one portion of the inhabitants enjoying themselves fully, whilst the other, under a different ecclesiastical *régime*, are called to severe spiritual exercises. From the way in which communes and the other territorial divisions are cut up between different dioceses, the inhabitants are obliged at times to make long journeys, and cross the boundaries of their own province to betake themselves to their diocesan see.

“These anomalies of the diocesan boundaries, and these enormous differences in importance, extent, and riches, between one diocese and another of the kingdom, sprang from manifold causes. During the many ages that Italy was divided between different Governments, every one had its own special views in allowing or promoting new ecclesiastical divisions. They were multiplied, diminished, united, disunited, just according to the whim for creating new dioceses, unmaking them, or remaking them, in order to serve either the politics or the caprices of the Court of Rome, and sometimes the unjustifiable wills of a sovereign, a cardinal, or a favourite, disposing of the flock for the convenience of the pastors.”

Thus far the Report.

To remedy this state of things, it is proposed to recognise only 69 sees, with territorial limits more in harmony with the limits of the civil provinces.

Thus each province will have a bishop, with his residence in the chief town; a few provinces will have more than one, on account of extent of territory or difficulty of communication; and lastly, a few sees will be retained in homage to ancient and venerable ecclesiastical

traditions, as Spoleto, Nola, and Taranto. The annual income of the five principal archbishops—viz., of Milan, Turin, Florence, Naples, and Palermo—is fixed at 24,000 francs each. Thirteen other archiepiscopal sees will receive 18,000 francs each; these include Genoa, Bologna, Modena, Pisa, Spoleto, Capua, Messina, and others. The 51 episcopal sees will receive 12,000 francs each. Thus, at a cost of under *one* million of francs annually, instead of *eight*, an episcopal see will be provided for every 300,000 souls; so that, as the Report says, Italian Catholics will find themselves nearly in the same condition as the rest of their brethren in Europe; any difference being in favour of Italy having a more numerous episcopate.

It is hoped that the ecclesiastical authorities will feel the necessity and propriety of conforming to those proposed arrangements, as time and reflection shall lead Rome to more conciliatory counsels. But if not, the State, true to its purpose of not intruding into matters purely affecting the spirituality, will content itself with simply ignoring any additional bishops, if such shall hereafter be nominated to any of the existing sees which the State has decided on not recognising after the present holders vacate them. Such prelates will have no legal existence in the eye of the State, and will have no share of the temporal emoluments granted to the recognised sees. But the Report expresses strong confidence in the power of accomplished facts, and in the good sense of the chief pastors, who will not wish to be separated from the flock, though the limits of the fold may be changed, to obviate difficulties from this source. (3.) This extensive reduction of the episcopate will be accompanied by a corresponding reduction of cathedral and collegiate chapters. At present, cathedral chapters, in Italy, are more numerous than episcopal sees, there being no less than 268 cathedral chapters, with about 4,600 canons, and 2,650 chaplains. The excess of chapters over sees arises from the union of some sees, of which both cathedral chapters were retained. It is proposed to leave 15 canons and 10 chaplains for each metropolitan chapter, 12 canons and 6 chaplains for each episcopal chapter. This will effect a reduction of four-fifths of the existing number. The Report fully recognises the importance of the original idea of the chapter, as the council of the bishop, and earnestly desires the restitution of the ancient practice, "*Nihil agat episcopus inconsulto presbyterio.*" It expresses a hope that these chapters "will receive into their bosom, for an honourable repose, those venerable priests who, after having spent the best years of their life in the fatiguing duties of the parochial ministry, will be wise and experienced counsellors of the bishop in the government of the diocese." But whilst such are its aims and hopes, the Report forcibly pleads that the present excessive number of cathedral and collegiate chapters and dignities has too

often tended only to call forth a race of clergy, tempted by the prospect of easy means of subsistence with little or no corresponding work—sinecures, in fact,—and it does not forget to point the moral, by reminding us that “Laura’s immortal bard, in fine, could be a canon.” With the collegiate chapters the Report is prepared to deal with unflinching hand, drawing a wide distinction between them and the cathedral chapters, and declaring that, at this day, no one in good faith could fail to recognise that these collegiate bodies are as parasites, clinging round the normal hierarchical constitution of the Church, serving only to maintain a lazy clergy, educated neither to the virtues of the citizen nor to those of the priest. It adds that, for the most part, the members of these collegiate chapters discharge their light duties by deputy.

It is proposed, therefore, to sweep away these bodies entirely, saving existing interests, with a number of kindred chaplaincies and simple benefices without cure of souls. The net rental of the various chapters is returned at more than 8,000,000 francs, “though often badly administered.” A considerable saving is naturally hoped for from this source.

Another great reduction, following on that of the episcopate, is proposed in the episcopal seminaries. These at present are considerably in excess of the sees,—288 in all, including the higher theological and preparatory schools. Like the bishoprics, these seminaries are very irregularly distributed. Their joint revenues amount to more than 3,500,000 francs, spread amongst seminaries and provinces without either measure or proportion to the just needs of the institutions themselves or of the population. Several contain a numerous body of scholars, where they belong to a large diocese—thus 30 are returned as having more than 100 students; but many are insignificant, not having more than 12: the mean is below 57, including lay as well as clerical students. A considerable number at this moment are closed, either by their own bishops or by Government, on account of contraventions of the laws on public instruction. There is a very large diminution in the number of candidates for the priesthood throughout the country at present. It is proposed that the edifices of the suppressed seminaries, and that portion of their property which was destined to elementary and secondary instruction, shall pass to the provincial administrations, to be employed for the same purpose, viz., public instruction. One theological seminary is to be recognised for each diocese, into which students shall not be admitted before they have completed their eighteenth year, when youths may be expected to have finished their general preparatory studies, and to have made up their minds as to their career. Thus the future clergy will have undergone their preparatory training in common with their fellows of

other classes. Still it is much to be regretted that no attempt is proposed for encouraging the attendance of the clerical students at the ancient universities of the kingdom. (5.) The Report speaks in terms of warm commendation of the parochial clergy, as those to whom the State ought largely to extend protection and favour. It deplores that in Italy so large a proportion of them have hitherto received so small a proportion of the rich inheritance of the Church. The parishes, according to the ecclesiastical returns, number 18,334; but there is a discrepancy of 2,000 between this number and that of the returns accompanying this Report, which makes the parishes amount only to 16,330. This difference is attributed to the mode in which these returns were based on the mortmain tax. The total rentals of the parishes are returned at upwards of 14,500,000 francs, exclusive of 3,500,000 francs for the support of nearly 11,000 endowed vice-parochial cures,—“perpetual curates” we might call these latter,—who take charge of a district in large parishes. To these rentals are to be added the fees, which, in large parishes, specially in cities, often form a very considerable addition, but in the poor country parishes are of trifling amount. Of the parishes, 17 only are returned as having a rental of 10,000 francs and upwards; 113 range from 10,000 to 5,000; upwards of 1,000 range from 5,000 to 2,000; more than 4,500 from 2,000 to 800; whilst no less than 10,603 are returned at less than 800 francs, of which 1,420 are below 300. It is proposed to bring up all to a minimum of 800. The whole number of secular clergy employed in parochial work throughout the kingdom is very large. The returns are given only for 42 out of the 59 provinces of the kingdom, but these show 65,647 priests. This gives an average of 1,563 for a province, at which rate, for the 59 provinces, we shall have upwards of 92,000 parochial clergy. There is immense disparity in the population of the parishes, a large number containing very few souls, whilst others are very extensive. This is the case with some in Sicily, where we remember spending an evening with the hospitable old Parroco of Aci-Reale, between Messina and Catania, and finding him presiding over a parish which reminded us of some of our own Colonial bush parishes, in extent twenty-five miles in length, but with a staff of curates far exceeding the clergy of many of our Colonial dioceses, viz., nearly ninety, of whom, however, not a tenth were competent to preach. Three or four of his staff dropped in for a friendly chat, and showed keen interest in inquiring into the constitution and teaching of the English Church.

(6.) For the administration of the funds devoted to the maintenance of the fabrics of the churches, the project proposes to establish a uniform system of lay boards of administration throughout the parishes. The Parroco will be eligible for election as a member also, but will

not be *ex officio* president. The Government reserves to itself a certain share in the nomination of members, and, under given circumstances, a power of dissolution and re-election of these vestry boards, as we may call them. Similar lay boards will be appointed for watching over the maintenance of the cathedral fabrics. In these the bishop will have an *ex officio* share, "as being the person most interested, in order that the administration of his own church may be an example to the subordinate ones."

This is the only feature in the scheme which marks a tendency to restore the working of the lay element in the Church. It was here that the Select Committee of which Baron Ricasoli was president went much further, and proposed a bold return towards primitive practice. Whilst they agreed in the main with the present project in regard to the suppression of monasteries and reduction of bishoprics, &c., and conversion of the real property of the Church into rental from the public funds, they spoke strongly against placing the clergy in direct stipendiary dependence on the State. This, as we have seen, the present project also professes to avoid, though in appearance more than in reality. But the Ricasoli project proposed to withdraw from the State all share in the administration of the revenues, by giving back to each diocese and parish the quotas of rental to be respectively allotted to them. These were to be administered locally by boards elected, in each parish and diocese, by the votes of all male Catholics, from amongst clergy and laity, over thirty years of age, and possessing certain other qualifications. But further, to the parochial boards was also to be entrusted the nomination of the parish priests, subject to canonical institution by the bishop; and to the diocesan boards was to be intrusted the nomination of the bishops, saving the rights of the Crown and ecclesiastical superiors. Thus the share anciently enjoyed by the faithful in the choice of their pastors, and by clergy and laity in the choice of the chief pastors of the Church, would have been restored after a fashion much akin to that in use in the Reformed Episcopal Church in America. It was this feature which vitally distinguished the project of Ricasoli's Committee from all others yet brought forward. There can be little doubt it would have led to such a restoration of the working of the lay element in the Church as would gradually have resulted in a more thorough return to the primitive constitution of the Church, as opposed to Rome's present despotic *régime*, *e. g.*, by leading on to the restoration of diocesan and provincial synods, and thus to the restoration of the ancient rights of bishops and metropolitans, now wholly lost in their servile dependence on Rome. It would also have powerfully tended to draw the clergy into closer relations with the laity, and thus into harmony with their fellow-citizens under the present *régime*. In all these ways it would

have tended effectively, though indirectly, to promote some eventual reformation of the Church, the need of which is daily more acknowledged. This proposal naturally alarmed Rome more than any hitherto made; it was currently believed at the time that it stimulated the Pope to open direct communications with the King for filling up the vacant sees. But it was ahead of the feeling of Parliament at the time, and a confused idea prevailed that it was an intrusion by the State into the proper domain of the Church; whereas, in truth, it was nothing more than a restoration of ancient rights long enjoyed by the clergy and the faithful, and that only to a partial and imperfect extent. It remains to be seen if this idea will again be entertained by Parliament. The present Report speaks in very high terms of the authors of this "dazzling theory," which it considers of neither immediate nor easy application, though it claims to advance a step nearer towards it. Meanwhile it carefully reserves to the Government the power of exercising watchful superintendence over the general administration of ecclesiastical affairs. One provision regarding "foreign prelates" rings with a sound not unfamiliar to our own ears:—

"No visitation of a foreign ecclesiastical superior can take place in the kingdom, either directly or by delegation, without the previous assent of the Government. . . . No provision of the national ecclesiastical power shall produce civil effects, nor affect temporalities, if not rendered executory by the civil power. . . . National or metropolitan councils, and diocesan synods, cannot be held without the previous assent of the Government."

The struggle against united Italy, carried on through the help of Peter's pence, seems to be aimed at in the provision that—

"Collections and alms for real *or apparent* scope of worship and religion, and religious functions outside the churches, will be forbidden if not previously permitted by Government. Those who contravene this disposition will be punished under the Penal Code."

Appeals against abuse of ecclesiastical power will be, as in France, to the Council of State; but Italy, more logical than France, will not content itself with simply denouncing such abuse, but, in case of need, will follow it up by sequestration of revenues, or removal from his see, of the ecclesiastical offender. Lastly, all special personal privileges of the clergy, and of those who aspire to the priesthood, are abolished; *e. g.*, seminary students, like others, will not be exempt from the military conscription.

Such are the main features of the Cortese-Sella project. Meanwhile, just lately, a new idea has been broached, out of Parliament, by Signor Minghetti, formerly Finance Minister, who also formerly served the Pope in the same capacity. Minghetti's idea has

the merit of simplicity. It is, briefly, to call on the clergy to convert the whole of their real property, within ten years, into any other form of rental they like, thus securing the unlocking of the lands in their hands, only leaving them to transact the sale themselves. Then they are to be called on to hand over to the State, in three or four annual portions, *one-third* of their whole property, and are to be left in undisturbed control of the remaining two-thirds. At the end of the ten years allowed for the sale and conversion of the landed and real property, the monastic orders are to be no longer recognised—all considered suppressed, but without any claims to pensions—the existing members being considered to have had time and means to provide for themselves. The whole ecclesiastical arrangements of the country, bishoprics, chapters, seminaries, parishes, &c., to be left wholly to the control of the Church itself, *i. e.*, in fact to Rome. The State to withdraw entirely from further interference on receipt of one-third of the existing property of the Church as a “discharge in full.” Minghetti’s estimate is, that the real property of the Church reaches seventy-two million of pounds sterling; thus twenty-four would be given to the State,—say six millions yearly for four years. The whole annual rental at present he estimates at ninety million francs,—say £3,600,000 sterling.

There is no doubt that, sorely as the loss of so large a slice would be felt, Rome is less disposed to object to this proposal than any other; and it is believed to find favourable countenance in the counsels of the French Emperor, as smoothing the way for his persistent attempts at reconciling Rome and Italy. But it appears to meet with little favour amongst Italian statesmen and laymen thus far. They dread such a postponement of the question for ten years, and believe the Pope will only be rendered more obstinate by it, and that he will take all he can get out of the scheme, but make no concessions in return. Moreover, it has been conclusively shown by an able Canonist in the *Opinione*, the leading ministerial journal, that the idea of getting the bishops and clergy, and the Pope himself, to sanction such a voluntary sale of Church property, and renunciation of a third of it, is wholly illusory, and contrary to all ecclesiastical obligations, and will be found impracticable. Still some members of the present Government have been thought not unwilling to look favourably on Minghetti’s proposal as a staving off of present embarrassments, and perhaps in deference to French wishes; but it is not expected Parliament will listen to this scheme, which would leave a powerful and compact ecclesiastical militia under the uncontrolled direction of Rome, and a thorn in the side of Italy, so long as the spirit dominant in Rome shall remain adverse, as hitherto, to the unity and independence of the country. We have thus endeavoured to lay

before our readers the present aspects of these important questions; but, as we said at starting, we do not venture to predict with confidence in what shape they may be solved, if at all, during the present session of the Italian Parliament. Since we began to write, the Cortese-Sella project has passed through the preliminary examination of the nine permanent committees, and has reached the second stage, that of the Select Committee, where it is still *sub judice*.

LEWIS M. HOGG.

NOTE ON THE ARTICLE ON CHURCH HYMN-BOOKS IN No. III.—Messrs. Shaw, of Paternoster Row, request us to state that they are now the publishers of Kemble's Hymn-book, and that the present editions contain ample indices of subjects. The cheap edition now issued is even more wonderful than we had stated, containing the 150 Psalms and 624 hymns for *twopence*.

In quoting the last verse of Doddridge's hymn, p. 442, a mistake was made through inadvertence. The first line should run,—

“Christ shall the banquet spread.”

END OF VOLUME I.

INDEX.

- ÆSTHETICS, progress in science of, 280 ; English philosophers have neglected this field of thought, 281 ; M. Cousin's "Eclecticism," what it meant, 282 ; Cousin's doctrines, 283 ; in the highest art life is represented as it is, 287 ; all things are not to be represented, 287.
- Altar lights, did the case of *Westerton v. Liddell* decide their legality ? 13 ; Dr. Lushington decided that candlesticks might remain on Communion-table, but only for *necessary purposes*, 14 ; no proper ground, therefore, for alleging decision in favour of altar lights, 14.
- Art, Christian, not contained within same limits as religious art, 69 ; all true and high art sacred from the first, 69 ; reasons why Christian art assumed conventional form in third and fourth centuries, 72, 76 ; missing link in Christian art supplied, 77.
- Art, Christian, shows first access of terrorism in tenth century, 377 ; Michael Angelo eliminates religious sentiment from art, 378.
- Artists and artistes, the difference between, 279.
- Augustine's belief in sinfulness of error, 380 ; his character, 381.
- BECKET literature, 271 ; contemporaries of Becket, 272 ; Arnulf, Bishop of Lesieux, 272 ; Master David, 273 ; merits of Mr. Hardy's descriptive catalogue, 276.
- Beautiful, a curious fact with relation to the, 293 ; the conditions of pleasure must be the conditions of the beautiful, and why, 295 ; force as a constituent in the beautiful, 293, 296, 297 ; the invisible the source of beauty, hence the starting-point of idealism, 298.
- Blunt's "Directorium Pastorale" reviewed, 568 ; yields to no treatise of its kind in real usefulness, 569.
- Brecks and Woolfrey, decision in case of, "legalizes prayers for dead," 3.
- Brookes's Life of F. W. Robertson, edited with ability, but not faultlessly, 247.
- CAMBRIDGE University, what might be expected of, 517, 518.
- Cambridge's Hymns on Holy Communion reviewed, 510.
- Canada, Church of, step taken by it as to election of bishops, 333, 339.
- Canon of Old Testament, when was it closed ? 101 ; Ewald's opinion, 102 ; his inconsistency, 103 ; what constitutes writing canonical, 104 ; importance of linguistic argument, 105.
- Catechist's Manual, the, reviewed, 357.
- Catacombs, work of, has realism of simplicity, 73.
- Cecil, Richard, sayings of, 605, 606, 607, 608, 611, 612, 613.
- Channing, change represented by, in respect of toleration, 423.
- "Church Government in the Colonies," two grounds on which it can rest, 313 ; peculiarity of first colonial bishopric—Nova Scotia, 314 ; invalidity of grant of coercive jurisdiction brought out in Tasmania case, 315 ; greatest risk Colonial Church could run, being given over to uncontrolled will of priestly rulers, 316 ; peculiarity of see of Rupert's Land, 319 ; a point of serious moment—legal disabilities of bishops, 319 ; inadvisable to leave Colonies unregarded, 323 ; analogy of civil government applicable to Church government, 323 ; an embryo church not capable of self-government, 323 ; case of Mr. Long, 324 ; free action or thought not possible under men like the Bishop of Capetown, 328 ; members of Colonial Church have power to bind themselves together by contract, 330 ; but no right to agree to be governed by rules inconsistent with their position as members of the Church, 331 ; contracts therefore insecure, 331 ; objections to right of appeal, 333 ; the hardship in causes being brought from the Colonies to be tried at home no greater than in civil causes, 334 ; first requisite of a body which has to organize itself, 335.
- Church Service, Mr. Blunt's suggestions for shortening, 571.
- Clergy, minds of, driven back on Divine origin of the Church thirty years ago, 2.
- Close's thoughts on daily choral services reviewed, 508.
- Colenso, Bishop, on missions to the Zulus reviewed, 345.
- Coleridge's, Sir J., opinion on Conscience Clause, 586.

Colonial Church—its peculiar position—by status in colony unconnected with the State, but united with Church at home, subject to law, 338.

Colonies. Church Government in, grounds on which it can rest, 313.

Commentary on New Testament by Trapp reviewed, 178.

Conceiving and believing, distinction between, 36; consequences of this distinction, 37; if Divine Personality exempted from conditions, then different from the only personality (our own) we directly know, and which we only know as conditioned, 37; confessions of earlier divines, 37; a philosophical theology which appeals not to knowledge, but to ignorance, 39; this open acknowledgment distasteful to many minds, 40; Hamilton's philosophy steers a middle course, 41; nothing theologically novel in Hamilton's system, 43.

"Conscience Clause," substance of history of the, 579; how Mr. Lingens hit on expedient of Conscience Clause, 581; National Society protests against it, 582; no school adopting clause admitted into Society, 581; position of clergymen accepting Conscience Clause, 583; advantages of matter being discussed in Parliament, 583; what required of parents under the clause, 585; Archdeacon Allen's phraseology, 585; Sir John Coleridge's opinion and its influence, 586; actual interpretation of clause, 587; how clause would work, 588; Mr. Hubbard's objections, 589; illustrations of position of Dissenting children, 590; error of Archdeacon Denison and his followers, 591; how refusal of clause would work, 593; no evidence of a compact or contract between Committee of Council and National Society, 595; what the *understanding* amounts to, 595; Mr. Hubbard as defender of religious freedom, 597; opponents of Conscience Clause appeal to convictions worthy of all respect, 599; Conscience Clause right in principle, 600; clause should cease to be operative on certain cases, 601; not much evil to be feared from agitation against clause, 603.

Consciousness presents itself as a relation between the person conscious and that of which he is conscious, 32; modes taken for the reduction of these two factors to one—*Materialism*, *Idealism*, and *Indifferentism* in which characteristic differences of mind and matter disappear, 33; Christian philosophy, unlike Greek philosophy, must in its higher phase concern itself with the existence and nature of God, 34; solution of question of unconditioned comparatively easy were man a being of intellect alone, 34.

Convocation, canons of, are legally valid if they have been formally sanctioned by

Sovereign, 11; canons of 1640 in a singular position, and why, 12; lawyers regard them as dead letter, 12.

Convocation, the steps necessary for assemblage of, 251; proceedings of Convocation in June, 1865, the same as that in time of Elizabeth, 252; relation of the Upper and Lower Houses to each other, 253; mode of representation, 254; anomalies, 255; secured large amount of recognition, 256; mode of conducting business only suited to function of standing committee on church matters, 257; Lower House subject to the Upper, 259; case of *Essays and Reviews*, 262; Bishop of Natal's book censured, 263; last two years strengthened position of Convocation, 269.

Cortese-sella, the, project, 644. •

Cousin's Eclecticism, 282; his work not chiefly constructive, 283; he reduces physical and intellectual to moral beauty, 284.

Crete, importance of, 551; its natural advantages, 552; Cretan experience of Ottoman rule, 555; Captain Spratt's book, 556, 557; antiquities of Crete—the labyrinth, 558; Captain Manias, 559; mountain groves of Ida, 562; peculiar conformation of Crete, 562; population, 563; war with Turkey, 564.

DENISON, Archdeacon, error of, 591.

Doxology, the, when it is suitable, 446.

Dutch Church, statistics of, 451; changes brought about by French Revolution, 452; regulations imposed by King William I. accepted by people, but prejudicial, 453; members of Church no voice in call of pastor, 458; Dr. Opzoomer's system, 466; Bilderdijk opposes rationalistic movement, 467; efforts for relief, and representations, 470, 471.

"ECLECTIC Notes," by John H. Pratt, reviewed, 604.

Education, what true, is, 84; schoolmaster should be permanent, 87; common fault to give the masters more boys than can be dealt with, 87; seclusion or partial seclusion of boys recommended, 89; Mr. Thring's separate study theory defective, 91; merits of "the barrack theory," 92; true principle to guide punishment, 93; true individuality, 94.

Education of women, more regard paid to it in past days than usually supposed, 397; Paston letters, what they prove, 398, 399; Victorian reign characterized by great efforts to raise standard of women's moral and intellectual acquirements, 401; influence of emigration, 402; evil effects of parents demanding a smattering of every branch of knowledge, 405; unreasonableness of forcing acquirements where no natural aptitude, 407; the best impulse the sense of duty to God, 408; ladies' colleges, good done

- by them, 409; benefits of local university examinations, 410, 411; result of examinations, 413.
- "Eirenica," books entitled to rank as, 549.
- Eirenicon, subjects suggested by Dr. Pusey's, 534; defects of scheme proposed, 535; how Church of Rome exercises such attraction, 536; advantages of *any* attempt at peace, 537; what necessary to real union, 538; the Eirenicon approaches differences with unmistakable desire for peace, 538, 539; tone of conciliation towards Nonconformists, 539; effect of "Eirenicon" on Articles and confessions generally, 543; Tract XC., the Eirenicon, and the Articles, 545.
- Ely, Bishop of, his charge reviewed, 171.
- Emigration, its effect on education of women, 402.
- England, Church of, her reverence for antiquity and catholicity distinguished her from other Protestant bodies, 2; hence stress laid on minute points of ritual in the argument as to Church and State, and the reference to antiquity, 2; why Church of England, more than other churches, requires assistance of Legislature, 338.
- English ritual seen not to be same as in former ages, 2; authoritative decision needed—hence judgments of ecclesiastical courts, 3; case of *Faulkner v. Litchfield* showed that law courts could not ignore reformation, 4; judgment indicates great weight of enactments and authorities of sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 5; case of *St. Barnabas* unfavourable to extreme ritualism, 7.
- FAULKNER v. Litchfield*, case of, what it showed, 4.
- Fawcett's "Economic Position of the British Labourer" reviewed, 350.
- Foster, Rev. H., sayings of, 611.
- Fry, the Rev. W., remarks by him, 611.
- GARBETT'S "Religion in Common Life" reviewed, 356.
- German theology, Schleiermacher's influence in, 473, 474; division among the opponents of rationalistic movement, 474; Eichhorn, the minister, seeks to find a medium for union, 474; king withholds sanction from "doctrinal ordinance," 475; impediments to united action, 475; Strauss rejects theories of Eichhorn and Paulus, 476.
- Governess, false position of the, in society, 406.
- Government patronage lessened in proportion as clergy are driven back on Divine origin of the Church, 2.
- Greece, good book of travels in, a desideratum—Sir Thomas Wyse's "Excursion" supplies this, 51; conditions of travelling in Greece peculiar, 53; compensations, 54; Monemvasia, 55; now unvisited, but celebrated in Middle Ages as "Malvoisie," 55; Marathonisi, its improvements, 56; Sparta, 58; rugged range of Taygetus, 59; great defect of Greece, want of roads to carry produce, 61; waterfall of Styx, 65; monastic institutions of Greece, 65.
- Guardian Angel's Whispers, the, reviewed, 359.
- HALLÉ, requirements in divinity at University of, 525, 526.
- Hamilton, Sir William, philosophy steers middle course between Pantheism and Positivism, 41; he declares both wrong, 41; nothing theologically novel in Hamilton's system, 43; with him the non-conditioned in philosophy as in religion was matter of belief, not knowledge, 44; this the cardinal point in his philosophy, 46; Hamilton would denominate the school Mr. Mill is of as virtually atheistic, 47; Mr. Mill makes belief in an immaterial principle superfluous, 47; diametrical difference runs through all their views of mental science, 48; Mr. Mill misses Hamilton's meaning, 49; Hamilton avoids sceptical conclusion by distinction between understanding and reason, 187; Hamilton anticipated Mill's objections, 190; his doctrines of Relativity and natural Realism quite compatible with each other, 192; how Hamilton uses the terms "unconditioned" and absolute, 196, 199; Hamilton's distinction between the indefinite and infinite unperceived by Mr. Mill, 200.
- "Hebrew Kings and Prophets," by Dean Stanley—its attractions, 615; Part II. a satisfactory advance on the former, 616; lifelike reality of portrait of Saul, 617; terms objected to, 618; David, 619; best lectures relate to Solomon, 621; Solomon's wisdom denotes practical tact, sagacity, penetration, 622; proof the extent of the Solomonian trade, 623; Proverbs and Ecclesiastes most distinctly associated with Solomon, 624; character of Elijah, 628-9; unwritten prophecy rises to highest point in him, 628; Dr. Stanley gone too far in a mere naturalistic treatment of the Bible, 640.
- Heinfetter's *Literal Translation of the Old Testament* reviewed, 353.
- Hill's *Travels in Egypt and Syria* reviewed, 343.
- Hubbard, Mr., as defender of religious freedom, 597.
- Hullah's lectures on music reviewed, 504.
- Hutton's *Studies in Parliament* reviewed, 513.
- Hymn-books, metrical versions of Psalms in, useless, 435; Kemble's the most complete book, 437; 'S. P. C. K.' worst arranged, 437; no reason why

- hymns should be expressed in plural number, 441; when the doxology is suitable, 445, 446.
- "Hymns Ancient and Modern" first among first of hymn-books, 435.
- Hymn, English, what it should be, 448.
- IDA, mountain group of, 562.
- India, reason of indifference to affairs of, 123; deep interest of the Church in Indian questions, 124; first necessary of missionary to take account of tone of thought and action among Englishmen, 125; effects of recent Biblical criticism on old Indians, 126; the need of Church in India is men able to deal with those disputed questions, 126; evils of low standard of native teachers, 129; the convert should study Greek literature as being least alien to his own, 132; English books not good class-books for Orientals, 133.
- Indian missionaries, defects of training in, 129; the results of this, 129.
- Indian question, a difficult, 134; Mr. Maine's proposal to permit re-marriage of converts, 135; Scriptural objections to proposed marriage bill, 137.
- IRELAND, NOTES FROM — Irish Church, statistics regarding the, 489; advantages which would attend uniting yet further rural parishes, 490; Roman Catholic priesthood not promoters of loyalty to British authority, 491; education in Ireland, 492; Irish theological literature, 493; natural science in Ireland, 494; Irish literature, 495; death of Sir William Hamilton, astronomer royal for Ireland, 498.
- Ireland, example of, in theological training, 523; divinity course of *two complete academic years* exacted, 523; nevertheless Dublin suffers from "Moloch of Cambridge idolatry," 525.
- Italian Parliament, monasteries discussed in, 1866 session of, 642; civil marriage and national education, 647.
- JEFFREYS' "Easy Guide to Doctrine and Prayer" reviewed, 357.
- "Jesus tempted in the Wilderness," by Adolphe Monod, reviewed, 186.
- Jouffroy's influence, 289; his "Cours d'Esthétique," 290; causes of slight popularity in France, 290; value of his lectures, 300.
- LADIES' colleges, good done by them, 409; yet system such as should not be generally recommended, 409.
- Lea's "Catechizings on the Prayer Book" reviewed, 357.
- Lévêque's "Science of the Beautiful" characterized by completeness of design, 301; yet unsatisfactory, 301, 302; his intellectualist tendency, 304.
- Local university examinations, 410, 411, 413.
- Long, the case of Mr., 324, 336.
- MANSEL'S, Mr., argument, 208; Mr. Mill's misrepresentations of it, 209.
- Meyrick's "Preces Privatae Quotidianæ Launceloti Andrewes" reviewed, 510.
- Mill, Mr. J. S., misunderstands Hamilton's theory of relativity, 188; he demands more of philosophy than Hamilton deems it can accomplish, 189; Mill's objections anticipated by Hamilton, 190; Mr. Mill stumbles on the threshold with regard to the "absolute," 193; sources of Mr. Mill's errors, 194, 198; inconsistencies, 205; his mistake as to the infinite, 213; another *ignoratio elench* on Mr. Mill's part, 217; Hamilton would hold the school Mill is of as virtually atheistic, 47.
- Miraculous, belief in the, 375; ceased, owing to insensible modification of human belief as to supernatural, 376.
- Monasteries, abolition of, likely to form occupation of 1866 session of Italian Parliament, 642; the King's promise as to encumbrances of national life, 643; the Cortese-sella project, 644; sale of real property of Church, 645; plan for suppression of monasteries, 648, 649.
- Monastic institutions of Greece very degraded, 65.
- Mozart's letters, translated by Lady Wallace, reviewed, 181.
- Music the supreme art of our day, 309, 310.
- NATAL case, different feelings produced by the famous, 311; it shows what might be expected from unrestrained liberty, 327; dangers of absolute independence, 327.
- Newton, John, sayings of, 608, 609.
- ORNAMENTS in English churches, what they are defined to be in rubric of first Prayer-book of Edward, 15; chronological objection to rubric of Prayer-book met by Judicial Committee's answer, 16; time when royal assent given to Act not material, 17; this rubric does not direct use of lights at altar, 17; if ordinance in force as to altar lights, then holy water, osculatory, and pyx should be used, 20; Archbishop Peckham quoted, 20; old canons even *required* images, 21; altar not described with technical correctness by term "ornament," 20; contradictions in ritualistic agreements as to ornaments, 22; royal injunction of Edward VI. of no importance, and the reason, 23; a rule permitting of definite additions no rule at all, 24; confusion consequent on arbitrarily lighting candles on the altar, 25; vestments and ornaments revived, not because found mediæval, but because reformers thought them worthy, 28; an important distinction — altar and communion-table, 30.
- Oxford University, what might be expected of, 517; proportion of gradu-

- ates who enter the Church diminished, 518; causes of this, 519; no examination required for students in divinity, 522.
- PAINTERS, Christian, why they copied pagan forms, 73; distinction between English Christian artists and those of the Continent, 78.
- Parker, Theodore, his early life, 423; died at Florence in his fiftieth year, 425; his character and doctrines, 425, 428; his "absolute religion" dispenses with revelation, 427; the few great truths held by Christendom he treats with contempt, 429; "God become man" is to him a manifest absurdity, 429; Parker's mind not philosophical, but passionate and rhetorical, 430; was not capable of altering his standpoint, 431; some grains of gold in his scheme, 432.
- Pashley's, Mr., estimates of Cretan population, 563.
- Pastoral work, 568; Archbishop Whately's "Parish Pastor" quoted, 573.
- Persecution, dogmatic basis of, traced by Mr. Lecky to exclusive salvation, 376; Augustine's belief in sinfulness of error, 380; development of the idea of persecution, 382.
- Philosophy, Christian, must concern itself, in its higher phase, with the existence and nature of God, 34.
- Pictures, the early portable, 75.
- Portraitists, English, Reynolds the most brilliant of, 385; portrait painting a necessity in England, 386; gradually declined since days of Reynolds, 386; the advent of Lawrence unfortunate, 387; improvement within last forty years, 387; qualifications of portraitist, 389; tone of modern society, which opposes marked character, adverse to portraiture, 390, 393; influence of photography beneficial, 394.
- Pratt's "Oracles of God" reviewed, 358.
- Puritans, the, what they sought in New England, 416; little freedom of thought allowed among them owing to position of civil magistrate, 417; evidently such system could not be maintained in a rapidly increasing society, 417; decline of religious feeling in first half of eighteenth century, 418; weakness of the congregational system seen, 419.
- "Pusey on Daniel"—learned but bitter in tone, 97; the Pusey party great obstacle to formation of "new era in theology," 99; "Daniel" revives an old struggle, 99; Dr. Pusey successful in accounting for Daniel's Græcisms in opposition to Dr. Williams, 108; only partially right as to Chaldee of Daniel, 110; argument as to difference of Daniel's language from that of his contemporaries, 113; disposition to strain meaning of texts, 117; instances, 118, 119.
- RATIONALISM, aim of Mr. Lecky's work on, 361, 362; the word rationalism used vaguely—two different senses in which used, 366, 367; positivism in relation to rationalism, 367; wherein Mr. Lecky differs from Buckle and the positivists, 371.
- Rationalistic movement a movement of reason, not a blind issue of sentiment, 364; highest impulses of the movement came from the theological sphere, 365, 383; the history of theology, in one sense, the history of rationalism, 370; the chief moral development of the rationalistic movement seen in change as to conception of hell, 379.
- Realist and Idealist—hopes of modern art rest on former, and how, 71; work of catacombs has realism of simplicity, 73.
- "Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum" never ratified, and the Act 25 Hen. VIII., c. 19, revived, and enacted to extend to Elizabeth and her heirs, 11.
- Robertson, Frederick William, his youth, 221; his dissatisfaction with himself, 224; all his early influences derived from Evangelicals, 225; influenced by Tractarian movement, 229; Carlyle and German metaphysics still further detach him from the past, 229; life at Cheltenham no longer possible, 230; his fine qualities, 232; in Brighton, preaches at a white heat, 233; contempt for mere popularity, 236; love for nature, 237; differences of opinion about his teaching, 238; he sometimes caricatured Evangelical doctrine, 240; tolerant not from indifference, but loyalty to truth, 242; a great unity in his teaching, 244; Mr. Brooke's volumes able but not faultless, 247.
- Roman Church, sale of real property of, 645; rights which state reserves to itself as to fixing number of bishoprics, likely to be beneficial, 645; civil marriage and national education, 647; how Rome's system fails in producing clergy fitted to influence the time, 648; Episcopal revenues, 655, 657; distribution of bishoprics, 657, 658; lay board of administration, 660.
- ROME, NOTES FROM—Rome, encouragement to commerce small in, 499; effect of changes in ministry, 500; difficulty of dealing with brigandage, 500; Roman water supply, 500, 501; death of Mr. John Gibson, sculptor, 502, 503.
- Royal injunctions and proclamations, their force and use, 12.
- "SANCTUARY Common Service Book" reviewed, 510.
- Sanderson's "The Creed of the Church" reviewed, 358.
- Schools, less dependence on ability of head master in "great schools" than in grammar schools, 82; mere intellectual training not what is wanted, 84.
- Schools for Indian natives much needed,

138; natives eager for instruction, 138; Punjab Conference, 138; conviction gaining ground that English science, art, and literature are divinely intended to prepare way for conversion, 140.

Scott, Rev. Thomas, sayings of, 610, 612.

"Sesame and Lilies," by John Ruskin, reviewed, 176.

Simons, remark of Mr., 613.

Sparta, its attractions, 58; Mistra abandoned for ancient site, and the consequences, 58.

Spreat's, Captain, book done much to acquaint English with Crete, 556, 557.

Strauss rejects Eichhorn's explanation of miracles, and theory of Paulus, 476; defects of mythical hypothesis, 477; Strauss's influence vast, 477; has impelled many towards Romanism, 478; Baur's inquiries introduced a new phase, 482; Baur's system, 482, 484; results of accepting Strauss's hypothesis, 487.

Styx, waterfall of, 65.

Sunday question, the, its origin and importance, 142, 143; Sabbath obligation must not rest on reasons of general expediency, 145; What is work? 146; Patriarchs' Sabbath, 148; Sabbath of the law, 149; of the prophets, 150; of the scribes, 151; of Christ, 153; of the apostles, 155; the Lord's day, 157; Sabbath of the reformers, 159; what the Puritan element did to maintain purity of English life, 161; strict Sabbath observance beneficial to Scotsmen, 161; the Sunday league, 162; objection to Sunday bands and opening of galleries, 164; duties of individuals, 167.

Symbol, power of a, 74; Good Shepherd earliest Christian symbol, 75.

TAINÉ'S, M., positivist theory of the beautiful, 305; his "reigning personage," 307, 309.

Tasmania, case of bishopric of, 338.

Theological training, absence of efficient, at universities, 519; what is required of candidates for holy orders, 520, 521, 522; Ireland has set better example, 523; consequences of abeyance of regular

theological teachers in England, 527; medicine, law, and divinity, never been on equality with arts, 527, 528; means of supplying defects in plan, 529, 532, 533; best to combine professorial and tutorial instruction, 530.

Thirty-nine Articles, recent blow to authority of, of no consequence, 547.

Thring's, Mr., grammar-school experiment matured but over-sanguine, 81; its success, 83; value of his book, 84.

Time, the true idea of, 35; Universal condition of human consciousness, 45.

Trollope's "History of Commonwealth of Florence" reviewed, 349.

"UNCONDITIONED," the, sanctioned by Plato, 31; contains history of speculation in miniature, 32; solution of question of unconditioned easy were man a being of intellect alone, 34; the unconditioned must be existence *per se*, 195; is the unconditioned a mere abstraction, or has it a real existence? 195, 196; must exist out of relation to everything else, 196.

Union of the churches, what necessary to real, 538.

Unitarianism in New England, abhorrence of Calvinistic doctrines characteristic of, 419; change represented by Channing, 422; in what all Unitarians agree, 423; German criticism influences American thought, 423; a new school, its leading spirit, Theodore Parker, 423.

United States, Episcopal Church of, 340.

Universities, absence of efficient theological training at, 519; aid must come from the bishops, 523.

"WATCHWORDS for the Christian Year" reviewed, 359.

Witchcraft, distinguished men believers in, 363, 373; men ceased to believe in it because seen to be unreasonable, 364; counterpart belief in influence of charms, 373; with decline of it, religious terrorism, 373; Puritanism blameable, 374.

Woodd, Basil, remark by, 612, 613.

"Work and Prospects" reviewed, 169.

